area handbook series 

North Korea 

a country study 




North Korea 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Robert L. Worden 




On the cover: Statues of a worker, a peasant, and a party intellectual in 

front of Chuch'e Tower in P'yongyang 
Courtesy Pulmyol ui t'ap (Tower of Immortality), P'yongyang: Munye 

Ch'ulpansa, 1985, 325 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 2008. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

North Korea: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress; edited by Robert L. Worden. ~ 5th ed. 

p. cm. -- (Area handbook series) (DA Pam ; 550-81) 
"Research completed October 2007." 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

ISBN 978-0-8444-1188-0 

1. Korea (North). I. Worden, Robert L. II. Library of Congress. Federal 
Research Division. 
DS932.N662 2008 
951.93-dc22 

2008028547 



AUTHENTICATED 
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INFORMATION 




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ISBN 978-0-8444-1188-0 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the 
Federal Research Divison of the Library of Congress under the Coun- 
try Studies/Area Handbook Program, formerly sponsored by the 
Department of the Army and revived in FY 2004 with congressionally 
mandated funding under the sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships 
of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social sci- 
entists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the 
observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. 
Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 
their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and 
the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each 
other and toward their social system and political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be 
construed as an expression of an official U.S. government position, pol- 
icy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted stan- 
dards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions 
for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

David L. Osborne 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 
E-mail: frds@loc.gov 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supercedes North Korea: A Country Study, published 
in 1994. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portions of that 
edition in the preparation of the current book. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division of 
the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. Sandra 
W. Meditz made many helpful suggestions during her review of all 
parts of the book and managed the editing, indexing, and production 
of the book. Catherine Schwartzstein edited the manuscript, made 
many very useful suggestions, and helped clarify obscure points. She 
also performed the final prepublication editorial review and compiled 
the index. Sarah Ji- Young Kim provided valuable assistance in check- 
ing facts, reviewing and revising maps and figures, collecting illustra- 
tions, and assisting with the preparation of the Country Profile and 
Bibliography. Margaret L. Park, a Library of Congress intern from 
Rutgers University, prepared the preliminary drafts of the maps for the 
book. Janie L. Gilchrist performed word processing. 

The authors also are grateful to other individuals in the Library of 
Congress who contributed to the book. Foremost was Sonya Sungeui 
Lee, Korea Reference Specialist in the Asian Division, who gave 
important advice and clarified many points. She also helped identify 
illustrations from the Library of Congress collections to use in the 
book. Paul Dukyong Park of the Asian Division assisted in locating 
and providing copies of North Korean publications. Youngsim Leigh 
of the African/Asian Acquisitions and Overseas Operations Division 
provided various sources and contact information for photographs and 
other information on North Korea. Sarah Byun, Elaine Hyojoung 
Kim, and Young-ki Lee of the Regional and Cooperative Cataloging 
Division clarified points on the romanization of Korean-language 
words. Suk- Young Kim, a fellow in the John W. Kluge Center of the 
Library of Congress, on sabbatical from the University of California 
Santa Barbara, read parts of the manuscript and made valuable sugges- 
tions both on the text and on North Korean propaganda posters that 
could be used for illustrations. The extensive research assistance on 
Chapter 4 by Lucia Selvaggi of Boston University must be acknowl- 
edged as well. 

Christopher S. Robinson prepared the book's maps and charts and 
also performed the photocomposition and preparation of the final digi- 
tal manuscript for the printer. Both he and Katarina David of the Fed- 



v 



eral Research Division performed digital conversion of photographs 
and illustrations used in the study. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of individuals and 
public and private organizations that allowed their photographs to be 
used in this study; they have been acknowledged in the illustration 
captions. Additionally, thanks goes to Boon-hee Jung and Chan-ho 
Lee of the Ministry of Unification of South Korea and to Jung-woo 
Lee of the Overseas Pan-Korean Center in Washington, DC, for pro- 
viding recent photographs of North Korea. 



vi 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv 

Table B. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors xix 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction xxix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Bruce Cumings 

THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN NATION 4 

THE THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD 6 

Paekche 6 

Koguryo 7 

Silla 9 

Korea under Silla 11 

UNIFICATION BY KORYO 12 

THE CHOSON DYNASTY 16 

Florescence 16 

Dynastic Decline 21 

KOREA IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 

WORLD ORDER 24 

JAPANESE COLONIALISM, 1910-45 29 

THE RISE OF KOREAN NATIONALISM AND 

COMMUNISM 32 

NATIONAL DIVISION IN THE 1940s 37 

Tensions in the 1940s 37 

U.S. and Soviet Occupations 39 

The Arrival of Kim II Sung 40 

The Establishment of the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea 42 

vii 



THE KOREAN WAR, 1 950-53 43 

THE POSTWAR PERIOD 45 

The Economy 45 

Corporatism and the Chuck 'e Idea 49 

International Relations 54 

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 

CENTURY 57 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 59 

Helen-Louise Hunter 

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 61 

Topography and Drainage 63 

Climate 64 

Environmental Factors 65 

POPULATION 67 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUES 70 

Creating a New Society 70 

The Cult of Kim II Sung 71 

A Class Society 78 

The New Socialist Society 82 

The Work Unit as the Basic Social Unit 82 

A Thought-Controlled Society 85 

The Elite Life in P'yongyang 91 

The Privileged Life Beyond Money 94 

Daily Life 95 

A Society in Crisis 100 

A Militarized Society 102 

Family Life 104 

Children 110 

Leisure Activities 113 

Religion 115 

EDUCATION 120 

Primary Education 122 

Middle School and Beyond 122 

Higher Education 123 

HEALTHCARE 126 

Chapter 3. The Economy 133 

David Kang 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1940s-90s 135 

viii 



The Economy after World War II 135 

North Korea' s Development Strategy 137 

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE SINCE THE 

EARLY 1990s 142 

Comparisons with South Korea 142 

Organization 142 

Natural Resources 145 

Energy and Power Generation 146 

Transportation 147 

Forestry and Fishing 150 

Telecommunications and the Internet 151 

Government Budget 152 

AGRICULTURE, THE FAMINE OF 1995-98, AND 

ECONOMIC CHANGES 153 

Collapse in the 1990s 153 

Causes of the Famine 155 

Effects of the Famine 156 

Post-Famine Situation 156 

Economic Reforms 157 

Reform of the Public Distribution System 159 

Banking and Finance 162 

Legal and Administrative Reforms 1 63 

Special Economic Zones 165 

Top-Down Reform Measures 170 

Assessment of the Economic Reforms 171 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 173 

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS 1 74 

Sunshine Policy and New Economic Development ... 1 74 

Kaesong Industrial Venture 176 

THE ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 178 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 181 

Victor D. Cha and Balbina Y. Hwang 

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE GOVERNMENT, 

PARTY, AND MILITARY 187 

THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY 191 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 1 94 

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 196 

The Legislature 196 

The Executive 199 

ix 



The Judiciary 201 

Local Government 202 

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 203 

The Role of Chuch'e 203 

The Origins of Chuck 'e 204 

Application of Chuch 'e in the North Korean State .... 205 

PARTY LEADERSHIP AND ELITE RECRUITMENT .... 208 

Composition 208 

Party Members 209 

Party Cadres 210 

The Ruling Elite 211 

Leadership Succession 211 

MASS ORGANIZATIONS 214 

THE MEDIA 215 

FOREIGN POLICY 217 

Inter-Korean Affairs 218 

China and the Soviet Union/Russia 223 

Japan 224 

The United States 227 

PROSPECTS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REFORM 230 

Chapter 5. National Security 235 

James M. Minnich 

MILITARY HERITAGE 237 

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES 238 

National Defense Organizations 239 

National Security Policy Formulation 244 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED 

FORCES 245 

General Staff Department 245 

Army 247 

Special Operations Forces 249 

Air Force 252 

Navy 253 

Reserve Forces 254 

Strategic Weapons 257 

Officer Corps Professional Education and Training . . . 262 

Enlisted Conscription and Training 264 

Military Ranks 267 

DOCTRINE, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS 269 



x 



DEFENSE INDUSTRY 270 

INTERNAL SECURITY 272 

Control System 272 

Punishment and the Penal System 273 

Judicial and Prosecutorial Systems 275 

Ministry of People's Security 276 

State Security Department 277 

Guard Command 279 

Border Security Command and Coastal Security 

Bureau 279 

NATIONAL SECURITY PROSPECTS 280 

Bibliography 283 

Glossary 307 

Index 313 

Contributors 329 

Published Country Studies 331 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of North Korea, 2007 xxviii 

2 Korea in the Fifth Century A.D 8 

3 North Korea in Its Asian Setting 36 

4 Topography and Drainage 62 

5 Population by Age and Sex, 2005, and Estimated 

for 2025 68 

6 Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 2005 144 

7 Primary Roads and Expressways, 2005 148 

8 Primary Railroads, Ports, and Airports, 2006 149 

9 Special Economic Zones, 2006 166 

10 Party, State, and Government Power, 2006 190 

1 1 Simplified National Military Command 

Structure, 2006 240 

12 Deployment of Ground and Naval Forces and 

Air Wings, 2006 246 

13 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 2007 266 

14 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 2007 268 



xi 



Preface 



This edition of North Korea: A Country Study replaces the previous 
edition, published in 1994. Like its predecessor, this study attempts to 
review the history and treat in a concise manner the dominant social, 
political, economic, and military aspects of contemporary North 
Korea. Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, for- 
eign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and 
international organizations, and numerous periodicals and Web sites 
on Korean and East Asian affairs. A word of caution is necessary, 
however. Even though more information is forthcoming from and 
about North Korea since it became a member of the United Nations in 
1991, the government of a closed society such as that of North Korea 
controls information for internal and external consumption, limiting 
both the scope of coverage and its dissemination. 

A chronology of major historical events is provided at the front of 
the book (see table A). Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the 
book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable and enduring 
sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each 
chapter. A glossary also is included. 

Spellings of place-names in the book are in most cases those 
approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN); spellings of 
some of the names, however, cannot be verified, as the BGN itself 
notes. Readers of this book are alerted that because the BGN recog- 
nizes the Sea of Japan as the formal name of the body of water to the 
east of the Korean Peninsula, this book also uses that term. However, 
Koreans themselves call this body of water the East Sea; thus, that term 
also is given at each first use. Similarly, the Yellow Sea is identified as 
the West Sea. The generic parts appended to some geographic names 
have been dropped and their English equivalents substituted: for exam- 
ple, Mayang Island, not Mayang-do, Mount Paektu, not Paektu-san, 
and South P'yongan Province, not P'yongan-namdo. In some cases, 
variant names have been introduced: for example, Amnok for the river 
as it is known in North Korea and Yalu as the same river is known in 
China. The name North Korea has been used where appropriate in 
place of the official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The 
McCune-Reischauer system of transliteration has been employed 
except for the names of some prominent national and historical figures. 
Thus, Kim Il-song is rendered as Kim II Sung, and Kim Chong-il is 



xiii 



rendered as Kim Jong II. The names of Korean authors writing in Eng- 
lish are spelled as given in the original publication. 

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion table 
(see table B) is provided to assist readers who are unfamiliar with met- 
ric measurements. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of August 1, 
2007. Certain other parts of the text, however, have been updated: the 
Chronology and Introduction discuss significant events that have 
occurred since the completion of research, and the Country Profile and 
portions of some chapters include updated information as available. 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



2333-ca. 194 B.C. Old Choson kingdom. 

2000 B.C. Pottery culture introduced. 

Fourth century B.C. Walled-town states noted. 

ca. 194-108 B.C. Wiman Choson state; iron culture emerges. 

A.D. 246-668 Three Kingdoms period. 

246-660 Paekche kingdom. 

3 1 2-67 1 Koguryo kingdom. 

356-935 Silla kingdom. 

384 Buddhism adopted as state religion in Paekche. 

ca. 535 Buddhism adopted as state religion in Silla. 

668 Korea unified under Silla, Koguryo pushed to the north. 

698-926 Parhae state rises as successor to Koguryo. 

75 1 Dharani Sutra, oldest example of woodblock printing in the world. 

892-935 Later Paekche kingdom. 

918-1392 Koryo Dynasty. 

1231 Koryo army defeated by invading Mongols. 

1254 Second Mongol invasion. 

1274 and 1281 Korean forces join Mongols in abortive invasions of Japan. 

1392-1910 Choson Dynasty. 

141 8-50 Reign of King Sejong, who introduces hangul (or choson 'gul) alphabet. 

1592 and 1597 Armor-clad "turtle ships" under Yi Sun-sin defeat Japanese invaders. 

1627 and 1636 Manchu invasions of Korea. 

August 1 866 Koreans attack armed American ship, the General Sherman, in Taedong 
River, destroying the ship and killing crew. 

1864-73 Yi Ha-ung introduces institutional reforms. 

1876 Unequal treaty imposed by Japan; China seeks to reassert traditional influ- 



1885 

1894 

1894-95 

1905-10 

1910-45 

April 15, 1912 

1919 

1925 

1931 

1937-^5 

February 16, 1941 
1943 

August 11, 1945 

September 1945 
October 10, 1945 



Chinese general Yuan Shikai blocks Korean reforms and nationalism. 
Tonghak (Eastern Learning) rebellion. 

Using pretext of Sino-Japanese War, Japan moves troops into Korea. 
Japanese protectorate established over Korea. 
Korea becomes a colony of Japan. 
Kim II Sung bom 

Nationwide protests demand independence from Japan. 

Korean Communist Party established in Seoul. 

Japan annexes Manchuria; Chinese and Korean joint resistance forces 
emerge; heavy industrialization in northern Korea follows. 

World War II in East Asia; Koreans involved in both sides of the war. 

Kim Jong II born (but later his official birth date is proclaimed as February 
16, 1942). 

Allied powers (United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union) define 
postwar period of tutelage for Korea. 

United States sets thirty-eighth parallel as dividing line between Soviet 
and U.S. zones. 

Kim II Sung arrives in North Korea. 

North Korean Communist Party established. 



XV 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



February 8, 1946 Interim People's Committee, led by Kim II Sung, becomes first North 
Korean central government. 

August 28-30, 1946 Korean Workers' Party (KWP) founded, First KWP Congress held. 

February 8, 1948 Korean People's Army (KPA) formally established. 

March 27-30, 1 948 Second KWP Congress. 

August 15, 1948 Republic of Korea established in South Korea with its capital at Seoul. 

September 2, 1948 First Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) held. 

September 9, 1948 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) established in North 
Korea with its capital at P'yongyang; constitution adopted. 

December 26, 1948 Soviet forces withdrawn from northern half of Korean Peninsula. 

June 25, 1950 Korean War ("Fatherland Liberation War") breaks out. 

October 25, 1950 Chinese forces enter Korean War. 

February 7, 1953 SPA gives Kim II Sung title of marshal. 

July 27, 1953 Armistice signed by United States (for the United Nations), North Korea, 
Soviet Union, and China (but not South Korea). 

1954-56 Three- Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan. 

December 1955 Kim II Sung proclaims chuch 'e political ideology of autonomy and self- 
reliance. 

April 23-29, 1956 Third KWP Congress. 

August 27, 1957 Second SPA election. 

1957-61 Five- Year Plan. 

October 26, 1958 Withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea completed. 

September 6-1 8, 1 96 1 Fourth KWP Congress. 

1961-67 First Seven- Year Plan. 

October 8, 1 962 Third SPA election. 

1964 Nuclear research facility established at Yongbyon. 

October 5-12, 1966 Kim II Sung elected KWP general secretary. 

November 25, 1967 Fourth SPA election. 

January 23, 1968 North Korean patrol boats capture U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. 

November 2-13, 1970 Fifth KWP Congress held. 

July 4, 1972 High-level talks between North Korea and South Korea end with 
announcement that unification will be sought peacefully. 

December 25, 1972 State constitution revised; Kim II Sung elected president. 

August 25, 1975 North Korea joins Nonaligned Movement. 

October 10-14, 1980 Sixth KWP Congress held. 

February 28, 1982 Seventh SPA election. 

September 8, 1984 SPA adopts joint-venture law. 

December 12, 1985 North Korea signs Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

November 2, 1986 Eighth SPA election. 

March 13, 1987 North Korea becomes party to 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 

January 1989 South Korea's Hyundai founder tours North Korea, announces joint ven- 
ture in tourism. 

April 22, 1 990 Ninth SPA election. 

September 1990 First of series of prime minister-level meetings between North Korean 
and South Korean officials takes place in Seoul. 

September 17, 1991 North Korea becomes member of the United Nations. 

December 1 99 1 Kim Jong II appointed KPA supreme commander. 



XVI 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



December 13, 1991 
January 20, 1992 

January 30, 1992 

April 1992 

January 1993 
March 12, 1993 

April 1993 

June 15, 1994 
July 8, 1994 
October 1994 

1995-98 
July 8, 1997 
October 8, 1997 
July 26, 1998 
September 1998 

June 13-15,2000 
July 2000 

October 9-12, 2000 

October 23, 2000 

October 2002 
December 2002 

August 3, 2003 
August 27-29, 2003 

February 25-28, 2004 

June 23-25, 2004 

February 10, 2005 

July 26-August 7, 2005 
September 13-19, 2005 



Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Coopera- 
tion (Basic Agreement) signed between North Korea and South Korea 
calls for reconciliation and nonaggression and establishes four joint com- 
missions; joint declaration on denuclearization initialed. 

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed; 
both sides agree not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, 
deploy or use nuclear weapons" or to "possess nuclear reprocessing and 
uranium enrichment facilities"; agreement takes effect on February 19, 
1992. 

P'yongyang signs full-scope Safeguards Agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), having pledged to do so in 1985. 

State constitution amended, emphasizes chuch 'e instead of Marxism- 
Leninism. 

North Korea refuses IAEA access to two suspected nuclear waste sites. 

P'yongyang announces intent to withdraw from Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

National Defense Commission chairmanship passes from Kim II Sung to 
Kim Jong II. 

Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter visits P'yongyang. 
Kim II Sung dies unexpectedly. 

Bilateral talks held with United States starting in June lead to Agreed 
Framework freezing North Korea's nuclear facilities. 

Devastating floods followed by famine. 

The end of three years of mourning for Kim II Sung. 

Kim Jong II appointed general secretary of KWP. 

Tenth SPA election. 

State constitution revised, Kim Jong II 's power consolidated as he is 
reconfirmed as chairman of the National Defense Commission, the "high- 
est office of state." 

First inter-Korean summit, emanating from "Sunshine Policy" announced 
by South Korea in 1998, held in P'yongyang. 

North Korea begins participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 

Vice Marshal Cho Myong-nok visits President William J. Clinton in 
Washington, DC. 

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright hosted in P'yongyang for talks 
on North Korea's missile program. 

North Korea admits developing nuclear weapons technology. 

North Korea removes United Nations seals and cameras from Yongbyon 
nuclear facility, moves fresh fuel to reactor. 

Eleventh SPA election. 

Six-Party Talks initiated in Beijing, involving North Korea, South Korea, 
the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. 

In second round of Six-Party Talks, North Korea proposes it be provided 
"compensation" in return for freezing its nuclear weapons program. 

In third round of Six-Party Talks, U.S. proposal to resolve nuclear issue 
discussed. 

P'yongyang announces it has nuclear weapons and is suspending its par- 
ticipation in the Six-Party Talks. 

First session of fourth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing. 

In Joint Statement of Principles, at second session of fourth round of Six- 
Party Talks, all parties unanimously reaffirm goal of denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula in a verifiable manner. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



November 9-11, 2005 At first session of fifth round, North Korea begins boycott of Six-Party 

Talks, citing the "U.S.'s hostile policy" and U.S. law enforcement action 
that led in September to a freeze of North Korean accounts in Macau's 
Banco Delta Asia. 

July 4-5, 2006 North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles over Sea of Japan (East 

Sea). 

October 9, 2006 North Korea announces that six days earlier it conducted an underground 

nuclear weapon test, with the statement that the test will "contribute to 
defending the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area 
around it." 

December 1 8-22, 2006 Second session of fifth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing, with all 
parties reaffirming commitment to Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, 
but left deadlocked over financial dispute with the United States. 

February 8-13, 2007 Third session of fifth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing; joint docu- 

ment on initial steps toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
with a 60-day timetable for North Korea to shut down its main nuclear 
reactor, signed on February 13. 

March 19-22, 2007 First session of sixth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing. 

June 25, 2007 North Korea acknowledges transfer of funds frozen by United States at 

Banco Delta Asia in Macau, confirms it will take next step in implement- 
ing February 13, 2007, agreement. 

July 16, 2007 IAEA confirms Yongbyon nuclear reactor has been shut down. 

July 1 8-20, 2007 First session of sixth round of Six-Party Talks resumes in Beijing; joint 

communique signed on July 20 stating parties' commitment to the Sep- 
tember 19, 2005, joint statement and the February 13, 2007, agreement 
and a tentative date for the next round of negotiations. 

September 27-30, 2007 Second session of sixth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing; imple- 
mentation of February 13, 2007, agreement confirmed. 

October 2-4, 2007 Second North-South summit held in P'yongyang; Kim Jong II and South 

Korean president Roh Moo Hyun issue joint declaration on North-South 
cooperation to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to abide by 
nonagression. 

November 14-16, 2007 North Korean prime minister Kim Yong-il holds talks in Seoul with South 
Korean prime minister Han Duck-soo. 

December 1 1 , 2007 Cross-border freight-train service reestablished for first time since Korean 

War. 

January 4, 2008 North Korea declares it has disclosed all nuclear developments; United 

States disagrees. 

February 26-27, 2008 New York Philharmonic Orchestra performs in P'yongyang. 

March 28, 2008 North Korea test fires missiles over the sea and warns that it might stop 

disabling its nuclear facilities. 

May 16, 2008 United States agrees to restart deliveries of food aid to North Korea. 

June 26, 2008 North Korea submits declaration of its nuclear inventory to China, as chair 

of the Six-Party Talks. 

June 27, 2008 United States announces intent to remove North Korea from list of state 

terrorism sponsors and to lift some trade sanctions. North Korea destroys 
cooling tower at Yongbyon Scientific Research Center. 

June 30, 2008 First renewed U.S. food aid delivery arrives in North Korea. 

August 11, 2008 United States announces decision not to remove North Korea from state- 

sponsored terrorism list until P'yongyang allows independent verification 
of its declared nuclear programs. 

October 1 1 , 2008 United States formally removes North Korea from its list of state terrorism 

sponsors. 



Table B. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



^Vhen you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 




. . V.jy 


inches 


Meters 


3 3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 



and add 32 



xix 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK — Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk). 

Short Form: North Korea (Choson). 

Term for Citizen(s): Korean(s). 

Capital: P'yongyang. 

Date of Independence: August 15, 1945, from Japan; Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea founded September 9, 1948. 



xxi 



Geography 



Size: Total 120,410 square kilometers land area, 130 square kilome- 
ters water area. 

Topography: Approximately 80 percent mountain ranges separated 
by deep, narrow valleys; wide coastal plains on west coast, discontinu- 
ous coastal plains on east coast. The highest peak Mount Paektu, 2,744 
meters above sea level. Only 22.4 percent of land arable. Major rivers 
are Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) in north, Taedong in south. 

Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid summers. 

Society 

Population: 23,479,089 estimated in July 2008. In 2008, birthrate 
14.6 births per 1,000; death rate 7.3 per 1,000; sex ratio 0.95 male to 
each female as of 2008 estimate. Approximately 60 percent of popula- 
tion living in urban areas, about 14 percent in P'yongyang in 2005. In 
2008 estimated population density per square kilometer 194. 

Ethnic Groups: Almost all ethnic Koreans, a few Chinese and Japa- 
nese. 

Language: Korean, some dialects not mutually intelligible; written 
language uses phonetic-based hangul (or choson 'gul) alphabet. 

Religion: Traditionally Buddhist, now about 10,000 practicing; about 
10,000 Protestants, 4,000 Roman Catholics, indeterminate number of 
native Ch'ondogyo (Heavenly Way) adherents. Organized religious 
activity except officially supervised is strongly discouraged. Personal- 
ity cult of Kim II Sung promoted by state as sole appropriate belief. 

Health: Life expectancy estimated in 2008 at 69.4 years for males, 75 
for females. Infant mortality 21.9 per 1,000; one doctor for every 700 
inhabitants and one hospital bed for every 350 inhabitants. Estimated 
famine deaths in 1990s vary from 500,000 to 3 million people. In 1998 
an estimated 60 percent of children suffered malnutrition, 16 percent 
acutely malnourished. 

Education and Literacy: Eleven years free, compulsory, universal 
primary and secondary education. Higher education offered in 300 
colleges and universities. In 2000 primary and secondary education 
included: 27,017 nursery schools, 14,167 kindergartens, 4,886 four- 



xxii 



year primary schools, and 4,772 six-year secondary schools, enrolling 
5.9 million students. Nearly 1.9 million students attended postsecond- 
ary institutions. Literacy rate 99 percent. 

Economy 

Major Features: Traditionally socialized, centrally planned, and pri- 
marily industrialized command economy isolated from rest of world; 
prior to 1991 heavily dependent on Soviet aid. Since 2002 "economic 
improvement measures" practiced to create incentives, increase sala- 
ries, and improve flow of products to cash-paying consumers; 
increased economic cooperation with South Korea. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 2007 estimated at US$40 billion, 
possibly as low as US$10 billion; per capita income based on GDP 
(purchasing parity power) estimated in 2007 was $1,900. GDP by sec- 
tor, based on 2002 estimates, is agriculture 30 percent, industry 34 per- 
cent, and services 36 percent. 

Agriculture: Principal crops include rice, potatoes, corn, cabbages, 
apples, soybeans, pulses, and sweet potatoes; other vegetables, fruits, 
and berries also important. Livestock includes pigs, poultry, rabbits, 
horses, cattle, sheep, and goats. Fishing provides important dietary 
supplement, including freshwater and saltwater fish, shellfish, and 
mollusks; about 63,700 tons produced using aquaculture in 2002. 

Industry and Manufacturing: Machine building, armaments, elec- 
tric power, chemicals, metallurgy, textiles, and food processing. 

Natural Resources: Coal, iron ore, cement, nonferrous metals (cop- 
per, lead, and zinc), precious metals (gold and silver), also magnesite. 

Exports: Estimated US$1.4 billion free on board, 2006. Major com- 
modities: minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including 
armaments), textiles, fishery products. South Korea, China, and Thai- 
land are largest trading partners. 

Imports: Totaled US$2.8 billion cost, insurance, and freight, 2006. 
Major imports: petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, 
textiles, and grain. China, South Korea, Thailand, and Russia are main 
trading partners. 

Exchange Rate: Officially US$1=140.00 won in late October 2008; 
internal black market rate 2,500-3,000 won to US$1. 



xxm 



Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Inland Waterways and Ports: 2,250 kilometers, most used only by 
small boats; Amnok (Yalu), Tuman (Tumen), and Taedong most 
important navigable rivers. Major port facilities — all ice-free — at 
Namp'o and Haeju on west coast and Najin, Ch'ongjin, Hungnam, 
and Wonsan on east coast; merchant fleet 171 ships of gross-registered 
tons or more in 2007. 

Roads: In 2006 total road network estimated at 25,554 kilometers; 
724 kilometers paved, 24,830 kilometers unpaved. Major expressway 
links Wonsan on east coast with P'yongyang inland and Namp'o on 
west coast. 

Railroads: In 2006 total rail network approximately 5,235 kilometers, 
although officially claimed to total 8,500 kilometers, 1.435-meter 
standard gauge roadbeds located primarily along east and west coasts; 
3,500 kilometers electrified. Rolling stock includes about 300 electric 
and numerous diesel locomotives; great majority of freight carried by 
rail. Subway system opened in P'yongyang in 1973. 

Civil Aviation: In 2007 estimated 77 usable airports, 36 with perma- 
nent-surface runways and 41 with unpaved runways. Sunan Interna- 
tional Airport north of P'yongyang offers about 20 flights per week on 
North Korean, Chinese, and Russian carriers; other airports at 
Ch'ongjin, Hamhung, Najin, and Wonsan. State-run airline Air Koryo, 
uses 15 Soviet-made planes, provides domestic service to three air- 
ports and foreign service to eight cities in China, Thailand, Germany, 
and Russia. In 2001 only 5 tons per kilometer freight carried by air. 

Pipelines: 154 kilometers of oil pipelines in 2007. 

Telecommunications: 17 AM, 14 FM, and 14 shortwave govern- 
ment-controlled radio stations in 2006. Nearly all households have 
access to broadcasts from radios (4.7 million in 2001) or public loud- 
speakers. Four main television stations, 55 television sets per 1,000 
population; in 2005 estimate, 980,000 telephones in use; e-mail ser- 
vice introduced in 2001, but public Internet access restricted. 

Print Media: Twelve principal newspapers, 20 major periodicals; 
electronic and print media controlled by state. 



xxiv 



Government and Politics 



Party and Government: Communist state under one-man dynastic 
leadership. Party, state, and military structures consolidated under the 
leadership of Kim Jong II; National Defense Commission, which he 
chairs, nation's "highest administrative authority." Position of presi- 
dent conferred posthumously on Kim II Sung after his death in 1994. 
Premier and cabinet appointed by unicameral Supreme People's 
Assembly (SPA), except minister of the People's Armed Forces, who 
answers directly to Kim Jong II. President of SPA Presidium is titular 
head of state. Constitution adopted in 1948, revised in 1972, 1992, and 
1998. Korean Workers' Party (KWP) ruling party under general secre- 
tary Kim Jong II. Last full party congress was 1980; Central Commit- 
tee last met in 1994. With KWP, Chongu (Friends) Party and Korean 
Social Democratic Party provide nominal multiparty system. 

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces (do), two provincial-level 
municipalities (chikalsi or jikhalsi — P'yongyang and Najin-Sonbong), 
one special city (t'ukpyolsi) — Namp'o. The second level includes ordi- 
nary cities (si or shi), urban districts (kuydk), and counties (gun or kun). 
Third level made up of traditional villages (n, or ni); cities subdivided 
into wards (gu); some cities and wards subdivided into neighborhoods 
(dong), the lowest level of urban government to have its own office and 
staff. 

Judicial System: Three-level judicial system patterned on Soviet 
model. Central Court highest court and accountable to Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly (SPA); also provincial courts at intermediate level and 
"people's courts" at lowest level; special courts try cases involving 
armed forces personnel and crimes related to railroads and rail 
employees. 

Foreign Relations: Once heavily dependent on traditional close allies, 
Soviet Union and China; diplomatic relations expanded significantly 
since early 1990s. North Korea now has diplomatic relations with 150 
nations; maintains full embassies in 27 nations. Nuclear weapons pro- 
liferation and missile sales major issues shaping relations with neigh- 
bors and United States. Three-Party Talks (North Korea, United States, 
and China) in 2003 discussed nuclear weapons and economic aid 
issues; Six-Party Talks (United States, North Korea, South Korea, 
China, Japan, and Russia) held 2003-7. Improved relations with South 
Korea aimed at eventual peaceful reunification of Korean Peninsula. 



xxv 



National Security 



Armed Forces: Korean People's Army — 1,106,000 personnel in 
2005, world's fourth largest after China, United States, and India. 
Army — approximately 950,000 (including at least 87,000 special 
operations troops); navy — 46,000; air force — 110,000. 

Military Budget: According to North Korea, US$1.8 billion, or 15.7 
percent of government budget (2003). External sources believe more 
likely around US$5 billion, or 44.4 percent of government budget. 

Military Units: Army — nine infantry, four mechanized, one tank, and 
one artillery corps; P'yongyang Defense Command; Border Security 
Command; Missile Guidance Bureau; and Light Infantry Training 
Bureau. Navy — two fleets, 19 naval bases. Air force — four air divi- 
sions, three air combat divisions stationed at 1 1 airbases. 

Military Equipment: Main battle tanks, light tanks, armored person- 
nel carriers, towed artillery, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket 
launchers, mortars, surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, antitank 
guided weapons, recoilless launchers, and air defense guns; subma- 
rines, frigates, corvettes, missile craft, large patrol craft, fast torpedo 
craft, patrol force craft, amphibious ships, coastal defense missile bat- 
teries, hovercraft, minesweepers, depot ship, midget ships, and survey 
vessels; bombers, fighters and ground attack fighters, transports, trans- 
port helicopters and armed helicopters, training aircraft, unmanned air 
vehicle, and air-to-air missiles and surface-to-air missiles. 

Auxiliary Forces: Border guards and police under Ministry of Peo- 
ple's Security — 189,000; reservists and paramilitaries — 7.7 million. 



xxvi 



International boundary 

— „ttv-t Demarcation line and 
demilitarized zone 

Province boundary 

® National capital 

O Provincial-level municipality 

® Administrative capital 

NOTE: Najin-Sonbong, Namp'o, 
and P'yongyang are designated 
as special cities treated as 
provinces 

20 40 60 Kilometers 



20 40 60 Miles 



Boundary representation 128 
not necessarily authoritative 



CHINA 



Ch'ongjin^ 

2 




Hyesan 



Kanggye 



^Sinuiju 



Hamhung^ 



West 
'Korea 
'Bay 



- f-MAS 7 

P'yongsong 
Pyd^yang ( \^ 6nsan ' 

V 8 



Nampjoe 



10 



Sariwon 



Haeju 



11 



yeffoiu Sea 
(West Sea) 



12 



'East 
%prea 
'Bay 



Sea of 
japan 
(•East Sea) 



130 
_L_ 



Provinces and Provincial-Level Municipalities 



1 . Nanjin-Sonbong 

2. North Hamgyong 

3. South Hamgyong 

4. Yanggang 



5. Chagang 

6. North P'yongan 

7. South P'yongan 

8. P'yongyang 



9. Namp'o 

10. North Hwanghae 
11: South Hwanghae 
12. Kangwon 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of North Korea, 2007 



xxviii 



Introduction 



AS A NATION, KOREA HAS a long history of cultural and political 
development. Uniquely Korean characteristics have been in place on 
the peninsula for more than 4,000 years. As a divided nation, that his- 
tory is much shorter. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), or North Korea, with its capital in P'yongyang, has formally 
existed as a separate state only since September 9, 1948. The southern 
half of the peninsula is governed by the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea), with its capital in Seoul, which came into being just three 
weeks earlier. Divided Korea is the legacy of Japanese colonialism 
(1910- 45), World War II (1937^15 in Asia, 1939^5 in Europe), the 
Cold War between the United States and its allies and the former 
Soviet Union and its allies (1948-91), the Korean War (1950-53), and 
long-term intransigence between the two Koreas. 

Events that took place within China and the Soviet Union, 
Pyongyang's staunchest supporters, in the late twentieth century had 
significant effects on North Korea. Economic reforms in China in the 
late 1970s and the demise of the Soviet Union and the communist 
Eastern bloc in the early 1990s resulted in market-based costs for 
imports from these partners and lesser amounts of economic aid and 
moral support. These realities, plus improved relations between North 
Korea and Japan, coincided with the gradual improvement of relations 
between P'yongyang and Seoul, leading in 1991 to their joint admis- 
sion to the United Nations and an agreement between the two sides on 
reconciliation and nonaggression. Prospects appeared positive for fur- 
ther rapprochement between North and South and between North 
Korea and the United States until the unexpected death of North 
Korea's paramount leader, Kim II Sung (1912-94). 

The regime's ability to manipulate international economic and food 
aid, following the disasters of floods in 1995 and famine between 
1995 and 1998, and the determination of Kim's successor, his son Kim 
Jong II, to develop nuclear weapons capabilities further inhibited the 
development of normal relations with other nations. The on-again-off- 
again Six-Party Talks — held in Beijing among North Korea, South 
Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States — between 2003 
and 2007 have produced many reassurances and moderate expecta- 
tions but few tangible results. 

The Korean Peninsula is strategically situated in the northeast cor- 
ner of the Asian landmass. The northern half of the peninsula borders 



xxix 



the People's Republic of China and Russia to the north and South 
Korea to the south. The Yellow Sea (or West Sea as preferred by Kore- 
ans) washes the western shore of the peninsula, and the Sea of Japan 
(or East Sea as preferred by Koreans) is off the east coast. The penin- 
sula is a salient pointing at Japan and has, for millennia, been a cross- 
roads of cultural exchange and military invasions between mainland 
and insular Northeast Asia. Long an area of interest to imperial China, 
Korea has been fought over by all of its neighbors and, most recently, 
was the focal point of major conflict during the Korean War. In the 
decades since an armistice was signed in 1953, the peninsula — both 
north and south — has been transformed by internal and external politi- 
cal, military, and economic forces, and the societies of the two halves 
of the peninsula have been continually reshaped. North Korea is nota- 
ble for being largely mountainous — more than 80 percent of the land 
is mountain ranges, divided by deep, steep valleys relieved only on the 
west coast by wide plains and more sporadic plains on the east coast. 
The climate can be harsh, bitterly cold in the winter and hot and humid 
in the summer. 

The origins of Korean civilization, like any ancient culture, emerge 
from legends and myths, some of which are bolstered by archaeology 
and historical analyses. Paleolithic and neolithic societies populated 
the peninsula between 500,000 and 7,000 years ago, respectively. But 
it is the pottery culture that emerged around 2000 B.C. and the devel- 
opment of walled-town states in the fourth century B.C. that historians 
of Korea see as the origins of Korean culture. The northern advance of 
Korean culture and influence was met by a similar advance from 
China and the establishment of a Chinese presence in what today are 
North Korea and northern parts of South Korea. Temporarily blocked 
in the north, Korean — or Choson — culture was concentrated in the 
south. Three kingdoms — Silla, Paekche, and Koguryo — developed 
there during the third century to the seventh century A.D. When 
Koguryo became ascendant for a time, it pushed its control deep into 
what is today northeastern China. Silla eventually became supreme, 
and a centralized government emerged by the fifth century A.D. Bud- 
dhism was introduced from China by the fourth century, a legal code 
was established in the sixth century, and cultural borrowing from Tang 
Dynasty (614-906) China, especially Confucianism, took hold. As 
Silla declined, the new state of Koryo arose and established its own 
dynasty (924-1392) and flourishing culture until its demise in the late 
fourteenth century in the wake of invasions by the Mongols from 
Inner Asia. 

The Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) followed Koryo, and Korea 
enjoyed a long period of cultural development and relative peace. 
Neo-Confucian doctrines introduced from China swept away old prac- 



xxx 



tices, resulting in the emergence of a well-educated secular society, an 
agrarian majority, and scholar-officials imbued with Neo-Confucian 
principles that prescribed the hierarchical position of every member of 
society. A Choson king is credited with inventing the modern Korean 
hangul alphabet (which the North Koreans call choson 'gul). Korean 
printers were using movable metal type two centuries before the Euro- 
peans. Korea's deployment of the world's first armor-clad ships, so- 
called "turtle ships," repulsed devastating invasions from Japan in the 
late sixteenth century, but they were followed in the mid-seventeenth 
century by Manchu invasions from the north that debilitated Choson. 

Revival from foreign invasions engendered increasing isolation 
and, by the nineteenth century, dynastic decline. The arrival of the 
Western powers in East Asia brought new problems and differing 
degrees of success at modernization and reform by Korea and its 
neighbors, China and Japan. Imperialist rivalries among China, Japan, 
and Russia resulted in direct interference in Korea's affairs. Despite 
attempts by reformers to strengthen Korea, Russian and Japanese 
competition over a disintegrating China spilled over into Korea. Fol- 
lowing the Russo-Japanese War (1904—5), Japan solidified its control 
over Korea by making it a protectorate, then a colony and part of the 
Japanese Empire. 

Japanese rule over Korea differed from that imposed by other colo- 
nial powers. Rather than just extract resources and labor from Korea, 
Japan allowed manufacturing to take root (primarily in the north) and 
agriculture to flourish (primarily in the south). Korean economic 
growth sometimes outstripped that in Japan. Nonetheless, the experi- 
ence was humiliating for Koreans, and nationalism and political activ- 
ism emerged. The North Koreans' legacy of guerrilla warfare against 
Japan during World War II would later give legitimacy to the 
P'yongyang regime. The end of World War II brought independence 
from Japan but also division of the peninsula into two parts and even- 
tually a devastating war. 

North Korea's contemporary society is under the regimentation of 
one-party rule and controlled by the world's first communist dynasty, 
that of the Kim family. Despite claims of socialism by the leadership, 
society is as structured today as in premodern times. After 1948 the 
new leadership began to build a rigid class structure that emphasized 
Confucian hierarchical values, the cult of Kim II Sung, and a thought- 
controlled, thoroughly militarized society. Members of the ruling 
Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and the military establishment are pre- 
eminent in society and favored with housing, food, education, and 
creature comforts. For others, life has been impoverished, with limited 
education, a poor health-care system, no open religious institutions or 
spiritual teaching, and few basic human rights. 



xxxi 



The economy of North Korea has gone through tremendous change 
since 1948. Before World War II, the northern half of the Korean Pen- 
insula was an industrial heartland supporting Japan. Rather than ship 
raw materials or semifinished products back to Japan, colonial entre- 
preneurs built mines to exploit the raw materials and factories to pro- 
duce the finished products. As North Korea developed following the 
destruction of the Korean War, it did quite well for a time. Within four 
years, most parts of the economy had returned to 1949 levels of pro- 
duction. All sectors of the economy reportedly experienced high 
growth rates. Central economic development plans were imposed, but 
competition to fulfill plan targets by various parts of the economy 
caused imbalances between light and heavy industries and between 
industry and agriculture. Nevertheless, until 1960 the North's recon- 
structed economy grew faster than that of the South. During the 1960s, 
in sharp contrast to the growth during the previous plans, the economy 
experienced slowdowns and reverses. Despite a desire to modernize, 
the regime's 1955 declaration of national self-reliance (chuck 'e) had 
become a central focus of economic planning. Most trade was with 
China and the Soviet Union, which provided North Korea with needed 
industrial, military, and technological assistance at bargain rates. Then 
the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union collapsed, China had reformed 
its economy and opened it to the world, and North Korea was left in a 
state of shock. South Korea, which had not recovered as quickly from 
the Korean War, had eventually surged past the North and built an 
economy with vast international implications. Gradual rapprochement 
with the South led to joint economic ventures and infusions of invest- 
ment and aid from the South. Flood and famine in the mid-1990s, 
however, caused grievous harm to the economy and between 500,000 
and 3 million deaths. "Adjustments" to the economy were in order, 
and the regime cautiously allowed changes to the public distribution 
system, adopted monetized economic transactions, and changed the 
incentives for labor and companies in 2002. The centrally planned 
economy was shelved, but the economy itself continues in transition 
and is barely functional. 

The North Korean state is tightly controlled by a small group of 
elites led by Kim II Sung from 1948 to 1994 and, since 1994, by his 
son and successor, Kim Jong II. The cult of personality and the nepo- 
tism of the Kim family are special features of North Korean politics. 
Kim II Sung's wife, daughter, son-in-law, a cousin by marriage, a 
brother-in-law, and his son all held high-level positions in the regime 
during the elder Kim's lifetime. Kim Jong II was groomed as a succes- 
sor well in advance of his father's unexpected death in 1994. After 
three years of official mourning, the younger Kim assumed control of 
the state, party, and military. And he set out to groom one of his own 



xxxii 



sons to succeed him. The cult status built around the father has been 
retained and enhanced by the son. Whether it will pass on to a third 
generation is yet to be seen. 

As the ubiquitous Kim cult is a beacon for society, the concept of 
chuch 'e is a guiding principle for politics. Marxism-Leninism, once a 
hallowed principle in North Korea, was not included when the state 
constitution was amended in 1992. By 1998, when the constitution 
was revised again, the concept of private ownership was added, and 
technocrats and local light-industry managers were granted some 
autonomy from central party control. Nevertheless, chuch 'e, in the 
words of this book's authors, is "inextricably intertwined" with the 
cult of Kim, and the regime could be imperiled by further economic 
disasters. 

In the North Korean regime, the party, the state, and the military 
also are inextricably intertwined, with the top leadership positions of 
all three held by Kim Jong II. However, the "military-first" (songuri) 
policy, which was formalized in 1995, has meant a slippage in the con- 
trol the party bureaucracy has over the state. To control the state, polit- 
ical and moral suasion are insufficient for Kim; instead, he exercises 
tight military control to fill this apparent gap. Constitutionally, the 
highest military organ of state authority is the National Defense Com- 
mission, and Kim Jong II is its chairman. The presidency is held post- 
humously by Kim II Sung, and the titular head of state is the chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea's 
nominal legislature. The National Defense Commission is accountable 
on paper to the Supreme People's Assembly. But with Kim as chair- 
man of the commission, as well as supreme commander of the Korean 
People's Army, chairman of the KWP's Central Military Commission, 
and general secretary of the KWP, there is no room for doubt about 
who is in charge and which organ of state is predominant. The KWP 
has not held a national party congress since 1980, and the KWP Cen- 
tral Committee, which is supposed to hold plenary sessions every six 
months, has not met since 1994. Nevertheless, the KWP continues to 
play a critical role in supervising its own members and controlling 
mass organizations, such as those for children, youth, women, work- 
ers, loyal opposition parties, and even Koreans living overseas, regi- 
menting civilian society in general. 

Society also is controlled by the civilian bureaucracy. Through offi- 
cials from the central government down to the ward level and through 
control exercised over the media and all forms of communication, the 
government plays an important part in the day-to-day regimentation of 
society. Mirroring the Supreme People's Assembly are provincial and 
local people's assemblies, which provide an appearance of popular 



xxxiii 



support and involvement, at least by local elites, in the governance of 
the country. 

Kim Jong II also controls the all-powerful military establishment. 
North Korea has, after China, the United States, and India, the fourth 
largest combat force in the world. There are more than 1 .2 million per- 
sonnel on active duty and an additional 7.7 million personnel in para- 
military and reserve forces. With a forward deployment of its forces 
near the demilitarized zone (DMZ — see Glossary) that divides North 
and South, North Korea helps keep the Cold War legacy alive. This 
deployment is bolstered by the world's largest artillery force — some 
13,500 artillery pieces and rocket launchers. Members of the armed 
forces are among the best fed, housed, educated, and trained in North 
Korean society. The intent is to keep them at a high state of readiness 
against the perceived threat from U.S. forces stationed in South Korea 
and patrolling the adjacent seas and in the air in Northeast Asia. North 
Korea has developed and tested long-range missiles and nuclear weap- 
ons capabilities to counter the specter of a remilitarized Japan and the 
perennial fear of the United States. The Ministry of People's Armed 
Forces, which provides administrative direction to the military, is not 
subordinate to the cabinet but instead answers directly to the chairman 
of the National Defense Commission. 

North Korea's military capabilities are designed to support the 
goals of the state and the party, namely to reunify and communize the 
peninsula. These goals influence military strategic planning, cadre 
training, and force modernization. The Korean People's Army has a 
three-part strategy of surprise attack; quick, decisive war; and mixed 
tactics to carry out the nation's defense policy. The tactics include 
plans to launch massive conventional, chemical artillery, and missile 
attacks and simultaneous insertion of special operations forces. The 
development of a nuclear weapons capability has been part of the 
overall strategy. So too is the long-term construction of North Korea's 
large defense industry, which also is closely managed by the National 
Defense Commission. The songun policy ensures that defense, indus- 
try, and the military establishment in general have all they need or 
want. 

August 24, 2007 

* * * 

As the manuscript for this book was being completed, a number of 
significant events occurred in or concerning North Korea. North 
Korea reported on October 9, 2006, that it had conducted its first 



xxxiv 



nuclear test — a "historic event that brought happiness to our military 
and people," according to the Korean Central News Agency. Amidst 
skepticism about the size and success of the test, independent sources 
revealed that a low-yield (estimated between a half-kiloton and five- 
kiloton) device had been detonated. As North Korea apparently joined 
the world's nuclear club, it received international condemnation, from 
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Nations, and 
even from its close ally, China. Even as sanctions were discussed, a 
North Korean official suggested that his country could launch a 
nuclear missile if the United States did not resume negotiations. How- 
ever, Kim Jong II himself reportedly apologized for the test and said 
there were no plans for additional tests. 

Despite the tensions caused by the North Korean test, on December 
18, 2006, the Six-Party Talks resumed in Beijing among representa- 
tives of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia, 
and China, After protracted negotiations, an agreement was finally 
signed on February 13, 2007, by which North Korea agreed to shut 
down its main, Soviet-built nuclear reactor capable of producing weap- 
ons-grade plutonium and to allow inspections by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the United States agreed to 
release US$25 million of North Korean (allegedly money-laundered) 
funds frozen in 2005 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury at Banco 
Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank owned by the Delta Asia Financial 
Group, and to provide economic aid and improve diplomatic relations. 
P'yongyang did not shut down the aging nuclear reactor at Yongbyon 
as promised by April 14 but gave assurances that it would do so soon 
after the United States released the Banco Delta Asia funds via the Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank in New York on June 25, 2007, to a North Korean 
account at a commercial bank in Russia near the border with North 
Korea. Just before the announcement, Assistant Secretary of State 
Christopher R. Hill made an unannounced two-day trip to P'yongyang 
on June 21-22. The trip was made despite there being no U.S. demand 
for concessions as a condition of the visit, which was requested by 
North Korea. Following Hill's meetings with Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officials, the Six-Party Talks resumed two days later on July 
18-20 and continued on September 27-30 in Beijing. At the latter ses- 
sion, the six parties agreed to implement the February 17, 2007, agree- 
ment. In subsequent months, the United States agreed on May 16, 
2008, to restart deliveries of food aid and in June 2008 to remove North 
Korea from its list of countries sponsoring terrorism. 

On June 27, 2008, North Korea submitted to the Chinese, as the 
host nation of the Six-Party Talks, a 60-page declaration of its nuclear 
inventory, including a list of its nuclear facilities, the amount of pro- 
duced and extracted plutonium and how it is used, and the volume of 



xxxv 



its uranium stocks. The next day, Washington reciprocated with the 
announcement that it would remove North Korea from its list of states 
that sponsor terrorism, and North Korea dramatically destroyed a 
cooling tower at the Yongbyon facility. Despite these breakthroughs, 
the North Koreans rejected the U.S. suggestion of on-the-spot inspec- 
tions of their nuclear facilities and sampling of nuclear material. The 
Bush administration responded on August 11 by announcing that it 
would not remove North Korea from the state- sponsored terrorism list 
until P'yongyang established a mechanism that allowed international 
inspectors to verify the claims of its June 27 nuclear declaration. 

Other momentous events included the April 11, 2007, appointment 
of Kim Yong-il as North Korea's premier, replacing Pak Pong-ju, who 
had held the office since September 2003. Kim had been the long-time 
deputy bureau director and minister of land and marine transport 
before becoming premier. In May 2007, the railroad crossing the west- 
ern DMZ was reconnected between North Korea and South Korea for 
the first time since 1950. On May 17, two five-car passenger test trains 
ran between Kaesong in North Korea and Munson, in South Korea, 
across the DMZ and back. Freight service on the same 2 5 -kilometer 
route was inaugurated on December 11, 2007. 

North Korea reportedly suffered its heaviest-ever rainfall in August 
2007 and the worst since the devastating floods of 1995. About 10 per- 
cent, or 450,000 tons, of the country's crops were destroyed in the 
August floods; hundreds of people died, and some 300,000 were left 
homeless. A summit conference planned for August 28-30 in P'yong- 
yang between Kim Jong II and South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun 
was postponed until October 2-4 because of the floods. At the conclu- 
sion of their cordial summit, Kim and Roh signed a joint declaration call- 
ing for permanent peace and economic prosperity on the Korean 
Peninsula. Despite follow-up prime ministerial talks in Seoul in Novem- 
ber, political realities in South Korea compelled Roh to take a stronger 
stance on North Korea, and inter-Korean relations, like the Six-Party 
Talks, continued to fluctuate. 

More serious developments occurred in September 2008. On Sep- 
tember 9, Kim Jong II failed to appear at public celebrations for the 
sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. The condition of 
Kim's health, as he recovered from a reported cerebral hemorrhage, 
was subject to silence within North Korea and considerable specula- 
tion outside the country. Regional and more distant observers 
expressed concern about the sustainability of the P'yongyang regime. 
The nuclear dispute with the United States and other nations took a 
serious turn on September 24 when North Korea asked IAEA officials 
to remove their seals and surveillance equipment at the Yongbyon 



xxxvi 



nuclear reprocessing plant and then denied them access. P'yongyang 
sought more concessions — and removal from Washington's state- 
sponsored terrorism list — as it threatened to resume processing 
nuclear fuel. However, on October 11, the United States formally 
removed North Korea from its terrorism list, and the North agreed to 
resume its denuclearization procedures. 

Amidst ostensibly improved international relations between North 
Korea and other nations, bilateral ties between P'yongyang and Seoul 
became more tense. The North objected to South Korea's emerging, 
more conservative policies concerning nuclear, human rights, and 
other issues. On October 7, North Korean units tested two ship-to-ship 
missiles in the Yellow Sea, which was seen as a provocation by the 
South. On October 17, P'yongyang threatened to cut off all civilian 
relations if the conservative policies of the South — which the North 
viewed as provocative — continued. In the meantime, the North contin- 
ued to deny reports concerning Kim Jong IPs poor health, and foreign 
sources began to reveal new famine conditions emerging in various 
parts of the DPRK. 



November 5, 2008 Robert L. Worden 



xxxvii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Statue of Kim II Sung as a young man preaching revolution, a part of 
Wangjae-san Grand Monument, Onsong, North Hamgyong Province 
Courtesy Pulmyol ui t'ap (Tower of Immortality), Pyongyang: Munye 
Ch'ulpansa, 1985, 137 



THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SITUATION of the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, was rel- 
atively stable and predictable from the end of the Korean War in 
1953 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The first-generation revo- 
lutionaries who built and directed the political system after 1948 still 
held power as the 1990s began. Kim II Sung, the founder of the state 
and the center of its politics, continued to hold ultimate power. But 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the emergence of a major 
crisis in relations with the United States in 1993 over North Korean 
nuclear policy, and Kim's unexpected death in 1994 put North Korea 
on a much less stable and predictable footing. A general collapse of 
its energy system and massive flooding followed in 1995, leading to 
famine that claimed the lives of somewhere between 300,000 and 
800,000 people annually through 1998. A new generation led by, and 
beholden to, Kim's son — Kim Jong II — took over at the highest ech- 
elons in the late 1990s and attempted to respond to the watershed 
changes of the previous decade, on the Korean Peninsula and in the 
world. 

North Korea responded to a dynamically shifting set of political, 
economic, and diplomatic opportunities and constraints with a stark 
survival strategy and sporadic reform. The nation held far-reaching 
negotiations with the United States that led in October 1 994 to the ces- 
sation of further development at its nuclear complex at Yongbyon. 
After former dissident Kim Dae Jung came to power in the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea) in 1998, his policy of engagement led to the 
first-ever summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas in 
June 2000, and to a host of agreements on South Korean investment, 
trade, and tourism in or with the North. Kim Jong II also broadened 
the North's diplomatic ties by opening relations with Australia, Can- 
ada, and most countries in the European Union. The fate of the entire 
North Korean system hinged on its success in adaptation to this new 
environment: whether the state survived as a separate entity, an equal 
partner in some sort of federation with the South, or went the way of 
many other communist systems and simply disappeared still was a 
very open question in the early twenty-first century. 

However the new leaders respond, the legacies of the past weigh 
heavily on them. More than most communist systems, North Korea 
has molded Marxism-Leninism to the requisites of an indigenous 
political culture and a continuous tradition going back to antiquity. 
Furthermore, the deep-seated continuity of leadership and national 



3 



North Korea: A Country Study 

structure since the late 1940s means that North Korea continues to 
work within long-established foundations of politics, economics, 
and diplomacy. It is essential to grasp the evolution of North Korean 
history in order to understand the developments since the mid-1980s. 

The DPRK originated with the national division in 1945 and in the 
midst of the post-World War II confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. North Korea was, and in some ways still 
is, a classic Cold War state, driven by reference to the long-running 
conflict with South Korea and the United States. It was founded in the 
heyday of Stalinism, which had particular influence on the North's 
heavy-industry-first economic program. The regime's Korean origins 
traced to a harsh guerrilla struggle against Japan in the 1930s. Here is a 
state perhaps uniquely forged in warfare, in Manchuria (as Northeast 
China was then commonly known) against Japan, in a civil struggle 
fought by unconventional means at the inception of the regime, and 
through vicious fratricidal war while national structures were still in 
infancy. Out of that war came one of the world's most remarkable gar- 
rison states, with most of the adult population having military experi- 
ence. All these influences combined to produce a hardened leadership 
that, whatever else one might think of it, knew how to hold onto 
power. But North Korea also accomplished a rare synthesis between 
foreign models and domestic sources of politics; the political system is 
deeply rooted in native soil, drawing upon Korea's long history of uni- 
tary existence on a small peninsula surrounded by greater powers. 

The Origins of the Korean Nation 

Koreans inhabit a mountainous peninsula protruding southward 
from Northeast Asia and surrounded on three sides by water (see fig. 
1; The Physical Environment, ch. 2). The peninsula, for most of its 
recorded history, was surrounded on three sides by other peoples: 
Chinese to the west, Japanese to the east, and an assortment of "bar- 
barian" tribes, aggressive invaders, and, in the twentieth century, an 
expanding and deepening Russian presence to the north. Although 
Japan exercised decisive influence by the late sixteenth century, in 
ancient times the peoples and civilizations on the contiguous Asian 
continent were far more important. 

The northern border between Korea and China formed by the 
Amnok (known as the Yalu in China) and Tuman (Tumen as it is 
called in China) rivers has been recognized for centuries. These riv- 
ers did not always constitute Korea's northern limits, as Koreans 
ranged far beyond this barrier well into Northeast China and Siberia, 
and neither Koreans nor the ancient tribes that occupied the plains of 
Manchuria regarded these riverine obstacles as sacrosanct borders. 



4 



Historical Setting 



The harsh winter climate also turned the rivers into frozen pathways 
for many months, facilitating the back and forth migration from 
which, over time, the Korean people were formed. 

Paleolithic excavations show that human beings inhabited the 
Korean Peninsula 500,000 years ago, but most scholars assume that 
present-day Koreans are not descended ethnically from these early 
inhabitants. Neolithic humans were there 7,000 or 8,000 years ago, 
their presence affirmed by the ground and polished stone tools and 
pottery they left to posterity. Around 2000 B.C., a new pottery cul- 
ture spread into Korea from China, leaving evidence of prominent 
painted designs. These neolithic people practiced agriculture in a set- 
tled communal life and were widely supposed to have had consan- 
guineous clans as their basic social grouping. Korean historians in 
modern times sometimes assume that clan leadership systems char- 
acterized by councils of nobles (hwabaek) that emerged in the subse- 
quent Silla period traced back to these neolithic peoples. There is no 
hard evidence, however, to support such imagined beginnings for the 
Korean people. 

A mythical figure, Tan' gun, is said to have founded the Korean 
nation in 2333 B.C. (a date set by the South Korean government), 
the year he built his royal palace near modern-day P'yongyang and 
established the Old Choson kingdom. Although his origins are 
obscure, the Tan' gun legend has existed since before the second cen- 
tury A.D. and has had influence ever since. The North Korean 
regime's Foundation Day on October 3 relates to Tan'gun, and the 
government claimed in 1 993 to have found and excavated his tomb 
near P'yongyang. 

By the fourth century B.C., a number of walled- town states on the 
peninsula had survived long enough to come to the attention of 
China. The most illustrious state was Old Choson, which had estab- 
lished itself along the banks of the Liao and the Taedong rivers in 
southern Manchuria and northwestern Korea. Old Choson prospered 
into a civilization based on bronze culture and a political federation 
of many walled towns, which, judging from Chinese accounts, was 
formidable to the point of arrogance. Riding horses and using bronze 
weapons, the Choson people extended their influence to the north, 
taking most of the Liaodong Basin. But the rising power of the north 
China state of Yan (also known as Eastern Zhou) checked Choson 's 
growth and eventually pushed it back to territory south of the 
Ch'ongch'on River, located midway between the Yalu and Taedong 
rivers. As Yan gave way in China to the Qin (221-207 B.C.) and the 
Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) dynasties, Choson declined, and refugee 
populations migrated eastward. Out of this mileu emerged Wiman, a 
man who assumed the kingship of Choson sometime between 194 



5 



North Korea: A Country Study 

and 180 B.C. Wiman Choson melded Chinese influence and the Old 
Choson federated structure; apparently reinvigorated under Wiman, 
this state again expanded over hundreds of kilometers of territory. Its 
ambitions ran up against a Han invasion, however, and Wiman 
Choson fell in 108 B.C. 

These developments coincided with the emergence of iron cul- 
ture, enabling a sophisticated agriculture based on implements such 
as hoes, plowshares, and sickles. Cultivation of rice and other grains 
increased markedly, allowing the population to expand. There was 
an unquestioned continuity in agrarian society from this time until 
the emergence of a unified Korean state many centuries later, even if 
the peoples of the peninsula could not be called Korean. 

Han Chinese built four commanderies to rule the peninsula as far 
south as the Han River, with a core area at Lolang (Nangnang in 
Korean), near present-day P'yongyang. It is illustrative of the relent- 
lessly different historiography practiced in North Korea and South 
Korea, as well as both countries' dubious projection backward of 
Korean nationalism, that North Korean historians denied that the 
Lolang district was centered in Korea and placed it northwest of the 
peninsula, possibly near Beijing. Perhaps this was because Lolang was 
clearly a Chinese city, as demonstrated by the many burial objects 
showing the affluent lives of Chinese overlords and merchants. 

The Three Kingdoms Period 

Paekche 

For about four centuries, from the second century B.C. to the sec- 
ond century A.D., Lolang was a great center of Chinese statecraft, art, 
industry (including the mining of iron ore), and commerce. Its influ- 
ence was far-reaching, attracting immigrants from China and exacting 
tribute from several states south of the Han River, which patterned 
their civilization and government after Lolang. In the first three centu- 
ries A.D., a large number of walled-town states in southern Korea had 
grouped into three federations known as Chinhan, Mahan, and 
Pyonhan; rice agriculture had developed in the rich alluvial valleys 
and plains to the point of establishing reservoirs for irrigation. 

Chinhan was situated in the middle part of the southern peninsula, 
Mahan in the southwest, and Pyonhan in the southeast. The state of 
Paekche, which soon came to exercise great influence on Korean his- 
tory, emerged first in the Mahan area; it is not certain when this hap- 
pened, but Paekche certainly existed by A.D. 246 because Lolang 
mounted a large attack on it in that year. That Paekche was a central- 
ized, aristocratic state melding Chinese and indigenous influence was 



6 



Historical Setting 



not in doubt, nor was its growing power: within a century, Paekche 
had demolished Mahan and continued expanding northward into 
what today is the core area of Korea, around Seoul. It is thought that 
the Korean custom of father-to-son royal succession began with King 
Kun Ch'ogo (reigned ca. 346-75) of Paekche. His grandson inaugu- 
rated another long tradition by adopting Buddhism as the state reli- 
gion in 384. 

Koguryo 

Meanwhile, two other powerful states had emerged north of the 
peninsula around the time of Christ — Puyo in the Sungari River 
Basin in Manchuria, and Koguryo, Puyo's frequent enemy to its 
south, near the Yalu River. Koguryo, which also exercised a lasting 
influence on Korean history, developed in confrontation with the 
Chinese. Puyo was weaker and sought alliances with China to coun- 
ter Koguryo but eventually succumbed around A.D. 312. Koguryo 
was expanding in all directions, in particular toward the Liao River 
in the west and toward the Taedong River in the south. In 3 13 Kogu- 
ryo occupied the territory of Lolang and came into conflict with 
Paekche. 

Peninsular geography shaped the political space of Paekche and 
Koguryo, and a third kingdom, Silla. In the central part of Korea, the 
main mountain range, the T'aebaek, runs north to south along the edge 
of the Sea of Japan (or, as Koreans prefer, the East Sea). Approxi- 
mately three-quarters of the way down the peninsula, however, 
roughly at the thirty-seventh parallel, the mountain range veers to the 
southwest, dividing the peninsula almost in the middle. This south- 
west extension, the Sobaek Range, shielded peoples to the east of it 
from the Chinese-occupied portion of the peninsula but placed no seri- 
ous barrier in the way of expansion into or out of the southwestern 
portion of the peninsula. This was Paekche's historical territory. 

Koguryo, however, extended over a wild region of northwestern 
Korea and eastern Manchuria subjected to extremes of temperature 
and structured by towering mountain ranges, broad plains, and life- 
giving rivers. The highest peak, known as Paektu-san (Mount 
Paektu, or White Head Mountain), is situated on the contemporary 
North Korea-China border and has a beautiful, crystal-pure lake at 
its summit. Kim II Sung and his guerrilla band utilized associations 
with this mountain as part of the founding myth of North Korea, just 
as Kim Jong II was said to have been born on the slopes of the moun- 
tain in 1942. Unsurprisingly, North Korea claimed the Koguryo leg- 
acy as the mainstream of Korean history. 



7 



North Korea: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, Seoul, 1984, 39; 
Republic of Korea, Government Information Agency, Korean Overseas Information 
Service, Facts About Korea, Seoul, 2006, 17; and Suh Cheong-Soo, ed., An Encyclo- 
pedia of Korean Culture, Seoul, 2004, 219. 



Figure 2. Korea in the Fifth Century A.D. 



8 



Historical Setting 



Silla 

According to South Korean historiography, however, it was the 
glories of a third kingdom that were most important in founding the 
nation. Silla eventually became the repository of a rich and cultured 
ruling elite, with its capital at Kyongju in the southeast, north of the 
modern port of Pusan. The military men who ruled South Korea, 
either as dictators or elected leaders beginning in 1961, all came 
from this region, and most South Korean historians consider Silla's 
historical lineage as predominant. It was the Paekche legacy that suf- 
fered in divided Korea, as Koreans of other regions and historians in 
both North Korea and South Korea discriminated against the people 
of the Cholla provinces in the southwest of the peninsula. But taken 
together, the Three Kingdoms continued to infuence Korean history 
and political culture. Koreans often assumed that regional traits that 
they liked or disliked went back to the Three Kingdoms period. 

Silla evolved from a walled town called Saro. Silla chroniclers are 
said to have traced its origins to 57 B.C., but contemporary histori- 
ans have regarded King Naemul (r. A.D. 356^02) as the ruler who 
first consolidated a large confederated kingdom and established a 
hereditary monarchy. His domain was east of the Naktong River in 
today's North Kyongsang Province. A small number of states 
located along the south-central tip of the peninsula facing the Korea 
Strait did not join either Silla or Paekche but instead formed a Kay a 
League, which maintained close ties with states in Japan. Silla even- 
tually absorbed the neighboring Kaya states in spite of an attack by 
Wa forces from Japan on behalf of Kaya in A.D. 399, which Silla 
repelled with help from Koguryo. Centralized government probably 
emerged in Silla in the second half of the fifth century, as the capital 
became both an administrative and a marketing center (see fig. 2). In 
the early sixth century, Silla's leaders introduced plowing by oxen 
and built extensive irrigation facilities. Increased agricultural output 
presumably ensued, allowing further political and cultural develop- 
ment, including an administrative code in 520, a hereditary caste 
structure known as the bone -rank system to regulate membership of 
the elite, and the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion around 
535. Status in Silla society was so much influenced by birth and lin- 
eage that the bone-rank system led each family and clan to maintain 
extensive genealogical records with meticulous care. Because only 
male offspring prolonged the family and clan lines and were the only 
names registered in the genealogical tables, the birth of a son was 
greeted with great felicitation. The elite, of course, was most con- 
scious of family pedigree. 



9 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Silla was weaker militarily than Koguryo, however, and sought to 
fend off its rival through an alliance with Paekche. By the beginning 
of the fifth century, Koguryo had achieved undisputed control of all 
of Manchuria east of the Liao River as well as the northern and cen- 
tral regions of the Korean Peninsula. At this time, Koguryo had a 
famous leader appropriately named King Kwanggaet'o (r. 391-412), 
whose name translates as "wide open land." Reigning from the age 
of 18, he conquered 65 walled towns and 1,400 villages, in addition 
to assisting Silla when the Wa forces from Japan attacked. But as 
Koguryo's domain increased, it confronted China's Sui Dynasty 
(589-618) in the west and Silla and Paekche to the south. 

Silla attacked Koguryo in 551 in concert with King Song (r. 
523-54) of Paekche. After conquering the upper reaches of the Han 
River, Silla then turned on Paekche forces and drove them out of the 
lower Han area. While a tattered Paekche kingdom nursed its 
wounds in the southwest, Silla allied with Chinese forces of the Sui 
and the successor Tang (618-906) dynasties in combined attacks 
against Koguryo. The Sui emperor, Yang Di, launched an invasion of 
Koguryo in 612, marshalling more than 1 million soldiers, only to be 
lured into a trap by the revered Koguryo commander, Ulchi Mundok, 
who destroyed the Sui forces. Perhaps as few as 3,000 Sui soldiers 
survived their eclipse, thus contributing to the fall of the dynasty in 
618. Tang emperor Tai Zong launched another huge invasion in 645, 
but Koguryo forces won another striking victory in the siege of the 
Ansisong (An Si Fortress), forcing him to withdraw. 

Koreans have always viewed these victories as sterling examples of 
resistance to foreign aggression. Had Koguryo not beaten back the 
invaders, all the states of the peninsula might have fallen under long- 
term Chinese domination. Thus commanders such as Ulchi Mundok 
became models for emulation thereafter, especially during the Korean 
War (1950-53). Paekche could not hold out under combined Silla and 
Tang attack, however. The latter landed an invasion fleet in 660, and 
Paekche quickly fell. Tang pressure also had weakened Koguryo, 
which, after eight successive years of battle, succumbed to a combina- 
tion of external attack, internal strife, and several famines. Koguryo 
retreated to the north, enabling Silla forces to advance and consolidate 
their control up to the Taedong River, which flows through P'yongyang. 

Silla emerged victorious in 668. It is from this famous date that 
South Korean historians speak of a unified Korea. The period of the 
Three Kingdoms thus ended, but not before all of them had come 
under the long-term sway of Chinese civilization by introducing 
Chinese statecraft, Buddhist and Confucian philosophy, Confucian 
practices of educating the young, and the Chinese written language 



10 



Historical Setting 



(Koreans adapted the characters to their own language through a sys- 
tem known as idu). The Three Kingdoms also introduced Buddhism, 
the various rulers seeing, in a body of believers devoted to Buddha 
but serving one king, a valuable political device for unity. Artists 
from Koguryo and Paekche perfected a mural art found on the walls 
of tombs and took it to Japan where it deeply influenced Japan's 
temple and burial art. Indeed, many Korean historians have come to 
believe that the wall murals in royal tombs in Japan indicated that 
the imperial house lineage may have Korean origins. 

Korea under Silla 

Silla and Paekche had sought to use Chinese power against Kogu- 
ryo, inaugurating another tradition of involving foreign powers in 
Korean internal disputes. Silla's reliance on Tang forces to consolidate 
its control had its price, however, because Silla had to resist encroach- 
ing Tang forces, which limited its sway to the area south of the Tae- 
dong River. But Silla's military force, bolstered by an ideal of the 
youthful warrior (hwarang), was formidable, and it seized Paekche 
territories by 671 and by 676 pushed Koguryo northward and the Tang 
commanderies off the peninsula, thereby guaranteeing that the devel- 
opment of the Korean people would take independent form. 

The broad territories of Koguryo were not conquered, however, 
and a Koguryo general named Tae Cho-yong established a successor 
state called Parhae that extended to both sides of the Amnok and 
Tuman rivers. Parhae forced Silla to build a northern wall in 721 and 
kept Silla forces below a line running from present-day P'yongyang 
to Wonsan. By the eighth century, Parhae controlled the northern 
part of Korea, all of northeastern Manchuria, and the Liaodong Pen- 
insula. Both Silla and Parhae continued to be influenced deeply by 
Tang civilization. 

There were many contacts between Silla and Tang China, as large 
numbers of students, officials, and monks traveled to China for 
study. In 682 Silla set up a national Confucian academy to train high 
officials and later instituted a civil-service examination system mod- 
eled on that of the Tang. Parhae modeled its central government even 
more directly on Tang systems than did Silla and sent many students 
to Tang schools. Parhae culture melded indigenous and Tang influ- 
ences, and its level of civilization was high enough to merit the Chi- 
nese designation as a "flourishing land in the East." 

Silla in particular, however, developed a flourishing indigenous civi- 
lization that was among the most advanced in the world. Its capital at 
Kyongju was renowned as the "city of gold," where the aristocracy 
pursued a high culture and extravagant pleasures. Tang historians wrote 



11 



North Korea: A Country Study 

that elite officials possessed thousands of slaves, with like numbers of 
horses, cattle, and pigs. The wives of such senior officials wore gold 
tiaras and earrings of delicate and intricate filigree. Silla scholars stud- 
ied the Confucian and Buddhist classics, advanced state administration, 
and developed sophisticated methods for astronomy and calendrical 
science. The Dharani Sutra, recovered in Kyongju, dates as far back as 
75 1 and is the oldest example of woodblock printing yet found in the 
world. "Pure Land" Buddhism united the mass of common people, 
who could become adherents through the repetition of simple chants. 
The crowning glories of this "city of gold" are the Pulguksa Temple in 
Kyongju and the nearby Sokkuram Grotto, both built around 750 and 
home to some of the finest Buddhist sculpture in the world. The grotto, 
atop a coastal bluff near Kyongju, boasts a great stone Sakyamuni Bud- 
dha in the cave's inner sanctum, poised such that the rising sun over the 
sea strikes him in the middle of the forehead. 

Ethnic differences between Koguryo and the Malgal people native to 
Manchuria weakened Parhae by the early tenth century, however, just 
as Silla 's power had begun to dissipate a century earlier when regional 
castle lords splintered central power and rebellions shook Silla's foun- 
dations. While Parhae came under severe pressure from Qidan (or 
Kitan) warriors from Inner Asia (the region west and north of China 
proper), Silla's decline encouraged a resurgent Paekche under a leader 
named Kyonhwon to found Later Paekche at Chonju in 892, and 
another restorationist, named Kungye, to found Later Koguryo at 
Kaesong in central Korea. Wang Kon, the son of Kungye, who suc- 
ceeded to the throne in 918, shortened the name to Koryo and became 
the founder of a new dynasty (918-1392) by that name, whence came 
the modern term "Korea." 

Unification by Koryo 

Wang Kon's army fought ceaselessly with Later Paekche for the 
next decade, with Silla in retreat. After a crushing victory over Paekche 
forces at present-day Andong in 930, Koryo received a formal surren- 
der from Silla and proceeded to conquer Later Paekche by 935 — amaz- 
ingly, with troops led by the former Paekche king, Kyonhwon, whose 
son had treacherously cast him aside. After this accomplishment, Wang 
Kon became a magnanimous unifier. Regarding himself as the proper 
successor to Koguryo, he embraced survivors of the Koguryo lineage 
who were fleeing the dying Parhae state, which had been conquered by 
Qidan warriors in 926. He then took a Silla princess as his wife and 
treated the Silla aristocracy with unexampled generosity. Wang Kon 
established a regime embodying the last remnants of the Three King- 
doms and accomplished a true unification of the peninsula. 



12 



Pulguksa Temple, built between 751 and 774, is a masterpiece of the 
golden age of Buddhist art in the Silla kingdom and is on the UNESCO 
World Heritage List. The temple is in Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, 

South Korea. 

Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, New York 

With its capital at Kaesong, the Koryo Dynasty's composite elite 
forged a tradition of aristocratic continuity that lasted down to the 
modern era. The elite combined aristocratic privilege and political 
power through marriage alliances, control of land and central politi- 
cal office, and making class position hereditary. This established a 
pattern for Korea, in which landed gentry mingled with a Confucian- 
or Buddhist-educated stratum of scholar-officials; often scholars and 
landlords were one and the same person, but in any case landed 
wealth and bureaucratic position were powerfully fused. Thus at the 
center a strong bureaucracy influenced by Confucian statecraft 
emerged, which thereafter sought to dominate local power and mili- 
tated against the Japanese or European feudal pattern of small-scale 
sovereignty, castle domains, and military tradition. By the thirteenth 
century, there were two dominant government groupings — those of 
the civil officials and the military officials — known thereafter as 
yangban (the two orders — see Glossary). 

The Koryo elite admired the splendid civilization that emerged 
during China's Song Dynasty (960-1279). Official delegations and 
ordinary merchants brought Koryo gold, silver, and ginseng to China 
in exchange for Song silks, porcelains, and woodblock books. The 
treasured Song porcelains stimulated Koryo artisans to produce an 



13 



North Korea: A Country Study 

even finer type of inlaid celadon porcelain. Unmatched in the world 
before or since for the pristine clarity of its blue-green glaze and the 
delicate art of its inlaid portraits (usually of flowers or animals), 
Koryo celadon displayed the refined taste of aristocrats and later had 
great influence on potters in Japan. 

Buddhism coexisted with Confucianism throughout the Koryo 
period, deeply influencing the daily life of society and perhaps 
bequeathing to modern Korea its eclecticism of religious belief. 
Koryo Buddhist priests systematized religious practice by rendering 
the Chinese version of the Buddhist canon into mammoth wood- 
block print editions, known as the Tripitaka Koreana. The first edi- 
tion was completed in 1087 after a lifetime of work but was lost; 
another, completed in 1251 and still extant, was located at the Haein 
Temple. Its accuracy, combined with the exquisite calligraphic carv- 
ings, made it the finest of some 20 Tripitaka editions created in East 
Asia. By 1234, if not earlier, Koryo had also invented movable iron 
type, two centuries before its use in Europe. 

This high point of Koryo culture coincided with internal disorder 
and the rise of the Mongols, whose power swept most of the known 
world during the thirteenth century. Koryo was no exception, as 
Khubilai Khan's forces invaded and demolished Koryo 's army in 
1231, forcing the Koryo government to retreat to Kanghwa Island 
(off modern-day Inch'on), a ploy that exploited the Mongol horse- 
men's fear of water. But after a more devastating invasion in 1254, in 
which countless people died and some 200,000 people were made 
captives, Koryo succumbed to Mongol domination, and its kings 
married Mongol princesses. The Mongols then enlisted thousands of 
Koreans in ill-fated invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, using 
Korean-made ships. The Kamakura shogunate (1185-1333) turned 
back both invasions with aid, as legend has it, from opportune 
typhoons known as the "divine wind" or kamikaze. The last period of 
Mongol influence was marked by the appearance of a strong bureau- 
cratic stratum of scholar-officials or literati (sadaebu in Korean). 
Many of them lived in exile outside the capital, and they used their 
superior knowledge of the Confucian classics to condemn the 
excesses of the ruling families, who were backed by Mongol power. 

The overthrow of the Mongols by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) 
in China gave an opportunity to a rising group of military men, 
steeled in battle against coastal pirates from Japan, to contest power 
in Koryo. When the Ming claimed suzerainty over former Mongol 
domains in Korea, the Koryo court was divided between pro-Mongol 
and pro-Ming forces. Two generals marshaled their forces for an 
assault on Ming armies on the Liaodong Peninsula. One of the gen- 
erals, Yi Song-gye, was pro-Ming. When he reached the Amnok 



14 




One of the 81,200 wood printing blocks of the Tripitaka Koreana, completed 
in 1251 following the destruction of the originals during the 

Mongol invasions 

Courtesy Korean Collection, Asian Division, Library of Congress, 

Washington, DC 



More than 6,500 volumes of the 
Tripitaka Koreana are housed at Haein 
Temple in South Kyongsang Province, 
South Korea. 

Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, 

New York 




15 



North Korea: A Country Study 

River, he abruptly turned back and marched on the Koryo capital, 
which he subdued quickly. He thus became the founder of Korea's 
longest-lasting dynasty, the Choson (1392-1910). The new state was 
named Choson, harking back to Old Choson 16 centuries earlier, and 
its capital was built at Seoul. 

The Choson Dynasty 

Florescence 

One of Yi Song-gye's first acts was to carry out a sweeping land 
reform long advocated by literati reformers. After a national cadas- 
tral survey, all old land registers were destroyed. Except for estates 
doled out to loyalists called "merit subjects," Yi declared all other 
land to be owned by the state, thus undercutting Buddhist temples 
(which held sizable tracts of farmland) and locally powerful 
clans— both of which had exacted high rents from peasants, leading 
to social distress in the late Koryo period. These reforms also greatly 
enhanced the taxation revenue of the central government. 

Buddhist influence in and complicity with the old system made it 
easier for the literati to urge an extirpation of Buddhist economic and 
political influence, and exile in the mountains for monks and their 
disciples. Indeed, the literati accomplished a deep Confucianization 
of Choson society, which particularly affected the position of 
women. Often prominent in Koryo society, they were relegated to 
domestic chores of child rearing and housekeeping, as so-called 
"inside people." 

As Neo-Confucian doctrines swept the old order away, Korea 
effectively developed a secular society. Common people, however, 
retained attachments to folk religions, shamanism, geomancy, and 
fortune-telling, influences condemned by Confucianism. This 
Korean mass culture created remarkably lively and diverse art 
forms: uniquely colorful and unpretentiously naturalistic folk paint- 
ings of animals, popular novels in Korean vernacular, and characters 
such as the mudang (shamans who summon spirits and perform 
exorcisms). In this way, women frequently found expression for 
their artistic creativity. 

For more than a century after its founding, Choson flourished as an 
exemplary agrarian bureaucracy deeply influenced by a cadre of 
learned scholar-officials, steeped in the doctrines of Neo-Confucian- 
ism. Like Koryo, the Choson Dynasty did not manifest the typical fea- 
tures of a feudal society. Choson possessed an elaborate procedure for 
entry to the civil service, which was highly developed, and a practice 
of administering the country from the top down and from the center. 



16 



Historical Setting 



The system rested upon an agrarian base, making it different from 
modern bureaucratic systems; the particular character of agrarian- 
bureaucratic interaction also provided one of Korea's departures from 
the typical Chinese experience. 

The leading Western historian of the Choson Dynasty, James B. 
Palais, has shown that conflict between bureaucrats seeking revenues 
for government coffers and landowners hoping to control tenants and 
harvests was a constant during the Choson, and that in this conflict 
over resources the landowners often won out. Despite theoretical state 
land ownership, private landed power soon came to be stronger and 
more persistent in Korea than in China. Korea had centralized admin- 
istration, to be sure, but the ostensibly strong center was more often a 
facade concealing the reality of aristocratic power. 

Thus Korea's agrarian bureaucracy was superficially strong but 
actually rather weak at the center. The state ostensibly dominated the 
society, but in fact landed aristocratic families kept the state at bay 
and perpetuated local power for centuries. This pattern persisted until 
the late 1940s, when landed dominance was obliterated in a northern 
revolution and attenuated in southern land reform; since then the bal- 
ance has shifted toward strong central power and top-down adminis- 
tration of the whole country in both Koreas (see The New Socialist 
Society, ch. 2; The Economy after World War II, ch. 3). 

Confucianism began with the family and an ideal model of rela- 
tions between family members. It generalized this family model to 
the state, and to an international system — the Chinese world order. 
The principle was hierarchy within a reciprocal web of duties and 
obligations: the son obeyed the father by following the dictates of 
filial piety; the father provided for and educated the son. Daughters 
obeyed mothers and mothers-in-law, younger siblings followed older 
siblings, wives were subordinate to husbands. The superior prestige 
and privileges of older adults made longevity a prime virtue. The rest 
of society viewed transgressors of these rules as uncultured beings 
not fit to be members of their community. When generalized to poli- 
tics, a village followed the leadership of venerated elders, and citi- 
zens revered a king or emperor who was thought of as the father of 
the state. Generalized to international affairs, China's emperor was 
the big brother of the Korean king. 

The glue holding the system together was education, meaning 
socialization into Confucian norms and virtues that began in early 
childhood with the reading of the Confucian classics. The model fig- 
ure was the so-called true gentleman, the virtuous and learned 
scholar-official who was equally adept at poetry or statecraft. Educa- 
tion started very early, as Korean students had to master the extra- 



17 



North Korea: A Country Study 

ordinarily difficult classical Chinese language — tens of thousands of 
written characters and their many meanings; rote memorization was 
the typical method. Throughout the Choson Dynasty, all official 
records, all formal education, and most written discourse was in 
classical Chinese. With Chinese language and philosophy, of course, 
came a profound cultural penetration of Korea, such that most 
Choson arts and literature came to use Chinese models. 

The Korean written alphabet, hangul (see Glossary), was system- 
atized in the fifteenth century under the greatest of Korean kings, 
Sejong (r. 1418-50), who also greatly increased the use of metal 
moveable type for book publications of all sorts. Some scholars con- 
sider Korean to be part of the Ural-Altaic group of languages, includ- 
ing Turkish, Hungarian, Finnish, and Japanese; others believe it may 
be a language isolate. In spite of the long influence of written Chi- 
nese, Korean remains very different in lexicon, phonology, and gram- 
mar. The hangul alphabet did not come into general use until the 
twentieth century, however; since 1948 the North Koreans have used 
the Korean alphabet— which they call choson 'gul — exclusively, 
while South Koreans retained usage of a mixed Sino-Korean script 
until the 1990s, at which time Chinese characters became less used. 

Confucianism is often thought to be a conservative philosophy, 
stressing tradition, veneration of a past golden age, obedience to 
superiors, careful attention to the performance of ritual, disdain for 
material things, commerce, the remaking of nature, and a preference 
for relatively frozen social hierarchies. Much commentary on con- 
temporary Korea focuses on the alleged authoritarian, antidemo- 
cratic character of this Confucian legacy. Yet a one-sided emphasis 
on these aspects would never explain the extraordinary commercial 
bustle of South Korea, the materialism and conspicuous consump- 
tion of new elites, or the determined struggles for democratization 
put up by Korean workers and students. On the other hand, the 
assumption that North Korean communism broke completely with 
the past would blind one to continuing Confucian legacies there: its 
family-based politics, the succession to rule of the leader's son, and 
the extraordinary veneration of Kim II Sung (see The Cult of Kim II 
Sung, ch. 2). 

The Choson Dynasty had a traditional class structure that departed 
from the Chinese Confucian example, providing an important legacy 
for the modern period. Yangban was still the Korean term for this 
aristocracy, but it no longer connoted simply two official orders. Its 
key features were its virtual monopoly on education and official 
position, possession of land, and the requirement of hereditary lin- 
eage for entry to yangban status. Unlike in China, commoners could 



18 



Korean movable-type specimens made of brass, iron, copper, and wood, ca. 
thirteenth century. Korea advanced the technology of printing by developing 

movable cast-metal type, from the 1230s. 
Courtesy Korean Collection, Asian Division, Library of Congress, 

Washington, DC 

King Sejong (r. 1418-50), the fourth king of the Choson Dynasty, to whom is 
attributed the development of the Korean hangul alphabet 
Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, New York 

not sit for state-run examinations leading to official position. Kore- 
ans had to prove that they belonged to a yangban family, which in 
practice meant a forebear having sat for exams within the past four 
generations. In Korea, as in China, the majority of peasant families 
could not spare a son to study for the exams, so that upward social 
mobility was sharply limited. But in Korea the limit also was specif- 
ically hereditary, leading to less mobility than in China and attitudes 
toward class distinction that often seemed indistinguishable from 
castes. A major study of all successful exam candidates in the 
Choson Dynasty (some 14,000) showed remarkable persistence in 
those elite families producing students to sit for the exams; other 
studies have documented the persistence of this pattern into the early 
twentieth century. Even in 1945, one could say that this aristocracy 
was substantially intact, although its effective demise came soon 
thereafter. 

Korea's traditional class system also included a peasant majority, 
and minorities of petty clerks, merchants, and so-called "base" 



19 



North Korea: A Country Study 

classes, caste-like hereditary groups (paekchong) such as butchers, 
leather tanners, and beggars. Although merchants ranked higher than 
low-born classes, Confucian elites frowned on commercial activity 
and squelched it as much as possible right down to the twentieth cen- 
tury. Peasants ranked higher than merchants because they worked 
the life-giving land, but the life of the peasantry was almost always 
difficult during the Choson period, although more so in the later cen- 
turies. Most peasants were tenants, required to give up at least half of 
their crop to landlords as tax, and subject to various additional exac- 
tions. The low-born classes were probably worse off, however, given 
the very high rates of slavery for much of the Choson period. One 
source reported more than 200,000 government slaves in Seoul alone 
in 1462, and recent academic study has suggested that as much as 60 
percent of Seoul's population may have been slaves. In spite of slav- 
ery being hereditary, rates of escape from slavery and manumission 
also were unusually high. Class and status hierarchies also are inher- 
ent in the Korean language and have persisted into the contemporary 
period. The correct form of address to superiors and inferiors was 
quite different, and elders could be addressed only using elaborate 
honorifics. Even verb endings and conjugations differed according 
to station. 

Choson-period Confucian doctrines did not stop at the nation's 
boundary but also informed a foreign policy known as "serving the 
great" (sadae), meaning China. Choson lived within China's world 
order, radiating outward from Zhongguo (the Middle Kingdom) to 
associated states, of which Korea was the most important. It was 
China's little brother, a model tributary state, and in many ways the 
most important of China's allies. Koreans revered things Chinese, 
and China responded by being for the most part a good neighbor, 
giving more than it took away. Exercising a light-handed suzerainty, 
China assumed that enlightened Koreans would follow it without 
being forced. Absolutely convinced of its own superiority, China 
indulged in a policy that might be called benign neglect of things 
Korean, thereby allowing Korea substantive autonomy as a nation. 

This sophisticated world order was broken up and laid low by the 
Western impact in the late nineteenth century, but there were impor- 
tant legacies for the twentieth century. As dwellers within a small 
power, Koreans had to learn to be shrewd in foreign policy, and they 
had a good example of that in China. Koreans cultivated the sophis- 
ticated art of "low determines high" diplomacy, seeking to use for- 
eign power for their own ends, wagging the dog with its tail. Thus 
both South Korea and North Korea often struck foreign observers as 
rather dependent on big-power support, yet both not only claimed 



20 



Historical Setting 



but also strongly asserted their absolute autonomy and independence 
as nation-states, and both were adept at manipulating their big-power 
clients. Until the mid-1980s, North Korea was masterful, both in get- 
ting big powers to fight its battles and in maneuvering between the 
two communist giants, the Soviet Union and China, to get something 
from each and to prevent either from dominating it. Much as in the 
traditional period, Pyongyang's heart was with China. 

The soft spot that Koreans had in their hearts for China was not, 
however, the main characteristic of Korea's traditional diplomacy: that 
was isolationism, even what scholar Kim Key-hiuk has called exclu- 
sionism (see Glossary). For three centuries after the Japanese inva- 
sions of the 1590s, Korea isolated itself from Japan, dealt harshly with 
errant Westerners washing up on its shores, and kept the Chinese at 
arm's length. Thus Westerners called Korea the "hermit kingdom," the 
term expressing the pronounced streak of obstinate hostility toward 
foreign power and the deep desire for independence that marked tradi- 
tional Korea. Ethnocentric and obnoxious to foreigners, a self-con- 
tained, autonomous Korea not besmirched by things foreign has 
remained an ideal for many Koreans. North Korea has exercised a 
"hermit kingdom" option by remaining one of the more isolated states 
in the world; it was really South Korea that, since 1 960, was revolu- 
tionary in the Korean context by pursuing an open-door policy toward 
world markets and seeking a multilateral, varied diplomacy. 

Dynastic Decline 

A combination of literati purges in the early sixteenth century, Japa- 
nese invasions at the end of the century, and Manchu invasions in the 
middle of the next century severely debilitated the Choson state, which 
never again reached the heights of the fifteenth century. This period 
also saw the Manchus sweep away the Ming Dynasty in China, ending 
a remarkable period when Korean society seemed to develop apace 
with China, while making many independent innovations. 

The doctrinaire version of Confucianism that was dominant dur- 
ing the Choson made squabbles between elites particularly nasty. 
The literati were grounded in Neo-Confucian metaphysics, which 
reached sublime heights virtually unmatched elsewhere in East Asia 
in the writings of Yi T'oegye, known as "Korea's Zhu Xi" after the 
Chinese twelfth-century founder of the Neo-Confucian school. For 
many other scholar-officials, however, the doctrine rewarded arid 
scholasticism and obstinate orthodoxy. First, they had to commit 
their minds to one or another side of abstruse philosophical debate, 
and only then could the practical affairs of state be put in order. This 
situation quickly led to so-called literati purges, a series of upheavals 



21 



North Korea: A Country Study 

beginning in the mid-fifteenth century and lasting more than 100 
years, with the losers finding their persons, their property, their fam- 
ilies, and even their graves at risk from victors determined to extir- 
pate their influence — always in the name of a higher morality. Later 
in the dynasty, the concern with ideological correctness exacerbated 
more mundane factional conflicts that debilitated central power. But 
such thinking also expressed the pronounced Korean concern with 
the power of ideas, still visible in Kim II Sung's doctrine of chuch 'e 
(see Glossary; Political Ideology, ch. 4), which has assumed that rec- 
tification of the mind precedes correct action, even to the point of 
Marxist heresy in which ideas determine material reality. At any 
rate, by the end of the sixteenth century the ruling elite had so 
homogenized its ideology that there were few heterodox miscreants 
left: all were presumably united in one idea. 

At the end of the sixteenth century, Korea suffered devastating 
foreign invasions. The first came shortly after Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
ended Japan's internal disorder and unified the islands. His eventual 
goal was to put China under his control, and he launched an invasion 
that put some 160,000 Japanese soldiers at Pusan in 1592. At this, 
the Choson court took flight to the Yalu River, infuriating ordinary 
Koreans and leading slaves to revolt and burn the registries. Japa- 
nese forces marched through the peninsula at will. In the nick of 
time, however, Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin built the world's first 
armor-clad ships, so-called "turtle ships" encased in thick plating 
with cannons sticking out at every point on their circular shape, 
which destroyed Japanese fleets wherever they were found. The 
Korean ships cut Japan's supply routes, and, combined with the dis- 
patch of Ming forces and so-called "righteous armies" that rose up in 
guerrilla warfare (even Buddhist monks participated), caused the 
Japanese to retreat to a narrow redoubt near Pusan. 

After desultory negotiations and delay, Hideyoshi launched a sec- 
ond invasion in 1597. The Korean and Ming armies were ready this 
time. Yi Sun-sin, with a mere dozen warships, demolished the Japa- 
nese forces in Yellow Sea battles near the port of Mokp'o. The 
would-be conqueror Hideyoshi died, and Japanese forces withdrew 
to their home islands where they nursed an isolationist policy for the 
next 250 years. In spite of the Choson victory, the peninsula had 
been devastated. Refugees wandered its length, famine and disease 
were rampant, and even the basic land relationships were overturned 
by the widespread destruction of the registers. Korea had paid a terri- 
ble price for turning back invasions that otherwise would have sub- 
stantially redirected East Asian history. 

Choson had barely recovered when the Manchus invaded from 
the north, fighting on all fronts to oust the Ming Dynasty. Invasions 



22 



n 



Admiral Yi Sun-sin (1545-98), the Korean 
naval hero who is best known for his 
innovative armored "turtle ships " 
Courtesy Korea Tourism Organization, 

New York 



in 1627 and 1636 established tributary relations between Korea and 
the Manchus' Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), but they were less delete- 
rious than the Japanese invasions, except in the northwest, where 
Manchu forces wreaked havoc. Thereafter, the Choson Dynasty had 
a period of revival, which, had it continued, might have left Korea 
much better prepared for its encounter with the West. 

The Confucian literati were particularly reinvigorated by an intel- 
lectual movement advocating that philosophy be geared to solving 
real problems of the society. Known as the Sirhak (Practical Learn- 
ing) Movement, it produced some remarkable people, such as Yu 
Hyong-won (1622-73), who sat in a small farming village and pored 
over the classics seeking reform solutions to social problems. He 
developed a thorough, detailed critique of nearly all the institutional 
aspects of Choson politics and society and a set of concrete reforms 
to invigorate it. Chong Yag-yong (1762-1836), thought to be the 
greatest of the Sirhak scholars, wrote several books that offered his 
views on administration, justice, and the structure of politics. Still 
others, such as Yi Su-kwang (1563-1628), traveled to China and 
returned with the new Western learning then spreading in Beijing, 
while Yi Ik (1681-1763) wrote a treatise entitled Record of Concern 
for the Underprivileged. 



23 



North Korea: A Country Study 

A new vernacular fiction also developed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, much of it taking the form of social criticism. 
The best known example is Ch'unhyang chon (The Tale of 
Ch'unhyang), which argues for the common human qualities of low- 
born, commoners, and yangban alike. Often rendered as a play, it has 
been a great favorite in both North Korea and South Korea. An older 
poetic form, made up of short stanzas and called sijo, became 
another vehicle for free expression of distaste for the caste-like ineq- 
uities of Korean society. Meanwhile, Pak Chi-won (1737-1805) 
journeyed to Beijing in 1780 and wrote Jehol Diary, which com- 
pared Korean social conditions unfavorably with those he observed 
in China. 

The economy was differentiating, as the transplanting of rice seed- 
lings boosted harvests and some peasants became enterprising small 
landlords. Commercial crops developed, including tobacco, ginseng, 
and cotton, and merchants proliferated at big markets, such as those 
in Seoul at Dongdaemun (East Gate) and Namdaemun (South Gate), 
and at the way stops to China at Uiju, or Japan at Tongnae, near 
Pusan. The use of coins for commerce and for paying wages became 
more widespread, and handicraft production increased beyond gov- 
ernment control. The old Koryo city of Kaesong became a strong 
center of merchant commerce and conspicuous wealth. Finally, 
throughout the seventeenth century Western learning filtered into 
Korea, often through the auspices of a spreading Roman Catholic 
movement — which attracted commoners above all by its creed of 
equality. 

Korea in the Nineteenth-Century World Order 

Unfortunately for Korea, the early nineteenth century witnessed a 
period of sharp decline in which most of Choson's new develop- 
ments were extinguished. Harsh persecution of Catholics began in 
1801, and agricultural production declined, resulting in an agrarian 
state of rank poverty, with many peasants pursuing slash-and-burn 
agriculture in the mountains. Popular uprisings began in 1811 and 
occurred sporadically through the rest of the century, culminating in 
the Tonghak (Eastern Learning — see Glossary) Movement of the 
1 860s, which led to a major peasant rebellion in the 1 890s. 

Korean leaders were aware that China's position had been trans- 
formed by the arrival of powerful Western gunboats and traders, but 
they reacted to the First Anglo-Chinese War, better known as the 
Opium War (1839-42), by reinforcing Korea's isolation. When U.S. 
Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his "black ships" forced 
Japan to open its ports in the mid- 1850s, stimulating drastic reform 



24 



Historical Setting 



of Japanese institutions — the Meiji Restoration of 1868 — and subse- 
quent industrialization, Korean literati attributed this change to 
Japan's inferior grasp of Confucian doctrine. There were French and 
American attempts to "open" Korea, including an August 1866 inci- 
dent when an armed American-owned merchant ship, the General 
Sherman (the former U.S. gunboat USS Princess Royal), steamed up 
the Taedong River almost to P'yongyang, whereupon locals burned 
it and killed all its crew (an event in which Kim II Sung claimed his 
great-grandfather was involved). Korea's success in rebuffing such 
intrusions encouraged the regime to think it could hold out indefi- 
nitely against external pressure. 

Developments from 1864 to 1873 under a powerful leader named 
the Taewon'gun, or Grand Prince, Yi Ha-ung (1821-98) offered fur- 
ther evidence of Korean resilience, because he was able to reform 
the bureaucracy, bring in new talent, extract new taxes from both the 
yangban and commoners, and keep the foreign imperialists at bay. 
Korea's descent into the maelstrom of imperial rivalry was quick 
after this time, however, as Japan succeeded in imposing a Western- 
style unequal treaty in February 1876, giving its nationals extraterri- 
torial rights and opening three Korean ports to Japanese commerce. 
China sought to reassert its traditional position in Korea by playing 
the imperial powers off against each other, leading to unequal trea- 
ties between Korea and the United States, Britain, Russia, Italy, and 
other nations. The Chinese even gave the Koreans the design of their 
national flag during this period. These activities split the Korean 
court into pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, pro-American, and pro-Rus- 
sian factions, each of which influenced policy down to the final 
annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. Meanwhile, various Korean 
reform movements, influenced either by Japanese or American pro- 
gressives, attempted to gain momentum. 

Although Korean historians have postulated an "enlightenment 
movement," this phase of sporadic Westernization cannot remotely 
be compared to the Enlightenment in Europe and was constantly 
thwarted by reactionary scholars and officials. A number of individ- 
uals, including Kim Hong-jip, Kim Ok-kyun, Yun Ch'i-ho, and Yu 
Kil-chun, were very impressed by what they witnessed in Japan in 
the early 1880s, as that country industrialized quickly. Yun went on 
to become an influential modernizer in the twentieth century, and Yu 
became the first Korean to study in the United States — at the Gover- 
nor Dummer Academy in Byfield, Massachusetts. Meanwhile, Kim 
Ok-kyun, impressed by the Meiji Restoration, sought to pull off a 
coup d'etat in 1884 with a handful of progressives and about 200 



25 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Japanese Legation soldiers. Resident Chinese troops quickly sup- 
pressed the coup, however, and Kim fled to Japan. 

For a decade thereafter, China reasserted a rare direct influence, 
when General Yuan Shikai established his residency in 1885 and 
momentarily made China first among the foreign powers then resi- 
dent in Korea. A conservative reformer in China, he had no use for 
Korean reformers and instead blocked the slightest sign of Korean 
nationalism. Japan put a definitive end to Chinese influence in the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), seizing on the reinvigorated Tonghak 
Movement, which led to widespread rebellion in 1894. Uniting peas- 
ants against Western pressure, growing Japanese economic penetra- 
tion, and Choson's corrupt and ineffectual government, the rebellion 
spread from the southwest into the center of the peninsula, thus 
threatening Seoul. The hapless court invited China to send troops to 
put the rebellion down, whereupon Japan had the pretext it wanted to 
send troops to Korea. After defeating Chinese forces, Japan declared 
Korea independent, thus breaking its long tributary relationship with 
China. Thereafter, Japan pushed through epochal reforms that ended 
the old civil service exam system, abolished traditional class distinc- 
tions, ended slavery, and established modern fiscal and judicial 
mechanisms. 

Korean reformers influenced by the West, such as Phillip Jaisohn 
(So Chae-p'il, 1866-1948) who had studied in the United States, 
launched an Independence Club in 1896 to promote Westernization 
and used the vernacular hangul in its newspaper, the Tongnip Sinmun 
(The Independent), alternating pages in Korean with English. The 
club included many Koreans who had studied Western learning in 
Protestant missionary schools and, for a while, influenced not only 
young reformers but also elements of the Korean court. One of the 
reformers was Yi Sungman, otherwise known as Syngman Rhee 
(1875-1965), who became the first president of the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) in 1948. The club was repressed and collapsed 
after two years. 

In 1897 King Kojong (r. 1864-1907), when confronted with Japa- 
nese plots, fled to the Russian Legation, where he conducted the 
nation's business for a year and shortly thereafter declared Korea to 
be the "Great Han (Korean) Empire," from which came the later 
name Taehan Min'guk, or Republic of Korea. It was the futile last 
gasp of the Choson; the only question was which imperial power 
would colonize Korea. Japan found a champion in U.S. president 
Theodore Roosevelt. In 1902 Britain established an alliance with 
Japan, and both London and Washington gave Japan a free hand in 
Korea. 



26 





The widow Myong-su shows her faithfulness to her late husband by spurning an 
unwanted suitor (upper left) and giving all her belongings to her servants to take care 
of her stepson (lower right). Woodcut from volume 3 o/Oryun haengsilto (Five Rules 

of Conduct), a 1 775 Korean book on Confucian ethics. 
Courtesy Korean Collection, Asian Division, Library of 

Congress, Washington, DC 



27 



North Korea: A Country Study 

To the north, Russia also was expanding into Manchuria and 
Korea and, in alliance with France and Germany, had forced Japan to 
return the Liaodong Peninsula, acquired from China as a result of the 
Japanese victory in 1895. Japan promptly leased the region from 
China and continued to develop it. Shortly thereafter, in 1900, Japa- 
nese forces intervened with the other foreign powers to suppress the 
Boxer Uprising in China. Russia continued to develop the railroad 
system in Manchuria and to exploit forests and gold mines in the 
northern part of Korea. During this period, Americans, too, were 
given concessions for railroad and streetcar lines, waterworks, 
Seoul's new telephone network, and mines. 

Russia and Japan sought to divide their interests in Korea, suggest- 
ing at one point that the thirty-eighth parallel be the dividing line 
between their spheres of influence. The rivalry devolved into the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), however, when Japan launched a suc- 
cessful surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Dalian (Port Arthur) in 
Northeast China. Japan then electrified all of Asia by becoming the first 
nonwhite people to subdue one of the "great powers"; thereafter many 
Asian progressives, Sun Yatsen of China and many young Koreans 
included, went to study in Japan. Under the peace treaty signed in 1905, 
brokered by Theodore Roosevelt in a conference at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, Russia recognized Japan's paramount rights in Korea. Dip- 
lomatic notes exchanged between the United States and Japan 
acknowledged a trade-off between the Philippines and Korea. Japan 
would not question American rights in its colony, and the United States 
would not challenge Japan's new protectorate, which it established in 
1905. Japan thus controlled Korea's foreign policy, installed a resident 
general, and, in 1907, deposed King Kojong. Kojong was succeeded by 
his son Sunjong (r. 1907-10), the second and last emperor of Korea. 
Significant Korean resistance followed on this deposition, spreading 
through several provinces as local yangban organized militias for guer- 
rilla warfare against Japan. In 1909 a Korean assassin named An 
Chung-gun killed Ito Hirobumi, the Japanese statesman who had con- 
cluded the protectorate agreement. An expatriate Korean in San Fran- 
cisco also gunned down Durham Stevens, a foreign affairs adviser to 
the Japanese who had lauded their efforts in Korea. Such opposition 
was too little and too late. In 1910 Japan turned Korea into its colony, 
thus extinguishing Korea's hard-fought independence, which had first 
emerged with Silla and Koguryo resistance to Chinese pressures. 

The Choson Dynasty faltered under the impact of Korea's open- 
ing in 1876 and then collapsed in a few decades. Despite its extraor- 
dinary five-century longevity, while the traditional system was 
adaptable, even supple in the marginal adjustments and incremental 



28 



King Sunjong (1874-1926; 
r. 1907-10), second and last 
emperor of the Great Han 
(Korean) Empire, ca. 1907 
Courtesy George Grantham 
Bain Collection, 
LC-USZ62-72799, Lot 
11148, Prints and Photo- 
graphs Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 



responses necessary to forestall or accommodate domestic or inter- 
nal conflict and change, it could not withstand the full foreign 
onslaught of technically advanced imperial powers with strong 
armies. The old agrarian bureaucracy managed the interplay of dif- 
ferent and competing interests by having a system of checks and bal- 
ances that tended over time to equilibrate the interests of different 
parties. The king and the bureaucracy kept watch on each other, the 
royal clans watched both, scholars could criticize or remonstrate 
from the moral position of Confucian doctrine, secret inspectors and 
censors went around the country to watch for rebellion and assure 
accurate reporting, landed aristocrats sent sons into the bureaucracy 
to protect family interests, and local potentates influenced the county 
magistrates sent down from the central administration. The Choson 
Dynasty was not a system that modern Koreans would wish to 
restore or live under, but in its time it was a sophisticated political 
apparatus, sufficiently adaptable and persistent to give unified rule to 
Korea for half a millennium. 

Japanese Colonialism, 1910-45 

Korea did not escape the Japanese grip until 1945, when Japan lay 
prostrate under the U.S. and Soviet onslaught that brought World 



29 



North Korea: A Country Study 

War II to a close. The colonial experience that shaped postwar Korea 
was intense and bitter. It brought development and underdevelop- 
ment, agrarian growth and an impoverished peasant tenancy, indus- 
trialization and extraordinary dislocation, and political mobilization 
and deactivation. The colonial period also resulted in a new role for 
the central state, new sets of Korean political leaders, communism 
and nationalism, and armed resistance and treacherous collaboration. 
Above all, it left deep fissures and conflicts that have gnawed at the 
Korean national identity ever since. 

Colonialism was often thought to have created new nations where 
none existed before, to have drawn national boundaries, brought 
diverse tribes and peoples together, tutored the natives in self-gov- 
ernment, and prepared for the day when the imperialist powers 
decided to grant independence; but all such advantages existed in 
Korea for centuries before 1910. Furthermore, by virtue of their rela- 
tive proximity to China, Koreans had always felt superior to Japan 
and blamed Japan's devastating sixteenth-century invasions for hin- 
dering Korean wealth and power in subsequent centuries. 

Thus the Japanese engaged not in creation, but in substitution 
after 1910: substituting a Japanese ruling elite for the Korean yang- 
ban scholar-officials, colonial imperative coordination for the old 
central state administration, Japanese modern education for Confu- 
cian classics, Japanese capital and expertise for the budding Korean 
versions, Japanese talent for Korean talent, and eventually even the 
Japanese language for Korean. Koreans never thanked the Japanese 
for these substitutions, did not credit Japan with creations, and 
instead saw Japan as snatching away the ancien regime, Korea's sov- 
ereignty and independence, its indigenous if incipient moderniza- 
tion, and above all its national dignity. Unlike some other colonial 
peoples, therefore, Koreans never saw Japanese rule as anything but 
illegitimate and humiliating. Furthermore, the very closeness of the 
two nations — in geography, in common Chinese cultural influences, 
and in levels of development until the nineteenth century — made 
Japanese dominance all the more galling to Koreans and gave a 
peculiar intensity to the relationship, a dynamic that suggested to 
Koreans that "there but for accidents of history go we." 

The Japanese built bureaucracies in Korea, all of which were cen- 
tralized and all of them big by colonial standards. Unlike the rela- 
tively small British colonial cadre in India, the Japanese came in 
large numbers (700,000 by the 1940s), and the majority of coloniz- 
ers worked in government service. For the first time in history, 
Korea had a national police, responsive to the center and possessing 
its own communications and transportation facilities. The huge Ori- 
ental Development Company organized and funded industrial and 



30 



One of 12 hand-colored maps in the manuscript atlas, Tae Choson chido (Great 
Korean Map); the atlas, dating to ca. 1874, has individual maps of the provinces of 

Korea, China, Japan, and the world. 
Courtesy Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 

agricultural projects, and came to own more than 20 percent of 
Korea's arable land; it employed an army of officials who fanned out 
through the countryside to supervise agricultural production. The 
official Bank of Korea performed central banking functions, such as 
regulating interest rates and providing credit to firms and entrepre- 
neurs — almost all of them, of course, Japanese. Central judicial bod- 
ies wrote new laws establishing an extensive, "legalized" system of 
racial discrimination against Koreans, making them second-class cit- 
izens in their own country. Bureaucratic departments proliferated at 
the Government General Headquarters in Seoul, turning it into the 
nerve center of the country. Semi-official companies and conglomer- 
ates, including the big zaibatsu (business empires) such as Mitsu- 



31 



North Korea: A Country Study 

bishi and Mitsui, laid railroads, built ports, installed modern facto- 
ries, and ultimately remade the face of old Korea. 

Japan held Korea tightly, watched it closely, and pursued an orga- 
nized, architectonic colonialism in which the planner and adminis- 
trator was the model, not the swashbuckling conqueror. The strong, 
highly centralized colonial state mimicked the role that the Japanese 
state had come to play in Japan — intervening in the economy, creat- 
ing markets, spawning new industries, and suppressing dissent. 
Politically, Koreans could barely breathe, but economically there 
was significant — if unevenly distributed — growth. Agricultural out- 
put rose substantially in the 1920s, and a hothouse industrialization 
took place in the 1930s. Growth rates in the Korean economy often 
outstripped those in Japan itself; one estimate suggested an annual 
growth rate for Korea of nearly 3.6 percent in the 1911-38 period, 
compared to a rate of 3.4 percent for Japan itself. 

Koreans have always thought that the benefits of this growth went 
entirely to Japan, and that Korea would have developed rapidly with- 
out Japanese help anyway. Nonetheless, the strong colonial state, the 
multiplicity of bureaucracies, the policy of administrative guidance 
of the economy, the use of the state to found new industries, and the 
repression of labor unions and dissidents that went with it provided a 
surreptitious model for both North and South Korea in the postwar 
period. Japan showed them an early version of the "bureaucratic- 
authoritarian" path to industrialization, and it was a lesson that 
seemed well learned by the 1970s. 

The Rise of Korean Nationalism and Communism 

The colonial period brought forth an entirely new set of Korean 
political leaders encouraged both by the resistance to, and the oppor- 
tunities of, Japanese colonialism. The emergence of nationalist and 
communist groups dates back to the 1920s; it was in this period that 
the left-right splits of postwar Korea began. The transformation of 
the yangban aristocracy also began at this time. In the 1930s, new 
groups of armed resisters, bureaucrats, and, for the first time, mili- 
tary leaders emerged. Both North Korea and South Korea have been 
profoundly influenced by the political elites and the political con- 
flicts generated during colonial rule. 

One thing from the Choson Dynasty that the Japanese were not able 
to destroy was the yangban aristocracy. Although the higher scholar- 
officials were pensioned off and replaced by Japanese, landlords were 
allowed to retain their holdings and encouraged to continue disciplin- 
ing peasants and extracting rice as in-kind tax payments from them. 
The traditional landholding system was put on a different basis 



32 



Historical Setting 



through new legal measures and a full property survey shortly after the 
Japanese took over, but tenancy continued and was systematically 
extended throughout the colonial period. By 1945 Korea had an agri- 
cultural tenancy system with few parallels in the world. More-tradi- 
tional landlords were content to sit back and let Japanese officials 
increase output; by 1945 such people were widely viewed as treacher- 
ous collaborators with the Japanese, and strong demands emerged to 
share out their land to the tenants. During the 1920s, however, another 
trend began as landlords became entrepreneurs. 

In 1919 mass movements swept many colonial and semicolonial 
countries, including Korea. Drawing on U.S. president Woodrow 
Wilson's promises of self-determination, a group of 33 intellectuals 
on March 1, 1919, petitioned for independence from Japan and 
touched off nationwide mass protests that continued for months. The 
Japanese fiercely crushed these protests, causing many younger 
Koreans to become militant opponents of colonial rule. The year 
1919 was a watershed for the anti-imperialist movement in Korea. 
The leaders of the movement were moderate intellectuals and stu- 
dents who sought independence through nonviolent means and sup- 
port from progressive elements in the West. Their courageous 
witness and the nationwide demonstrations that they provoked 
remained a touchstone of Korean nationalism. The movement suc- 
ceeded in provoking reforms in Japan's administration, but its failure 
to realize independence also stimulated radical forms of anticolonial 
resistance. 

Some Korean militants went into exile in China and the Soviet 
Union and founded early communist and nationalist resistance 
groups. The Korean Communist Party was established in Seoul in 
1925. One of the organizers was Pak Hon-yong, who became the 
leader of the Korean communist movement in southern Korea after 
1945. Various nationalist groups also emerged during this period, 
including the exiled Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, 
which included Syngman Rhee and another famous nationalist, Kim 
Ku, among its members. 

Sharp police repression and internal factionalism made it impossi- 
ble to sustain radical groups over time. Many nationalist and com- 
munist leaders were jailed in the early 1930s, only to reemerge in 
1945. When Japan invaded and then annexed Manchuria in 1931, 
however, a strong guerrilla resistance embracing Chinese and Kore- 
ans emerged. There were more than 200,000 guerrillas — all loosely 
connected, and including bandits and secret societies — fighting the 
Japanese in the early 1930s. After murderous but effective counter- 
insurgency campaigns, the numbers declined to a few thousand by 
the mid- 1930s. It was in this milieu that Kim II Sung (originally 



33 



North Korea: A Country Study 

named Kim S6ng-ju, 1912-94; the name II Sung means "become the 
sun") emerged. He was a significant guerrilla leader by the mid- 
19308, considered by the Japanese as one of the most effective and 
dangerous of guerrillas. The Japanese formed a special counterinsur- 
gent unit to track Kim down and assigned Koreans to it as part of 
their divide-and-rule tactics. 

Both Koreas created myths about this guerrilla resistance: North 
Korea claimed that Kim single-handedly defeated the Japanese, and 
South Korea claimed that Kim was an imposter who stole the name 
of a revered patriot. Nonetheless, this experience was important for 
understanding postwar Korea: the resistance to the Japanese became 
the main legitimating doctrine of North Korea; North Koreans traced 
the origin of the army, the leadership, and their ideology back to this 
founding moment. For the next five decades, the top North Korean 
leadership was dominated by a core group that fought the Japanese 
in Manchuria. 

Japan went to war against China in 1937 and the United States in 
1941, and as World War II took on global dimensions, Koreans for the 
first time had military careers opened to them. Although most were 
conscripted foot soldiers, a small number achieved officer status, and a 
few even attained high rank. Virtually the entire officer corps of the 
Republic of Korea army during the Rhee period (1948-61) was drawn 
from Koreans with experience in the Japanese Imperial Army. At least 
in part, the Korean War (1950-53) became a matter of Japanese- 
trained military officers fighting Japanese-spawned resistance leaders. 

Japan's far-flung war effort also caused a labor shortage through- 
out the empire, including Korea, where it meant that bureaucratic 
position was more available to Koreans than at any previous time. 
Thus, a substantial cadre of Koreans obtained administrative experi- 
ence in government, local administration, police and judicial work, 
economic planning agencies, banks, and the like. That this develop- 
ment occurred in the last decade of colonialism created a divisive 
legacy, however, for this also was the harshest period of Japanese 
rule, the time Koreans remember with greatest bitterness. Korean 
culture was squashed, and Koreans were required to speak Japanese 
and to take Japanese names. The majority suffered badly at the pre- 
cise time that a minority was doing well. This minority acquired the 
taint of collaboration and never successfully shucked it off. Korea 
from 1937 to 1945 was much like Vichy France in the early 1940s. 
Bitter experiences and memories of the period continue to divide 
people, even within the same family, and as they have been too pain- 
ful to confront directly, they have become buried history. Nonethe- 
less, the memory continues to play upon the national identity. 



34 



Historical Setting 



Perhaps the most important characteristic of Korea's colonial 
experience was the manner in which it ended: the last decade of a 
four-decade imperium was a pressure cooker, building up tensions 
that exploded in the postwar period. The colonial period built to a 
crescendo, abruptly collapsed, and left the Korean people and two 
different great powers to deal with the results. There had been some 
fighting against Japan along the Korea-China border in the late 
1930s, including forays into Korea by Kim II Sung's force, but no 
sustained armed resistance within Korea itself. 

In the mid- 1930s, Japan entered a phase of heavy industrialization 
that embraced all of Northeast Asia. Unlike most colonial powers, 
Japan located heavy industry in its colonies and brought the means 
of production to the labor and raw materials. Manchuria and north- 
ern Korea acquired steel mills, automotive plants, petrochemical 
complexes, and enormous hydroelectric facilities. The region was 
held exclusively by Japan and tied into the home market to the 
degree that national boundaries became less important than the new 
transnational, integrated production. To facilitate this production 
Japan also built railroads, highways, cities, ports, and other modern 
transportation and communication facilities. By 1945 Korea propor- 
tionally had more kilometers of railroads than any other Asian coun- 
try except Japan, leaving only remote parts of the central east coast 
and the wild Northeast China-Korea border region untouched by 
modern means of conveyance. These changes were externally 
induced and served Japanese, not Korean, interests. Thus, they rep- 
resented a kind of overdevelopment. 

The same changes fostered underdevelopment in Korean society 
as a whole. Because the changes were exogenous, the Korean upper 
and managerial classes did not blossom; instead, their development 
was retarded or ballooned suddenly at Japanese behest. Among the 
majority peasant class, change was considerable. Koreans became 
the mobile human capital used to work the new factories in northern 
Korea and Manchuria, mines and other enterprises in Japan, and 
urban factories in southern Korea. From 1935 to 1945, Korea began 
its industrial revolution, with many of the usual characteristics: 
uprooting of peasants from the land, the emergence of a working 
class, urbanization, and population mobility. In Korea the process 
was telescoped, giving rise to remarkable population movements 
when considered comparatively. By 1945 about 11 percent of the 
entire Korean population was living abroad (mostly in Japan and 
Manchuria), and fully 20 percent of all Koreans were either abroad 
or in a province other than that in which they were born (with most 
of the interprovincial movement being southern peasants moving 



35 



North Korea: A Country Study 



CHINA 



i 

130 



RUSSIA/ 




Sea of Japan 
('Last Sea) 




Honshu 



(7/ 



KOREA j / 

yellow ( -J S 
\ Sea ?7^7/ 
[ (West Sea) {:) 



J Shikoku 



'East 
China 
Sea 



^KyushG 





'Pacific Ocean 



ill 



1 



TAIWAN 



— 20 



20^3 



PHILIPPINES 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 

130 

I 



International boundary 

Cease-fire line of 1953 

38th parallel 

| j North Korea 

100 200 300 Kilometers 



200 



300 Miles 



Figure 3. North Korea in Its Asian Setting 

into northern industry). This was, by and large, a forced or mobilized 
movement; by 1942 it often meant drafted and conscripted labor. 
Peasants lost land or rights to work land only to end up working in 
unfamiliar factory settings, doing the dirty work for a pittance. 

When the colonial system abruptly terminated in August 1945, 
millions of Koreans sought to return to their native villages from 
these far-flung mobilization details. But they were no longer the 



36 



Historical Setting 



same people: they had grievances against those who remained secure 
at home, they had suffered material and status losses, they often had 
come into contact with new ideologies, they all had seen a broader 
world beyond the villages. It was this intense final decade that 
loosed upon postwar Korea a mass of changed and disgruntled peo- 
ple who greatly disrupted the early postwar period and the plans of 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 

National Division in the1940s 

Tensions in the 1940s 

The crucible of the period of national division and opposing states 
in Korea was the decade from 1943 to 1953. The politics of contem- 
porary Korea cannot be understood without comprehending the 
events of this decade. It was the breeding ground of the two Koreas, 
of war, and of a reordering of international politics in Northeast Asia 
(see fig. 3). 

From the time of the tsars, Korea was a concern of Russian security. 
The Russo-Japanese War was fought in part over the disposition of the 
Korean Peninsula. It was often surmised that the Russians saw Korea 
as a gateway to the Pacific, and especially to warm- water ports. Fur- 
thermore, Korea had one of Asia's oldest communist movements. 
Thus, it would appear that postwar Korea was of great interest to the 
Soviet Union; many have thought that its policy was a simple matter 
of Sovietizing northern Korea, setting up a puppet state, and then, in 
1950, directing Kim II Sung to unify Korea by force. There was 
greater complexity than this in Soviet policy, however, as historian 
Andrei Lankov's scholarship has demonstrated. The Soviets did not 
get a warm- water port out of their involvement in Korea, and they did 
not have an effective relationship with Korean communists. Commu- 
nist Party of the Soviet Union general secretary Joseph V. Stalin 
purged and even shot many of the Koreans who had functioned in the 
Comintern (see Glossary), and he did not help Kim II Sung and other 
guerrillas in their struggle against the Japanese. 

The United States took the initiative in big-power deliberations on 
Korea during World War II, suggesting a multilateral trusteeship for 
postwar Korea to the British in March 1943, and to the Soviets at the 
end of the same year. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, worried about 
the disposition of enemy-held colonial territories and aware of colo- 
nial demands for independence, sought a gradualist, tutelary policy of 
preparing colonials (like the Koreans) for self-government and inde- 
pendence. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the Allies, at 
the urging of the United States, declared that after Japan was defeated, 



37 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Korea would become independent "in due course," a phrase consistent 
with Roosevelt's ideas. At about the same time, planners in the U.S. 
Department of State drastically altered the traditional U.S. policy of 
noninvolvement toward Korea by defining the security of the penin- 
sula as important to the security of the postwar Pacific, which was, in 
turn, important to U.S. national security. 

At a midnight meeting in Washington on August 10-11, 1945, U.S. 
War Department officials, including John J. McCloy and Dean Rusk, 
decided to make the thirty-eighth parallel — roughly the half-way point 
between the northern and southern extremities of Korea — the dividing 
line between Soviet and U.S. zones in Korea. Neither the Soviets nor 
the Koreans were consulted. The day following Japan's surren- 
der — August 15, 1945 — was designated as the date of Korean inde- 
pendence from Japan. Then, when 25,000 U.S. soldiers occupied 
southern Korea in early September 1945, they found themselves up 
against a strong Korean impulse for independence and for thorough 
reform of colonial legacies. By and large, Koreans wished to solve 
their problems themselves and resented any implication that they were 
not ready for self-government. 

During World War II, Stalin usually did not voice an opinion in his 
discussions with Roosevelt about Korea. From 1941 to 1945, Kim II 
Sung and other guerrillas were given sanctuary in Sino-Soviet border 
towns near Khabarovsk, trained at a small school, and dispatched as 
agents into Japanese-held territory. Recent research by Japanese histo- 
rian Wada Haruki suggests that Chinese communists controlled the 
border camps, not Russians. Although the U.S. Department of State 
suspected that as many as 30,000 Koreans were being trained as 
Soviet guerrilla agents, postwar North Korean documents, captured by 
forces led by General Douglas MacArthur, show that there could not 
have been more than a few hundred guerrilla agents. When the Soviets 
occupied Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel in August 1945, they 
brought these Koreans (often termed Soviet-Koreans, even though 
most of them were not Soviet citizens) with them. Although this group 
was not large, several of them became prominent in the regime, for 
example Ho Ka-i, an experienced party organizer, and Nam II, whom 
Americans came to know during the Korean War when he led the 
North Korean delegation in peace talks. The Soviets acquiesced to the 
thirty-eighth parallel decision without saying a word about it and then 
accepted the U.S. plan for a multilateral trusteeship at a foreign minis- 
ters' meeting in December 1945. Over the succeeding two years, the 
two powers held so-called joint commission meetings trying to resolve 
their differences and establish a provisional government for Korea. 



38 



Historical Setting 



U.S. and Soviet Occupations 

The U.S. military command, along with emissaries dispatched 
from Washington, tended to interpret resistance to U.S. desires in the 
South as radical and pro-Soviet. When Korean resistance leaders set 
up an interim "People's Republic" and so-called "people's commit- 
tees" throughout southern Korea in September 1945, the United 
States saw this fundamentally indigenous movement as part of a 
Soviet master plan to dominate all of Korea. Radical activity, such as 
the ousting of landlords and attacks on Koreans who had served in 
the colonial police, usually was a matter of settling scores left over 
from the colonial period, or of demands by Koreans to run their own 
affairs. But it immediately became wrapped up with U.S. -Soviet 
rivalry, such that the Cold War arrived early in Korea — in the last 
months of 1945. Once the U.S. occupation chose to bolster the status 
quo and resist radical reform of colonial legacies, it immediately ran 
into monumental opposition to its policies from the mass of South 
Koreans. 

Most of the first year of the occupation (1945-46) was given over 
to suppression of the many people's committees that had emerged, 
which provoked a massive rebellion that spread over four provinces 
in the fall of 1946. After it was suppressed, radical activists devel- 
oped a significant guerrilla movement in 1948 and 1949. They also 
ignited a major rebellion at the port of Yosu in southern South Korea 
in October 1948. Much of this disorder stemmed from the unre- 
solved land problem, as conservative landed elements used their 
bureaucratic power to block redistribution of land to peasant tenants. 
The North Koreans sought to take advantage of this discontent, but 
the best evidence shows that most of the dissidents and guerrillas 
were southerners, upset about southern policies. Indeed, the strength 
of the left wing was in those provinces farthest from the thirty-eighth 
parallel, in the southwest, which historically had been rebellious (the 
Tonghaks came from there), and in the southeast, which had felt the 
greatest impact from Japanese colonialism. 

By 1947 Washington was willing to acknowledge formally that 
the Cold War had begun in Korea and abandoned attempts to negoti- 
ate with the Soviets toward a unified, multilateral administration. 
The Soviets also had determined that the postwar world would be 
one of two blocs, and they exercised broad administrative control in 
North Korea. According to declassified documents, when President 
Harry S. Truman announced the Truman Doctrine and the contain- 
ment policy in the spring of 1947, Korea was very nearly included 
along with Greece and Turkey as a key containment country; U.S. 
Department of State planners foresaw a whopping US$600 million 



39 



North Korea: A Countiy Study 

package of economic and military aid for southern Korea, backing 
away only when the U.S. Congress and the War Department balked 
at such a huge sum. The decision was then made to seek United 
Nations (UN) backing for U.S. policy in Korea, and to hold UN- 
sponsored elections in all of Korea if the Soviets would go along, in 
southern Korea alone if they did not. The elections were held in the 
South in May 1948, and they resulted in the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea on August 15 that year. 

The Arrival of Kim II Sung 

Kim II Sung did not appear in North Korea until late September 
1945. What he did in the weeks after the Japanese surrender is not 
known. The Soviets presented Kim to the Korean people as a guer- 
rilla hero. From August 1945 to January 1946, the Soviets worked 
with a coalition of communists and nationalists, the latter headed by 
a Protestant leader named Cho Man-sik. The coalition did not set up 
a central administration, nor did it establish an army. In retrospect, 
their policy was more tentative and reactive than U.S. policy in 
South Korea, which moved forward with plans for a separate admin- 
istration and army. Soviet power in East Asia was flexible and 
resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in early 
1946. 

Whether in response to U.S. initiatives or because most Koreans 
despised the trusteeship agreement that had been negotiated at the 
end of 1945, separate institutions began to emerge in North Korea in 
early 1946. In February 1946, an Interim People's Committee led by 
Kim II Sung became the first central government in the North. The 
next month, a revolutionary land reform ensued, dispossessing land- 
lords without compensation. In August 1946, a powerful political 
party (called the Korean Workers' Party — KWP) quickly filled the 
political vacuum and dominated politics; and in the fall, the first 
rudiments of a northern army appeared. Central agencies national- 
ized major industries (previously mostly owned by the Japanese) and 
began a two-year economic program based on the Soviet model of 
central planning and the priority of heavy industry. Nationalists and 
Christian leaders were ousted from all but pro forma participation in 
politics, and Cho Man-sik was held under house arrest. Kim II Sung 
and his allies dominated all the political parties, ousting people who 
resisted them. 

Within a year of the liberation from Japan, North Korea had a pow- 
erful political party, a growing economy, and a single leader named 
Kim II Sung. Although Kim had rivals, his emergence — and that of the 
Kim system — dated from mid- 1946. By then he had placed close, loyal 
allies at the heart of power. His prime assets were his background, his 



40 



Historical Setting 



skills at organization, and his ideology. Although Kim was only 34 
years old when he came to power, few other Koreans who were still 
alive could match his record of resistance to the Japanese. He was for- 
tunate to emerge in the last decade of a 40-year resistance that had 
killed off many leaders of the older generation. North Korea absurdly 
claimed that Kim was the leader of all Korean resisters, when in fact 
there were many more besides him. But Kim was able to win the sup- 
port and firm loyalty of several hundred people like him: young, tough, 
nationalistic guerrillas who had fought in Manchuria. The prime test of 
legitimacy in postwar Korea was one's record under the hated Japanese 
regime, and so Kim and his core allies possessed nationalist credentials 
that were superior to those of the South Korean leadership. Further- 
more, Kim's backers had military force at their disposal and used it to 
advantage against rivals with no military experience. 

Kim's organizational skills probably came from his experience in 
the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Unlike traditional 
Korean leaders — and many more intellectual or theoretical commu- 
nists, such as Pak H6n-y6ng — Kim pursued a style of mass leader- 
ship, using his considerable charisma and the practice of visiting 
factories and farms for "on-the-spot guidance," and he encouraged 
his allies to do the same. The North Koreans went against Soviet 
orthodoxy by including masses of poor peasants in the KWP, indeed 
terming it a "mass" rather than a class or vanguard party. 

Since the 1940s, North Korea has enrolled 12 to 14 percent of the 
population in the dominant party, compared to 1 to 3 percent for most 
communist parties. The vast majority of party members have been 
poor peasants with no previous political experience. Membership in 
the party gave them position, prestige, privileges, and a rudimentary 
form of political participation. Kim's ideology tended to be revolu- 
tionary-nationalist rather than communist. The chuck 'e ideology had 
its beginnings in the late 1940s (although the term chuck' e was not 
used until 1955), a doctrine that stressed self-reliance and indepen- 
dence but also drew upon the Neo-Confucian emphasis on rectifica- 
tion of the mind prior to action in the real world. Soon after Kim took 
power, virtually all North Koreans were required to participate in 
study groups and "re-education" meetings, where regime ideology 
was inculcated. 

In the 1940s, Kim faced factional power struggles among his group 
(those guerrillas who operated in Manchuria), communists who had 
remained in Korea during the colonial period (the domestic faction), 
Koreans associated with Chinese communism (the Yan'an faction), 
and Koreans from or close to the Soviet Union (the Soviet faction). In 
the aftermath of the Korean War, amid much false scapegoating for the 
disasters of the war, Kim purged the domestic faction, many of whose 



41 



North Korea: A Country Study 

leaders were from southern Korea; Pak Hon-yong and 12 of his asso- 
ciates were pilloried in show trials under ridiculous charges that they 
were American spies. Ten of them subsequently were executed. In the 
mid-1950s, Kim eliminated key leaders of the Soviet faction, includ- 
ing Ho Ka-i, and overcame an apparent coup attempt by members of 
the Yan'an faction — whereupon he purged many of them. Some, like 
the guerrilla hero Mu Chong, reportedly escaped to China. These 
power struggles ensued during only the first decade of the regime and 
were not repeated. There were of course conflicts within the leader- 
ship later on, but they were relatively minor and did not successfully 
challenge Kim's power. 

In the 1946^8 period, there was much evidence that the Soviets 
hoped to dominate North Korea. In particular, they sought to involve 
North Korea in a quasicolonial relationship in which Korean raw mate- 
rials, such as tungsten and gold, were exchanged for Soviet manufac- 
tures. Although the Soviets also sought to keep Chinese communist 
influence out of Korea, in the late 1940s Maoism was quietly intro- 
duced into Korean newspapers and books by a Yan'an-trained Korean 
agent. Soviet influence was especially strong in the media, where major 
organs were staffed by Koreans from the Soviet Union, and in the secu- 
rity bureaus. Nonetheless, the Korean guerrillas who fought in Man- 
churia were not easily molded and dominated. They were tough, highly 
nationalistic, and determined to have Korea for themselves. This was 
especially so for the Korean People's Army (KPA), which was an 
important base for Kim II Sung and which was led by another Manchu- 
rian guerrilla, Ch'oe Yong-gon, when it was founded on February 8, 
1948. At the founding ceremony, Kim urged his soldiers to carry for- 
ward the tradition of the Manchurian guerrillas. 

The Establishment of the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea 

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established on 
September 9, 1948, three weeks after the Republic of Korea was 
formed in Seoul on August 15. Kim II Sung was named premier, a title 
he retained until 1972, when, under a new constitution, he was named 
president. At the end of 1948, the Soviets withdrew their occupation 
forces from North Korea. This decision contrasted strongly with 
Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. Tens of thousands of Korean sol- 
diers who fought in the Chinese civil war (1946^49) also filtered back 
into Korea. All through 1949, tough, crack troops with Chinese, not 
Soviet, experience returned to be integrated with the KPA; the return 
of these Korean troops inevitably skewed North Korea toward China. 
It enhanced Kim's bargaining power and enabled him to maneuver 



42 



Historical Setting 



between the two communist giants. The Soviets kept advisers in the 
Korean government and military, although far fewer than the thou- 
sands claimed by South Korean sources. There were probably 300 to 
400 advisers assigned to North Korea, although many of those were 
experienced military and security people. Both countries continued to 
trade, and the Soviets sold World War II-vintage weaponry to North 
Korea. 

In 1949 Kim II Sung had himself named suryong (see Glossary) an 
old Koguryo term for "leader" that the Koreans always modified by 
the adjective "great" (as in Great Leader). The KPA was built up with 
recruiting campaigns for soldiers and bond drives to purchase Soviet 
tanks; meanwhile, the tradition of the Manchurian guerrillas was bur- 
nished in the party newspaper, Nodong Shinmun (Workers' Daily), 
perhaps to offset the influence of powerful Korean officers who fought 
with the Chinese communists, such Mu Chong and Pang Ho-san. 

The Korean War, 1950-53 

North Korea seemed almost to be on a war footing in early 1949. 
Kim's New Year's speech — analogous to a "state of the union" 
address in spelling out guidelines — was bellicose and excoriated 
South Korea as a puppet state. The army expanded rapidly, soldiers 
drilled in war maneuvers, and war-bond-purchasing drives continued 
for the purchase of Soviet weaponry. North Korea fortified the 
thirty-eighth parallel, and soon border incidents began breaking out. 
Neither side recognized the parallel as a legitimate boundary; the 
Rhee regime also wanted to unify Korea under its rule, by force if 
necessary. Rhee often referred to a "northern expedition" to "recover 
the lost territory," and in the summer of 1949 his army provoked the 
majority of the fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel (according to 
declassified U.S. documents), fighting that sometimes took hundreds 
of lives. 

This belligerent attitude was a prime reason why the United States 
refused to supply tanks and airplanes to South Korea: it feared that 
they would be used to attack the North. When U.S. secretary of state 
Dean Acheson made a speech in January 1950, in which he appeared 
to place South Korea outside the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia, he 
was mainly seeking to remind Rhee that he could not count on auto- 
matic U.S. backing, regardless of how he behaved. 

Although there remain murky aspects to the start of the Korean 
War, it now seems that the opening of conventional war on June 25, 
1950 (thus, the term "6-25 War" that is used in South Korea; the 
North refers to the war as the Fatherland Liberation War), was 
mainly Kim's decision, resisted by Stalin for many months and then 



43 



North Korea: A Country Study 

acquiesced to in early 1950, and that the key enabling factor was the 
existence of as many as 100,000 troops with battle experience in 
China. When the Rhee regime, with help from U.S. military advis- 
ers, severely reduced the guerrilla threat in the South in the winter of 
1949-50, the civil war moved into a conventional phase. Kim clearly 
sought backing from Stalin for his assault, but documents from the 
Soviet and Chinese sides, which have appeared sporadically since 
the 1990s, suggest that he got more backing from China. The key 
meetings appear to have occurred in April 1950, when Kim made 
secret trips, first to Moscow and then to Beijing. 

Had U.S. forces not entered the war, the northern regime would 
have won easily; the southern army and state collapsed in a few 
days. As eventually occurred, however, it was Kim's regime that the 
war nearly extinguished. The key year in which formal U.S. policy 
moved from multilateral internationalism to unilateral containment 
in Korea was 1947. There were at this time severe global limits on 
U.S. power, and the Truman administration could not publicly com- 
mit arms and money to Korea on the same scale as to Greece and 
Turkey. But in secret U.S. congressional testimony in early 1947, 
Acheson said that the United States had drawn the line in Korea, and 
he meant it. It was in pursuit of this basic containment policy that 
Acheson, by then secretary of state, urged Truman to commit mili- 
tary forces to save South Korea in June 1950. But, as the fighting 
wore on in the summer of 1950, U.S. policy changed once again. 
Had the United States simply sought to contain the communist thrust 
into the South, it would have restored the thirty-eighth parallel when 
it crushed the North Korean army. Instead, UN forces led by the 
United States under General Douglas MacArthur marched into North 
Korea and sought to destroy the northern regime and unify the pen- 
insula under Syng-man Rhee's rule. Again, declassified documenta- 
tion now shows that this action reflected a change from containment 
to a new policy called rollback: as policy planners described it, the 
United States for the first time had the chance to displace and trans- 
form some communist real estate. 

This thrust by UN forces in the fall of 1950, however, brought 
Chinese forces in on the northern side; these "volunteers" and a rein- 
vigorated North Korean army pushed UN and South Korean forces 
out of the North within a month and caused a crisis in American 
domestic politics as backers of Truman fought with backers of Mac- 
Arthur over the administration's unwillingness to carry the war to 
China. Although the war lasted another two years, until an armistice 
was signed on July 27, 1953, the outcome of early 1951 was defini- 
tive: a stalemate and a U.S. commitment to containment that 



44 



Historical Setting 



accepted the de facto reality of two Koreas— and that explains why 
U.S. troops remain in South Korea today. 

When the war finally ended, the North had been devastated by 
three years of bombing attacks that hardly left a modern building 
standing. Both Koreas had watched as a virtual holocaust ravaged 
their country and turned the vibrant expectations of 1945 into a 
nightmare. Furthermore, when Kim's regime was nearly extin- 
guished in the fall of 1950, the Soviets did very little to save it. 
China picked up the pieces, which the North Koreans have never for- 
gotten. From this moment on, it was clear that North Korea valued 
its relationship with China, whereas it dealt with the Soviet Union 
because it had to, not because it wanted to. And, in the end, South 
Korea did not sign the armistice agreement as a sign of disagreement 
over the decision not to pursue the war to the final defeat of the com- 
munist forces in the North. 

The point to remember is that this was a civil war. The true trag- 
edy was not the war itself, for a civil conflict solely among Koreans 
might have resolved the extraordinary tensions generated by colo- 
nialism and national division. The tragedy was that the war solved 
nothing: only the status quo ante was restored. Today, the tensions 
and the problems remain. 

The Postwar Period 
The Economy 

North Korea long had a socialist command economy with multi- 
year plans (as much as seven to 10 years) and a bias toward heavy 
industry. It allowed only a sharply limited role for market allocation, 
mainly in the rural sector, where peasants sold produce from small 
private plots. There was almost no small business. The North also 
sought a self-reliant, independent national economy; therefore, it 
would seem to be a typical socialist system on the Stalinist model, 
and certainly it was in the emphasis on heavy industry. 

The Three-Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan (1954-56), which 
began after the Korean War, and the Five-Year Plan (1957-61), 
which succeeded it, both stressed the reconstruction and develop- 
ment of major industries, with consumer goods at the bottom of pri- 
orities (see North Korea's Development Strategy, ch. 3). This bias 
toward major industries, however, pushed the economy forward at 
world-beating growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s. Official sources 
put the average annual growth rate in industry at 41.7 percent for the 
Three- Year Plan and 36.6 percent during the Five-Year Plan. The 
First Seven- Year Plan (1961-67) projected an average rate of 18 per- 



45 



North Korea: A Country Study 

cent, but stoppages of aid from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, 
owing to North Korean support for China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, 
caused the plan to be extended for three years. 

By the early 1970s, North Korea clearly had exhausted extensive 
development of its industries based on its own, prewar Japanese or 
new Soviet technologies, and it therefore turned to the West and Japan 
to purchase advanced technology and turnkey plants. These included a 
French petrochemical complex in 1971, a cement plant in 1973, and, 
in 1977, a request that Japan sell an integrated steel mill (which was 
denied). Even a complete pantyhose factory was imported, suggesting 
more attention to consumer items. Ultimately, these purchases caused 
North Korea to run into problems servicing its external debt, which 
ran to US$2 billion and US$3 billion by the late 1970s. 

Later seven- and 10-year plans failed to reach projected growth 
rates; still, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study published 
in 1978 estimated that North Korea's per capita gross national prod- 
uct (GNP — see Glossary) was the same as South Korea's as late as 
1976. In 1979 Kim II Sung claimed a per capita income in the North 
of US$1,900, and later North Korea put the figure at more than 
US$2,500, but it is not known if the figure was accurate, or how it 
was derived. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has fallen badly 
behind South Korea as transportation bottlenecks and fuel resource 
problems have plagued the economy. Published CIA figures for the 
1980s and 1990s place North Korea at around US$1,000 in per cap- 
ita GNP. The North did not do badly in producing goods of the sec- 
ond industrial revolution: steel, chemicals, hydroelectric power, 
internal combustion engines, locomotives, motorcycles, and various 
sorts of machine-building items. But it lagged far behind in the 
"communications" technologies of the third industrial revolution: 
electronics, computers, and semiconductor chips, for example. 

There were innovations, however, which suggested significant 
North Korean differences from the Stalinist model of industrializa- 
tion. The delivery of goods and services was decentralized to the 
neighborhood or village level, and several provinces were claimed to 
be self-reliant in food and consumer goods. Foreign visitors saw few 
long lines at stores and restaurants, although resident diplomats 
found that little was available in the stores. Clearly the morale of the 
population was better than in the former Soviet Union until the mid- 
1990s, as both the cities and the factories give an appearance of effi- 
ciency and hard work. 

North Korea had reasonably successful socialist agricultural sys- 
tems until the collapse of the economy in the mid-1990s (see Col- 
lapse in the 1990s, ch. 3). Agriculture was collectivized after the 



46 



Historical Setting 



Korean War, in stages that went from mutual aid teams to second- 
stage cooperatives but stopped short of building huge state farms as 
in the Soviet Union or the communes of Maoist China. Relying 
mostly on cooperative farms corresponding to the old natural vil- 
lages rather than state farms, and using material incentives with little 
apparent ideological bias against them, North Korea pushed agricul- 
tural production ahead rapidly. World Health Organization officials 
who visited in 1980 reported that "miracle" strains of rice were in 
wide use, and the CIA reported in a published study in 1978 that 
grain production had grown more rapidly in the North than in the 
South, that living standards in rural areas "have probably improved 
faster than in the South," and that North Korean agriculture was 
quite highly mechanized, fertilizer application was perhaps among 
the highest in the world, and irrigation projects were extensive. 

Up until the late 1980s, North Korea claimed to have the highest 
per hectare rice output in the world; although that claim cannot be 
proved, experts did not question the North's general agricultural suc- 
cess, and published CIA figures put North Korea's per capita grain 
output among the highest in the world in around 1980. Subsequently, 
North Korea failed to reach projected targets, however, such as the 
grand goal of producing 10 million tons of grain annually by 1986. 
By the 1990s, South Korea's rural population lived much better than 
its northern counterpart, and with accumulated disasters, by the late 
1990s the North was producing barely more than 4 million tons of 
grain per year. 

North Korea became a significant participant in international 
arms trafficking, selling missiles, machine guns, artillery, light tanks, 
and other items to friendly countries such as Pakistan, Syria, and 
Iran. North Korea traded weaponry for oil with Iran, accounting for 
as much as 40 percent of Iranian arms imports during the long 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88; see Defense Industry, ch. 5). 

Foreign observers discount North Korea's claims of nearly com- 
plete self-reliance. Until the Soviet collapse in 1991, the Soviet 
Union and China had provided petroleum, coking coal, and many 
other critical resources and competed for influence with aid and 
technicians. (Now Russia and China compete to have economic rela- 
tions with South Korea.) North Korea has done well in using indige- 
nous coal and hydroelectric resources to minimize oil use; only 10 
percent of its energy regime is dependent on imported petroleum. 
The pursuit of self-reliance is, of course, primarily a matter of anti- 
Western politics and foreign relations; it sacrifices efficiencies of 
scale and comparative advantage. 



47 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Until the 1970s, North Korea's foreign trade was almost wholly 
with the socialist bloc, but then it diversified imports and exports 
toward Japan, Western Europe, and various developing nations. By 
the mid- 1 970s, some 40 percent of its trade was with noncommunist 
countries, and within the bloc only half was with the Soviet Union; 
but, by the late 1980s, foreign exchange and other difficulties left 
North Korea once again dependent on trade with the Soviet Union, 
and the Russian demand for payment in hard currency for oil and 
other items drastically hurt North Korea's economy in the early 
1990s. Exporting has been a priority for several years, although the 
North in no sense has an export-led economy like the South. The 
focus on exports is to garner foreign exchange to import advanced 
technologies needed for further industrial growth and to pay for 
imported oil; the exporting policy has not been particularly success- 
ful. (North Korea's total trade with Russia and China was far less 
than South Korea's in the early 2000s.) 

In spite of these difficulties, American visitors to North Korea in 
the 1980s tended to come away impressed by what they saw. Crossing 
into North Korea from China made people think they had left a poor 
country for a moderately well-off one. The fields were deep green, and 
every meter of land was carefully tended; construction projects had 
round-the-clock shifts; people bustled through the streets to work at all 
hours; the cities suggested a clean, sparsely populated, diligent, and 
efficient system. 

The country still has an isolated, antiquarian, even bucolic atmo- 
sphere, as if one were thrown back to the 1950s; at the same time, it 
has a few world-class facilities, such as the P'yongyang Maternity 
Hospital, which is replete with German and Hungarian technology, 
or the fleet of Mercedes put at the disposal of officialdom (see 
Health Care, ch. 2). Until the famine period of the mid- to late 1990s, 
the mass of the people were well fed and plainly dressed, with little 
access to consumer goods beyond basic clothing and household 
items (see Effects of the Famine, ch. 3). 

Quite apart from the shocks it has received from abroad since 1989, 
North Korea faces its own set of structural problems in the economy. 
Its ponderous bureaucracy is impenetrable and exasperating to foreign 
business executives — and to its own officials, who find it hard to com- 
municate with other bureaucracies. Its dogged desire for self-reliance 
has alienated foreigners and placed many obstacles in the way of trade 
with the West, not least the relative lack of foreign exchange. Techno- 
logical obsolescence means the North must import newer technologies 
if it ever hopes to compete with the South, and since 2000 it has begun 
to adopt the new policies necessary to gain access to such technology, 
for example, revaluing its currency, enacting new tax and profit laws 



48 



Historical Setting 



for foreigners, and permitting limited space for market mechanisms 
(see Legal and Administrative Reforms, ch. 3). As long as North 
Korea maintains its hostility toward the United States and its military 
force commitments aligned against the South, it will not get the trade 
and technology that it claims to want and certainly needs. 

Both Koreas are industrial and urbanized nations, but on entirely 
different models of political economy. A unified Korea would thus 
be a formidable industrial state. What would permit this unlikely 
marriage of divergent systems? Perhaps the stress on education in 
both Koreas, strong backing from big-power allies, effective use of 
state intervention in promoting economic development, and, above 
all, the simple fact that neither are "new" states but rather grow out 
of an ancient and proud nation that began its modernization a cen- 
tury ago, not just in the postwar period. 

Corporatism and the Chuch'e Idea 

Marxism presented no political model for achieving socialism, only 
an opaque set of prescriptions. This political vacuum opened the way to 
an assertion of indigenous political culture and could even be said to 
demand it by virtue of the very paucity of political models. The stron- 
gest foreign influence on the North Korean leadership was the Chinese 
communist model, and so Kim II Sung was very much a "mass line" 
leader like Mao Zedong, making frequent visits to factories and the 
countryside, sending cadres "down" to local levels to help policy 
implementation and to solicit local opinion, requiring small-group 
political study and so-called "criticism and self-criticism," using peri- 
odic campaigns to mobilize people for production or education, and 
encouraging soldiers also to engage in production in good "people's 
army" fashion. The Ch'ollima (see Glossary) or "flying horse" Move- 
ment inaugurated in the late 1950s was a typical example of a Chinese- 
inspired strategy. North Korea, like China but unlike the Soviet Union, 
also maintained a "united front" policy toward noncommunist groups, 
so that in addition to the ruling KWP there were much smaller par- 
ties — the Korean Social Democratic Party and the native Ch'ondogyo 
(see Glossary) religion's Chongu (Friends) Party — with mainly sym- 
bolic functions (see The Korean Workers' Party, ch. 4). 

There are many differences from China and the Soviet Union, 
however, and many of them have been there from the beginning. The 
symbol of the KWP, for example, is a hammer and sickle with a writ- 
ing brush superimposed, symbolizing the "three-class alliance" of 
workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Unlike Mao's China, North 
Korea has never excoriated intellectuals as a potential "new class" of 
exploiters; instead, it has followed an inclusive policy toward them, 



49 



North Korea: A Country Study 

perhaps because postwar Korea was so short of intellectuals and 
experts, and because so many left the North for the South in the 
1945-50 period. The term intellectual, of course, refers to experts 
and technocrats, not dissenters and critics, of which there are 
exceedingly few in North Korea, even when compared to China and 
the former Soviet Union. The relatively sophisticated industrial 
structure that North Korea began in 1945 also required a higher pro- 
portion of experts and created labor shortages in agriculture, thereby 
stimulating mechanization of farming, another difference from 
China. In contrast to the typical Marxist-Leninist model, the KWP is 
less a tiny vanguard than a big "mass party," as mentioned earlier, 
which then raises the question, what is the vanguard? It is what Kim 
II Sung called the "core" or "nucleus" at the commanding heights of 
the regime, consisting of himself and his closest associates. All 
"good things" emanate in top-down fashion from this core, in sharp 
departure from Maoist dicta about the source of good ideas being the 
mass of peasants and workers. 

North Korea's political system is therefore a mix of Marxism- 
Leninism, Korean nationalism, and indigenous political culture. 
The term that perhaps best captures this system is socialist corpo- 
ratism. Although corporatism historically is associated with con- 
servative, even fascist regimes, since the 1920s there has been a 
particular strain of leftist corporatism, which argued that in the 
twentieth-century nation-state, conflict replaced class conflict as 
the motive force of history. Romanian Marxists were among the 
first to spell this out as a type of socialism particularly appropri- 
ate to colonial or less-developed countries, now usually called 
developing nations. North Korea was the first example of postco- 
lonial socialism; the colonial heritage of dependency and under- 
development deeply affected North Korean politics and still does 
so today. If nation-state conflict is the point, then you would 
emphasize masses rather than classes, that is, national unity 
rather than workers fighting bourgeois intellectuals; you would 
have a mass party, not a class party of proletarians. North Korean 
ideology has followed suit, burying Marxism-Leninism under the 
ubiquitous, always-trumpeted chuch 'e idea. One cannot open a 
North Korean newspaper or listen to a single speech without 
hearing about chuch 'e. The term was first used in a 1955 speech 
in which Kim castigated some of his comrades for being too pro- 
Soviet — thinking that if the Soviets eat fish on Monday, Koreans 
should, too, and so forth. But chuch 'e really means keeping all 
foreigners at arm's length, which resonates deeply with Korea's 
"hermit kingdom" past. 



50 



Historical Setting 

Chuch 'e has no meaning for a Marxist, but much for East Asians. It 
shares a first Chinese character with the ti-yong (essence and practical 
use) phrase popular in late nineteenth-century China and a second 
character with the Japanese kokutai (national polity) of the 1930s. The 
ti-yong concept built on Chinese learning as the basis of the ideology 
and Western learning or technology for its utility. Kokutai was a 
somewhat mystical term meant to distinguish all that was uniquely 
Japanese from all that was alien and foreign. Chuch 'e combines both 
meanings, taking Korean ideas as central, foreign ideas as secondary; 
it also suggests putting Korean things first at all times, being ever 
"subjective" where Korea is concerned. By the 1970s, chuch 'e had tri- 
umphed fundamentally over Marxism-Leninism as the basic ideology 
of the regime, but the emphases have been there from the beginning. 

Corporatist doctrine has always preferred an organic politics to 
the liberal, pluralist conception: a corporeal body politic, not a set of 
diverse groups and interests. North Korea's goal of tight unity at 
home produced a remarkable organicism, unprecedented in any 
existing communist regime. Kim was not just the "iron- willed, ever- 
victorious commander," the "respected and beloved Great Leader;" 
he was also the "head and heart" of the body politic (even "the 
supreme brain of the nation"). The flavor of this politics can only be 
realized through quotation from Korean Central News Agency 
releases: 

Kim II Sung ... is the great father of our people .... Long is 
the history of the word father being used as a word 
representing love and reverence ... expressing the unbreakable 
blood ties between the people and the leader. Father. This 
familiar word represents our people's single heart of boundless 
respect and loyalty .... The love shown by the Great Leader for 
our people is the love of kinship. Our respected and beloved 
Leader is the tender-hearted father of all the people .... Love of 
paternity ... is the noblest ideological sentiment possessed only 
by our people .... 

His heart is a traction power attracting the hearts of all 
people and a centripetal force uniting them as one .... Kim II 
Sung is the great sun and great man ... thanks to this, great 
heart national independence is firmly guaranteed. 

This verbiage was especially strong when the succession to Kim's 
son was publicly announced at the Sixth KWP Congress in 1980. 
The KWP was often referred to as the "mother" party, the mass line 
was said to provide "blood ties," the leader was always "fatherly," 
and the country was presumably one big "family." Kim was said to 



51 



North Korea: A Country Study 

be paternal, devoted, and benevolent, and the people were said to 
respond with loyalty, obedience, and mutual love. Unlike the Mao- 
ists, the regime has never tampered with the families of citizens per 
se, and indeed the family is termed the core unit of society in the 
constitution, and the society is called a "great integrated entity" (see 
Family Life, ch. 2). 

North Korean socialism demonstrates an apparent volunteerism, 
something also redolent of corporate politics. North Korean propa- 
gandists say that "everything is decided by idea," directly contradict- 
ing the materialism at the heart of Marxism. And, of course, the 
leader's ideas are the best, compounded by his firm "will," always 
described as "iron-like," or "steel-like." Kim II Sung invented 
chuck 'e, and all Koreans "must have chuch 'e firm in mind and 
spirit," and only then can they be good "Kimilsungists," and only 
then can the revolution be successful. The more one seeks to under- 
stand chuch e, the embodiment of Kim's rule and will, the more the 
meaning recedes. It is a state of mind, not an idea, and one that is 
unavailable to the non-Korean. It is the opaque core of North Korean 
national solipsism (see Glossary). 

The North Korean system is not simply a hierarchical structure of 
party, military, and state bureaucracies, but also a hierarchy of ever- 
widening concentric circles. At the center is Kim Jong II. The next 
circle is his family, followed by the now-elderly guerrillas who 
fought with Kim II Sung, and then the KWP elite. These individuals 
form the core circle, which controls everything at the highest eche- 
lon of the regime. Here politics is primarily personalistic, resting on 
something akin to oaths of fealty and obligation. The core must con- 
stantly be steeled and hardened, while moving outward and down- 
ward concentrically to encompass other elements of the population, 
and to provide the glue holding the system together. As the penum- 
bra of workers and peasants is reached, trust gives way to control on 
a bureaucratic basis, and to a mixture of normative and remunerative 
incentives. Nonetheless, the family remains the model for societal 
organization. An outer circle marks off that which is Korean from 
that which is foreign, a reflection of the extraordinary ethnic and lin- 
guistic unity of Koreans and the country's history of exclusionism. 

This corporate system is instinctively repellent to anyone who iden- 
tifies with the modern liberal idea, or indeed with the modern Marxist 
idea. North Korea's simple adherence to its corporatism would be one 
thing, but by trumpeting the system's worth far and wide, it has earned 
widespread disbelief and ridicule. Nonetheless, the system is different. 
In 1990, when many Marxist-Leninist regimes had collapsed, the 
North Koreans proudly stated that they were still hewing to their well- 
worn path, of "nation-first-ism," placing the nation first in everything. 



52 



Kim Jong II with his parents, ca. 1943 
Courtesy Kumsukangsan (P yongyang), February 2002, 8 

The North Korean difference can be explained only by reference to the 
tradition and the political culture from which it derives. It is a mixture 
of Confucian holdovers, Korean traditionalism, and socialist corporat- 
ism. 

The strength and stability of the system rest on marrying tradi- 
tional forms of legitimacy to modern bureaucratic structures, with the 
peculiar charisma of Kim II Sung providing the transition and the 
glue between the two. The weakness is that core political power 
seems still to rest upon personalistic ties, with trust barely extending 
beyond the leader's family and his long-time guerrilla associates. 
This is the reason that Kim Jong II was deeply involved in party and 
government activities for at least 25 years before he took power, and 
an entire generation of party faithful and government bureaucrats was 
rewarded over these same years for supporting his succession. Nor is 
father-to-son succession in any way alien to East Asian political cul- 
ture: many huge South Korean firms are headed by the founder's son. 

This look inside North Korea may or may not explain why North 
Korea is so reviled in the West. In any case, its external policies fre- 
quently give good reasons for abhorring it. In October 1983, a bomb 
blast in Rangoon, Burma, decimated South Korean president Chun 
Doo Hwan's cabinet and very nearly killed Chun himself. A Burmese 
court determined that North Korean terrorists carried out this despi- 
cable act. The North Koreans presumably acted on the assumption 



53 



North Korea: A Country Study 

that killing Chun would have an effect similar to the 1979 assassina- 
tion of South Korean president Park Chung-hee: that is, the removal 
of the maximum leader causes deep disorders to the political system; 
they were probably right. In 1987 another terrorist blew a South 
Korean airliner apart, an act also linked to North Korea. The motive 
for that act was more murky, perhaps intended to dissuade foreigners 
from coming to the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. If so, it bespoke desper- 
ation and a purely malicious and gratuitous terrorism emanating from 
P'yongyang. The Olympics went off without widely predicted terror- 
ist activity, however, and to date there has been no further evidence 
of North Korean terrorism. In the early twenty-first century, the 
North reportedly has trafficked in illegal narcotics and counterfeit 
currency. 

With its external reputation for worst-case socialism, in the 1990s 
most observers thought North Korea would go the way of the Stalinist 
states of Eastern Europe and collapse. Some thought East Germany 
would be the model, with North Korea folding up and embracing a new 
unity with the South. Others suggested the example of Romania, where 
Nikolae Ceau^escu had modeled his dictatorial rule on Kim II Sung's. 
The "revolution of 1989" was so unexpected as to breed humility into 
all observers of socialist states, but, so far, North Korea has not fol- 
lowed the East German path. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who reined in 
the military there; amid the widespread demonstrations against Erich 
Honnecker's regime, Gorbachev kept the 360,000 Soviet Army troops 
in their barracks. North Korea, however, has an independently con- 
trolled army estimated at 1 .2 million strong, and most of the pressure 
the Soviets could exert had been applied (overall Soviet aid to 
P'yongyang declined precipitously after Gorbachev took power, 
although military aid continued). 

Korea's main difference from Eastern Europe is that it suffered a 
terrible civil war, with some 4.5 million killed, in recent memory. 
The North probably suffered nearly 2 million casualties. There also 
were 1 million Chinese casualties. It is very hard to believe that mil- 
itary commanders who fought the South in a bloody civil war would 
allow South Korea to overwhelm North Korea, by whatever means. 
If North Korea's socialist system collapses under the intense interna- 
tional pressures of our time, probably the apparatchiks will declare 
themselves to have been nationalists all along (with some measure of 
truth) and try to keep their hold on power. 

International Relations 

It is a mark of some kind of failure that, more than half a century 
after the Korean War ended, the two Koreas still face each other 



54 



Historical Setting 



across the bleak Demilitarized Zone (DMZ — see Glossary), engaged 
most of the time in unremitting hostility, punctuated by occasional 
brief thaws and increasing North-South exchanges. Huge armies are 
still poised to fight at a moment's notice. This has been true since the 
Korean War, which really solved nothing, except to solidify armed 
bulwarks of containment, to which the United States, South Korea, 
and North Korea remain committed, even in the post-Cold War 
world. Both Koreas continue to be deeply deformed by the necessity 
to maintain this unrelenting struggle. Yet, around the peninsula much 
has changed. 

Watershed changes in world politics in the 1970s altered the Cold 
War logic that had governed East Asia. With U.S. president Richard 
M. Nixon's opening to China in 1971-72, both North Korea and 
South Korea watched helplessly as their great-power benefactors 
cozied up to each other. With the conclusion of the Second Indo- 
china War (1954-75), obstacles to ending the Cold War throughout 
Asia were even fewer. The new strategic logic of the 1970s had an 
immediate and beneficial impact on the Korean Peninsula. The 
Nixon administration withdrew a division of U.S. troops without 
heightening tension. The North Koreans responded by virtually halt- 
ing attempts at infiltration (compared to 1968, when more than 100 
soldiers died along the DMZ and the spy ship USS Pueblo was 
seized) and by significantly reducing their defense budget. Henry 
Kissinger revealed in his memoirs that Kim II Sung was in Beijing 
during Kissinger's famous "secret visit" in July 1971; although it is 
not known whether they talked, it is likely that Nixon and Kissinger 
encouraged South Korea to talk with the North and indicated to the 
North various benefits that might come their way if North Korea 
took a moderate path. In what seemed to be a miraculous develop- 
ment, in early 1972 both Koreas held talks at a high level (between 
the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and Kim II 
Sung's younger brother), culminating in a stunning July 4, 1972, 
announcement that both would seek reunification peacefully, inde- 
pendently of outside forces, and with common efforts toward creat- 
ing a "great national unity" that would transcend the many 
differences between the two systems. Within a year, this initiative 
had effectively failed, but it was a reminder of what can be accom- 
plished through enlightened diplomacy and of the continuing impor- 
tance of the unification issue. 

Later on, the policies of the United States and China shifted again, 
if less dramatically. When the Carter administration announced plans 
for a gradual but complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from 
Korea (air and naval units would remain deployed in or near Korea), 



55 



North Korea: A Country Study 

a prolonged period of North Korean courting of Americans began. In 
1977 Kim referred to President Jimmy Carter as "a man of justice," 
and the North Korean press momentarily dropped its calumnies 
against the United States, including use of the term "U.S. imperial- 
ism." Kim gave interviews saying he was knocking on the American 
door, wanted diplomatic relations and trade, and would not interfere 
with American business interests in the South once Korea was reuni- 
fied. The North Koreans also began using a term of opprobrium for 
Soviet imperialism, chibaejuui ("dominationism"), a term akin to the 
Chinese usage, "hegemonism." By and large, P'yongyang stayed 
close to China's foreign policy line during the Carter years, while 
taking care not to antagonize the Soviets needlessly. When Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia in 1978, the North Koreans forcefully and pub- 
licly condemned the act, while maintaining a studied silence when 
China responded by invading Vietnam. 

Civil disorders in South Korea in 1979-80 and the emergence of a 
new Cold War atmosphere on a world scale froze the Korean situa- 
tion for much of the 1980s. The Carter administration dropped its 
program of troop withdrawal in 1979. The Reagan administration 
invited President Chun Doo Hwan to visit Washington as its first for- 
eign policy act, a move designed to bolster South Korean stability. 
The United States committed itself to a modest but significant build- 
up of force and equipment levels in the South. In the early 1 980s, the 
United States added some 4,000 personnel to the 40,000 already in 
South Korea, sold Seoul advanced F-16 fighters, and with the South 
mounted huge "Team Spirit" military exercises involving upwards 
of 200,000 troops of the two nations toward the beginning of each 
year. 

Sino-American relations warmed considerably in 1983, and for the 
first time China said publicly that it wished to play a role in reducing 
tension on the Korean Peninsula; this announcement was followed by 
a major North Korean initiative in January 1984, which called for the 
first time for three-way talks among the United States, South Korea, 
and North Korea. Previously, North Korea had never been willing to 
sit down with both nations at the same time. (The Carter administra- 
tion had made a similar proposal for three-way talks in 1979.) 
Through most of the 1980s, China sought to sponsor talks between 
Washington and P'yongyang (talks that occasionally took place in 
Beijing between low-level diplomats) and encouraged Kim II Sung to 
take the path of diplomacy. By the early 1990s, China had a much 
larger trade with South Korea than with North Korea, with freighters 
going back and forth directly across the Yellow Sea, and in 1992 
China and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations. South Korea 



56 



Historical Setting 



pursued an active diplomacy toward China, the Soviet Union and then 
Russia, and various East European countries, saying it would favor 
trade and diplomatic relations with "friendly" communist regimes. 
This policy bore fruit in 1988, when most communist countries 
attended the Seoul Olympics, with only Cuba honoring the North 
Korean "boycott." The collapse of East European communism griev- 
ously damaged North Korean diplomacy, as Hungary, Poland, Yugo- 
slavia, and other states opened diplomatic relations with Seoul. 

North-South Relations in the Twenty-first Century 

The two Koreas made sporadic progress in relations with each 
other in the late 1980s. The founder of the Hyundai conglomerate 
toured North Korea in January 1989 and announced a joint venture 
in tourism, which was the seed of a program whereby tens of thou- 
sands of South Koreans tour the scenic Mount Kumgang (Mount 
Diamond) in the North (see Special Economic Zones, ch. 3). As 
1991 ended, a watershed breakthrough seemed to occur when the 
two prime ministers signed a nonaggression pact, which committed 
both sides to substituting a real peace for the Korean War armistice, 
reducing troops and mutual vilification, and engaging in wide-rang- 
ing exchanges. This progress was followed up at the end of 1991 by 
an agreement to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. This par- 
ticular agreement was facilitated by a key American decision in 
1991 to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea. 

The 1994 Agreed Framework freezing North Korea's nuclear 
facilities opened up eight years of wide-ranging diplomacy on the 
Korean Peninsula. Four-Power Talks (the two Koreas, the United 
States, and China) sought to bring a final conclusion to the Korean 
War. President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of engagement 
opened the way to many joint ventures with the North, including a 
project in Kaesong that envisions operating hundreds of factories in 
which South Korean firms would employ North Korean labor, and 
reconnecting roads and railroad lines across the DMZ. In June 2000, 
Kim Dae Jung traveled to P'yongyang for a summit to meet Kim 
Jong II, the first time that the two heads of state shook hands since 
the country was divided in 1945. The administration of President 
William J. Clinton exchanged high-level visits in late 2000, with 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveling to P'yongyang to 
meet Kim Jong II, coming very close to a major deal that indirectly 
would have bought out the North's medium- and long-range mis- 
siles. The administration of President George W. Bush did not con- 
cur with that agreement, however, and its concerns about a second 
nuclear program involving highly enriched uranium derailed the 



57 



North Korea: A Country Study 

substantial detente that had occurred in the previous decade. Rela- 
tions between Washington and P'yongyang deteriorated in a low-key 
crisis that began in October 2002 and lasted into the second Bush 
administration. Unfortunately, the Agreed Framework unraveled, 
ending the freeze on the North's plutonium facilities and giving the 
North the fuel to build several nuclear weapons. North Korea 
declared itself to be a nuclear- weapons state on February 10, 2005, 
thus confirming a new and dangerous element in the balance of 
forces on the Korean Peninsula (see Strategic Weapons, ch. 5). 



* * * 



For additional reading on history prior to the twentieth century, the 
best sources are Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, 
Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner's Korea Old and New: A 
History; Han Woo-Keun's The History of Korea; and James B. Pal- 
ais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. For the Japanese period, 
Carter J. Eckert 's Offspring of Empire: The Koch 'ang Kims and the 
Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism; Sang Chul Suh's Growth and 
Structural Changes in the Korean Economy 1910-1940; and Michael 
Robinson's Cultural Nationalism in Korea, 1920-25 provide sound 
information. The Politics of Korean Nationalism by Chong-Sik Lee; 
Communism in Korea by Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee; 
The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 by Dae-Sook Suh; and 
Suh's Kim II Sung: A Biography are good books on the origins of 
Korean nationalism and communism. The Korean War and its origins 
are covered in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War; Rose- 
mary Foote, The Wrong War; and Peter Lowe, The Origins of the 
Korean War. Communism in Korea by Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, 
Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh's Socialist Korea: A Case Study in the 
Strategy of Economic Development, and a study of North Korea's 
agrarian socialism by Mun Woong Lee, Rural North Korea under 
Communism: A Study in Sociocultural Chang, offer a thorough 
grounding in North Korean history. A survey of North Korea's inter- 
national relations and U.S. policy toward North Korea can be found in 
Selig S. Harrison's Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and 
U.S. Disengagement. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



58 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Bas-relief on Pyongyang's Arch of Triumph. The inscription on the flag 
reads "The world s one and only patriot. Long live Kim II Sung. " 
Courtesy Pulmyol ui t'ap (Tower of Immortality), Pyongyang: Munye 
Ch'ulpansa, 1985, 283 



BEFORE ITS DIVISION IN 1945, Korea had been culturally and 
linguistically distinct for more than 5,000 years and a sovereign 
nation-state under the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) for more than 
500 years. Traditional culture and social structure during this long 
period of independent rule were deeply influenced by Chinese civili- 
zation, and high value was placed on Confucian ideals of social har- 
mony, loyalty, orthodoxy, authority, and filial piety. 

The years of colonization by imperial Japan (1910-45) humiliated 
Korea, depriving it of freedom and creating a skewed economy, but 
left the country ethnically and culturally distinct and little changed 
socially. Much more damaging to the ancient culture and society has 
been the division in 1945 into North Korea and South Korea, two 
independent nations with 10 million separated families that had 
hoped to reestablish a sovereign nation under traditional Korean val- 
ues, beliefs, and behavior. The Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea), the larger of the two countries and historically 
the more industrially developed, had a population of 9.1 million in 
1945, only slightly more than half that of the traditionally more 
agrarian Republic of Korea (South Korea), which had 16 million 
people in 1945. 

The two peoples that have emerged since 1945— the socialist 
society in the North and the pluralistic society in the South — live at 
opposite ends of the spectrum of world societies. Previously, it 
would have been almost unthinkable that two such different systems 
as the Koreas at the beginning of the twenty-first century could have 
emerged from the traditional Korean society that 100 years earlier 
had remained mostly unchanged for more than a millennium. 

The Physical Environment 

North Korea is located in the northern half of the Korean Penin- 
sula, which extends about 1,000 kilometers southward from North- 
east Asia. The nation occupies about 55 percent of the total land area 
of the peninsula, or approximately 120,410 square kilometers, and 
water covers 130 square kilometers. 

North Korea lies between South Korea to the south, China to the 
north and northwest, and Russia to the northeast. The northern bor- 
ders with China and Russia extend for 1,435 kilometers, with 1,416 
kilometers separating North Korea from the Chinese provinces of 
Jilin and Liaoning and the remaining 19 kilometers separating it 



61 



North Korea: A Country Study 




Sea of 
Japan 
('East Sea) 



umgartg-san 
638 



Demarcation line and 
demilitarized zone 



yellow Sea 
(West Sea) 




Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 



from Russia's Primorskiy Territory. This northern border is formed 
by the Amnok (or Yalu, as it is known in China) and Tuman (Tumen, 
as it is known in China) rivers, which have their sources in the 
region around Mount Paektu (Paektu-san or White Head Mountain), 
an extinct volcano and Korea's highest mountain (see fig. 4). The 
Amnok flows in a southwesterly direction into the Yellow Sea (or 
West Sea as it is known to Koreans), and the Tuman flows in a north- 
easterly direction into the Sea of Japan (or East Sea as it is known to 
Koreans). Part of the border with China near Mount Paektu has yet 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



to be clearly demarcated. Koreans trace their origin to the area 
around Mount Paektu, and the mountain has special significance for 
contemporary North Koreans because of the legend that has been 
created that their leader, Kim Jong II, son of founding leader Kim II 
Sung, was born on Mount Paektu during World War II, when his 
father was attaining the status of a military hero as a longtime anti- 
Japanese guerrilla fighter. 

Korea's west coast is bordered by the Yellow Sea, which separates 
Korea from China. The east coast is bordered by the Sea of Japan. 
The 8,460-kilometer seacoast of Korea is highly irregular, with 
North Korea's half of the peninsula having 2,495 kilometers of 
coastline. Some 3,579 islands lie adjacent to the Korean Peninsula, 
most of them along the south coast. 

North Korea's southern border with South Korea is at the thirty- 
eighth parallel, an unnatural division of the Korean Peninsula that 
was roughly the point where the opposing armies in the Korean War 
(1950-53) faced one another at the time of the cease-fire and signing 
of an armistice marking the end of the fighting on July 27, 1953. It is 
a border that was hastily agreed upon at the end of World War II by 
U.S. and Soviet leaders, with no particular reference to natural land 
features. 

Known since 1953 as the Demarcation Line (see Glossary), the bor- 
der between North Korea and South Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel 
is the most heavily guarded border in the world and the last flashpoint 
of the Cold War. The so-called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ — see Glos- 
sary), a 4,000-meter-wide strip of land that straddles the Demarcation 
Line, runs east and west for a distance of 238 kilometers over land and 
three kilometers over the sea. North Korea claims a 12-nautical-mile 
territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles. It 
also has established a military boundary line of 50 nautical miles on its 
east coast and the exclusive economic zone on the west coast in which 
foreign ships and aircraft without permission from the North Korean 
government are officially banned. 

Topography and Drainage 

Approximately 80 percent of North Korea's land area is made up 
of mountain ranges separated by deep, narrow valleys. All moun- 
tains on the Korean Peninsula higher than 2,000 meters above sea 
level are in North Korea, the highest one being Mount Paektu on the 
northern border with China at 2,744 meters above sea level. There 
are wide coastal plains on the west coast, the most extensive being 
the P'yongyang and Chaeryong plains, each covering about 500 
square kilometers. Because the mountains on the east coast drop 



63 



North Korea: A Country Study 

abruptly to the sea, the discontinuous coastal plains in the east are 
much smaller than those on the west coast. The majority of the popu- 
lation lives in the plains and lowlands, which constitute less than 25 
percent of the country, providing North Korea only a small amount 
of arable land. 

The mountain ranges in the north and east form the watershed for 
most of the country's rivers, which run in a westerly direction and 
empty into the Yellow Sea. The longest of these is the Amnok, 790 
kilometers in length and navigable for 678 kilometers. The second 
largest river, the Tuman, which is navigable for only 81 of its 521 
kilometers, is one of the few major rivers to flow into the Sea of 
Japan. The third longest river, the Taedong, which flows through 
P'yongyang and is largely responsible for the natural beauty of 
North Korea's capital city, is navigable for 245 of its 397 kilometers. 

There is no east-west waterway crossing the Korean Peninsula. 
Ships in eastern ports of North Korea can reach western ports only by 
going around the southern tip of South Korea. Outside observers of 
isolated and secretive North Korea were astonished when, in 1999, the 
captured intelligence ship USS Pueblo, which had been taken to the 
east coast port of Wonsan after its seizure by North Korea in January 
1968, appeared in P'yongyang as a much-acclaimed tourist attraction. 
Apparently, North Korea had disguised the ship, officially still a com- 
missioned vessel of the U.S. Navy, and sailed it around the peninsula, 
up the west coast and along the Taedong to P'yongyang. 

There are relatively few lakes in North Korea, and they tend to be 
small because of the lack of glacial activity and the stability of the 
earth's crust in the region. Unlike neighboring Japan and China, 
North Korea has experienced few severe earthquakes. 

Climate 

North Korea has long, cold, dry winters and short, hot, humid sum- 
mers. Temperatures range between -8° C in December and 27° C in 
August. Approximately 60 percent of the annual rainfall occurs 
between June and September, the main rice-growing period. August is 
the wettest month of the year with an average rainfall of 3 17 millime- 
ters. Typhoons can be expected on an average of at least once every 
summer. Since the mid-1990s, erratic weather conditions, particularly 
devastating floods in 1995 followed by a prolonged drought, have 
contributed to a precipitous drop in agricultural production (caused by 
serious failures of government agricultural policies as well as poor 
weather, deforestation, and soil erosion) and led to one of the worst 
famines of the late twentieth century, resulting in the death of more 
than 1 million North Koreans. 



64 



Peaks of the North Korean side of Mount Paektu, 
as seen from the Chinese side across Lake Chunji 
Courtesy Sarah Ji-young Kim 

Environmental Factors 

After the Korean War, North Korea embarked on an ambitious but 
ill-fated program of industrialization. Industry used generally obsolete 
technology and outmoded equipment transferred from the Soviet 
Union and China that in other communist-bloc nations eventually pro- 
duced air, water, and soil pollution. The passage of an environmental 
protection law by the Supreme People's Assembly in April 1986 sug- 
gests that North Korea had a serious pollution problem, probably most 
particularly in the industrial cities of Namp'o, Hamming, and 
Ch'ongjin. 

Air pollution, alleviated somewhat by the absence of private auto- 
mobiles and restrictions on the use of gasoline-powered vehicles 
because of the critical shortage of oil, has long been severe because of 
the heavy reliance on coal as the major source of energy. The major 
causes of pollution have been industrial boilers and kilns and house- 
hold heating and cooking. According to a United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) report published in 2003, data on air pollution are 
very limited and confined mainly to P'yongyang, where there is almost 
no industry and hydroelectric power rather than coal is more com- 
monly used to meet energy demands, giving an atypical picture of air 
quality throughout the rest of the country. However, in 1990 boilers and 
industrial kilns in P'yongyang consumed nearly 3.4 million tons of 



65 



North Korea: A Country Study 

coal, and household consumption for heating and cooking amounted to 
another nearly 358,000 tons of coal. The government has given priority 
to the prevention of air pollution in P'yongyang, where the government 
elite live, and to other major cities, with policies aimed at reducing coal 
consumption in the household sector, enhancing combustion efficiency, 
and employing gas purification devices on boilers and kilns. For sus- 
tainable management of air quality, however, the government will need 
to introduce advanced technologies, such as clean coal technology, 
high-efficiency purification of exhaust gas, and renewable energy 
options for environmentally sound energy development. 

North Korea is richly endowed with forests, which are distributed 
throughout the country with highest cover in the northern area. How- 
ever, the majority of the forests are mountain forest cover, more than 
70 percent of which stands on slopes greater than 20 degrees. In 
1945 the forested area of North Korea was estimated at 9.7 million 
hectares. War and industrial use greatly depleted this resource. For- 
est stock per hectare increased from 53.6 cubic meters in 1978 to 
55.9 cubic meters in 1990, at which time afforested and reforested 
areas totaled 1.1 million hectares. Thereafter, however, socioeco- 
nomic and industrial development led to a decrease in forested areas 
to 986,000 hectares by 1996. This degradation in forest resources, 
which play an important role in economic development as well as 
human well-being, has continued. At least part of the decline is the 
result of the excessive use of firewood during the energy crisis of the 
late 1990s brought about by the cut-off of exports of petroleum from 
Russia and the flooding of North Korea's coal mines. Deforestation 
for firewood occurred simultaneously with the destruction of huge 
areas of forests in the devastating floods and droughts that plagued 
North Korea in the 1995-97 period. Forest fires, landslides, and nox- 
ious insect damage have further decreased forest area and stocks. 
This trend has been accentuated by conversion of forest into farm- 
land since the mid-1990s, during the years of decreasing food 
imports. The government has undertaken initiatives to restore forests 
damaged by the recent flooding, droughts, forest fires and illegal 
deforestation, including the 1999 promulgation of the Law on the 
Forest, which established an annual Tree-Planting Day on March 2, 
and the inauguration of a 10-year plan for afforestation/reforestation 
to restore and rehabilitate 2 million hectares of degraded forests. The 
proposed measures, if successful, will restore only recent damage, 
however, rather than augment traditional forest resources. 

North Korea is rich in water resources, including rainfall, rivers, 
and underground water, but there is wide fluctuation in precipitation 
across the country and a short outflow time of rainfall because of the 
steep slopes of catchments. There were severe shortages of water 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



during the period of high temperatures and continued drought in the 
mid-1990s. One of the world's worst famines was a direct result of 
the shortage of water, the contamination of the water due to flooding 
and drought, and the decrease in agricultural production due to the 
natural disasters of those years (see Effects of the Famine, ch. 3). 
Discharges from some urban settlements and industries have sub- 
jected certain bodies of water to severe eutrophication, and some 
water-quality indices do not meet environmental standards. With 
water contamination and lack of investment in disinfections in stor- 
age reservoirs, water-borne diseases have led to numerous deaths, 
including 300,000 to 800,000 annually during the drought and fam- 
ine in the mid-1990s. The government adopted the Law on Water 
Resources in June 1997, amended in January 1999, establishing a 
basis for water-resources protection and strengthening government 
control on effluents and sewage from factories, enterprises, and puri- 
fication plants. Television, radio, newspapers, and newsletters were 
directed to inform the public frequently about the need for water 
conservation, which is now viewed as a critical issue in the country. 

Floods in the mid-1990s inflicted an estimated US$925 million in 
damage to North Korea's arable land. Forest degradation in hilly for- 
est areas adjacent to agricultural land contributed to land erosion. 
North Korea's mountainous terrain means that its agriculture is 
heavily dependent on chemical fertilizers, and the acidification of 
arable land by fertilizer application has brought about a decline in 
both soil humus content and crop output. In order to protect land 
resources from acidification and to enhance fertility, treated sewage 
and coal ash from urban centers are applied to the land. Again, 
P'yongyang is given priority over other parts of the country in the 
processing of municipal solid waste into fertilizer. There have been 
continuous efforts by the government to increase pubic awareness 
about the importance of land quality as the basis of their livelihood 
and national prosperity. 

Population 

North Korea's population, estimated in July 2007 to be 
23,301,725, is slightly less than half that of South Korea. The 
North's 2007 estimated birthrate is 15.0 births per 1,000 and the 
death rate 7.2 per 1,000. The country is highly urbanized. Only about 
40 percent of its citizens live in rural areas, a low percentage for a 
less-developed country and a reflection of the mountainous terrain 
and limited arable land. Population density is estimated at 188 per- 
sons per square kilometer. The inability of the rural population to 
produce enough food to feed the urban society would normally lead 



67 



North Korea: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



2005 




1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



AGE-GROUP 



2025 




1.200 1,000 800 600 400 200 



200 400 600 800 1.000 1,200 



POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 
International Programs Center, International Data Base Population Pyramids (North 
Korea), Washington, DC, 2007, htrp://www.census.gov/ipc/^ , ww/idbpyr.html. 



Figure 5. Population by Age and Sex, 2005, and Estimated for 2025 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



any government to finance necessary imports of food through 
exports of industrial and mineral products, which is how the northern 
half of Korea traditionally survived. However, since the mid-1990s, 
when agricultural production began falling precipitously and the 
demands for imported food have risen dramatically, the regime has 
not been able to increase exports of industrial products because of a 
simultaneous decline in industrial production (see Post-Famine Situ- 
ation, ch. 3). 

With plausible policy adjustments, an earlier call for international 
assistance, and less interference with the humanitarian aid organiza- 
tions' established norms for food distribution, North Korea could 
have averted the great famine of the mid- and late 1990s. As it was, 
the country suffered the worst famine in the late twentieth century, 
the only one in a country not at war, and one of the most devastating 
famines of the last century, which left at least 1 million people — 5 
percent of North Korea's population — dead. Most of the deaths were 
among the young and the elderly who, as is typical in famines, suc- 
cumbed to diseases such as tuberculosis before actually starving to 
death. 

Since the famine, the population growth rate has slowed signifi- 
cantly. The estimated annual growth of 0.9 percent (2002-5) repre- 
sents a dramatic decline from 2.7 percent in 1960, 3.6 percent in 
1970, and even the 1.9 percent rate in 1975. Earlier estimates by 
demographic experts that North Korea's population would increase 
to 25.5 million by 2000 and to 28.5 million in 2010 have proved way 
off the mark because of the effects of the unexpected, devastating 
famine. In 1990 life expectancy at birth was approximately 66 years 
for males and almost 73 for females. Despite the effects of the fam- 
ine, the 2007 estimate showed a slight increase in life expectancy 
(69.2 years for males and 74.8 for females). There also was a slight 
imbalance in the male:female sex ratio. According to 2007 esti- 
mates, there were 0.94 males for every female in the general popula- 
tion and 0.98 males for every female in the 15 to 64 age-group (see 
fig. 5). The population is almost completely ethnic Korean, with a 
few Chinese and Japanese. 

The North Korean government seems to perceive its population as 
too small in relation to that of South Korea. There is no official birth- 
control policy, but falling growth rates are the result of late mar- 
riages (after a man's compulsory military service), an exhausted 
population as a result of long hours of work and political study, fam- 
ilies ' limited resources and housing space, and, now more so than in 
earlier years, the deterioration in health conditions because of 
chronic food shortages (see Family Life, this ch.). 



69 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Social Structure and Values 

Creating a New Society 

In the relatively short span of 60 years, North Korea has devel- 
oped a unique society that is, in the opinion of many observers, the 
world's most oppressive, heading the list of countries having atro- 
cious human rights records. The society can best be described as a 
distinctively Korean version of socialism, mixing Marxist-Leninist 
ideas with the rigid hierarchical social structure and authoritarianism 
of Confucianism, enforced by an extreme totalitarian regime that 
rules with a mixture of terror and the world's most intense personal- 
ity cult. Despite mounting economic failures and horrific human 
rights abuses, the leadership has remained firmly in control of a 
compliant society in a well-armed but impoverished nation. 

Perhaps more than can be said of any other country, North Korea 
is the creation of one man — Kim II Sung — one of the most intriguing 
figures of the twentieth century, dominating his country during his 
lifetime and afterward as few individuals in history have done. From 
the late 1950s until his death in 1994, Kim's power was nearly 
unlimited, and he ruled his country longer than any other leader of 
the twentieth century. American political scientist Donald Oberdor- 
fer pointed out in The Two Koreas that when Kim died in July 1994, 
he had outlived Joseph Stalin for four decades and Mao Zedong by 
almost two decades and had remained in power during the terms of 
office of six South Korean presidents, nine U.S. presidents, and 21 
Japanese prime ministers. No leader has ever had so free a hand in 
shaping the destiny of his country, and it is fair to say that none has 
had greater success in creating a national society of his own design, 
quite unlike any other society, communist or otherwise. It is remark- 
able that such a man should have become the architect of a modern 
state and society almost single-handedly. He had only eight years of 
formal education (the last two of which were in schools in Northeast 
China before he was expelled for revolutionary activities). Kim was 
an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter who served for a decade in a unit 
attached to the Chinese Communist Party's guerrilla army, then for 
four years with a Soviet military unit during World War II, being 
thereafter installed by the Soviets as the new leader of North Korea 
in 1945. 

Kim II Sung does not appear to have had a coherent philosophic 
construct guiding his life or planning for North Korean society. He 
was not an intellectual and not well read. He was reported to have 
known a lot of Confucianism and a smattering of Marx, Lenin, and 
Hegel. Christian influences in Kim's early life had not been well 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



known until the serial publication in 1992-95 of his six-volume 
memoir With the Century. He was born in P'yongyang in 1912 to the 
daughter of a Presbyterian elder and a father who had been a student 
at a missionary school in P'yongyang. He claimed, later in life, not 
to have "been affected by religion" despite his youthful connections 
with the church but acknowledged that he "received a great deal of 
humanitarian assistance from Christians." But Kim Jong II, unlike 
his father, has never had anything favorable to say about religion, 
having had no personal familiarity with religious beliefs and prac- 
tices (see Religion, this ch.). 

Whereas South Korea's society was shaped by myriad influences, 
the North's is Kim II Sung's creation. It reflects his genius and limi- 
tations, his restricted experience of the world and his deeply held 
convictions and, perhaps most important of all, his nationalistic doc- 
trine of chuch 'e (see Glossary), doing things his way, being indepen- 
dent, not following foreign example or advice but rather his own 
idea of what was best for North Korea (see Political Ideology; The 
Role of Chuch 'e, ch. 4). Just as he personally laid out the streets of 
the rebuilt P'yongyang (his "dream city") after the devastation of the 
Korean War and decided which buildings would go where and which 
architects would design which buildings in which style (Soviet or 
Korean), he planned and enforced the daily life of his people from 
their waking up until their going to bed, from the cradle to the grave. 
His role in the everyday life of the people may have been somewhat 
exaggerated, especially in later years when the cult of Kim II Sung 
reached dazzling proportions, but there is abundant evidence that no 
other leader has ever had a greater hand in planning, directing, and 
boasting about a society that he created. 

It is difficult to describe the mix of ideas and influences that came 
to bear on the creation of North Korea's unique society. It is a rigid 
class society emphasizing Confucian hierarchal values, a fanatical 
cult society extolling Kim II Sung as a demigod, an Orwellian 
thought-controlled society, a thoroughly militarized society, an 
impoverished socialist economy with a limited education system and 
woefully poor health-care system, no free religious institutions or 
spiritual teaching, and few, if any, basic human rights (see Educa- 
tion; Health Care, this ch.). 

The Cult of Kim II Sung 

What matters most in North Korea is loyalty to the "Great 
Leader" Kim II Sung and his teachings and, since 1 994, their inter- 
pretation by his son and heir, the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong II. This is 
immediately apparent upon one's first meeting with a North Korean, 



71 



North Korea: A Country Study 

whose every sentence is peppered with references to "the thought of 
Kim II Sung," "dedication to Kim II Sung," being a "Kim II Sung 
man," or just "Kim II Sung." 

The Kim cult has flourished in the special conditions of a rela- 
tively small country with a homogeneous population, a tradition of 
social harmony, authoritarian rule and loyalty of the people to the 
ruler, and, in this case, a charismatic leader with a unique style of 
leadership who ruled for an unusually long time. For nearly 50 years, 
Kim II Sung traveled around his country for more than 150 days and 
sometimes as many as 225 days a year. From 1954 to 1961, he 
reportedly made more than 1,300 on-the-spot inspections of collec- 
tive farms, factories, mines, highways, housing complexes, childcare 
facilities, museums, and other public buildings. In the 30 years from 
1950 to 1980, he reportedly traveled more than 513,000 kilometers, 
averaging approximately 52 kilometers a day. He was personally 
familiar with every town and village, every farm and factory, visiting 
many of them repeatedly. Over the years, most North Koreans saw 
him close at hand on one or another of his visits to their provinces. 

While the relatively small size of North Korea made it easier for 
him to establish a personal relationship with his people than it was 
for Stalin or Mao, who were remote by comparison, Kim's particular 
personality and skills in establishing personal rapport, especially 
with children, cannot be denied. One of his effective leadership prac- 
tices, for example, which won the hearts of both children and their 
parents, was his custom on his endless visits to nursery and elemen- 
tary schools of taking a Polaroid camera and having each child's pic- 
ture taken with him. The children would then take the photographs 
home and hang them in their homes, where only images of Kim were 
allowed to be displayed. For many years, North Koreans have begun 
and ended their day with a bow to Kim's portrait in their home. 

From available evidence, it seems that the cult of personality in 
North Korea rests on a genuine belief of the vast majority of the peo- 
ple in the greatness and goodness of Kim II Sung. Visitors to North 
Korea often remark on the depth of the people's feelings for Kim. 
Whatever criticism there is, it is rarely voiced, even in private; peo- 
ple are afraid to criticize the regime, especially Kim. Some defectors 
have admitted to having secret doubts about his infallibility, but they 
would never have voiced these doubts in public or, for that matter, in 
private. The most convincing reason for accepting the genuineness 
of the people's love for Kim actually comes from defectors who 
have absolutely no reason to exaggerate their true feelings for Kim 
after having made the highly dangerous decision to defect and hav- 
ing no fear of being returned to the dreadful existence from which 



72 




Parade celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the North Korean Communist 
Party (later the Korean Workers ' Party), P 'yongyang, October 11, 1995; 

Kim II Sung is featured in the large circular portrait. 
Courtesy Korea Today (P 'yongyang), November 1995, 1 

they have so narrowly escaped. In spite of any reservations they may 
have about the excesses of the cult, they still express a certain rever- 
ence for Kim II Sung as a person and as a leader. Their admiration 
seems deep-seated, genuine, and unshakeable. Studied at a distance 
as an abstraction, the cult may appear ludicrous, almost unbeliev- 
able, but, up close, its hold over the perception and thought patterns 
of North Koreans is awe inspiring. 

When Kim II Sung died suddenly and unexpectedly of a heart 
attack in July 1994 at the age of 82, the nation was shocked and over- 
come with grief on a scale that few outsiders comprehended at the 
time. Kim had been their leader during all or most of their lifetimes; 
the people had seen him at close range on many occasions. They felt 
they had lost a father, as well as the "Great Leader," who in 1998 was 
officially proclaimed the "Eternal President" of North Korea. More 
than that, they had lost a cult leader whom they revered as a demigod. 



73 



North Korea: A Country Study 

It would be hard to exaggerate the mood of vulnerability, confu- 
sion, and uncertainty, on top of grief, that engulfed the nation in 
1995, at the time when the first of a series of natural calamities, 
floods, droughts, famines, and starvation, gripped the nation, bring- 
ing it to near economic collapse (see Collapse in the 1990s, ch. 3). 
Many North Koreans attributed the severe problems then afflicting 
the country to the loss of the "Great Leader," as if there had been 
some disastrous world reordering. 

The handling of Kim's funeral reflected the country's state of 
mind. No foreign dignitaries were invited to attend the funeral cere- 
monies, despite the fact that a head of state for almost half a century 
was being honored. Kim's chuck 'e philosophy of national indepen- 
dence may have played some role in the decision to ban outsiders, 
but the simple explanation seems to have been the people's feeling 
of a loss too personal and too private to share with others. Perhaps 
the moral superiority and defiant aloofness that cult members typi- 
cally feel toward nonbelievers militated against the inclusion of out- 
siders at such a painful time. The limited glimpse that the outside 
world was afforded of the national outpouring of grief, with hun- 
dreds of thousands of North Koreans weeping for days, bespoke an 
honest desire to grieve in private, with no play for international sym- 
pathy or support. There is no reason to think that their tears at this 
time were anything but genuine. 

After the funeral, at which the designated heir, Kim Jong II, 
appeared but did not speak, he did not appear again in public for 
many months. When asked why, he said simply that he was still 
grieving for his father, an unusual admission for a head of state. 
Observers of the scene wondered why he had not moved more 
quickly to assume the mantel of leadership. While there may well 
have been overriding political considerations involving the need to 
consolidate his own political position, there was a sense that he, too, 
was almost paralyzed by grief over his father's death and sensitive to 
the country's need for time and space to absorb the loss (see Leader- 
ship Succession, ch. 4). His state of mind over his father's death is 
often cited as a major reason for his slowness in responding to the 
natural disasters that befell North Korea in the mid-1990s. 

Since the elder Kim's death, the cult has grown to even greater 
proportions. It continues to dominate every aspect of North Korean 
life. In this regard, it should be emphasized that it still is — as it 
always has been — the cult of Kim II Sung. Kim Jong II succeeded to 
power as the son of Kim II Sung in the tradition of the Choson mon- 
archy. One might assume that, as his son, Kim Jong II would be ele- 
vated to the same godlike status. However, that does not seem to be 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



the case. He is more the apostle or high priest of his father's cult, and 
a very zealous one at that. As the chief beneficiary of the cult, he has 
every reason to maintain and promote the cult to ever higher 
excesses. For a period of time in his career, the younger Kim's main 
responsibility in the Ministry of Culture actually seems to have been 
the promotion of the cult. He has proven expertise in that area. 
Among Kim II Sung's children, Kim Jong II "was the one who got 
his father's trust. He supported Kim II Sung's deification," according 
to Hwang Jang-yop, Korean Workers' Party (KWP) secretary for 
ideology. The younger Kim is credited with coining the term Kimil- 
sungism, with its specific connotation of one-man rule, and during 
the 1960s and 1970s he presided over the elevation of Kim II Sung 
from national hero and "Great Leader" to official deity. 

It would have been far riskier for Kim Jong II to have tried to 
replace his father in the people's affections, which he is not likely to 
have accomplished in any case, than to co-opt his father's cult for his 
own purposes. In this way, he has avoided any comparison to his 
father in which he would inevitably be found wanting. At the same 
time, he has capitalized on the benefits of being the son of a cult 
demigod, a position that no one else can challenge and that is com- 
patible with traditional Confucian thinking, which holds high the 
father-son relationship of the five personal connections (ruler and 
subject, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, husband 
and wife, and friend and friend) that contribute to the perfect har- 
mony of society. 

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Kim Jong Il's 
political power is any less than his father's because the younger Kim 
is not the object of a comparable cult of personality. He is the pres- 
ent-day leader of a cult society, with all the powers associated with 
being the leader, as distinct from the object of worship. It is doubtful 
that he could ever have created so intense and enduring a cult built 
around his persona. He is not the charismatic man his father was. He 
has inherited total political power, which he reinforces by reinvigo- 
rating the cult worship of his father, without himself having the stat- 
ure of his father as a demigod in what is essentially a secular 
religious state. 

Foreign visitors to North Korea are often stunned by the omni- 
presence of Kim II Sung in the lives of North Koreans, not only in 
their view all the time but constantly in their thoughts as well. There 
are photographs of Kim hanging in people's homes; gigantic posters 
of Kim hanging from the roofs of huge public buildings; state-issued 
portraits of Kim in offices, classrooms, shops, public halls, factories, 
hospitals, and other indoor locations, as well as on the front of trains 



75 



North Korea: A Country Study 

and the decks of ships; mosaics of Kim with his band of anti-Japa- 
nese guerrilla fighters on the walls of the elaborately decorated 
P'yongyang subway system; and statues and sculptures, some of 
them gold-plated, and the most impressive of all a huge, illuminated 
white marble statue of Kim seated at one end of the magnificent 
International Friendship Exhibition Hall in a pose reminiscent of 
Abraham Lincoln's statue in the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, 
DC. By one count, there were more than 500 life-size statues of Kim 
in 1980, and by the time of his death in 1994 that number had 
increased many times over. There are elaborately staged theatrical 
productions of his life story, some of them reportedly produced by 
Kim Jong II, who is known to have taken a personal interest and role 
in the development of North Korea's movie and theater industries. 

Kim II Sung's birthplace at Man'gyongdae and his burial site in 
P'yongyang are shrines, and North Korean students and workers go 
on annual pilgrimages to them from all over the country, often walk- 
ing many kilometers to get there. On a typical day, Man'gyongdae is 
visited by some 10,000 people, including foreign visitors who are 
taken there as a routine first stop on their tour of P'yongyang and the 
vicinity. There are raised plaques at spots in the middle of roads 
where Kim stopped to give on-the-spot guidance. Subway seats 
where he sat are roped off as memorials. There are signs over the 
doors of factories and day-care nurseries marking the date that Kim 
visited. Objects that he touched on these visits are covered with glass 
or draped with a veil and often set aside in a special room. North 
Korea's only four-year civilian university is named after him, as is 
the four-year military university (see Higher Education, this ch.; 
Officer Corps Professional Education and Training, ch. 5). Kim's 
birthday (April 15) is celebrated as the most important national holi- 
day of the year. There is a photograph of Kim on the identification 
card that hangs from the neck of every North Korean. People are not 
required to bow down to all his portraits in public locations, but 
North Koreans have been known to take out the picture of Kim that 
they carry and bow to it, sometimes ostentatiously, as when a North 
Korean diplomat returns home from an overseas assignment. Kim II 
Sung is literally everywhere in North Korea. In P'yongyang, one 
cannot walk 100 meters without encountering his likeness. 

Kim II Sung's tomb is also an indicator of the level of cult devel- 
opment. Reconstruction of the Kumsusan Assembly Hall in 
P'yongyang started in 1995 and reportedly cost US$8.9 billion. 
Referred to by foreign media as a "tomb palace," the nearly 35,000- 
square-meter, five-story memorial houses Kim's embalmed body 
and a typical larger-than life statue of the deceased president. Some 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



200,000 people can assemble on the square in front of the complex. 
Male visitors to the hall where Kim lies in view are required to wear 
suits, and women are required to wear hanbok (traditional Korean 
dress). The tomb is connected to the P'yongyang subway and has 
people-mover walkways, escalators, air purification systems, auto- 
matic shoe cleaners, and granite and marble construction throughout. 

If this were not suffocating enough, there is the more psychologi- 
cally stifling pressure of how much Kim II Sung is constantly on the 
minds of the North Korean people, not just forever in their sight. 
Beginning in nursery school, children memorize poems about Kim's 
early life and make up their own poems and drawings in his memory. 
In later years, they act out stories of his life, and in middle and high 
school they memorize long passages from his teachings. Farmers can 
recite his writings about agriculture from memory; workers know 
other passages from his treatises on industry; women memorize his 
words about the family; foreign affairs students memorize his lec- 
tures on chuch'e and other international subjects; and everyone 
learns what it means to be "a Kim II Sung man." Every morning they 
hear the regime's political message for the day taken from Kim's 
writings, and at weekly political meetings and self-criticism ses- 
sions, they study these writings in much greater detail, beginning 
and ending with patriotic songs glorifying Kim. The only movies 
and theater productions that they see are variations on the theme of 
Kim's life. Whether working or relaxing, Kim II Sung is always in 
the forefront. 

The most distinguishing feature about North Korean society, then, 
is the intensity of the Kim cult, not just its more extreme outward 
manifestations, but the hold that it has over the people's minds and 
feelings. North Korea is, above all else, the world's most intense, 
cult society with all the trappings of a nation-state. 

As members of a cult society, North Koreans are trained not to 
think but to follow. They may be rational on most issues, but on sen- 
sitive issues touching on the cult or Kim's life and teachings, they 
are totally intransigent. Their unshakable faith in the correctness of 
Kim's teachings and confidence in his way of doing things, accord- 
ing to chuch 'e doctrine, can make them closed to negotiation and 
resistant to compromise, even at the sacrifice of their own best inter- 
ests. The strong belief in the lightness of their cause and their faith in 
better times to come, which true believers often have and take heart 
from, can see them through difficulties that nonbelievers might not 
weather as well. Some analysts consider that North Korea has been 
able to survive the natural calamities and adverse international pres- 
sure since the mid-1990s — which forecasters predicted would bring 



77 



North Korea: A Country Study 

the nation to the point of national collapse— only because of the 
internal strength of a people bound together in an irrational but uni- 
fying national cult. 

A Class Society 

Two phrases are likely to dominate any conversation with a North 
Korean, regardless of the subject under discussion, just as they dom- 
inate every aspect of life in North Korea. They are Kim II Sung 
sanga (Kim II Sung's thoughts) and songbun (see Glossary), mean- 
ing socioeconomic or class background. 

In North Korea, a person's songbun is either good or bad, and 
detailed records are kept by KWP cadre and government security 
officials of the degree of goodness or badness of everyone's songbun. 
The records are continually updated. It is easy for one's songbun to be 
downgraded for lack of ideological fervor, laziness, incompetence, or 
for more serious reasons, such as marrying someone with bad 
songbun, committing a crime, or simply being related to someone 
who commits an offense. It is very difficult to improve one's 
songbun, however, particularly if the stigma derives from the prerev- 
olutionary class status or behavior of one's parents or relatives. 

In the early days of the regime, songbun records were sketchy, 
and some people survived by concealing the fact that their father, 
uncle, or grandfather had owned land or was a physician, merchant, 
or lawyer. However, in the late 1960s, the state made a major effort 
to conduct exhaustive secret investigations of the background of all 
North Koreans. Periodically after that, additional investigations were 
carried out by the public security apparatus whenever Kim II Sung 
had reason to believe there was opposition to his rule in a certain 
area of the country, town, or factory. 

During the Choson Dynasty, four distinct Confucian-based social 
strata developed: the scholar-officials (or nobility), the "middle peo- 
ple" (technicians and administrators subordinate to the scholar-offi- 
cials), the commoners (a large group comprising about 75 percent of 
the total population, including farmers, craftsmen, and merchants), 
and the "despised" or base people at the bottom of society. To ensure 
stability, the government devised a system of personal tallies kept by 
the scholar-officials to identify people according to their status. 

Kim II Sung borrowed heavily from this Confucian system but 
upset the social hierarchy in a radical remaking of society, more in 
keeping with communist teachings and his personal experience as a 
guerrilla fighter. Because the only "good" people in the pre- 1945 
period, in Kim's view, were factory workers, laborers, and farmers, 
they and their descendants were accorded privileged status. The 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



highest distinction went to the anti-Japanese guerrillas who had 
fought with him in Northeast China (Manchuria) prior to and during 
World War II, and then to veterans of the Korean War and their 
descendants. Next came the descendants of the prerevolutionary 
working people and the poor, small farmers. 

The regime also recognized the essential roles of intellectuals and 
professional workers in society. The symbolism of this is seen in the 
KWP's insignia, which depicts a pen in the middle of the traditional 
socialist hammer and sickle to emphasize the relationship among the 
physical labor of workers and farmers and intellectual activities of 
the well educated. Kim realized that an educated population and 
skilled technicians were needed to rebuild the industrial bases that 
had been established in North Korea during the Japanese colonial 
period and destroyed during the Korean War. However, the knowl- 
edgeable people Kim favored were not the precommunist period lite- 
rati but rather educated technologists who were useful to 
reconstruction and who were completely trustworthy and loyal to the 
regime. Education in the new Korea was supposed to remove the dis- 
tinctions between intellectuals and the working class through, 
according to Charles K. Armstrong, "the political conversion of the 
former and the intellectual uplifting of the latter." 

Ranked below the former guerrillas, working people and farmers, 
and intellectuals, in descending order were — and still are — some 50 
distinct groups. The only touch of humor in this otherwise deadly 
business of ranking people according to their songbun is the termi- 
nology some defectors say refers to the chosen versus the neglected: 
"tomatoes" versus "apples" versus "grapes." Tomatoes, which are 
red to the core, are worthy communists; "apples," which are red only 
on the surface, need ideological improvement; and "grapes" are 
hopeless. 

Based on their songbun ranking, North Korea's population can be 
divided into three main groups. The preferred class, consisting of 
some 10 to 15 percent of the population, is given every advantage. 
Its members receive better schooling, including the possibility of 
attending Kim II Sung University, better jobs (in foreign affairs work 
or in the military), better housing, better clothing, better food and 
more of it, and better medical care. The middle 40 to 50 percent of 
the population — ordinary people — can hope for a lucky break, such 
as a good assignment in the military that will bring them to the atten- 
tion of KWP cades and may get them a better job afterward. There is 
no hope, however, of a college education or a professional career. 
And finally, there is the bottom 40 percent of the population — the 
"undesirables" — to whom all doors to advancement are closed. They 



79 



North Korea: A Country Study 

can expect little except assignment to a collective farm or factory, 
just like their parents. This group includes a high percentage of 
women, who generally do not have the military as a way to improve- 
ment and are usually assigned immediately after middle school to a 
farm or to a factory job in the neighborhood in which they grew up. 
For them, travel to another town or region is out of the question. 

In this total reorganization of society that Kim II Sung wrought 
with amazing success, and relatively little terror compared to the 
wholesale purges of Stalin and Mao, today's privileged, educated 
class are the children of the precommunist working class, while 
those discriminated against are the former privileged and educated 
class and their descendants. Thus, North Korean leaders of Kim II 
Sung's generation were not likely to have been educated beyond 
middle school, and their children — the leaders of today who have 
received a privileged education through college and a few through 
university — are a first-generation elite, schooled in Kimilsungism, 
with no family history of intellectual or professional achievement, 
untraveled and inexperienced in the ways of the world, owing every- 
thing to Kim II Sung and his social revolution. 

In this respect, the society that Kim created represents a signifi- 
cant break from traditional Korean society, where the privileged 
class, the scholar-officials, were a meritocratic elite who gained their 
positions through educational achievement. Talent was a necessary, 
although not always a sufficient, prerequisite for getting into the core 
elite. Influential family connections also helped to obtain high offi- 
cial positions but not to the same extent as in contemporary North 
Korea. 

The new social system has created a tight, cohesive leadership, 
bound not only by an intense loyalty to Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II 
but also by lifetime bonds to one another. In North Korea, one lives 
in housing provided by a father's work unit, grows up with children 
of other fathers who work with one's father, goes to school with 
those children, takes vacations with them, and eventually goes to 
work with them in the same career for the rest of one's life. Sociolo- 
gists who contend that the complexity of an individual's personality 
derives from the number of social groups to which an individual 
belongs could only conclude that the personality of most North 
Koreans is not that complex. They know fewer people in their life- 
times than the average person does in most other countries, and the 
people they know all share basically the same life experience in the 
same collective farm or factory or, in the case of the elite, in the 
same military ranks or foreign service or administrative work. 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



Another limiting feature of a class society based on songbun is its 
effect on the morale of the people, both the privileged and underpriv- 
ileged. One source, a defector interviewed by this author in 1980, 
had been given every advantage in life, schooled in the finest schools 
including Kim II Sung University, trained for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and given overseas assignments. This defector, however, 
was preoccupied with the unfairness of a system that allowed his 
friends, sons of higher-ranking party officials like his father, to 
escape volunteer labor, vacation at seaside resorts, and obtain choice 
assignments abroad despite their poorer grades and oftentimes lack 
of motivation and hard work. It would seem that the system breeds 
discontent at all levels, except perhaps at the very highest level. 
Competent people constantly "find themselves working for people 
who are their inferiors in knowledge and intelligence. They see 
incompetent people, trusted by the party because of their good 
songbun, getting ahead while the more competent are blocked from 
advancement on account of their songbun. People may be secretly 
admired for their own worth despite their lower status in life, but 
being held in good repute by others is no substitute for being deemed 
politically reliable by the party." 

In the final analysis, the system hurts more than just the people 
themselves. As one North Korean defector noted: "workers with a 
good family background neglect their work but are still promoted 
while workers with a poor family background do not work hard 
because there is no hope for promotion." Thus, among its other evils, 
the songbun system is, by its very nature, antithetical to the industri- 
alization process, which prospers when people are promoted on the 
basis of merit, rather than class background or ideology. The ever- 
widening economic disparity between North Korea and South Korea 
would seem to bear this out. The economic boom of South Korea, 
where much less importance is attached to class background and 
more emphasis is given to education and ability, has left North Korea 
far behind. In the North, where loyalty to Kim and a good family 
background are all that matter, ideological considerations have seri- 
ously interfered with good economic policy, and the results have 
been disastrous. 

In short, Kim II Sung managed nothing less than the complete 
remaking of the social structure without the terror associated with 
Stalin's and Mao's creation of communist societies in the Soviet 
Union and China, respectively. Kim's success in effecting funda- 
mental social change was much greater than that of other communist 
regimes as a result of both the much smaller, more homogeneous 
population of North Korea, and also his particular skills. By any 



81 



North Korea: A Country Study 

standard, he must be judged to have accomplished one of the most 
successful and intensely coercive social engineering feats of modern 
times. 

The New Socialist Society 

Kim II Sung's vision of a new socialist North Korean society 
developed from ideas that influenced him during his 15 years with 
China's communists and later with Soviet military units in the 1930s 
and 1940s. The idea of centering life, including the provision of 
social services, around an individual's basic work or school unit was 
a revolutionary break with traditional Confucian thinking, which 
envisioned society as a great family living in perfect harmony, with 
each individual family being the primary social unit. 

Many observers in the late 1940s and 1950s believed that Kim 
and his cohorts were out to destroy family life. There is enough evi- 
dence to convince some that the family is no longer the basic social 
unit of North Korea, that it has been supplanted by the work unit, 
which controls virtually every aspect of an individual's life. How- 
ever, the family has proved remarkably resilient in North Korea, as 
in China and the republics of the former Soviet Union. It may be that 
the family never really was as threatened as many Western observers 
thought, because it is not at all clear that Kim intended to destroy 
family ties in his remaking of society. He seems to have planned to 
reinforce the bonds of family while constructing a new socialist 
command structure that would better ensure his control over every 
aspect of the people's lives, thinking perhaps that the two were not in 
conflict. The family remains strong in North Korea, despite the radi- 
cal changes introduced by Kim II Sung that limit the time that family 
members spend together. 

The Work Unit as the Basic Social Unit 

In North Korea, everyone over the age of six is a member of some 
sort of a unit outside the family. It can be the school one attends; the 
factory, collective farm, or government office where one works; or the 
military unit to which one is assigned. The unit provides housing, as 
well as food, clothing, and medical care. Normally, it is the father's 
work unit that provides housing for his family. Thus, wives and chil- 
dren do not usually live with the people they work with or go to school 
with, although some students, mainly those in college or at Kim II 
Sung University, live on campus. With the exception of domestic 
chores, women and children perform all their daily tasks with their 
work or school unit. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



People apply to the unit for permission to travel, to stay at out-of- 
town hotels, or to eat at public restaurants. It is the unit that autho- 
rizes vacation time and arranges for one's stay at government-owned 
vacation retreats. The individual must apply to the unit for permis- 
sion to see a doctor or have an operation. If a person has saved 
enough money to buy a watch, bicycle, or other major consumer 
good, he or she must first get the unit's permission to make the pur- 
chase. He or she must also get its approval to marry. Finally, it is 
with fellow unit members that a person attends all party meetings, 
militia training, self-criticism sessions, morning and evening study 
sessions, and cultural events, such as concerts and museum visits, 
and social events, such as movies and dances and day trips to Kim's 
birthplace at Man'gyongdae or tourist sites in P'yongyang. The fact 
that a person can be tied to the same unit for years, sometimes for a 
lifetime, suggests the importance of personal relationships with oth- 
ers in the unit. It is easy to imagine the frustrations and unhappiness 
that people endure when those relations are not good and there is no 
hope of changing work units. The leader of the unit has a greater 
hold over a person than his or her spouse or parent when it comes to 
the everyday decisions discussed above, including some of the most 
important decisions of a lifetime, such as whom one will marry. It is 
also easy to see how the regime can control nearly every aspect of a 
person's life through the leader of his or her work unit, the individual 
who makes almost every decision affecting the lives of the people in 
that unit. 

The totalitarian regime came into being with the division of the 
population into these socialist work units, a feat that Kim II Sung 
accomplished soon after coming to power in 1946 with virtually no 
resistance and no use of force. This charismatic leader, who extolled 
traditional Confucian beliefs in filial piety, love of family, and loyalty 
to the state, disarmed many people. They were not well informed 
about communist doctrine and social organization. 

The grouping of people into work units applies to all North Koreans 
from the age of six to 60 (for women) or 65 (for men), when they can 
retire. Thus, unless husbands and wives belong to the same work 
unit — a common occurrence — they do not share many of the experi- 
ences that families in other countries normally share. Nor do they do 
as much with their children as parents in other countries. For instance, 
children visit Kim's birthplace and museums in P'yongyang on out- 
ings arranged by their schools. They go to the theater and concerts 
with their classmates. Meanwhile, their parents go to these same 
events, at different times, in the company of fellow members of their 
work units. Tickets are distributed to members of a work unit as a 



83 



North Korea: A Country Study 

group; they are not given separately to individuals or families at a time 
of their choosing. Thus, although family members may be exposed to 
many of the same experiences, they do not share these experiences 
with their parents or siblings. 

Parents are much less directly involved than Western parents in 
other aspects of their children's upbringing, such as their education 
and medical care. Family vacations are very rare. Children see phy- 
sicians assigned to their school; parents consult physicians assigned 
to their work units. School authorities, working with local party offi- 
cials, arrange the volunteer labor schedules of students during vaca- 
tion times, with little or no coordination with parents' volunteer 
labor schedules. Teachers accompany students to collective farms, 
where they help with rice transplanting and rice harvesting; parents 
are likely to be assigned to different collective farms for the same or 
different two-week stints of volunteer labor. 

The only time that parents and children are regularly together 
after 7:30 to 8:30 AM and before 10:00 or 10:30 PM is on Sunday, the 
one family day in North Korea. Generally, families spend the day 
together at home, most often doing household chores or resting. 
They may go for a walk in the park or visit an amusement center or 
the zoo. Often one sees fathers out with their children on Sunday 
afternoons, while mothers are at home catching up on the week's 
laundry and cleaning. The more affluent might eat Sunday dinner at 
a local restaurant as a special treat, not a common occurrence, some- 
thing they would probably do no more than a few times each year. 
There is a simple joy in being at home together as a family. Engaged 
in work, study sessions, self-criticism sessions, militia training, and 
other activities for most of their waking hours, six days a week, 
North Koreans long for leisure moments at home with their families. 
Women, especially those in the cities, are reported to especially 
resent the activities that keep them away from home in the evenings 
and separated from their children most of the week. 

There is much in this description of family life in North Korea to 
suggest that the family is no longer the basic social unit of society, 
that it has been supplanted by the work unit, which controls nearly 
every aspect of an individual's life. At the same time, one of the dis- 
tinguishing features about the North Korean leadership has been its 
strong familial aspects, including Kim II Sung's blatant nepotism in 
giving his relatives high party and government posts and his even 
more extraordinary and eventually successful efforts in promoting 
his son as his successor, a Confucian rather than communist practice. 
Kim's sense of family was always central to his life and leadership. 
North Korean propaganda constantly stresses the importance of the 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



family. Concerned that separating babies of only a few months of 
age from their working mothers and putting them in daytime nurser- 
ies — a practical solution to the pressing need to keep women in the 
workforce — might be interpreted as a move against the family, offi- 
cials have been at pains to deny any such intention. 

Some observers have suggested that the Kim cult, with Kim as the 
father figure, was meant to substitute for a sense of family — that of 
all North Koreans belonging to one big family, an old Confucian 
idea. Both Kim regimes have placed similarly high value on tradi- 
tional ideas of close familial bonds together with loyalty to the state. 

In short, Kim II Sung does not appear to have viewed the work 
unit and family as competing social units. As he envisaged it, the 
work unit was the best way of providing equal services to the popu- 
lation and getting equal work from the people, a communist ideal 
that appealed to him. He probably did not see that goal as threaten- 
ing the strong Korean sense of family, even though in practice it 
would mean much less time for the family to be together and a major 
loss in the family's control over decision making. One can conclude 
that family life and the prerogatives of the family have suffered, to 
the dismay of the people. But whatever discontent this has caused 
has certainly not lessened the people's strong feelings of family and 
may actually have fostered closer family ties as the one bulwark 
against the state's total control over people's lives. If the family is 
not the main social unit of current-day North Korean life, it is still 
people's primary love and refuge. 

A Thought-Controlled Society 

Childhood may be the only happy time in North Korea before the 
reality of life in a thought-controlled, totalitarian society sinks in. 
The KWP's control over every aspect of a person's life asserts itself 
in gradual steps, starting with membership in the Young Pioneer 
Corps, then the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League (see Glossary), 
and finally, for those who pass the test, the Korean Workers' Party 
(see Mass Organizations, ch. 4). 

The one day that seems to stand out as the most exciting day of 
childhood is the day a boy or girl becomes a Young Pioneer between 
the ages of nine and 11. It marks the only gala celebration of a 
child's life up to that point, because birthdays are not celebrated in 
any special way. Children receive the Young Pioneer red scarves and 
buttons at a ceremony held at school and attended by their families, 
usually on a national holiday such as Kim II Sung's birthday (April 
15), Army Day (April 25), or National Day (September 9). Each new 
Young Pioneer receives presents from the family, such as a new pen, 



85 



North Korea: A Country Study 

notebook, or school bag. These were the only gift-wrapped presents 
that one North Korean defector ever remembered receiving. 

There are about 3 million Young Pioneers in North Korea. They 
can be seen everywhere in P'yongyang and other cities marching two 
by two in orderly fashion, usually singing, with the yellow epaulets 
on their bright blue uniforms and red scarves tied around their necks. 
They receive two hours of ideological training every day and give a 
full day of volunteer labor on Saturdays. These commitments are 
nothing compared to later demands on their time, when they become 
members of the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League between the ages 
of 14 and 16. 

The political pressures of the adult world begin to engulf teenag- 
ers when they are 14 to 16 years old. If any one event can be singled 
out as marking the end of childhood, it is entry into the Kim II Sung 
Socialist Youth League, which brings tremendous new pressures to 
conform, endless new requirements for work, study, self-criticism, 
dedication, and service to the state. The symbolism involved in giv- 
ing up one's bright red Young Pioneer scarf in exchange for the 
much more somber league button seems to capture the mood exactly. 

Entrance to the league is by examination, but it is not difficult, 
and almost everyone eventually passes it by the time he or she is 16 
years old. There is no family celebration when a child joins the 
league, unlike entry into the Young Pioneer Corps. There is simply a 
meeting at school attended by the students and their teachers but not 
their families. Not knowing the changes that are in store for them, 
the new league members have no real sense of the significance of the 
event. Only when they look back, defectors say, can they appreciate 
entry into the league as the watershed in life that it really is. 

Having by then completed primary school and moved on to mid- 
dle school, most North Koreans have had a chance to observe the 
workings of songbun in society. They have gained some insight into 
their own standing in the rigidly class-conscious society. At this 
point, some begin a lifetime of adjustment to the unhappy fact of 
having been born with bad songbun and thereby deprived of any 
chance of great success in life, while others begin to relax in the 
comfortable feeling of having been lucky enough to be born with 
good songbun. 

Volunteer Labor 

Everyone in North Korea older than 16 years of age is required to 
perform volunteer labor for the state. One of the criteria for KWP 
membership is the amount of volunteer labor one has done as a 
member of the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League. There is always 
pressure — throughout life — to do more than is required. 



86 



The USS Pueblo, now a tourist attraction on the Taedong River in P 'yongyang 

Courtesy Choson (P 'yongyang), July 2005, 12 

Visitors to P 'yongyang in the 1970s used to comment on the 
amazing construction activity late at night. They described huge con- 
struction sites of several city blocks in size, swarming with thou- 
sands of workers, poorly dressed, laboring for long hours into the 
night, the whole scene illuminated by a series of light bulbs strung 
up above. They understandably, but incorrectly, assumed that these 
were regular construction workers on the night shift, their shabby 
clothes and wan appearance suggesting their poor standard of living. 
In fact, as defectors later revealed, these were middle-school and 
college students, unused to hard labor and wearing their oldest 
clothes, performing their stint of volunteer labor. Apparently, there 
was a certain excitement about this kind of nighttime construction 
project in P' yongyang. Students enjoyed seeing friends whom they 
had not met for awhile. There was a kind of camaraderie and esprit 
de corps. Girls and boys were both there, so there was something of 
a party atmosphere. Students got extra credit for night volunteer 
labor, which improved the chances of their being accepted into the 
party. The work was not strenuous and required no special skills. 

Certain projects are known to have been constructed by student 
rather than adult volunteers, who generally are recruited for larger 
projects. For instance, students, bused in for construction work dur- 
ing school vacations, built a new highway between Kaesong and 
Sinuiju (see Special Economic Zones, ch. 3). It is more usual for stu- 
dent volunteer laborers to do most of the road repairs or excavation 



87 



North Korea: A Country Study 

for new roads in North Korea, as distinct from road construction or 
more technically complex work. Students played a major role in the 
construction of three national monuments dedicated to Kim II Sung 
on his seventieth birthday on April 15, 1982, and were reported to 
have been "inspired" by the thought of donating their labor to these 
projects. 

Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League officials are responsible for 
organizing student volunteer labor. They are told the number of 
laborers needed for each project, and they see to it that all students in 
their jurisdiction are assigned on an equitable basis. 

Most volunteer labor is not as much fun as student projects in 
P'yongyang. People quickly tire of it, and after many years people 
become jaded about it. One defector described the volunteer labor he 
performed as a student in P'yongyang. He helped move heavy equip- 
ment on the roads, polished stone floors in newly constructed build- 
ings, cleaned up after renovations, helped with the construction of a 
swimming pool, and helped farmers transplant rice in the spring and 
then harvest it in the late summer. 

Almost all North Korean students in upper-middle school, high 
school, and college, as well as many adults, including members of 
military units, help with the spring planting and fall harvests. 
Schools are essentially closed during these periods, as are many 
offices and factories. People seem to dislike work on the farms most 
of all. Volunteer laborers camp out on the front porch of farmers' 
homes in crowded conditions. They generally receive inadequate 
food, certainly less than they are used to getting, and farmers find it 
difficult to put up with the people living temporarily in and around 
their homes. Sometimes the tension escalates into skirmishes. 

Students are required to give 30 to 40 days of volunteer labor dur- 
ing the spring rice transplanting season, 15 to 20 days during the har- 
vest, and an unspecified number of days during the monsoon season 
to repair flood damage. Additionally, they must perform other kinds 
of volunteer labor during their summer vacation, during winter break 
in December, and on school afternoons, including Saturday. This can 
easily add up to more than 150 days a year. In crises, such as 
droughts or floods, which were commonplace during North Korea's 
difficult years in the mid-1990s, students are mobilized for indefinite 
periods, putting in more than the average 150 days of work per year. 
Young men, who normally participate in a 60-day military training 
program during the summer, are exempt from volunteer labor at that 
time, but female students do volunteer labor during their summer 
break. All this adds to an incredible amount of volunteer labor per 
student per year. None of it is paid for, of course, so it is probably not 
accurately reflected in state statistics on national income. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



According to defectors, most students probably would not object 
to volunteer labor if they did not have to do so much of it, especially 
so much rice transplanting. They all say there is too much work, and 
it takes too much time from studying. But they seem to accept volun- 
teer labor as part of life. They only resent being asked to give so 
much and the unending pressure to give more. While the work itself 
may not be so bad, the pressure to do more is "unrelenting." 

Political Study Sessions 

In addition to obligatory volunteer labor, North Korean students 
and adults must participate in political study sessions three or four 
times a week and self-criticism meetings once a week. Study ses- 
sions are separate from academic studies, although the latter also 
include a strong ideological content. Generally, study sessions focus 
on contemporary issues and events. They may be devoted to the lat- 
est editorial in the party newspaper, Nodong Shinmun (Workers' 
Daily), the party line on the current economic situation, new direc- 
tives from Kim Jong II, or distilled current events in South Korea 
and other countries. There is continual study of Kim II Sung's life 
and teachings, much of it repeating what students are taught in 
school. By the time they have graduated from college, most students 
have read all of Kim's works and have taken detailed notes on them. 

Self-Criticism Meetings 

Some of the most difficult moments of a person's life in North 
Korea are spent in self-criticism meetings, which begin with joining 
the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League and continue until life's end. 
In the 1960s, these meetings were held monthly, but in the early 
1970s Kim Jong II is reported to have advised his father, based on 
his own experience as a student, to make these meetings weekly 
instead of monthly and of shorter duration and to sanction criticism 
of less serious offenses, such as smoking and staying up too late, so 
as to lessen the pressure that built up between monthly meetings. 
Apparently, the pressure is somewhat less under the new system, 
although people dread these meetings. 

Each school and work unit sets aside a particular afternoon or 
evening every week for criticism meetings, which consist of both 
self-criticism and criticism of others. According to a reliable source 
who endured many such sessions, it is a "terrifying thing to stand up 
in front of others and be criticized" and almost as upsetting to be 
under constant pressure to criticize others. People are encouraged to 
keep a notebook and write down all the things that they and their 



89 



North Korea: A Country Study 

friends and neighbors have done wrong during the week. They use 
these notes as talking points in the criticism sessions. 

There is a knack to surviving these sessions with minimum dan- 
ger and minimum psychological stress. The knack is to join forces 
with friends and agree ahead of time on whom to criticize that day 
and for what. That person is not surprised, then, by the criticism of 
friends and is prepared to respond. The individual also learns the 
safer things to criticize and how to turn the discussion quickly to 
Kim's teachings on that subject. For instance, in criticizing oneself 
or others for staying up late, it is important to explain that such 
behavior not only makes one lazy and sleepy the next day but is sug- 
gestive of a bourgeois attitude. Then the wrongdoer can go on to cite 
Kim's warning against other kinds of bourgeois behavior, deflecting 
the focus of the criticism from his or her own transgression to a 
broader discussion of bourgeois behavior. The trick is in making 
oneself and others seem guilty but not dangerously so and, in the 
process, to score points by citing Kim II Sung constantly. 

According to Kim Jong IPs directives, everyone is supposed to 
speak at each meeting, either in self-criticism or in criticism of oth- 
ers, but this does not always happen owing to lack of time. The pres- 
sure mounts for anyone left out to speak at the next meeting. 
Sometimes, self-criticism sessions can get very tense, especially if 
political subjects are discussed. One student remembered a friend 
who never again spoke to another student who criticized him at 
length for skipping a political class. 

By all accounts, criticism meetings are among the most dreaded 
moments of the week. As a way of blocking out the fear, one student 
said he never really listened during the meetings. His mind was 
always on other things. "Nothing [he] heard would have changed 
[his] mind about anyone anyway," knowing it all to be so fake. 

So long as these sessions focus on basically unimportant behavior, 
they are not in themselves threatening. What is important to the 
regime is the behavior that people are persuaded to avoid for fear of 
being discovered and criticized. In this sense, criticism meetings are 
a very effective instrument of control. What keeps North Koreans in 
line is the knowledge that they are always being watched and 
reported on by their friends and neighbors, as well as security per- 
sonnel. Criticism sessions establish that Orwellian climate of con- 
stant watchfulness in conditioning North Koreans, even as young 
students, to notice their fellow students and report on their behavior. 

According to those who have lived in the system for years, criti- 
cism meetings have the effect of encouraging some of the worst 
human traits: a disregard for others' feelings, a willingness to use 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



others to further one's own career, disloyalty, lying, moral superior- 
ity, and a super-critical attitude toward others. Remembering that 
these sessions begin when a student is only 14 to 16 years old, one 
can appreciate that young people are subjected to social and political 
pressures far beyond their capacity to handle. The maturity that is 
called for in walking the thin line between overzealous criticism of 
others, with the risk of losing friends, and a lackadaisical attitude, 
with the threat of party censure, is beyond the skill of most people of 
this age. Small wonder that childhood in North Korea ends abruptly 
with league membership and consequent exposure to the deadly 
business of self-criticism sessions. 

The Elite Life in P'yongyang 

The inequality of life under the songbun system could not be 
more dramatically illustrated than in Kim II Sung's building a 
"dream city" for the privileged elite that is off-limits to the rest of the 
population. In no other country is there such a striking difference 
between living in one city and living anyplace else in the entire 
country. 

P'yongyang was reduced to rubble during the Korean War. Since 
then it has been rebuilt according to a design personally approved by 
Kim II Sung. The streets, laid out in a north-south, east-west grid, 
give a well-ordered appearance, and its public buildings, which are on 
a grand scale, make it a monumental city. The elegant decor of its pub- 
lic buildings features terraced landscaping, illuminated fountains and 
statues, marble floors, high sculptured ceilings, mosaic wall decora- 
tions, plush red carpeting and oriental rugs, and exquisite imported 
crystal chandeliers. 

North Korea's showcase capital of P'yongyang is not only atypical 
of the rest of the county but atypical of East Asia in general. The natu- 
ral beauty of its parks and rivers, the grandeur of its public buildings 
and its wide, tree-lined avenues — all sparkling clean — and the careful 
control of the chosen few living there, creates an impression of a spa- 
cious, uncrowded Asian city. P'yongyang has been described by for- 
eign visitors as one of the most beautiful cities they have ever seen. In 
winter, with snow on the ground, they have noted an eerie, frozen 
beauty somewhat suggestive of a Siberian city with its Russian-style 
architecture relieved by more modern buildings of graceful Korean 
design. In the spring and summer, one's impression is of flowers, wil- 
low trees, parkland, and rivers. Despite all this natural beauty, it strikes 
most foreigners as silent, remote, and unlike the vibrancy and liveli- 
ness of most other Asian cities. Its grandeur and attractiveness are not 
accompanied by what one would most expect to find in the capital of a 



91 



North Korea: A Country Study 

country: a large population going about its business in a spontaneous, 
unprogrammed way. In P'yongyang everything is planned, never 
spontaneous. Its chosen population consists of the super-privi- 
leged — few in number and privileged beyond the ordinary North 
Korean's wildest imagination — who enjoy the "good life" by North 
Korean standards but the worst life, in world opinion, in terms of basic 
human rights. 

A priority of Kim's in designing his dream city was to limit the 
size of its population. According to defectors, everyone wants to live 
in P'yongyang. There would be a mass movement of people into the 
city, were it not for the tight controls, with guards at every entry and 
registration required of all residents. To maintain its orderly, unclut- 
tered appearance, bicycles and trucks are forbidden in major sections. 
There are no privately owned vehicles, so the only automobiles are 
those belonging to the government for official use. People travel by 
bus, trolley, or subway (see Transportation, ch. 3). The mere exis- 
tence of a subway in P'yongyang, much less one with elaborate tile 
mosaics and crystal chandeliers, seems surreal in a country where 
most people walk to and from work and only the fortunate are bused 
to their factories. 

In most of North Korea, men and women go to bathhouses of rel- 
atively primitive design two or three times a month. In P'yongyang, 
the privileged go to the Health and Recreation Center, open seven 
days a week, featuring a showcase gym, huge indoor swimming 
pool, and elaborate sauna facilities. They have the most modern hos- 
pital facilities, unheard of anywhere else in North Korea. The 
P'yongyang Maternity Hospital has a closed-circuit television sys- 
tem that allows visitors to talk with patients and see newborn babies 
in the nursery. A showcase nursery school, which caters to the sons 
and daughters of Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, has a heated 
swimming pool, a fancy merry-go-round, an electric train, and a host 
of expensive tricycles. None of the other 60,000 childcare and kin- 
dergarten facilities in the country are equipped in such a way. Some 
10,000 privileged children, ages eight to 16, go to the P'yongyang 
Children's Palace, a huge complex of four buildings containing more 
than 500 rooms, with an assembly hall seating 1,200. The Children's 
Palace offers courses in music, dance, martial arts, science, mechan- 
ics, gymnastics, painting, and sculpture, as well as an assortment of 
sports activities. One Westerner observed that the three grand pianos 
in one room would have been "unavailable to any student in his 
country without a master's degree in pianoforte." Most foreign visi- 
tors are genuinely impressed with the technical proficiency of the 
students studying ballet and violin. In the evening, these youngsters 



92 



Propaganda poster showing 
representatives of the army, 
industry, women, and intellectuals. 
In the background is the national 
seal of the Democratic People s 
Republic of Korea. The caption 
reads: "Let us sacrifice for our 
fatherland as a citizen armed with 
strong consciousness. " 
Courtesy Choson Yaesul 
(Pyongyang), January 2003, 47 




put on musical shows for foreign visitors, such as the one U.S. Sec- 
retary of State Madeleine Albright attended in 2000. A permanent 
staff of 500 full-time teachers and 1,000 part-time teachers direct the 
activities at the Children's Palace. 

North Korea's concept of an after-school center for extracurricu- 
lar activities was modeled on an expanded version of the Swiss 
experience. Kim II Sung was especially proud of the Children's Pal- 
ace. He used to visit it three or four times a year. He was there for the 
opening of the first elevator installed in a North Korean building. 

The North Koreans instituted a novel system for ensuring that the 
privileged always enjoy the most modern conveniences. People are 
constantly moved in and out of apartments in P'yongyang as newer 
ones are built. Because apartment buildings are occupied by people 
working in the same office — in P'yongyang most likely a govern- 
ment ministry — they can be moved as a group. There is no disrup- 
tion of social ties, as one's neighbors move on together into a new, 
higher- standard apartment building. 

For North Koreans who have seen P'yongyang rebuilt from the 
ashes of the Korean War, there is genuine pride in the glory of the 
city. Kim II Sung himself took great personal pride in P'yongyang. 
He considered it his "own creation," his "personal child." He was 
well aware of the importance of morale in a war-torn country, and he 
is reported to have designed it "to enhance the ego and morale of the 



93 



North Korea: A Country Study 

whole nation." He loved the city and once said he would never risk 
its destruction. It is truly a dream city, in the sense that more than 88 
percent of North Korea's population can only dream of living in this 
city of 2.9 million. Only the very apex of North Korean society 
enjoys its incomparable amenities. 

The Privileged Life Beyond Money 

In an effort to create the impression of a classless society, the 
North Korean government likes to cite statistics on income to sup- 
port its contention of great equality. However, money is not a good 
measure of privilege in North Korea, nor are the rationing system or 
any of the established rules and regulations. The system of privilege 
operates outside the established system of wages and rations and the 
normal distribution of goods and services. 

Salary levels are particularly deceptive. The highest paid cabinet 
ministers, who earn around 250 won (for value of the won — see 
Glossary) per month, and professors at Kim II Sung University and 
top artists and musicians, who earn around 200 won a month, are 
paid only three to four times the wage of the average North Korean 
factory worker, who earns 60 to 90 won per month. However, cabi- 
net ministers and other high-ranking officials receive many extra 
benefits. They are entitled to free high-quality cigarettes, woolen 
clothes, and leather shoes. Ordinary citizens would not have access 
to special shops where these and other items, such as beef, pork, 
wine, liquor, candy, eggs, and anchovies, can be purchased at dis- 
count prices. There are different shops for different levels of the 
hierarchy so that people are not aware of what is available to others. 

On important national occasions, high-level officials are given 
special gifts, such as imported color televisions, fountain pens, and 
wristwatches. They go to private showings of Western movies and 
have access to Western magazines and books, banned for ordinary 
North Koreans. They live in exclusive apartment buildings with ele- 
vators (instead of long walk-up stairways on the outside of the build- 
ing) and have a living room, separate dining room, kitchen, 
bathroom, and two to four bedrooms. Their apartments are furnished 
with a color television, refrigerator, sewing machine, electric fan, 
and, in some cases, air conditioning, all of which are beyond the 
hope of the average citizen. Such officials are driven to work in 
chauffeured limousines. 

The elite have other special services at their disposal, including 
prestigious medical facilities that dispense rare and expensive medi- 
cines, all free of charge. Most North Koreans would not even be 
aware of the existence of these medical clinics. There are special 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



clubs for the elite that include bowling alleys and tennis courts, ten- 
nis being a game that most North Koreans have never seen. Among 
the luxurious government-owned retreats tucked away from public 
view, there are resorts on the beach at Wonsan and hillside villas in 
the mountains along the east coast that are sometimes used by visit- 
ing foreign dignitaries but otherwise are reserved for top party and 
government leaders. 

Unlike his father, who spent the first half of his life as a guerrilla 
fighter in harsh conditions and who seemed to retain a taste for the 
simpler life, Kim Jong II has been raised amidst privilege, given the 
best available education, finest clothes, good food, luxury automo- 
biles, lavish vacation homes with swimming pools, tennis, land for 
horseback riding, and Western movies, of which he is a connoisseur. 
In P'yongyang he presumably lives in the large presidential mansion 
that was built for his father in the late 1970s. The house is reported to 
be a three-story building with a five-story presidential hall and a sep- 
arate three-story conference and museum building. The complex has 
a moat on two sides and formal gardens and lawns, is set back from 
the street, cordoned off from normal traffic, and obscured from pub- 
lic view. No foreigner is known to have been taken there. 

The average North Korean has no idea how Kim and his coterie 
live. The rarified lifestyle and hidden wealth are known only to the 
privileged few. The system has promoted an elitism that is the very 
antithesis of the communist notion of egalitarianism. 

There is one area in which the elite have no special privilege: 
political freedom. As a person rises through the ranks to the top lead- 
ership, more, rather than less, is expected in terms of political obei- 
sance to the Kim cult. As the individual has more to lose in a fall 
from power, he or she is naturally disinclined to jeopardize a career 
by a less than fulsome show of fidelity. Thus, one finds the most 
exaggerated worship of the cult at the upper levels of the govern- 
ment. The ambassador in an embassy is likely to be the most fanati- 
cal observer of the cult. Such fidelity may not be his true feeling, but 
it is the price of survival. He is likely to set the example in terms of 
long hours of studying Kim's teachings and participation in criticism 
sessions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel are routinely brought 
home for a month's political reindoctrination every two years. Their 
privileged status brings them no respite from constant political sur- 
veillance. No one escapes that. 

Daily Life 

Most North Koreans have no means of acquiring the prerogatives 
of privilege. They might have access to a television, refrigerator, and 



95 



North Korea: A Country Study 

sewing machine in communal rooms in their factories or cooperative 
farms. A lucky few might have a wristwatch or a bicycle that was 
won as a result of an economic competition within their factory or 
office. Whatever their income, they are unable to buy more than 
their allotment of basic foodstuffs, such as rice, corn, and sugar, all 
of which are rationed. And, in contrast to the privileged, who get 
their allotment of food grains in rice, ordinary citizens get a mixture 
of rice and other grains. 

Certain benefits come without charge. Typical housing for the 
ordinary North Korean family is provided free of charge by the work 
unit. It consists of a living-dining room, one bedroom, a kitchen, and 
shared toilet facilities, regardless of the size of the family. Education 
and medical care also are free, but there is a significant difference 
between the medical and educational services provided for the privi- 
leged and nonprivileged. Access to automobiles and vacation retreats 
and exemption from volunteer labor are out of the question for the 
majority. Finally, and most importantly, the intangibles in life are not 
a matter of free choice. Ordinary citizens have no choice where they 
live, what job they do, where they can travel, or what they might be 
willing to give up to send their children to college. 

Wages are a particularly misleading measure of equality in North 
Korea, appearing to indicate that the elite live only twice as well as 
ordinary North Korean working people and about three or four times 
as well as the lowest-paid unskilled workers. There is a salary range 
for each category of wage earners depending on the size and location 
of a factory, the nature of a person's job within the factory, and the 
seniority of an individual worker. A work-team rating system further 
adjusts wages on the basis of performance. Workers can be rewarded 
or penalized for such things as the care they take of equipment, the 
quality of their work, their initiative in solving production problems, 
and their safety record. The wage structure is basically modeled after 
that of the Soviet Union with a few adjustments. 

Wages have no bearing on food consumption, basic work and 
school clothes, and other essential consumer goods that are dispersed 
through the government distribution system. Nor do they determine 
the level and kind of education and medical care, which are provided 
free of charge by the work or school unit in keeping with the 
songbun system. Salaries can be thought of as something of a cross 
between wages as known in most of the world and children's allow- 
ances, which are given for extra expenditures above and beyond 
basic housing, food, clothing, education, and medical care provided 
by parents. North Koreans can spend their wages on extra food, 
clothing, cigarettes, haircuts, cosmetics, entertainment (dinner at a 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



restaurant or the movies), or occasionally the purchase of a major 
item such as a wristwatch or bicycle, but only with permission from 
the work unit. 

The limited role of money in the economy is reflected in the dis- 
tortion between wages and prices, especially the price of nonessen- 
tial goods that the regime wants to limit. A nylon sweater and two 
pairs of nylon stockings, considered nonessential luxury items, are 
priced at the average North Korean's monthly salary. The average 
daily wage of 2.5 won would not cover the cost of one kilogram of 
peanuts, one meter of nylon cloth, one pair of nylon socks, or a pair 
of nylon stockings. It could buy one meter of cotton cloth, a tooth- 
brush and toothpaste, one private bath in a bathhouse and a cake of 
soap, a haircut and styling, or a set of table tennis paddles and balls. 
There is simply no way that an average family could ever hope to 
save enough to buy a refrigerator (selling for 300 to 400 won) or a 
black-and-white television (300 to 700 won). 

Until the late 1990s, one of the distinguishing features of the 
North Korean economy was the uniformity of prices of goods 
throughout the country, the similarity of goods and services available 
in urban and rural areas, and the provision of similar shopping facili- 
ties in different areas, in keeping with Kim II Sung's intention to pro- 
vide a basic equality in the system, with allowances for the people at 
the top but with enforced uniformity for all others. Kim used to boast 
that "any item sold in a North Korean 'daily necessity' store could 
be bought in the most remote area at the same price as in any other 
place." Since the famine of the mid-1990s, the emergence (with the 
regime's blessing) of local free markets outside the government's 
public distribution system has brought some disparity in prices 
throughout the country determined by economic forces of supply 
and demand in different locales. However, the regime continued to 
assert control over the distribution of more goods, especially food, as 
agricultural production had somewhat improved. 

Neighborhoods 

In building his new socialist society after the war, Kim was influ- 
enced by the Swedish experience of self-sufficient urban neighbor- 
hoods. For every block of living quarters for 5,000 to 6,000 
inhabitants (administered as a unit called a dong), he created the 
same array of shops, typically on the first floor of a high-rise apart- 
ment building, including a food store supplying rice, vegetables, 
fish, and other foodstuffs and a barbershop, beauty parlor, tailor, 
public bathhouse, shoe-repair shop, fuel-supply depot, branch post 
office, medical clinic, children's nursery school, and library, all of 



97 



North Korea: A Country Study 

which are run by the dong administrative committee. In rural areas, 
where there are fewer inhabitants, the same group of stores is pro- 
vided for each county, the population of which would also be about 
5,000 to 6,000 people. Wherever one travels in North Korea, includ- 
ing P'yongyang, one sees this same grouping of stores that Kim con- 
sidered essential to everyday living. 

The residents of each urban dong or each rural county (gun or 
kun) are expected, indeed forced, to shop in their neighborhood 
stores. They are registered to shop there and no place else. They can- 
not redeem their rice rations elsewhere. Each store can track the pur- 
chases of its registered customers; there is no need for coupons. If a 
family is going out to dinner at a restaurant, the neighborhood store 
can authorize the restaurant's purchase of so many grams of rice and 
deduct that amount from the family's running account. 

Kim's neighborhood concept contributes to the overwhelming 
sense of uniformity about the country. Just as every place has the 
same prefabricated dining halls at factories, schools, and military 
installations, one sees the same group of stores, often in the same 
layout. The people are all exposed to essentially the same shopping 
experience, although in the larger cities there also are bookstores, 
photographic studios, flower shops, music stores, optical shops, 
sports equipment stores, and even pet stores for those who can afford 
them. 

Consumer Goods and Services 

In organizing North Korean society on a self-sufficient neighbor- 
hood concept, Kim avoided some of the commuting problems encoun- 
tered by Soviet consumers who used to complain of having to walk 
long distances to shop. The difficulty associated with shopping in 
North Korea is occasioned by the fact that everyone shops at the same 
times: on the way home from work or during the midday break. There 
are no other times to shop because almost everyone is at work or 
attending school. Visitors to North Korea all attest to the emptiness of 
stores during the day except during these rush hours. North Koreans 
also must shop every day. Without refrigeration, most people have no 
means of keeping food fresh, especially in summer. 

The regime has controlled the consumption of consumer goods 
and services through the rationing of basic foodstuffs, the direct dis- 
tribution of essential work and school clothes, and tight control over 
the distribution of all other goods (including extra clothing and addi- 
tional foods, basic necessities such as haircuts and bathing services, 
and nonessential items such as wristwatches and bicycles) through a 
system of artificially low wages and artificially high prices. While 



98 



Newly built traditional-style rural houses, Chagang Province 
Courtesy Kumsukangsan (Pyongyang), June 2000, 49 

the price of basic necessities such as haircuts, public baths, subway 
fares, school supplies, and home fuel (wood and coal) is relatively 
low, luxury items such as wool, finished clothing, electrical appli- 
ances, and imported items are priced exorbitantly, well above the 
reach of most workers. 

Diet 

The system has effectively limited food consumption and in the 
process had a significant impact on the birthrate. Most people simply 
cannot afford to have more than two children, even with both parents 
working. The average number of children per family, according to 
2007 estimates, is two, low for an Asian country. 

Kim envisaged the consumption of food based on the energy 
required to do a job rather than the prestige of the job. Thus, a per- 
son's allotment of food grains does not necessarily parallel his or her 
wages. Miners and ocean fishermen and others doing heavy work, 
including the military, are allotted more grain than government and 
party officials engaged in less strenuous physical activities. How- 
ever, the privileged among the latter receive their grain allowance in 
rice rather than a combination of food grains and are paid higher 
wages, enabling them to buy more food and other consumer goods, 
shop at special stores with discounted prices for luxury items not 
available elsewhere, and receive a plethora of nonmonetary benefits, 
including better housing, better medical care, and higher education. 



99 



North Korea: A Country Study 

The kind of rice— polished or unpolished — a North Korean is 
allotted under this system also is very important. North Koreans 
have a definite preference for rice over corn, barley, or wheat. Only 
high government and party officials enjoy polished rice. A cabinet 
minister who receives 700 grams of grain in the form of polished 
rice is considered much more favored than a blast-furnace operator 
who receives 900 grams of grain per day as 50 percent unpolished 
rice, 40 percent corn, and 10 percent wheat flour. Rations for chil- 
dren are considered generous compared to rations for adults. Thus, a 
family consisting of adults only is generally less well off in terms of 
rationed food. It is a common occurrence for childless households to 
be short of grain well before the end of the month. 

North Korean families receive grain rations only for members of the 
immediate family. When they have visiting guests or relatives or a wed- 
ding or funeral, they must ask their guests to bring their own rice rations. 

The basic diet for most North Koreans is rice and vegetables, 
three times a day, with fruit occasionally (when in season), chicken 
two or three times a month, and red meat five or six times a year. 
Heavy on carbohydrates, low in fats, proteins, vitamins, and miner- 
als, it is not a balanced or varied diet. According to defectors, the 
monotony of the same meal, three times a day, for long periods is a 
major source of dissatisfaction. Moreover, chronic malnutrition is a 
serious problem, as 27 percent of the population lives at or below the 
absolute poverty level. 

After enjoying a steady improvement in their diet from the late 
1950s through the 1970s, North Korean consumers must have been 
disappointed with the lack of progress in the 1980s through the mid- 
1990s. A dramatic improvement in food supplies in the late 1970s 
had engendered high hopes for continued progress. Instead, hopes 
were dashed by an actual decline in rice allotments, both in rural and 
urban areas, continued shortages of fresh fruits, meats (except poul- 
try), fish, kimchi, cooking oils, cigarettes, and liquor. According to 
defectors, the decline in rice allotments was a major source of dissat- 
isfaction. However, the worst was yet to come. 

A Society in Crisis 

North Korea's economy received a severe jolt with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 and the cut-off of Soviet exports of oil and 
food at "friendship" (subsidized) prices. This shock led to the closing 
of factories and coal mines and resulted in power shortages. Then 
there was a decrease in Chinese exports of food, fertilizer, oil, and 
coking coal because of China's economic reforms. North Korea's agri- 
cultural production began to decline just as food imports also were 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



declining. Because of its inhospitable environment for crop produc- 
tion, the country had developed an agriculture that was highly depen- 
dent on a range of industrial inputs, particularly chemical fertilizers, 
insecticides, and electrically powered irrigation systems. 

The government's public distribution system was beginning to 
fail as early as 1991; by 1994 it had totally collapsed in some locali- 
ties (see Reform of the Public Distribution System, ch. 3). These 
problems were temporarily overshadowed in July 1994 by the unex- 
pected death of Kim II Sung, which left an exhausted population vir- 
tually paralyzed in a state of deep mourning. Then the country was 
hit by devastating floods, droughts, and famine in the mid-1990s 
(see Causes of the Famine; Effects of the Famine, ch. 3). 

The famine took its greatest toll on such vulnerable groups as chil- 
dren and the elderly. Older people reportedly were choosing not to eat 
so that others in their family might survive. The entire faculty of one 
school, except for two professors, was reported to have perished. 
Nineteen percent of one urban area reportedly died. The regime's 
harsh response to the crisis was to perform triage in cities in the north 
and east and to let the general population fend for itself. Proportion- 
ally high numbers of people died there. Starving North Koreans were 
told to stay inside when foreign humanitarian workers were in town 
so that the outside world would not know the extent of the disaster. 

A major change in North Korean society can be traced to the 
tragic events of the mid-1990s. People, already worn out and weak- 
ened, became seriously demoralized, traumatized by having to 
decide which children to feed over others, and depressed over so 
many deaths in a family and in the country at large. Regime propa- 
ganda was replaced by a new brutality over the population associated 
in the people's minds with the ascent to power in 1994 of Kim Jong 
II. The government distribution system continued to collapse as 
farmers' markets, operating on their own, diverted food from official 
channels in establishing the first glimmers of an unregulated com- 
mercial system. Out of necessity, households were forced to secure a 
larger share of their food from the new outlets, either farmers' mar- 
kets or general markets in the cities or through informal barter 
exchanges. As the market has come to supply a greater and greater 
share of total consumption, a new divide has appeared in the society. 
On one side are those who are able to augment their wages with for- 
eign exchange (in areas close to the border with China, on the east 
coast where foreign seafarers call, and in P'yongyang where the elite 
have contact with foreigners). On the other side are those who live 
on shrinking local currency wages with no access to foreign 
exchange or other income-earning opportunities. The latter, spending 



101 



North Korea: A Country Study 

about 30 percent of their income on government-distributed food and 
another 30 percent on nonfood essentials, have only about 30 percent 
of their budgets to cover up to 50 percent or more of their caloric 
needs. Surveys suggest that these households spend up to 80 percent 
of their income on food. Some have managed to survive only by sell- 
ing their possessions or establishing a sideline business, such as 
making and selling sweatshirts or selling homegrown vegetables. 

The rise of a free market outside the centrally planned economy 
and the breakdown in the government food distribution system cre- 
ated a new economic competition in the population that did not exist 
when the government had tight control over the dispersal of all 
goods. It lessened the people's dependence on the regime, increased 
opportunities for individual initiative, and lessened the cult-like hold 
on the people's thinking that all good things come from Kim. It 
seems all but inevitable that the trauma and dislocations since the 
mid-1990s have increased dissatisfaction with the regime, whether 
admitted or not. 

In the short space of seven years (1991-97), the country experi- 
enced more destabilizing change in its economy, political system, 
and society than since the Korean War. It was the worst economic 
decline in the twentieth century of a country not experiencing war, a 
decline that altered the nature of society and brought a response from 
the government that has included a new element of fear and indiffer- 
ence from a previously less draconian totalitarian regime. 

As the famine intensified, thousands of people left home in search 
of food. Some took the much riskier step of fleeing across the border 
into China. The flood of refugees into China created a serious prob- 
lem for the North Korean government in its relations with China, 
which has long tried to limit the influx of illegal North Koreans into 
Northeast China. Beijing periodically has cracked down with arrests 
and the forced repatriation of some 200,000 to 300,000 of the North 
Korean refugees who had sought refuge in China since the mid- 
1990s. Faced with the loss of control over starving people wandering 
away from home in search of food, the North Korean government 
responded by establishing a network of ad hoc prison-labor camps, 
detention centers characterized by extreme deprivation and torture, 
in which those caught fleeing to or returning from China were incar- 
cerated for periods of up to six months (see Punishment and the 
Penal System, ch. 5). 

A Militarized Society 

North Korea is the world's most militarized society. For more 
than 50 years, the regime has allocated between 25 and 33 percent of 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



its gross national product (GNP— see Glossary) to the military, sup- 
porting the 1 .2 million-strong armed forces and reserve and paramil- 
itary forces of 7.7 million (see Organization and Equipment of the 
Armed Forces, ch. 5). For most men and some women, military ser- 
vice follows middle school as a matter of course. Of the physically 
fit, only the privileged few (Kim Jong II being one of the elite group 
who went from middle school to Kim II Sung University without 
ever serving in the military) and those at the other extreme — with 
very bad songbun — are exempt from military service. Most young 
men are anxious to join the military, if only to avoid the stigma that 
is attached to those who do not. For most, it offers the promise of a 
better future. At a minimum, it improves the chances of getting a 
better job after discharge. A sailor trained as a radio operator, for 
example, later might be assigned as the radio operator on a civilian 
fishing boat. Although one's career is essentially determined by 
one's songbun, a young man's performance in the military service 
can alter the direction of his career within certain prescribed limits. 

In a country that has traditionally placed people in precise catego- 
ries or rankings within the society, the military ranks high in North 
Korea. Parents are proud to have their sons in the army, and for sol- 
diers there is the psychic boost of being a member of a privileged 
group. Practically every family has at least one member on active 
duty, in the reserves, or retired from the military. There is a close 
association between the population and the defense establishment 
because of the military's constant assistance to the civilian popula- 
tion in nonmilitary ways, such as road construction, industrial con- 
struction, civil engineering projects, and rice planting and harvesting 
(see Reserve Forces, ch. 5). A major drawback of military service is 
the long separation of sons from their families. Most young men do 
not see their parents during their entire enlistment. Most are not 
granted leave, even in times of family crisis, such as the death of a 
parent. This prolonged absence is a major source of discontent in the 
military ranks and a major sorrow for parents. 

From a sociological viewpoint, the importance of the military's 
extensive interaction with the civilian economy, especially in farm- 
ing activities, is its reinforcement of the sameness of life. Service in 
the military is not an escape from an otherwise inevitable round of 
rural drudgery. For some who grew up in cities, it is an introduc- 
tion — more than they might want — to life on a collective farm. Mili- 
tary service offers no escape from political study, either. If anything, 
soldiers are subjected to more intensive political indoctrination than 
civilians. They attend classes at least three days a week and self-crit- 
icism sessions at least once a week. Political meetings held to launch 



103 



North Korea: A Country Study 

major campaigns have been known to last 24 hours and to degrade 
unit readiness as a result of sleep deprivation. Foreigners have noted 
how tired North Korean troops appear. 

In years of economic collapse, the government distributed inter- 
national food aid mainly to the military and the elite class in 
P'yongyang. Thus, the political and military elite have had a variety 
of channels for acquiring food not available to the general popula- 
tion. These include the "first draw" on the domestic harvest, access 
to grains and other foods sold on the domestic market through privi- 
leged access to foreign exchange, and direct access to imports from 
China and South Korea and other international food aid that the gov- 
ernment distributes through what is left of the centralized food distri- 
bution system. Compared to the rest of society, which was left to 
fend for itself at the height of the famine, the military has fared well 
in terrible times. 

Family Life 

With most able-bodied young men in the military, except for the 
elite few in college, it is not surprising that foreigners inevitably 
remark on the conspicuous absence of young men in the workplace. 
Farmers are either women or old men. Most of the workers at facto- 
ries, especially textile factories, also are women. According to North 
Korean statistics, women account for more than 50 percent of the 
total workforce but probably as much as 90 percent of the civilian 
labor force between the ages of 16 and 30. This statistic represents 
nothing less than a social revolution in an Asian country where 
fewer than 5 percent of industrial workers were women in tradi- 
tional, precommunist times. The role of women changed dramati- 
cally and quickly in the early 1950s from the traditional role of full- 
time housewife and mother to full-time worker, in addition to wife 
and mother. 

Another major change has been the increase in women's educa- 
tion. Women may well account for almost two-thirds of college stu- 
dents. Graduates of teachers' colleges and medical schools are 
almost all women; most men of the same age are in the military. The 
reliance on women in the workplace is a necessity in a nation with 
20 percent of its male population and almost all its young men 
between the ages of ages 17 to 30 serving in the military. 

Although they compete favorably with men at the low and middle 
levels, few women have risen to top management positions in fields 
other than teaching and medicine (except for women athletes and 
artists). Women dominate the KWP in terms of overall membership 
and offices held at lower levels but are poorly represented at higher 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



levels. For instance, women hold the majority of party committee 
jobs at the factory and neighborhood levels but hold a far lower pro- 
portion of party jobs at the city and county levels and even fewer 
posts at the provincial and national levels. The same is true of 
women in government. Whereas they are very active at lower levels, 
such as on election committees, women hold relatively few higher- 
level government posts. 

In traditional times, women married in their late teens and early 
twenties; often their bridegrooms were even younger. Today laws 
prohibit marriage of women younger than 27 and men younger than 
30. Were it not for these laws, which are strictly enforced, there 
would be a large age differential between husbands and wives as a 
result of young men's long service in the military. 

Kim II Sung held fast to traditional ideas of courtship and mar- 
riage. Arranged marriages are still very much accepted in North 
Korea and apparently preferred. As in traditional times, young men 
and women have little or no dating or courtship experience prior to 
marriage. Western notions of courtship and marriage now accepted 
in South Korea, China, and other Asian nations would be viewed by 
most North Koreans as a corruption of traditional values rather than 
a release from outmoded strictures. 

It is not arranged marriages or the limitations on premarital social 
life that are so much hated as the laws against early marriage. Most 
young women have finished middle school and started to work by 
the time they are 16; they have to wait another 11 years before they 
can marry. Young men are a decade older by the time they have fin- 
ished military service. The enforcement of late marriages has had the 
effect of controlling the birthrate, whether or not that was the major 
reason for the state's ban on early marriages. 

In the changed social times of today, males and females study in 
coeducational schools at all levels (including college and Kim II 
Sung University) and work together in factories and offices and on 
the farms. There are inevitable pressures on young people thrown 
together in everyday life but prohibited from marrying until they are 
in their late twenties. There is little information about how young 
people cope with these pressures. According to defectors, it is not a 
subject that North Koreans discuss even with their closest friends. It 
would seem that they simply accept traditional values reinforced by 
the regime's need for a large military. 

Foreigners who have visited both North Korea and China are 
invariably struck by the contrast between the familiar scene in China 
of young couples strolling together in parks and the absence of any 
such sight in North Korea. Occasionally, pairs of young women or 



105 



North Korea: A Country Study 

young men can be seen walking alone but never a male-female cou- 
ple. Usually, young people are seen in groups of three or more. They 
do not get closer to each other than an arm's length. The most they 
would do is sit down for a few moments to talk confidentially. Not 
even married couples walk arm in arm; there are no public displays 
of affection. Unmarried men and women would never dare to hold 
hands in public. 

At school, young men and women have friendships, even roman- 
tic friendships, but sexual relations are taboo. Both the man and the 
woman would be risking the standing of their family as well as their 
own future and career. Special friendships are acknowledged in the 
exchange of notes or love letters, but private meetings are rare. Illicit 
sex is a serious offense, and strict punishment is meted out. It is 
grounds for dismissal from school, expulsion from political organi- 
zations, and sometimes discharge from the military. If a woman 
becomes pregnant out of wedlock, an abortion can be performed up 
to five months. Illegitimate children are very rare. When such a baby 
is born, it falls under the care of the state. The mother must surrender 
the child to the authorities, who are given full responsibility in 
deciding what is best for the child. This is in keeping with the state's 
attitude toward the custody of children in divorce cases, where again 
the authorities give little weight to parental rights compared to their 
view of the best interests of the children. 

In short, there is simply no place for young couples seeking pri- 
vate moments together, except possibly at the movies. This situation 
explains why some people still go to the movies despite the tedious 
nature of the regime-scripted stories. There are no bars, dance halls, 
discos, or coffeehouses. What is left for those who establish roman- 
tic friendships at school are a few shared private moments together 
after class, after criticism sessions, or during volunteer labor stints. 
Even a walk together in the park or in the countryside is accompa- 
nied by risk and requires great care. Students are constantly on their 
guard, knowing full well that their behavior with members of the 
opposite sex is a prime topic for self-criticism sessions. Social 
behavior in this and other areas is self-regulated through the control 
mechanism of endless self-criticism sessions. 

Whatever secret friendships they may make, young people know 
that eventually they will marry someone with a similar background 
selected by their parents and approved by the KWR The tradition of 
arranged marriages has served the regime's purposes well for vari- 
ous reasons, but the overwhelming criterion has always been 
songbun. The system tends to preserve the purity of the privileged 
class, keeping it free of less desirable elements. Those with bad 
songbun have no choice but to marry others of the same background. 



106 



Women tilling the soil, January 2006 
Courtesy Kathi Zellweger, Caritas-Hong Kong 

Whereas in precommunist days, a go-between oversaw the negotia- 
tions between the two families, today the party acts as the go- 
between. Personal records, kept by the KWP secretary of each fac- 
tory, collective farm, or government agency, provide the necessary 
information to match couples of similar background. Permission 
from the party is absolutely required. Because the husband's or 
wife's place of work has to provide accommodations, a couple can- 
not live together without the party's approval. 

People can ask for the party's permission to marry, or they can 
leave the choice of a marriage partner to the KWP entirely. Interest- 
ingly, the better a person's songbun, the more likely he or she is to 
rely on the party. It is easier to accept the party's verdict if one is 
thereby assured of a good career. At the lower end of the social spec- 
trum, collective-farm workers, miners, and unskilled factory work- 
ers, whose careers are not likely to be significantly affected by their 
choice of a spouse, seem to play a greater role in the selection of 
their marriage partners. The regime is mindful of this natural selec- 
tion process in assigning young men, newly discharged from the mil- 
itary, to collective farms and factories where there are extra single 
women. Apparently, some are temporarily assigned to textile facto- 
ries, where most of the workers are women, where they can meet 
single women. Later, after they have married, they are transferred to 
other jobs. 



107 



North Korea: A Country Study 

The society is still characterized by the traditional tendency of 
families to remain in the same general area where their ancestors 
lived for generations. Marriages between people from different geo- 
graphical areas are discouraged. Marriages between urban males and 
rural females are particularly discouraged as a means of limiting 
migration into the cities. Children of collective farmers have little 
chance of moving out of the countryside into the cities, unless they 
truly excel in school and are given the rare opportunity of a higher 
education, with the possibility of a job in the city. 

The state's downplaying of the wedding ceremony has been one 
of the most obvious social changes in North Korea, considering the 
elaborate weddings that traditionally involved costly ceremonies, 
feasts, and gift exchanges between the two families. The regime has 
outlawed all such costly, showy weddings, primarily for economic 
reasons but perhaps also because of the tradition of simple weddings 
that Kim II Sung and his anti-Japanese guerrillas established. Typi- 
cally, the ceremony is held at home, with a small reception afterward 
at home or at a restaurant. Most weddings are held on Sundays or 
holidays because those are the only times that people are not work- 
ing. The wedding ceremony itself is rather perfunctory. The bride 
and groom simply bow to a picture of Kim, in a communist update 
of the traditional bow to the bride's and groom's parents. Then they 
kiss each other briefly, a North Korean couple's only public kiss. 
The presiding official — a work-unit or party functionary — gives a 
congratulatory speech. There is no exchange of wedding rings or 
other jewelry. The bride keeps her maiden name. Children take their 
father's name. 

Although simple by traditional standards, wedding receptions are 
nonetheless joyous occasions for North Koreans, offering, as they 
do, one of the few opportunities to indulge in eating, drinking, and 
singing. Only for a wedding can North Koreans buy special quanti- 
ties of wine, rice cookies, and cakes. The major constraint on the 
number of guests is the amount of food and liquor that can be pro- 
vided. Usually relatives living nearby and a few close friends of the 
bride and groom, including their supervisors, will be invited. A cou- 
ple is authorized a skirt and jacket for the bride, a new suit for the 
groom, and a set of bedclothes. A special touch at weddings is the 
taking of pictures. This is probably the only occasion when ordinary 
North Koreans are photographed, but many families are not able to 
afford the services of a photographer. 

Honeymoons are out of the question. A newlywed couple typically 
takes three or four days off from work on paid vacation. They may 
not be able to live together for several months, perhaps even for a 
year or more. They must wait to be assigned housing by the husband's 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



place of work, although they might live at one or the other's parents' 
home in the interim. 

Defectors have reported many unhappy marriages in North Korea. 
Whether this is because they were arranged marriages or not, most 
marriages reflect the stress and strain of a life where both spouses 
leave home early in the morning, return home late at night, eat sup- 
per, and go to bed. They have very little time together and almost no 
time for leisurely activities. There is minimal prospect of divorce 
and almost no chance for extramarital romance. Adulterous relation- 
ships are dangerous. If discovered, they result in job demotion and 
expulsion from the party. Only the elite are thought to be immune 
from the party's swift and inexorable punishment, and even they 
must be careful. According to one defector: "Everyone works 
together and knows where everyone else should be. People are 
missed at once if they do not go home after work. Besides, the work- 
ing hours are so long that there is no time or energy left over." 

The stability of the family is reinforced by attitudes toward 
divorce. As in traditional times, marriage in North Korea is still 
viewed as an alliance between families, suggesting something much 
more permanent than the union of two people. Marriage as an insti- 
tution has been idealized by the regime, and divorce is criticized. 
Divorce is another area in which the regime's attitude has reinforced 
traditional values. In actual practice, it is very difficult to get a 
divorce. For one thing, it is difficult to get permission to travel in 
order to institute legal proceedings; divorce application fees are 
high; and one has to get the party's approval to seek a divorce. 
Divorce is harmful to one's career, so most people in high positions 
are deterred from seeking a divorce. At a minimum, it would ruin the 
chances for advancement; more likely, it would result in a demotion. 
The fear of losing one's children is another serious deterrent to 
divorce. For all these reasons, divorce is a rare occurrence. 

Women continue to work after they marry as a matter of course. 
Almost all able-bodied women work until retirement at age 60. 
Under the banner of full equality between the sexes, the regime has 
forced a totally new lifestyle on North Korean women, who have had 
absolutely no choice in the matter. Social equality with men has 
meant only a more difficult life for women, with many hours 
devoted to hard work on the job and additional hours devoted to 
political study and volunteer labor, plus all the traditional responsi- 
bilities of home and children. 

Women may be the most dissatisfied people in the society. Their 
major complaints are reported to be the lack of help at home, too lit- 
tle time with their children, and too much time in political study. 
There are also feelings of job discrimination in the assignment of 



109 



North Korea: A Country Study 

women to the more menial jobs after a limited education. Women are 
not spared from heavy work, either. Almost half of the stevedores 
observed at the port of Namp'o appear to be women; other women 
have worked as rock drillers and workers in fish-processing plants in 
temperatures well below freezing. The long years that men have to 
spend in the military have forced women into these physically 
demanding and dangerous jobs. 

Women, as well as men, are enormously overworked. For women, 
the day begins earlier and ends later than it does for men. In rural 
areas and urban areas without indoor plumbing, working wives and 
mothers rise early to fetch water from a centralized location. They, 
like men, must be at work by 8:00 am. Morning exercise music 
blares over loudspeakers, and participation in morning exercise 
drills, although voluntary, is encouraged. Young children are 
dropped off at nurseries or kindergartens on the way to work. All 
across North Korea, from 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning workers are in 
political study meetings under the direction of a party official. This 
is the time set aside for study of the day's editorial in Nodong Shin- 
mun and for new party and government policies and decisions to be 
relayed to the people. Toward the end of the hour, office directors 
and plant managers lead a discussion of work plans for the day. 
Work starts at 9:00 AM and continues until 1:00 PM, with a short 
break for exercises. After a long midday rest period, during which 
many people take a nap, work continues until around 8:00 in the eve- 
ning, after which study sessions and self-criticism meetings are con- 
ducted until 10:00 PM. On the way home, mothers pick up their 
children at the nurseries and then stop at the central kitchen in their 
neighborhood or on their collective farm to pick up cooked rice for 
dinner. Older children are at home waiting, usually sleeping or doing 
their homework or housework. There is an unchanging regularity 
about people's lives, six days a week, 52 weeks a year. 

Children 

The time North Koreans spend with their families may be limited, 
but that time is treasured and engenders feelings that are intense. 
From all available evidence, parents dote on their children no less 
than parents anywhere else in the world. In fact, if anything, they 
seem to live for their children, perhaps because their own lives offer 
little but hope for a better future for their children. Parents make sac- 
rifices gladly, saving as much as they can all during their lives to 
secure the best for their children. 

Just as in traditional times, North Koreans grow up today with a 
strong sense of loyalty to both their parents and the state. Children 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



are taught to love and respect their parents in the traditional Asian 
way. The regime does nothing to distort those natural family feelings. 
Its concern has been to incorporate such feelings into a broader love 
for Kim II Sung and the state. 

Kim is portrayed in official regime propaganda not only as a 
fatherly figure but also as a model son. A 1980 article entitled "Kim 
II Sung Termed Model for Revering Elders" tells how he warmed his 
mother's cold hands with his own breath after she returned from 
work each day in the winter and gave up the pleasure of playing on a 
swing because it tore his pants, which his mother then had to mend. 
"When his parents or elders called him," said the article, "he arose 
from his spot at once no matter how much fun he had been having, 
answered 'yes' and then ran to them, bowed his head and waited for 
what they were going to say." According to Kim himself, "Commu- 
nists love their parents, wives, children, and their fellow comrades, 
respect the elderly, live frugal lives and always maintain a humble 
mien." Kim Jong II is also described as a filial son. When he was 
five years old, a propagandist wrote, he insisted on personally guard- 
ing his father from evil imperialists with a little wooden rifle. 

Love of children has become a national dogma, following the 
example set by Kim II Sung, who easily surpassed even the most 
consummate Western politicians in his seemingly endless joy in 
kissing babies and hugging young children. He visited state nurseries 
constantly. He referred to the children of North Korea as the "kings 
and queens" of the country, the "hope of the future." He seemed gen- 
uinely to delight in young children. It was part of his personality and 
appeal, and it captured the North Korean spirit and attitude perfectly. 

Children in North Korea are showered with material things, such 
as toys and games, to the limit of their parents' and the state's ability 
to provide them. An example of this is the fancy equipment — play- 
ground equipment, sports equipment, and musical instruments — on 
which state nurseries spend an inordinate amount of money. 

North Korean children attend nursery school from the age of four 
months, if not earlier. There are day nurseries in every village, large 
cooperative farm, or major workshop, where the children go home 
every evening with their parents. There are three-day nurseries at the 
county level, where the children go home on Wednesday evening 
and again on Saturday through Sunday. And there are weekly board- 
ing nurseries in P'yongyang and other big cities, where the children 
either go home on weekends or live permanently while their parents 
are serving abroad. The equipment, routine, and teaching at nursery 
schools are supposedly standardized, although this is doubtful in 
practice. All nurseries provide the same comprehensive care, includ- 



111 



North Korea: A Country Study 

ing medical checkups by physicians or nurses and regular haircuts 
and shampoos by barbers. Thus, parents are freed from many of the 
routine child-care chores that would otherwise keep a mother from 
work. 

Children are taught discipline and love for the state and their par- 
ents from the earliest age. They are taught that Kim is the source of 
everything good and that they should love, honor, and obey him. 
They are taught respect for their elders, which is expressed in the tra- 
ditional custom of children bowing to their parents, teachers, and 
others in authority. Informed observers of societies in both China 
and North Korea have noted that authority relationships between 
children and adults in North Korea are, if anything, even more struc- 
tured than in China. The good manners and discipline learned at an 
early age tend to become reflex action that North Korean defectors 
actually find difficult to abandon later, in adjusting to life in another 
country. Classroom discipline is very tight, and the role of the 
teacher is supreme. Spanking children, as a form of discipline by 
teachers, is forbidden. Violations of school discipline, such as not 
paying attention in class or leaving the school grounds, are quickly 
addressed. First, the school notifies the parents. If the student does 
not quickly improve, his or her ration is cut. At this point, the 
songbun of both the student and the parents has slipped several 
notches. 

Despite their disciplined behavior learned early on, there is a 
lively, high-spirited, self-confident attitude in North Korean children 
that foreigners immediately notice. It is possible that this is partly 
the result of the regime's constant reiteration of Kim II Sung's 
chuch 'e philosophy, basically a mind-over-matter view of the world 
in which all things are possible if people work hard enough to 
achieve them, in which slogans such as "We have nothing to envy in 
the world," do have a positive, reassuring effect. 

North Korean children spend relatively few hours at home with 
their families; however, children are with other children at a younger 
age and for longer periods of time than in most contemporary societ- 
ies. Presumably, they are more used to a group environment than the 
average American child of the same age. They are taught a variety of 
skills at a very early age — singing, dancing, athletics, and instrumen- 
tal music — which may rank as one of the regime's major social 
accomplishments. Foreigners are often amazed at the musical and 
gymnastic abilities of young North Korean children who perform in 
these areas with great poise, self-confidence, and maturity. The 
"happy smiling faces" of children seem to be in stark contrast to the 
"grim, unsmiling expression" on the face of North Korean adults 



112 



Chuck 'e Tower, built in 1982 on the bank of the Taedong River, commemorates 
Kim II Sung s seventieth birthday; the design is attributed to Kim Jong II. 

Courtesy Kathi Zellweger, Caritas-Hong Kong 

with whom foreign visitors come in contact. Compared to later life, 
childhood is a happy time. 

Leisure Activities 

With their days filled with work or school, volunteer labor, politi- 
cal study, and self-criticism meetings, North Koreans have precious 
little time to spend by themselves, with their friends, or at home with 
family. Essentially, they have Saturday evenings and Sundays free. 
The regime, which advocates that people ought to "do away with the 
slightest indolence and relaxation in life and work and live with rev- 
olutionary morale," provides little in the way of recreational facili- 
ties, except for movie theaters, city parks, some amusement centers, 
and sports events. Public restaurants are generally beyond a family's 
budget, and there are no coffeehouses, bars, or cabarets. Young peo- 
ple might have ice skates or simple fishing equipment. Otherwise, 
their only recreational equipment is likely to be a soccer ball, basket- 
ball, volleyball, or table tennis paddles. Table tennis is played on 
concrete tables permanently installed throughout North Korea in 
public places such as school playgrounds and city parks. 



113 



North Korea: A Country Study 

North Koreans are sports minded, almost to the point of obses- 
sion. Students are required to participate in after-school sports as an 
extension of their normal school day. Most schools offer soccer, bas- 
ketball, volleyball, handball, table tennis, boxing, gymnastics, and 
track. Kim Jong II is reported to enjoy tennis and horseback riding, 
both sports unavailable to the general population. 

There is great interest in the national competition among North 
Korea's professional sports teams, especially the men's soccer 
teams. Often, the games are televised. Popular interest in spectator 
sports is one of the main escapes from the political pressures of life. 

Movies are inexpensive but are not popular because all are North 
Korean-made films with a predictable propaganda theme. A typical 
story line involves a Korean family split apart by the Korean War, 
some family members in the North having a bright and happy exis- 
tence and those living in the South having tormented lives. At the 
end, the family is always reunited at the glorious day of reunifica- 
tion, and the movie ends with homage to Kim II Sung. People 
quickly tire of the story line and go to see only those movies that fea- 
ture their favorite movie stars. 

The circus is a popular recreation. A resident circus in P'yongyang 
performs year-round, featuring acrobatic acts and magic tricks. Visit- 
ing foreigners are uniformly impressed with the skills of the perform- 
ers. Students in other parts of the country are bused to P'yongyang to 
see the circus, as well as museums and other national institutions. 
Field trips to P'yongyang are part of every North Korean's education. 

An amusement of young people the world over — pets — are not a 
part of North Korean lifestyle. Dogs and cats are thought of not as 
pets but as food. They are not kept inside as house pets and are not 
allowed in cities, including P'yongyang. The only pets in cities are 
birds and aquarium fish, both of which can be bought at local pet 
stores. They are quite popular but expensive. Only the privileged can 
afford to buy birds, usually canaries. 

The major recreation at home and at school seems to be card play- 
ing, traditionally a favorite pastime. There are no organized dances 
or concerts for students, and they appear to spend little time reading 
for pleasure. Outside of Kim II Sung's collected works, school text- 
books, and official propaganda, no other books are available. Virtu- 
ally no works of Western origin have been printed in the country, and 
few appear to have been smuggled into the country until recently. 
The only news of the outside world getting into North Korea are the 
occasional books smuggled in from China and illicit radio broad- 
casts received by the few radios brought in from China. No literary 
underground has developed as it did in the Soviet Union, and there 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



are no well-known underground dissident writers. The inadequate 
lighting in homes and schools effectively rules out reading at night. 

Reports of North Koreans huddled around radios smuggled in 
from China listening to British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice 
of America broadcasts offer the first hint of news of the outside 
world reaching North Korean citizens. Videos of taboo Western 
movies, which also have been smuggled in from China, apparently 
have reached a limited number of people who put themselves at 
great risk in watching them. These first glimmers of an underground 
secret society represent the first sign of a crack — a very small one 
indeed — in the regime's hitherto successful block of all outside 
news. Although North Korea launched its first e-mail service in 
2001, Internet access is severely restricted. 

Religion 

Article 68 of the constitution grants freedom of religious belief 
and guarantees the right to construct buildings for religious use and 
religious ceremonies (see The Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). 
Although it may nominally provide for freedom of religious belief, 
in practice the government not only prohibits organized religious 
activity but also persecutes religious believers. Many observers 
agree that the official religion is the cult of Kim. The cult provides a 
religious fervor in an atheist state that in reality outlaws all religious 
beliefs and practices. Semireligious aspects of the cult include the 
making of Kim II Sung's birthplace into a shrine for worshiping 
Kim. The religious mystique of his life includes an association with 
Mount Paektu, the "holy mountain of revolution," where Kim II 
Sung lived in hiding during the war years and where his son Kim 
Jong II is supposed to have been born, according to legend (not true), 
a mountain that has always been revered as the mystical place of ori- 
gin of the Korean people. In North Korean embassies abroad, in 
most factories and homes, and in many schools, there are little rooms 
set aside as chapels for worshiping Kim. Kim II Sung's picture hangs 
beside lighted candles. Most North Koreans begin and end their day 
with a bow to Kim's portrait. These semireligious devotions to a 
national leader who has assumed the status of a demigod constitute 
the official and only "religion" allowed in North Korea. 

In the early 1900s, P'yongyang was the center of a very active 
Protestant missionary effort in Korea. Kim II Sung's parents and 
grandfather were Christians who went to church regularly when they 
lived in P'yongyang and later when they moved to Manchuria. How- 
ever, the missionaries' efforts are not visible now. There are no 
openly professed Christians in North Korea today — such an admis- 



115 



North Korea: A Country Study 

sion could be reason for imprisonment — and Christian mission cen- 
ters have long since disappeared. Officials claim that U.S. bombs 
destroyed every single Christian church during the Korean War. Old 
customs based on both Eastern and Western religious beliefs persist, 
such as dressing the dead in new clothing and placing them in cof- 
fins for burial. However, religious believers, such as the families of 
people who defected to South Korea after the war and the old elite 
class, are regarded as members of the "disloyal" class, "enemies of 
the state" who can be imprisoned for that reason alone. Churches are 
regarded as symbols of imperialist oppression. Defectors report that 
even in the privacy of the family, North Koreans are afraid to profess 
a belief in God. 

A 1992 defector, a North Korean table tennis champion who, at 
age 18, was the youngest political prisoner at the prison camp where 
he was imprisoned for walking across a frozen river into China on 
the spur of the moment "out of curiosity" after skiing down Mount 
Paektu at a ski resort used by the sons and daughters of high offi- 
cials, was emphatic on the subject: 

When Billy Graham visited North Korea, he said 
Christianity is reviving. I'll tell you the real story of 
religious life in North Korea. There's absolutely no religion 
in North Korea. I saw so many people in camp who came in 
because of religious belief. Even secretly praying is enough 
to get you sent to camp. Probably everyone in North Korea 
who is a religious believer is sent to a camp. I want to write 
a letter to Billy Graham: 'If you really want to know 
religion in North Korea, go to a prison camp.' When Billy 
Graham went to a church service, he should have asked 
people in the congregation to recite Bible verses. 

The people who attended the staged religious services for Billy 
Graham and other visiting dignitaries are presumed to have been act- 
ing out their roles as devout worshipers. They do not attend church 
regularly, only when the regime has foreign dignitaries to impress. 

Only those born before 1950 would have any recollection of the 
old religious beliefs and practices. As Lee Sang-tae, a member of the 
Central Committee of the General League of Writers, explained, 
when asked if the use of gigantic choirs in Song of Paradise and 
other North Korean "revolutionary" musical extravaganzas traced 
back to church music brought in by Western missionaries: "Abso- 
lutely not. We have had no such influence from the missionaries. We 
developed our songs based on our traditional heritage. Before libera- 
tion, we had religions — Buddhism, Christianity — but after liberation 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



the influence of these disappeared." Lee spoke for the new genera- 
tion, Kim Jong Il's generation, to whom the religious beliefs of their 
parents have clearly not been passed on. Therein lies a significant 
difference between Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II. Whereas Kim the 
elder could remember attending church and even playing the organ 
at church services and would have had a clear memory of his par- 
ents' and grandparents' religious devotions, Kim Jong II has no such 
heritage. He knew his father as a man who had by then renounced 
Christian doctrine, who claimed that he was "not affected by reli- 
gion" despite his youthful connections with the church, and who 
founded an atheist state with his self-worship substituted for God. 

A December 1980 editorial in Nodong Shinmun explicitly ele- 
vated the cult to a national religion, inviting foreigners to join. In a 
direct challenge to the Christian faith, which reportedly has some 
14,000 adherents, and a brazen attempt to replace the father/son of 
the Christian trinity with the Kim father/son deity, the editorial pro- 
claimed: "People of the world, if you are looking for miracles, come 
to Korea! Christians, do not go to Jerusalem. Come rather to Korea. 
Do not believe in God. Believe in the great man." 

Former Buddhist temples, which apparently survived the war 
because of their remote location in mountainous areas, are consid- 
ered cultural relics rather than active places of worship and have 
been taken over by the state and converted to secular use. Those at 
Mount Kumgang and Mount Mohyang, for example, are considered 
national treasures and have been preserved and restored. The latter 
features an academy for Buddhist studies. Some 10,000 practicing 
Buddhists reportedly exist in North Korea. Two churches, the Prot- 
estant Pongsu Church and Catholic Changchung Cathedral, were 
opened in P'yongyang in 1988, just in time for the World Festival of 
Youth and Students the following year and obviously to provide the 
illusion of freedom of religion to foreigners attending the festival. At 
the Pongsu Church on a Sunday during the festival, worshipers sang 
"Jesus Loves Me" in Korean. According to Bradley K. Martin, an 
American journalist and author of Under the Loving Care of the 
Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, who was there, 
"many of them appeared to know (the hymn) by heart." Martin noted 
that a pastor prayed "in the name of Jesus Christ" for the success of 
the festival, preached on a political theme — the need for removal of 
nuclear weapons from the peninsula, and prayed for Korean reunifi- 
cation. Martin also reported that church members and clergy were 
not KWP members and that they removed their Kim II Sung badges 
while in church. He was told that Protestants who did not attend the 
Pongsu Church worshipped at home but that it was rare, in either 
instance, to see anyone under the age of 40. 



117 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Another American correspondent in P'yongyang to attend the 
youth festival visited the newly opened Catholic church and noticed 
churchgoers depositing their Kim II Sung badges in a bowl as they 
entered. The priest, as it turned out, drove a Mercedes and made 
more money than the highest-ranking party member the journalist 
had been allowed to meet, a sure sign that he was acting the part of a 
priest for the benefit of the foreign visitors. When the journalist 
asked his young North Korean interpreter "Who is more important to 
you, Kim II Sung or God?" the interpreter is reported to have looked 
thoroughly confused for the first time in the interview. "Who's 
God?" he asked. Again, all of this, including the churchgoers' appar- 
ent familiarity with the hymns, could have been staged. 

As others have concluded, this attempt by the regime to show a 
tolerant attitude toward Christianity at the youth festival was 
intended to improve Pyongyang's standing in the West at a time 
when Kim II Sung was trying to drive a wedge between Seoul and 
Washington. In March- April 1992, American evangelist Billy Gra- 
ham was invited to North Korea for the same reason and also 
attended services at the Protestant Pongsu Church. Kim II Sung 
appears to have backed away from the direct challenge to established 
religions exemplified in the 1980 Nodong Shinmun editorial. After 
Kim's death in 1994, foreigners have noticed no activity at the 
church on many subsequent visits. Kim II Sung may have been per- 
sonally impressed with Mr. Graham and may have built the two 
Christian churches in P'yongyang to impress Western visitors, but, 
interestingly, Kim Jong II has not made a similar pretense of reli- 
gious services in P'yongyang since he took power two years after the 
Graham visit. He has accorded the Graham family VIP treatment on 
their subsequent visits to North Korea but no open show of fake reli- 
gious services. When Billy Graham's son Franklin visited in 2000, 
he was not allowed to preach. 

In view of Kim Jong IPs lack of pretense in recent years about the 
absence of religious observances in North Korea, the announcement 
in July 2006 that California's megachurch pastor the Reverend Rick 
Warren, author of the book The Purpose-Driven Life, which is popu- 
lar in South Korea, had accepted an invitation to preach in North 
Korea in a 15,000-seat stadium at an outdoor evangelistic crusade in 
March 2007, the first such event in the officially atheist state in 60 
years, came as quite a surprise to most observers of North Korea. 
The visit was to mark the 100th anniversary of the 1907 P'yongyang 
Revival, one of the most important events in the spread of Christian- 
ity to Korea. The event was being arranged by a group of South 
Korean businessmen, not North Korean officials, but the latter evi- 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



dently agreed so as to give the appearance of religious freedom and 
tolerance after the worldwide condemnation North Korea has 
received for its July 4, 2006, launch of seven missiles capable of 
bearing nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Il's surprising reversal in allow- 
ing a Potemkin-like evangelistic crusade, after 10 years' open disre- 
gard of the world's criticism of his country's lack of religious 
freedom, suggests a desperate need to counter world opprobrium. A 
future visit by Billy and Franklin Graham also was under discussion 
with North Korean officials in August 2006. 

As Hwang Jang-yop, the former chief ideologue who articulated 
North Korea's chuch'e philosophy and is the highest-level North 
Korean official to have defected, has said, the churches in 
P'yongyang "are fake churches built for show," and the monks living 
in the Buddhist temples "are of course fake monks." Genuine believ- 
ers in North Korea cannot profess their faith, said Hwang, "only fake 
believers are allowed to do so." 

A woman defector from North Korea revealed her secret life as a 
Christian before she fled in 1999. Her parents were Christian, and 
she carried on the family tradition. She said that religious believers 
"have been captured and gunned to death, and their families sent to 
jails for political criminals.... Believers are forced to go underground 
because of the harsh oppression. Nobody could freely talk about reli- 
gion during the 1960s and 1970s." However, the defector found that 
despite the suppression, religious beliefs were hard to eradicate, and 
underground church members stayed in contact through meetings. 
People who owned short-wave radios listened to South Korean 
Christian broadcasts and then shared what they had heard with their 
coreligionists. Meetings took place at friends' homes where illegal 
"home services" were held. 

In so many ways, but especially in religious beliefs and practices, 
have North and South Korea diverged since the Korean War. It is 
only one, but a most important, difference between the two societies 
that will loom large in the eventual reunification of Korea. The offi- 
cial religion in North Korea as it is practiced today — the cult of Kim 
II Sung — would seemingly be incompatible with any recognized 
religious belief in the world today. 

As an apparent sign of opening to Russia, construction of a Rus- 
sian Orthodox church began in P'yongyang in 2003, following a 
visit to the Russian Far East by Kim Jong II in 2002, and it was con- 
secrated in August 2006. The North Korean government paid for 
construction of the church, and the Russian Orthodox Church pro- 
vided the icons, sacred vessels, and bells. A Russian-trained North 
Korean priest was put in charge. 



119 



North Korea: A Country Study 

An indigenous monotheistic religion — Ch'ondogyo (Heavenly 
Way) — an outgrowth of the nineteenth-century Tonghak Movement 
(see Glossary), also perseveres. Ch'ondogyo stresses the equality 
and unity of man with the universe and was traditionally popular 
among the rural population. Its teachings draw from Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Daoism, and Catholicism. Ch'ondogyo has around 
2.7 million adherents who have a KWP-controlled political voice via 
the Chongu (Friends) Party. 

Education 

The North Korean leadership takes great pride in its free educa- 
tion system. When the communists came to power in 1946, illiteracy 
was widespread, and fewer than 20 percent of all Koreans had gone 
beyond elementary school. Now 99 percent of the population is liter- 
ate. To accomplish this end, the country dispensed with complex 
Chinese characters in favor of sole reliance on the indigenous, sim- 
ple, and phonetically precise choson 'gul (Korean script; known in 
South Korea as hangul) writing system. Against its advantages in 
being a relatively easy language with a nationalistic appeal, reliance 
on choson 'gul has had the disadvantage of further isolating North 
Korea from other countries of East Asia where knowledge of Chi- 
nese characters remains the "linguistic glue" binding China, South 
Korea, and Japan together. Ignorance of Chinese characters has been 
a major drawback for North Korea in its efforts to expand trade and 
other foreign contacts and an embarrassment in terms of its aca- 
demic and scholarly standards. 

Having lost most of the intellectuals and skilled technicians living 
in the North in the mass exodus to the South after the Korean War, 
the regime felt a great sense of urgency to develop a new class of 
skilled technicians to rebuild the country. By 1956 it had established 
a program of universal compulsory primary education of six years, 
including kindergarten, that was extended to the junior-middle 
school level by 1958, providing students with a total of seven years 
of free education. Emphasis also was placed on adult education in an 
effort to make the whole population literate through a night program 
for farmers that operated during the winter months. A major expan- 
sion of technical schools also was undertaken, with specialized 
courses in mining, engineering, mechanics, communications, energy, 
fishing, medicine, law, music, and art. North Korea's only four-year 
university, Kim II Sung University in P'yongyang, was established 
in 1946. 

The shortage of teachers and funds delayed the regime's more 
ambitious goal of establishing a free, compulsory nine-year educa- 



120 




Second-grade students sharing essays 
Courtesy Choson (Pyongyang), June 2006, 15 

tion system until 1967. It was the first such program in East Asia, 
both China and Japan then having only six-year compulsory systems 
with tuition partially free. The current 11 -year compulsory, free edu- 
cation program, involving two years of kindergarten, four years of 
primary school, and five years of middle school, was established in 
the mid-1970s. According to North Korean official statistics for 
2000, there were 1.5 million children in 27,017 nursery schools, 
748,416 children in 14,167 kindergartens, 1.6 million students in 
4,886 four-year primary schools, and 2.1 million students in 4,772 
middle schools. Nearly 1.9 million students attended more than 300 
colleges and two-year universities. In 2005 there were an estimated 
2.5 million students in primary schools, another 2.5 million students 
in middle school, and about 1 million students in high school. Yet 
another source cites a total of 8 million enrolled in education, from 
nursery school through elementary and middle school, high school, 
college, and university, including correspondence courses and edu- 
cational courses for workers at their job sites (so-called factory col- 
leges). It is impossible to confirm these statistics that the regime 
releases, but they give some idea of the emphasis on education, 
although one must make allowance for the significant amount of vol- 
unteer labor that students above the age of 1 1 , and particularly above 
the age of 14, give to economic projects throughout the year, espe- 
cially at rice planting and harvesting time and all during the summer. 
The country's elaborate, state-financed system of nurseries and 



121 



North Korea: A Country Study 

"children's palaces" for prekindergarten children is not included in 
the 11 -year compulsory education program. 

Primary Education 

Beginning in primary school, the education system is intended, in 
Kim's own words, to train North Koreans to "serve the existing 
social system." Even in primary school, children commit passages of 
Kim's speeches to memory and recite them at the front of the class, 
at other times sitting in perfect silence and upright attention. As one 
can imagine, there are reportedly few behavior problems. One 
teacher explained: "We are educating them in communist morality. 
We are educating them in a unitary idea — thinking in the same way 
and acting in the same way." 

There are typically one primary school in each village and one 
middle school in each district made up of two or three villages. Nor- 
mally, a middle school in a city accommodates about 1,000 students 
and a rural middle school about 500 or 600 students. Defectors esti- 
mate the size of an average class to be about 30 students. Because of 
limited classroom facilities, many schools operate in two shifts, with 
an afternoon overlap accommodating non-classroom activities such 
as physical education, militia training, and study hall. 

Middle School and Beyond 

Boys and girls receive essentially the same education in coeduca- 
tional institutions through middle school. On completion of the 11- 
year compulsory program, which ends around the age of 15 or 16, 
most young women go to work, either on farms or in local factories, 
and most males begin their obligatory military service. Approxi- 
mately 30 percent of all male students, usually the sons of high-rank- 
ing government and military officials, are exempted from military 
service to continue their education through high school and college 
or, possibly, university. Kim Jong II, for instance, never served in the 
army but went straight from middle school to high school to Kim II 
Sung University. After completing their military duty, about 5 per- 
cent of former military draftees enter a one-year preparatory (high 
school) course for college or university. High schools are "special- 
ized" schools, as are colleges, which may be engineering, industrial, 
agricultural, medical, foreign languages, music, fine arts, drama, ath- 
letic, teacher- training, or KWP colleges. Admission to college or 
university (all of which are two-year universities except for the four- 
year Kim II Sung University) is somewhat easier after service in the 
military than directly from middle school. The military decides who 
will go on to college and who will be assigned to manual labor. 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



Beyond middle school, North Korea has devoted its major efforts 
toward increasing the supply of technically and scientifically profi- 
cient personnel by expanding the enrollment at and resources of 
technological colleges, vocational schools (usually two-year schools 
divided into agricultural and mechanical programs), and factory col- 
leges, and by sending selected groups of students abroad, primarily 
to Russia and Eastern Europe, for scientific and technical education. 
Kim Jong II appears to have been the driving force in the new pro- 
gram to send North Korean students abroad for training. In April 
1998, he spoke favorably of Deng Xiaoping's "great feat in sending 
2,000 or so students abroad annually" from China and expressed his 
hope that North Korea could emulate China on this point. 

There has been an improvement in mass education at the lower 
grades and impressive training of technicians for the workforce since 
the late twentieth century. However, Western technicians who have 
supervised the construction and early production processes of plants 
imported from the West have despaired of North Korean engineering 
incompetence, disregard for safety procedures, careless maintenance 
and repair procedures, and stubborn refusal to accept advice. 

Higher Education 

The absence of true higher education and an educated, intellectual 
class is the most serious deficiency of the system. Sixty years after 
its founding, Kim II Sung University remains the sole civilian four- 
year university. Its graduates, numbering about 3,000 a year out of a 
total student body of 12,000, who constitute the educational elite of 
the country, represent less than 0.01 percent of the population. The 
university, like every other educational institution and perhaps more 
than others, subordinates education to unrelenting political indoctri- 
nation. Students in the social sciences spend almost 50 percent of 
their time in ideological study. Students in the science departments 
devote about 20 percent of their time to Kim study. Most of the 
books in the university's library are various editions of Kim's col- 
lected works, bound in leather. A separate catalog, which takes up 
one room, indexes all of his speeches. As students become more 
educated and advance to higher levels in school, and at Kim II Sung 
University, they actually have to spend more time studying Kim's 
teachings and expend more energy in public observance of the Kim 
cult. In a system that puts a premium on political loyalty, the bright 
and ambitious cultivate their political skills and worry less about 
academic proficiency. 

From all reports, there is dissatisfaction with the limited opportu- 
nities for higher education. Many students who want to go on to high 



123 



North Korea: A Country Study 

school or college and are qualified to do so are barred, either because 
of sdngbun or because of the limited number of schools of higher 
learning. Only about 30 or 40 percent of middle-school graduates go 
directly to high school, and another 5 percent attend high school 
after completing military service; fewer than 10 percent of high 
school graduates go on to college or university. 

Imbalances in the curriculum constitute another serious defi- 
ciency. The study of science predominates, while the social sciences 
are all but neglected, except for the study of Marxism-Leninism and 
the communist revolution in Korea. According to one former stu- 
dent, more than three out of four classrooms at Kim II Sung Univer- 
sity consist of laboratories for the study of biology, chemistry, 
geology, and related subjects. Foreign visitors have been singularly 
unimpressed with the laboratories at the university, the best that 
North Korea has to offer. 

There are indications that Kim Jong II realizes the dire need for 
economists and financial experts as North Korea struggles to recover 
from its economic collapse in the late 1990s, expand trade with other 
countries, and promote foreign investment in North Korea, at least to 
the extent that it can do so without allowing unwanted foreign influ- 
ences to seep into the country. The dilemma for the regime is the dif- 
ficulty in learning economics without exposure to the benefits of a 
free-market system. 

Outside of science, music, drama, and certain technical skills, the 
education system is unimpressive, most notably in the social sci- 
ences and foreign-language departments. Because of the limited 
number of trained linguists, North Korea has been unable to host 
several international conferences at the same time or even some 
large ones at any given time. An international table tennis meet held 
in P'yongyang in 1979 dramatized the acute need for translators in 
many different languages. Shortly thereafter, the School of Foreign 
Languages broke away from Kim II Sung University to become a 
separate institution. Around that same time, Kim II Sung made the 
study of English compulsory in upper-level middle schools. Prior to 
that, students in middle school were required to study Russian; after 
1978, both English and Russian were mandatory. At the same time, 
in a crash program to train English-speaking technicians and party 
and government officials, North Koreans were sent to special lan- 
guage-training programs in Japan, Guyana, Yugoslavia, and Iraq. 

North Korea's kidnapping of foreign nationals to teach their lan- 
guages to its diplomatic corps and kidnapping of foreign actors and 
actresses to spearhead its movie industry between 1977 and 1983 are 
now well known. Kim Jong IPs hand can be seen in these criminal 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



acts, which may have accomplished his immediate purpose as minis- 
ter of culture in jump-starting a nonexistent foreign-language pro- 
gram but at the cost, some years later, of a disastrous setback in 
international relations with the countries involved. The nation's rela- 
tions with Japan, in particular, have been affected significantly by 
North Korea's surprising admission in 2003 that it did in fact kidnap 
Japanese citizens off the beach in Japan, as Japan had long claimed 
and North Korea had adamantly denied, for the purpose of teaching 
Japanese to its foreign diplomats. 

The basic problem that affects the quality of a North Korean's 
education is the conflict between reality and the state's insistence on 
its own brand of the "truth." The quality of North Korean education 
can never be any better, or any closer to the truth, than the official 
party line. North Koreans are taught, for instance, and have no rea- 
son to question such basic untruths as: Russia, not the United States 
or Britain, was primarily responsible for the defeat of Japan and Ger- 
many in World War II. A good idea of the level of studies can be 
observed from the caliber of what is called original research. There 
are only 10 to 15 journals in the fields of chemistry, physics, geogra- 
phy, other physical sciences, linguistics, history, and archaeology 
that could be considered remotely scholarly, and Western scholars 
have found no original ideas or research techniques of any real merit. 
None of these journals are available in translation outside of North 
Korea. There has been some good archaeological work and some 
research on Korean dialects, but there are no North Korean scholars 
with international standing in any field. Science may be the only area 
in which a North Korean can get a fairly good education with a rela- 
tively small component of ideological indoctrination. Some of the 
rising economic stars have been trained in the sciences, bespeaking 
both the superiority of a scientific education and the absence of an 
economics program. 

In short, the regime has educated a whole generation of North 
Koreans in Kim II Sung's image, more sophisticated than he in the 
technical and scientific areas but essentially practical-minded people 
interested in solving immediate issues at hand. The current genera- 
tion of North Koreans has had little in the way of intellectually chal- 
lenging experience, and the members of the older generation who 
might have retained some of the earmarks of a traditional education 
have passed from the scene. The loss of a highly educated elite, like 
the loss of traditional religious beliefs, has long-term implications 
for North Korea's eventual reentry onto the world scene after more 
than 60 years of political, social, and cultural isolation. Corrections 
to the education system would require years to show results. 



125 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Health Care 

To the extent the state can make it available, medical care is pro- 
vided free of charge. In assuming full responsibility for the health of 
its people, the regime has given priority to preventive medicine, and 
physical exercise is seen as the first line of defense against illness. 
Children and adults are expected to participate in physical exercise 
during work breaks and school recesses. They also are encouraged to 
take part in recreational sports, such as running, gymnastics, volley- 
ball, ice skating, and traditional Korean games. Mass gymnastic dis- 
plays, involving tens of thousands of uniformed participants, are a 
regular feature of major holidays and visits of important foreigners 
to P'yongyang. 

The government has instituted nationwide regular medical check- 
ups. It is this feature of North Korea's health program, plus the prac- 
tice of cleanliness, that most impresses foreigners. Checkups are 
provided on a routine basis at every school, factory, cooperative 
farm, office, and military unit. People are given a complete annual 
checkup and in addition are required to have monthly checkups for 
the treatment of minor conditions, such as colds. In some places, 
physicians go to schools and factories; otherwise people visit local 
clinics. In either case, because health care is organized around peo- 
ple's place of work or school, members of the same family do not 
see the same physician. There is no choice of physician. Individuals 
are required to follow the orders of their assigned physician and can- 
not refuse treatment. There is continuity in medical records; a per- 
son's lifetime "health card" is automatically forwarded to the new 
health clinic if he or she moves. 

The regime has been very aggressive in attacking epidemic dis- 
eases, including typhus, smallpox, cholera, and encephalitis, by 
instituting a nationwide inoculation program, which, however, suf- 
fers from a chronic shortage of serums. Physicians oversee the rou- 
tine spraying of public places such as trains, buses, restaurants, and 
hotels with DDT and other insecticides. Foreigners report such 
spraying of trains after every stop. 

The prevalence of tuberculosis is generally blamed on malnutrition 
and hard work. At one time, it was the leading cause of death in North 
Korea. In 2005 it ranked farther down on the list behind cancer, heart 
disease, strokes, and digestive and respiratory ailments. However, dur- 
ing the late 1990s, when famine claimed the lives of 1 million or more 
North Koreans, the immune systems of the vulnerable, mainly the 
elderly and the young, weakened as caloric intake fell, and many peo- 
ple succumbed to diseases such as tuberculosis before actually starv- 
ing to death. As of 2005, no cases of human immunodeficiency virus/ 



126 



Research staff of the Acupuncture and Moxibustion Division, Koryo Institute of 

Medical Science, P 'yongyang 
Courtesy Choson (P 'yongyang), June 2004, 22 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/ AIDS) had been offi- 
cially reported. 

As one of its first priorities after the war, the regime sought to 
train more physicians at long-established medical colleges in 
P'yongyang, Hamhung, Ch'ongjin, and Sariwon, plus newly estab- 
lished medical junior colleges located in each province. In terms of 
the number of physicians and hospitals per capita, North Korea ranks 
high in the world today, although it is unclear just how well trained 
these physicians are. In the past, North Korea reportedly had one 
doctor for every 700 inhabitants and one hospital bed for every 350 
inhabitants. Health expenditures in 2001 represented 2.5 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). Despite these expen- 
ditures, the country is thought to be some 15 to 20 years behind in 
medical research. 

Medicine is not a prestigious profession in North Korea. Medical 
doctors, lawyers, professors, and other intellectuals of prerevolution- 
ary days were denounced as enemies of the state and relegated to the 
lower classes. Many young men choose not to go to medical school; 
more than 75 percent of North Korea's physicians are women. There 
are no nursing colleges; women with a high-school education or less 
serve as nurses. 

There is a significant variation in the quality of medical care 
throughout the country. Central hospitals in P'yongyang, such as the 



127 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Red Cross Hospital and the P'yongyang Medical College Hospital, 
have the most modern equipment and hundreds of cancer and heart 
disease specialists. City and provincial hospitals, such as the 
P'yongyang Hospital and Haeju Hospital, are reserved for seriously 
ill patients. There also are county and ward hospitals, factory hospi- 
tals for factories with 7,000 or more employees, and rural health cen- 
ters. On a smaller scale, clinics that have no beds and essentially 
give first-aid treatment are run by nurses or midwives, not trained 
medical doctors. 

All eye surgery reportedly is done in the central hospitals in 
P'yongyang. Foreign visitors who have observed the modern operat- 
ing rooms and equipment in these hospitals see not only the best, 
but, in some cases, the only facilities for certain kinds of operations 
or cancer treatment. Cataract surgery is not available to the average 
North Korean, a situation that may confine him or her to life without 
reading after a certain age. The P'yongyang Maternity Hospital, 
another showcase hospital, has become a regular stop on the VIP 
tour of P'yongyang since its opening in late 1980. 

The epitome in medical care is provided to top party and govern- 
ment officials at the Government Hospital in P'yongyang (also 
known as the Ponghwa Clinic). Dr. Ch'oe Ung-sam, the first director 
of the clinic and Kim II Sung's longtime chief personal physician, 
graduated from a Japanese medical school and later served as dean 
of Ch'ongjin Medical College. In addition to the clinic, he operated a 
special medical sendee providing 24-hour medical care for both Kim 
II Sung and Kim Jong II, plus special services for cabinet ministers 
and top KWP officials. Unlike other hospitals, the Ponghwa Clinic 
has central heating and, in each patient's room, air conditioning, a 
sofa, two armchairs, and a coffee table. Its elite patients look out 
over a floral, terraced courtyard. Most North Koreans are not aware 
of the existence of the Ponghwa Clinic, but anyone going near it 
would notice the government cars parked in front. Foreign visitors 
are not taken to the Ponghwa Clinic, despite North Korean interest in 
showing off the nation's other premier facilities. 

Except for a few pediatric hospitals, tuberculosis sanatoriums, 
and the central hospitals in P'yongyang, most hospitals are general 
hospitals. A typical one would have about 100 to 150 beds, with 
most rooms accommodating from 10 to 15 patients each. The major- 
ity of the patients are there for surgery; the most common operations 
are for appendicitis, tonsillitis, boils, and abscesses. Only the most 
modern hospitals have beds with mattresses; most others have 
wooden-board beds; patients bring their own bedding. Visitors are 
not allowed in patients' rooms. The rules isolating hospital patients 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



from other people are strictly enforced throughout the country. 
Patients are not allowed to leave their rooms, and they are not 
allowed to smoke. While they are in the hospital, they must submit 
their food ration card and eat only meals provided by the hospital. 
Even by North Korean standards, the food is poor. Going to the hos- 
pital is not a comfortable experience. 

North Koreans' major complaints about medical care are the 
shortage and extremely high cost of medicines, especially antibiot- 
ics, which are in great demand. Pharmaceutical imports from Japan, 
Russia, and China are reserved for the elite. Antibiotics available to 
the general public are produced domestically. Control over scarce 
supplies is exerted by physicians who are authorized to prescribe 
only those medicines that are available, in amounts that can be filled. 
Most modern drugs are not sold on the open market; foreign visitors 
always note the absence of pharmacies selling medicines. Only tradi- 
tional medicines produced domestically are available at special 
drugstores. Black-market sale of medicines has long been pervasive. 

The regime has claimed a dramatic improvement in the health and 
longevity of its population. According to North Korean statistics, the 
average life expectancy was a little more than 38 years in the 
1936-40 period; in 2007 life expectancy was estimated at 69.2 years 
for men and 74.8 years for women. Other projections are much 
lower for both men and women. Life expectancy is not expected to 
improve as the first decade of the twenty-first century proceeds. 

Prior to the famine of the mid-1990s with its horrific death toll, 
North Koreans reportedly were pleased with the advances made in 
medicine, especially in the fight against traditional epidemic diseases 
and the improvement in surgical care. Free medical care has been 
considered one of the regime's most impressive accomplishments. 
However, the people know nothing about the advances made in other 
countries. They know only what the state has told them, and they 
have been told — and apparently believe — that medical care in South 
Korea and the West is a luxury that only the rich can afford. They 
must be much more cynical now, however, after watching a million or 
more of their loved ones die in one of the great famines of the twenti- 
eth century. Estimates of the death toll vary from the government's 
quasi-official figure of 220,000 to the estimate of 3.5 million by the 
South Korean nongovernmental organization Good Friends. Typical 
of a famine, most deaths were due to disease, not starvation. The min- 
gling of drinking water with sewage in the flooding in 1996 led to 
gastrointestinal diseases, which led to dehydration, especially in chil- 
dren. With their immune systems already weakened as a result of 
poor nutrition, they were vulnerable to a number of illnesses. 



129 



North Korea: A Country Study 

There also have been serious long-term health effects of the fam- 
ine, some irreversible, which will erase many of the medical 
advances of past years. According to a 2004 UN survey, there has 
been serious stunting (low height for age) and wasting (low weight 
for height) of children under six, as a result of chronic malnutrition. 
The rate of stunting was found to be 37 percent; 23 percent were 
underweight (weight for age); and 7 percent showed signs of wast- 
ing. Not surprisingly, given the regime's handling of scarce food 
supplies, the survey revealed considerable regional variation. The 
stunting rate in P'yongyang was found to be half that in cities of the 
north and east that are geographically removed from rural areas, cit- 
ies where the government was unable or unwilling to transport 
scarce foodstuffs. According to a 2004 UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization report, North Korea's population is one of the most 
undernourished in the world, in the company of the very poorest 
nations such as Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Haiti. Despite the flow of 
international aid since the mid-1990s, there has been no significant 
improvement in nutritional levels since 1995. 

With the loss of at least 5 percent of its population during the fam- 
ine in the mid-1990s, and a lower birthrate and higher mortality rate 
since then, North Korea has seen a drop in its population and a dete- 
rioration in the health of the people that would normally be seen only 
in wartime. Estimates in 2007 indicate a birthrate of nearly 15.0 
births per 1,000 population, a death rate of just over 7.2 deaths per 
1,000, and an infant mortality rate of 22.5 per 1,000 live births. The 
total fertility rate for 2007 has been estimated at two children per 
woman. 

The long-term health effects of a famine that ranks as one of the 
worst of the twentieth century, coupled with chronic food shortages 
that continue into a second decade and promise only more malnour- 
ished North Korean children, will plague North Korea for years to 
come. Its hopes for steady growth in its population, to compete with 
South Korea's much larger population, have been soundly dashed. 
Meanwhile, the smaller, sicker population that remains after so many 
deaths will likely need greater expenditures on health — and more 
food for better nutrition — than the regime can afford without contin- 
ued international aid or a drop in military expenditures. 



* * * 

Much of this chapter is based on the author's 1999 book, Kim II- 
song's North Korea. The book is a declassified Central Intelligence 
Agency study originally prepared in the early 1980s and based on all 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



the sources available to the U.S. Government at that time, including 
interviews with North Korean defectors, foreign diplomats either 
stationed in P'yongyang or traveling to North Korea, East European 
technicians working at North Korean industrial sites, and other visi- 
tors to the country. 

Bradley K. Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly 
Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty is the best source of 
information on the society published since 2003. Other excellent 
studies that provide a more specific focus on a particular feature of 
North Korean society are David R. Hawk's report The Hidden 
Gulag: Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps; Stephan Haggard 
and Marcus Noland's Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of 
Famine in North Korea; and The Great North Korean Famine: Fam- 
ine, Politics, and Foreign Policy by Andrew S. Natsios. 

Since the famine of the mid-1990s and the flood of North Korean 
refugees into China seeking to escape the deteriorating food condi- 
tions and the tightening totalitarian controls, defector reports have 
provided a better and better understanding of North Korean society. 
These defector reports have been featured in newspaper and maga- 
zine articles, as well as academic journals and conferences. Several 
early twenty-first-century videos of a public execution in North 
Korea of people who have helped the refugees along the Chinese bor- 
der have provided new sources of up-to-date, irrefutable information. 

Foreign visitors to North Korea, all carefully screened by the 
regime beforehand, continue to write feature articles about their vis- 
its to P'yongyang. They are usually not allowed to travel outside 
P'yongyang, however, the one exception to this having been the 
international humanitarian aid officials who have been allowed in 
many areas but not, for instance, in the northeast provinces. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



131 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



The lead statuary of the Monument for Socialism, Revolution, and 
Construction of Socialism, Mansudae Square, P 'yongyang, completed 
in April 1972. The handle on the torch is inscribed "chuch'e, " while 
the book says "Selected Works of Kim II Sung. " 
Courtesy Pulmyol ui t'ap (Tower of Immortality), P 'yongyang: Munye 
Ch'ulpansa, 1985, 63 



THE ECONOMY of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), or North Korea, has undergone tremendous changes since 
the 1990s began. Compared to its neighbors — the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea), China, Russia, and Japan — North Korea is by far the 
poorest and most backward country in Northeast Asia. The stresses 
that North Korea's economy underwent in the 1990s under the leader- 
ship of Kim Jong II led many observers to expect that it would soon 
implode. That the North Korean regime has survived far longer than 
most expected and continues to function, and even reform its econ- 
omy, is an intriguing puzzle. However, although North Korea has sur- 
vived, its economy is in shambles and has contracted steeply. By the 
late 1990s, these pressures finally had forced the North Korean leader- 
ship to begin undertaking economic reforms, essentially abandoning 
the Soviet-style centrally planned — or command — economy to which 
it had clung since the late 1940s under the leadership of Kim II Sung. 
Whether those reforms can have their intended effect is a question that 
will only be answered in the future. 

North Korea has been — and remains — one of the most closed soci- 
eties in the world. Reliable information about the state and condition 
of its economy, as well as information about its economic organiza- 
tion, is exceedingly scarce. North Korea has made comparatively sub- 
stantial strides toward openness since the 1990s, especially after the 
June 2000 summit between South Korea's president Kim Dae Jung 
and Korean Workers' Party (KWP) general secretary Kim Jong II, that 
increasingly deepened interactions between the two Koreas. This 
greater openness has led to better information than was previously 
available, although the quality and quantity of information about basic 
economic functions, such as gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary), growth rates, and industrial production, remain superficial and 
suspect at best. 

Economic Development, 1940s-90s 

The Economy after World War II 

North Korea has been one of the most closed, autarkic, and cen- 
tralized economies in the world since the late 1940s. Although this 
situation began to change in the early twenty-first century, the econ- 
omy remains one of the most obscure and recondite. For decades, the 
economy was organized around the doctrine of chuch 'e (see Glos- 
sary). Although in reality North Korea was heavily dependent on aid 



135 



North Korea: A Country Study 

and technology transfers from the Soviet Union and China, the 
attempt to be virtually autarkic was a main aspect of its economy 
until the late 1990s. 

At the end of the era of Japanese colonization of the Korean Pen- 
insula (1910—45), North Korea inherited the basic infrastructure of a 
modern economy and achieved considerable success because of the 
ability of the communist regime to marshal underused resources and 
idle labor and to impose a low rate of consumption. The Japanese 
had developed extensive heavy industry, particularly in the metal- 
lurgy and chemical industries, hydroelectric power, and mining in 
the northern half of Korea, where they introduced modern mining 
methods. The southern half of the peninsula produced most of the 
rice and the majority of textiles. The hydroelectric and chemical 
plants were said to be second to none in Asia at that time in terms of 
both their scale and technology. The same applied to the railroad and 
communication networks. 

There were, however, serious defects in the industrial structures 
and their location. The Korean economy, geared primarily to benefit 
the Japanese homeland, was made dependent on Japan. Heavy 
industry was limited to the production of mainly raw materials, 
semifinished goods, and war supplies, which were then shipped to 
Japan for final processing, consumption, or deployment. Japan did 
not allow Korea to develop a machine-tool industry. Most industrial 
sectors were strategically located on the eastern or western coasts 
near ports so as to connect them efficiently with Japan. Railroad net- 
works ran mainly along the north-south axis, facilitating Japan's 
access to the Asian mainland. Because the Japanese held almost all 
key government positions and owned and controlled the industrial 
and financial enterprises, only a few Koreans acquired the basic 
skills essential for modernization. Moreover, the Japanese left 
behind an agrarian structure — land tenure system, size of land hold- 
ings and farm operations, and pattern of land use and farm 
income — that needed much reform. 

The sudden termination of the Japanese occupation at the end of 
World War II, in August 1945, and the subsequent partition of the 
nation brought economic chaos (see National Division in the 1940s, 
ch. 1). Severance of the complementary "agricultural" South from 
the "industrial" North and from Japan meant that North Korea's tra- 
ditional market for raw materials and semifinished goods as well as 
its sources of food and manufactured goods were cut off. Further- 
more, the withdrawal of the entrepreneurial and engineering skills 
supplied mainly by Japanese personnel affected the economic base. 
Thus, the task facing the communist regime in the North was to 



136 



The Economy 



develop a viable economy, which it reoriented mainly toward other 
communist-run nations, while at the same time rectifying the "mal- 
formation" in the colonial industrial structure. The problem was fur- 
ther compounded by the devastation of the industrial base during the 
Korean War (see The Korean War, 1950-53, ch. 1). North Korea's 
economic development did not begin in earnest until after the 
Korean War. 

North Korea's Development Strategy 

During what North Korea called its "peaceful construction" 
period before the Korean War, the fundamental task of the economy 
was to overtake the level of output and efficiency attained toward the 
end of the Japanese occupation. This effort included restructuring 
and developing a viable economy oriented toward the communist- 
bloc nations and beginning the process of socializing the economy. 
Nationalization of key industrial enterprises and land reform, both of 
which were carried out in 1946, laid the groundwork for two succes- 
sive one-year plans in 1947 and 1948, respectively, and for the Two- 
Year Plan (1949-50). During this period, a piece-rate wage system 
and an independent accounting system began to be applied, and the 
commercial network increasingly came under state and cooperative 
ownership. 

The basic goal of the Three-Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan 
(1954-56) was to reconstruct an economy devastated by the Korean 
War. The plan stressed more than merely regaining the prewar output 
levels. China, the Soviet Union, and East European countries pro- 
vided reconstruction assistance. The highest priority was developing 
heavy industry, but an earnest effort to collectivize farming also 
began. At the end of 1957, output of most industrial commodities, 
except for a few items, such as chemical fertilizers, carbides, and 
sulfuric acid, where the recovery took longer, had returned to 1949 
levels. 

Having basically completed the task of reconstruction, the state 
planned to lay a solid foundation for industrialization while complet- 
ing the socialization process and solving the basic problems of food 
and shelter during the Five-Year Plan (1957-61). The socialization 
process was completed by 1958 in all sectors of the economy, and 
the Ch'ollima Work Team Movement (see Glossary) was introduced. 
Although growth rates reportedly were high, there were serious 
imbalances among different economic sectors. Because rewards 
went to individuals and enterprises that met production quotas, fran- 
tic efforts to fulfill plan targets in competition with other enterprises 
and industries caused efforts to be disproportionate between various 



137 



North Korea: A Country Study 

enterprises, between industry and agriculture, and between light and 
heavy industries. Because resources were limited and the transporta- 
tion system suffered bottlenecks, supplies went primarily to politi- 
cally well-connected enterprises or those whose managers 
complained the loudest. An enterprise or industry that performed 
better than others often did so at the expense of others. 

Until 1960 North Korea's economy grew faster than that in the 
South. During the reconstruction period after the Korean War, there 
were opportunities for extensive economic growth. This general pat- 
tern of initially high growth resulting in a strong rate of capital for- 
mation was mirrored in the other Soviet-style economies. Toward 
the end of the 1950s, as reconstruction work was completed and idle 
capacity began to diminish, the economy had to shift from the exten- 
sive to the intensive stage, where the simple discipline of marshaling 
underused resources became less effective. In the new stage, ineffi- 
ciency arising from emerging bottlenecks led to diminishing returns. 
Further growth could be attained only by increasing efficiency and 
technological progress (see The Economy, ch. 1). 

Beginning in the early 1960s, a series of pervasive and serious 
bottlenecks began to impede development. Blockages generally 
were created by the lack of arable land, skilled labor, energy, and 
transportation and by deficiencies in the extraction industries. More- 
over, both land and marine transportation lacked modern equipment 
and infrastructure. The inability of the energy and mining sectors, as 
well as of the transportation network, to supply power and raw mate- 
rials as rapidly as the manufacturing plants could absorb them began 
to slow industrial growth. The Five-Year Plan targets were mostly 
completed by 1959, and the year 1960 was officially categorized as a 
"buffer year" before the next plan started in 1961 . 

The First Seven- Year Plan (1961-67) built on the groundwork of 
the previous plans but changed the focus of industrialization. Heavy 
industry, with the machine-tool industry as its linchpin, gained con- 
tinuing priority. During the plan, however, and because of the with- 
drawal of Soviet aid during the Sino-Soviet dispute, the economy 
experienced widespread slowdowns and reverses for the first time, in 
sharp contrast to the rapid and uninterrupted growth during the pre- 
vious plans. Poor performance forced the regime to extend the plan 
for three additional years, to 1970. During the last part of the de 
facto 10-year plan, emphasis shifted to pursuing parallel develop- 
ment of the economy and of defense capabilities. 

The Six- Year Plan (1971-76) followed immediately after the previ- 
ous plan, but in the aftermath of the poor performance of the previous 
plan, growth targets of the Six- Year Plan were scaled down substan- 



138 



The Economy 



tially. Because some of the proposed targets in the First Seven- Year 
Plan had not been attained even by 1970, the Six- Year Plan did not 
deviate much from its predecessor in basic goals. The Six- Year Plan 
placed more emphasis on technological advance, self-sufficiency in 
industrial raw materials, improving product quality, correcting imbal- 
ances among different sectors, and developing the power and extrac- 
tive industries; the last of these had been deemed largely responsible 
for slowdowns during the First Seven- Year Plan. The plan called for 
attaining a self-sufficiency rate of 60 to 70 percent in all industrial sec- 
tors by substituting domestic raw materials wherever possible and by 
organizing and renovating technical processes to make such substitu- 
tion feasible. Improving transport capacity became one of the urgent 
tasks in accelerating economic development — understandably because 
it was one of the major bottlenecks threatening the Six- Year Plan. 

By the end of August 1975, North Korea claimed to have fulfilled 
the Six-Year Plan 16 months ahead of schedule. Under the circum- 
stances, it was expected that the next plan would start without delay 
in 1976, a year early. However, it was not until nearly 30 months 
later that the plan was unveiled; 1976 and 1977 became "buffer" 
years. 

The inability of the planners to formulate and institute economic 
plans continuously reveals as much about the inefficacy of planning 
itself as about the extent of the economic difficulties and administra- 
tive disruptions facing North Korea. Targets for successive plans, for 
example, had to be based on the accomplishments of preceding 
plans. If these targets were underfulfilled, all targets of the next plan 
had to be reformulated and adjusted. 

The basic thrust of the Second Seven- Year Plan (1978-84) was to 
achieve the three-pronged goals of self-reliance, modernization, and 
"scientification." Although the emphasis on self-reliance was not new, 
it had not previously been the explicit focus of an economic plan. Dur- 
ing the 1970s, North Korea was not nearly as closed off to the interna- 
tional community as it became during and after the 1980s. Although 
trade accounted for a relatively small proportion of the country's total 
economy during the Cold War, North Korea still traded with other 
countries. And, while most of the trade was conducted with China and 
the Soviet Union, a surprisingly large proportion of trade occurred out- 
side the communist bloc. For example, during the 1970s, about 10 per- 
cent of North Korea's trade was with Japan, and more than 15 percent 
was with nations belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD — see Glossary). 

This new emphasis on self-reliance might have been a reaction to 
the mounting foreign debt originating from large-scale imports of 



139 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Western machinery and equipment in the mid-1970s. Through mod- 
ernization North Korea hoped to increase mechanization and auto- 
mation in all sectors of the economy through the process of 
scientification, the adoption of up-to-date production and manage- 
ment techniques. The specific objectives of the economic plan were: 
to strengthen the fuel, energy, and resource bases of industry through 
priority development of the energy and extractive industries; to mod- 
ernize industry; to substitute domestic resources for certain imported 
raw materials; to expand freight-carrying capacity; and to accelerate 
a technical revolution in agriculture. 

All indications are that the Second Seven- Year Plan was not suc- 
cessful. North Korea generally downplayed the accomplishments of 
the plan, and no other plan received less official fanfare. It was offi- 
cially claimed that the economy had grown at an annual rate of 8.8 
percent during the plan, somewhat below the planned rate of 9.6 per- 
cent. The reliability of this aggregate measure, however, is highly 
questionable. By official admission, the targets of only six commod- 
ities were attained (cereals and grains among them). After the plan 
concluded, there was no new economic plan for two years, an indica- 
tion of both the plan's failure and the severity of the economic and 
planning problems confronting the economy in the mid-1980s. 

The main targets of the Third Seven- Year Plan (1987-93) were to 
achieve the "Ten Long-Range Major Goals of the 1980s for the Con- 
struction of the Socialist Economy." These goals included the three 
previous policy goals of self-reliance, modernization, and scientifi- 
cation. Furthermore, the plan gave more attention to developing for- 
eign trade and joint ventures. Because of the collapse of the socialist 
bloc in the late 1980s, the plan never had a serious chance of suc- 
ceeding, and in 1993 North Korea admitted it was not successful. On 
December 8, 1993, Premier Kang Song-san said that, "Due to the 
collapse of socialist countries and the socialist market, our country's 
economic cooperation and trade have faced setbacks. This has 
brought serious damage to our economic construction, and therefore 
our Third Seven- Year Plan has had a hard time achieving its goals." 
After 1993, North Korea did not promulgate plans. 

The end of the Cold War (1945-89) severely shook North Korea. 
During the Cold War, North Korea had been able to rely on extensive 
Soviet and Chinese military, technological, and economic aid. This 
aid had been large in absolute terms, and, more importantly, had pro- 
vided North Korea access to more advanced technology than it could 
otherwise have obtained on its own. Beginning in 1989, the North 
Korean economy underwent a series of shock waves. The limits to a 
centrally planned economy had already begun to be reached during 



140 




A streetcar in downtown P 'yongyang, June 2006 
Courtesy Overseas Pan-Korean Center, Washington, DC 



the 1980s, and to compound these problems, the Soviet Union and 
China abandoned North Korea and stopped providing aid and mate- 
rials at "friendship prices." Both the Soviet Union and China also 
normalized relations with South Korea. From US$260 million in aid 
to the North in 1980, by 1987 North Korea was actually running a 
deficit with the Soviet Union, and by 1990 all aid from Moscow had 
ceased. In 1992 China also decided to make North Korea pay market 
prices for goods previously sold at friendship prices, thus further 
aggravating North Korea's problems. As a result, North Korean 
imports of oil and grain from China dropped dramatically in the 
early 1990s. For example, while North Korea had imported 1.5 mil- 
lion tons of coal from China in 1988, by 1996 that amount had 
dropped precipitously, to only 100,000 tons. 

The severe problems inherent in a centrally planned economy had 
fully manifested themselves by the mid-1980s, and the economy had 
started its decline even before the Soviet Union and China aban- 
doned aid to the North. By 1990 North Korea's economy had begun 
to contract, experiencing negative GDP growth rates from 1990 to 
1998. Only in 1999 did that growth actually turn positive for the first 
time in a decade. By 2003, South Korea's Ministry of Unification 
estimated gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) per capita in 
North Korea at US$762, and a total GNP of US$17 billion, while 
industrial capacity was half what it had been in 1989. 



141 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Economic Infrastructure Since the Early 1990s 

Comparisons with South Korea 

Although North Korea recovered more quickly from the Korean 
War than the South, by the mid-1960s, South Korea had begun its 
economic development, and its economy was growing rapidly. By 
the 1980s, South Korea had caught and surpassed the North in both 
absolute GDP and per capita income. North Korea recovered rapidly 
from the war of 1950-53, in large measure as a result of extensive 
aid from the Soviet Union and China. At its peak in 1960, North 
Korea's absolute GNP was almost 80 percent that of South Korea's. 
However, as the South began its development under President Park 
Chung-hee in the 1960s, the North rapidly fell behind. Within a 
decade, North Korea's economy was half the absolute size of South 
Korea's, and by 1990 it was only 10 percent of the South's. By 2003, 
most estimates put the South's economy at 33 times larger than the 
North's. The South has a population roughly twice that of the North, 
and although per capita incomes were roughly similar until around 
1975, the South's continued economic dynamism meant that by 1990 
South Korean per capita income was roughly US$6,000, while that 
in the North was about US$1,000. By 2003, the per capita income 
gap between the two countries had again expanded dramatically. 
North Korea's GNP per capita was then roughly US$762, while that 
in the South was 10 times more, at US$17,800. 

Organization 

North Korea historically was organized on lines similar to other 
centrally planned economies. Property rights belonged largely to the 
state, resources were allocated through plans and not through mar- 
kets, and prices and money were not the central features of the econ- 
omy. Up until 1998, the state constitution recognized two general 
economic categories: state-owned enterprises and worker coopera- 
tives (see The Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). From the late 1940s 
to the late 1980s, North Korea had one of the most complete socialist 
economies in the world. 

The KWP is the supreme power in North Korea, and it has full 
control over the government and state organs. The constitutional 
revisions of September 1998 retained the stipulations that the "Dem- 
ocratic People's Republic of Korea shall conduct all activities under 
the leadership of the Workers' Party." No decision can be made 
without the approval of the party, and the party retains full control 
over economic enterprises, factories, and the cooperative farms. 



142 



The Economy 



The system of party control over the economy was formalized in 
the Taean Work System (see Glossary), which Kim II Sung announced 
on a visit he made to the Taean County Electrical Appliance Plant in 
December 1961. The Taean Work System continued for 41 years. 
Under this system, factory party committees' collective leadership 
oversaw production activities, and these factory party committees 
were under the direct control of the provincial KWP chapters. The fac- 
tory party committee was responsible not only for business and techni- 
cal aspects of the factory, but also for political and moral aspects. The 
secretary of the factory, a member of the provincial party chapter, pre- 
sided over the factory party committee, organized production and 
management goals, and was responsible for ensuring that policy and 
political directives were followed in the factory. This role gave the 
secretary tremendous control, despite the appearance of a consensual 
decision-making organization, and some party chiefs abused their 
power by making unilateral decisions without regard to the managers 
of the factory. North Korea abandoned the Taean Work System in July 
2002 and introduced a new economic management system (see Legal 
and Administrative Reforms, this ch.). 

Forced collectivization of the North Korean agricultural system 
occurred between 1945 and 1958. More than 1 million farm house- 
holds were turned into collectivized farms, with a smaller number of 
designated "state farms." North Korea achieved this change without 
massive loss of life or disruption, and this relatively successful col- 
lectivization stands in contrast to the Chinese and Soviet experi- 
ences, where forced collectivization led to mass famine and loss of 
life in the millions. By the late 1990s, there were approximately 
3,000 cooperatives, 300 state farms, and 240 other farms. During the 
1950s, Kim II Sung announced in a series of speeches the basic 
framework of collectivization for agricultural development and self- 
sufficiency in North Korea. These speeches included four basic prin- 
ciples: mechanization, chemicalization, irrigation, and electrifica- 
tion. This framework came to be known as the Ch'ongsan-ni Method 
(see Glossary) of agriculture, taking its name from a small agricul- 
tural collective near P'yongyang, where, in 1960, Kim had spent 
time talking with farmers and reportedly providing "on-the-spot 
guidance." The KWP Central Committee formally adopted the four 
principles and the Ch'ongsan-ni Method on February 25, 1964. As 
with the Taean Work System, the Ch'ongsan-ni Method largely 
ceased to function by the early 2000s. 

The Ch'ongsan-ni Method was essentially unchanged until the con- 
stitutional revisions of September 1998 formally permitted private 
ownership of assets, as well as instituting the Cabinet of Ministers, 



143 



North Korea: A Country Study 



International boundary 
Demarcation line and 
demilitarized zone 
National capital 
Populated place 



25 50 75 Kilometers 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



A 



CHINA 




c 


Coal 




Coalfield 




Shipbuilding 


Au 


Gold 




Cement 




and repair 


Fe 


Iron ore 


Q 


Chemicals 


% 


Steel 


Mg 


Magnesite 




Electronics 




Synthetic fiber 


Zn 


Zinc 




Machines 


1 


Textiles 



Source: Based on information from Korean Resources Corporation, "Korea Mineral Informa- 
tion Service," Seoul, 2005, http://kores.net/; and John C. Wu, "The Mineral Industry 
of North Korea" in United States Geological Survey, Mineral Year Book, 3, Area 
Reports: International, Washington, DC, 2005, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/ 
pubs/country/2005/knmyb05 .pdf. 

Figure 6. Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 2005 



144 



The Economy 



composed mainly of the heads of ministries (see The Executive, ch. 4). 
Concurrently, the government administrative reform of September 
1998 aimed to cut expenditures and increase efficiency through 
greater centralization of functionally related bureaucracies at the cen- 
ter, and through delegation of responsibilities to local units. These 
actions had the result of decreasing central control over local adminis- 
trative authorities. 

Most notably, North Korea's industrial structure profile is one of a 
relatively industrialized country. In 2003 agriculture made up only 
27.2 percent of the economy, mining 7.8 percent, manufacturing 
18.5 percent, and services 32.8 percent. This is the profile of a coun- 
try that has managed to begin moving beyond abject poverty. 

North Korea's growth rates have varied significantly by industry. 
Although growth was slow from 2001 to 2003, there was expansion 
across all major sectors. Mining and power generation showed the 
most growth (3.2 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively), but services, 
manufacturing, and agriculture also all reveal positive growth. Fol- 
lowing the 1990 drop-off in oil imports and the floods and famine of 
the mid- to late 1990s, although the overall economy contracted by 
almost 25 percent, trade volume has increased. Agricultural output 
has rebounded from a low in 1997, but production of most industrial 
and mining goods remains reduced, mostly as a result of the lack of 
energy and demand. 

Natural Resources 

North Korea's major natural resources include coal, copper, fluor- 
spar, gold, graphite, iron ore, lead, magnesite, pyrites, salt, tungsten, 
and zinc (see fig. 6). The country also has uranium ore deposits, 
which often have been cited in the international crisis over North 
Korea's nuclear weapons program that may include a uranium 
enrichment program in addition to its known plutonium reprocessing 
program (see The United States, ch. 4). 

Some 22.4 percent — about 27,000 square kilometers — of North 
Korea's land is arable. Of this area, about 8 percent is in permanent 
crops. Because of adverse weather conditions, agriculture is heavily 
dependent on insecticides, chemical fertilizers, and electrically 
driven irrigation systems. The latter require energy resources that 
North Korea desperately lacks since the cut-off of Russian oil 
imports in the early 1990s and shortages of hydroelectric power 
since the prolonged drought in the mid-1990s. For all these reasons, 
the North never has been and is not likely ever to be self-sufficient in 
food (see Agriculture, the Famine of 1995-98, and Economic 
Changes; Foreign Economic Relations, this ch.). 



145 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Energy and Power Generation 

A major problem for the North Korean economy lies in its energy 
sector. A stable energy supply is fundamental to a sustainable econ- 
omy, and North Korea's outdated and crumbling energy grid is a 
drag on the entire economy. Energy shortages began in 1990 when 
the Soviet Union and China severely reduced their fuel exports to 
North Korea. The reduction in imports resulted in part from contin- 
ued Western economic sanctions against the North and in part from 
North Korea's inability to pay for energy imports with hard currency. 

Much of the energy infrastructure is outdated, poorly maintained, 
and based on obsolete technology. Because the power grid is so old 
and dilapidated, even if supply constraints were eased by increased 
imports, the actual transmission of energy, especially electricity, 
would remain problematic. Outdated distribution facilities and inef- 
ficient management also lead to a major loss of power during trans- 
mission itself. The system has been driven to collapse because of the 
lack of investment in the energy infrastructure, and because North 
Korea faces limitations on both the technology and the capital 
needed to improve energy efficiency, rehabilitate its transmission 
grid, and develop reliable power plants. According to South Korea's 
Ministry of Unification, 70 percent of North Korea's power facilities 
have either been abandoned or are in urgent need of repair. 

Since 1990 North Korea's energy use has declined, marked 
mainly by a drastic drop in oil imports. For example, North Korea's 
crude oil imports in 2002 were 23 percent of those of 1990, and there 
has been no rise in refining capacity since 1975. 

The decline in oil imports has had a negative impact since the 
early 1990s. North Korea's total volume of power-generation capac- 
ity in 1998 was 7.1 million kilowatts, and by 2003 it had only risen 
to 7.7 million kilowatts. Whereas in 1990 North Korea produced 
27.7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, in 2002 it produced only 19 
billion kilowatt-hours, or 6 percent of South Korea's production. 
Night-time satellite photography showing electric light usage reveals 
North Korea, except for P'yongyang, as a "black hole" in Northeast 
Asia. 

A light-water nuclear-reactor project in Kumho, on the eastern 
coast in South Hamgyong Province, opened in December 1997 as a 
cooperative undertaking between North Korea and the Korean Pen- 
insula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multilateral 
consortium composed initially of representatives from the European 
Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Kumho was 
a relative success story until work stopped on the reactors in 2004 as 
a result of tension between North Korea and the United States over 



146 



The Economy 



suspected North Korean infringements of the 1994 Agreed Frame- 
work (see Glossary; The United States, ch. 4). This project was not 
intended for widespread economic use but was designed to allow 
workers from Japan, South Korea, and the United States into the 
building site. Because foreign workers actually lived at the site, 
North Korean and foreign officials had to reach a number of agree- 
ments covering such issues as currency exchange, mail and commu- 
nications exchange, and travel and housing. 

Although the North is attempting to develop renewable sources of 
energy, such as hydroelectric power and wind power, these sources 
still do not meet primary-energy demand. Hydroelectric power con- 
stituted 17 percent of North Korea's energy use in 2002, but coal 
remained the mainstay of energy production, accounting for 70 per- 
cent of primary-energy use. Until major renovations in the energy 
sector can be implemented, the entire North Korean economy will 
remain severely impeded. Because North Korea lacks the technology 
and the capital with which to upgrade transmission and generation 
facilities, the task of renovation will be a long process, if it occurs at 
all. 

Transportation 

Railroad, highway, air, and water transportation all are used in 
North Korea. Railroads are the most important mode of transporta- 
tion, linking all major cities and accounting for about 86 percent of 
freight and about 80 percent of passenger traffic. Roads, on the other 
hand, support only 12 percent of the freight-transporting capacity, 
and rivers and the sea, only 2 percent. Transportation by air, other 
than for military purposes within North Korea, is negligible (see fig. 
7; fig. 8). 

Railroads and Rapid Transit 

In 2002 North Korea had 5,214 kilometers of railroads, some 167 
percent of the South's total. Even though the North has more kilome- 
ters of railroads than the South, 80 percent of these railroads are elec- 
trified, and thus operations frequently are suspended because of a 
lack of power in the grid. It is believed that North Korea has about 
300 electric and numerous diesel locomotives. About 35 million pas- 
senger journeys occur each year. The great majority of North Korea's 
freight is carried by rail in the interior, amounting to about 38.5 mil- 
lion tons annually. 

Two major railroad lines run north-south in the interior, and one 
each along the east and west coasts. Two east-west lines connect 
Wonsan and P'yongyang by a central and a southerly route, and a 



147 



North Korea: A Countiy Study 




part of a third link line constructed in the 1980s connects provinces in 
the mountainous far north near the border with China. The railroad 
system is linked with the railroads of China and Russia, although 
gauge inconsistencies necessitate some dual gauging with Russia. As 
North Korea and South Korea continue to reconnect rail lines 
between the two countries, there has also been a need to strengthen 
the carrying capacity of the northern railroads, which have deterio- 
rated as a result of the lack of infrastructure maintenance since the 
1980s. 



148 



The Economy 



International boundary 

Demarcation line and 

demilitarized zone 

® National capital 

• Populated place 

1 — ► Railroad 

«X« Airport 

vL Port or terminal 

25 50 75 Kilometers 
25 50 75 Miles 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 





Ungsang& 
Ch'dngjin 



Kimch'aekj 



Huichonj 

■hdngju^ K ^ ch , 6n 
Anju(sunch'dn 



Pyongyang 
Songnim 



Changjin 



Hamhung^ 



Wonsan 



Sangi-ri 



'Hungnarn 

'East 
'Korea 
'Bay 



Sea of 
Japan 
CEast Sea) 



A, 



Sariwon 



Changydn 



yellow Sea 
(West Sea) 



P'yongsan_^- 



Kosong 
Pydnggang 



-Demarcation tine and 
demilitarized zone 



Kaesong 



SOUTH 
KOREA 



Figure 8. Primary Railroads, Ports, and Airports, 2006 



A subway system opened in P'yongyang in 1973 with one line; 
another line was added in 1978. The system has an estimated 22.5 
kilometers of track and 17 stations. 

Roads 

North Korea's road network was estimated at 31,200 kilometers 
in 1999. Of this total, only 1,997 kilometers were paved, of which 
only 682 kilometers were multilane highways. By 2005 expressways 



149 



North Korea: A Country Study 

linked P'yongyang with Huich'on to the north, with Wonsan to the 
east, Namp'o to the west, and Kaesong to the south near the western 
section of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ — see Glossary). Wonsan, 
on the east coast, is linked by expressway to Kosong near the eastern 
section of the DMZ. However, 29,203 kilometers (93.6 percent of 
the 1999 total) of North Korea's roads had gravel, crushed stone, or 
dirt surfaces, and maintenance on many roads was poor. Most of the 
paved roads are less than two lanes wide. 

Maritime Capabilities 

North Korea has a harbor loading capacity of 35.5 million tons, 7 
percent of the capacity of South Korea. The major port facilities — all 
ice free — are at Namp'o and Haeju on the west coast and Najin (often 
referred to in the media as Raj in), Ch'ongjin, Hungnam, and Wonsan 
on the east coast. United Nations (UN) statistics for 2002 report that 
North Korea had ships totaling 870,000 gross registered tons. In 2006 
the merchant fleet itself was composed of 232 ships of 1,000 gross 
registered tons or more. These ships included, by type, the following: 
176 cargo carriers, 14 bulk carriers, four container ships, three live- 
stock carriers, five dual-purpose passenger/cargo ships, 17 petroleum 
tankers, three refrigerated-cargo ships, eight roll-on/roll-off ships, 
one chemical tanker, and one vehicle carrier ship. 

Civil Aviation 

In 2003 North Korea had an estimated 78 usable airports, 35 of 
which had permanent-surface runways and 43, unpaved runways. 
North Korea's Sunan International Airport is located 20 kilometers 
northeast of P'yongyang and offers about 20 flights per week on 
North Korean, Chinese, and Russian carriers. Other major airports 
are located at Ch'ongjin, Hamhung, Najin, and Wonsan. There are 
also 19 heliports. The state-run airline, which uses a fleet of 15 
Soviet-made planes, is Air Koryo. It provides domestic service to 
three airports and foreign service to eight cities in China, Thailand, 
Germany, and Russia. North Korean aircraft seldom are used for 
transporting cargo. In 2001, according to UN statistics, only 5 tons 
per kilometer were carried by air, as compared with South Korea's 
1 1,503 tons per kilometer. 

Forestry and Fishing 

Because of oil shortages, most forestry products are used for fuel, 
with only small amounts of timber (roundwood) going for construc- 
tion and manufacturing. In 2002, according to an estimate by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, North Korea pro- 



150 



The Economy 



duced 7.1 million meters of roundwood. Fishing provides an impor- 
tant supplement to the diet and for export. The catch in 2001 totaled 
200,000 tons of wild-caught freshwater and saltwater fish, shellfish, 
and mollusks and about 63,700 tons produced using aquaculture. 

Telecommunications and the Internet 

North Korea's telecommunications and Internet networks run 
largely on obsolete Soviet- and Chinese-made equipment dating 
from the 1950s and 1960s. The sector is deprived of any new gov- 
ernment financing and is faced with unreliable electricity supply and 
severe deficits in modern equipment, spare parts, elementary compo- 
nents, and raw materials. As a result, the networks are highly unreli- 
able and inefficient, cost- insensitive, labor extensive, and subject to 
frequent breakdowns. 

Despite these problems, one-third of North Korean villagers have 
access to prepaid cell phones and other telephones that allow them to 
make long-distance calls both domestically and internationally at 
some personal risk. North Korea also has several dozen modern tele- 
communications facilities and academic research institutes with 
sophisticated telecommunications equipment, allowing them access 
to and use of modern telecommunications technologies, including 
wireless radio and telephone, satellite communications, and the 
Internet. Only a few privileged North Koreans have such access, and 
public Internet use is restricted by the state. 

The North Korean Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, 
working with the International Telecommunication Union and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has laid fiber- 
optic cable lines throughout North Korea. By 2000 a nationwide 
communication network using fiber-optic cables had been set up, and 
by 2003 some 938,000 telephones were in use. The P'yongyang 
Informatics Center has begun developing software, focusing on the 
commercial markets. The center's products include a secure fax pro- 
gram that is being marketed through a Japanese company. According 
to political scientist Alexandre Mansurov, several North Korean 
computer institutes are equipped with between 200 and 300 Acer 
Pentium IV desktop computers hooked up to multiple Sun Microsys- 
tem servers running Microsoft Windows platforms with programs 
such as Microsoft Office, Adobe Photoshop, and other word-process- 
ing and desktop-publishing software. In May 2002, the first public 
Internet cafe opened in P'yongyang, equipped with six personal com- 
puters and charging US$3 per hour (roughly one-sixth the monthly 
salary of an average worker). By 2005 there were six or seven Inter- 
net cafes in P'yongyang, one equipped with 100 computers. The 



151 



North Korea: A Country Study 

North Korean government operates five official Web sites in Japan 
and one in China, and its diplomats around the world communicate 
with P'yongyang through e-mail. North Korea is said to have devel- 
oped extensive "intranets," including the Kwangmyong-net report- 
edly used by more than 2 million subscribers, and the Hoon-net, used 
mainly by foreigners. 

Chinese telecommunication companies are aggressively expand- 
ing their reach into North Korea. In 2003 Chinese cell-phone compa- 
nies started building relay stations along the North Korean border, 
and as many as 20,000 North Koreans have access to Chinese cell 
phones, despite government attempts to ban their use. High-ranking 
Korean People's Army (KPA) and KWP cadres do have access to 
Global Standard for Mobile (GSM) communications-based mobile 
phones in P'yongyang. Foreign government delegations visiting 
P'yongyang, especially from the South, use satellite phones for com- 
munication with their respective capitals. The first GSM cellular 
telephone network for 5,000 subscribers was established in the 
Najin-Sonbong area in early 2002, and a mobile-telephone network 
for foreign subscribers was launched in P'yongyang at the end of 
2002. 

Government Budget 

The Ministry of Finance controls all aspects of the government's 
budget. The state budget is a major government instrument in carry- 
ing out the country's economic goals. Expenditures represented 
about 75 percent of GNP in the mid-1980s — the allocation of which 
reflected the priorities assigned to different economic sectors. Taxes 
were abolished in 1974 as "remnants of an antiquated society." This 
action, however, did not have any significant effect on state revenue 
because the overwhelming proportion of government funds — an 
average of 98.1 percent during 1961-70 — was from turnover (sales) 
taxes, deductions from profits paid by state enterprises, and various 
user fees on machinery and equipment, irrigation facilities, televi- 
sion sets, and water. 

In order to provide a certain degree of local autonomy as well as 
to lessen the financial burden of the central government, a "local 
budget system" was introduced in 1973. Under this system, provin- 
cial authorities are responsible for the operating costs of institutions 
and enterprises not under direct central government control, such as 
schools, hospitals, shops, and local consumer-goods production. In 
return, they are expected to organize as many profitable ventures as 
possible and to turn over profits to the central government. 

Around November each year, the state budget for the following 
fiscal year (see Glossary) is drafted, subject to revision around 



152 



The Economy 



March. Typically, total revenues exceed expenditures by a small 
margin, with the surplus carried over to the following year. Accord- 
ing to these broad statistics, North Korea's central government 
expenditures for 2002 were US$10 billion, or 58 percent of total 
GDP. The largest share of the budget, nearly US$4.2 billion (41.6 
percent), was devoted to the national economy, while US$1.4 bil- 
lion, or 14.4 percent, went to the military. A total of 38.8 percent of 
the government budget was devoted to "People's Policy," which 
included public welfare, science, health, and education. Defense 
spending as a share of total expenditures traditionally has constituted 
a major part of the government budget (see Defense Industry, ch. 5). 

The Ministry of Finance also controls government finance, 
including banks. North Korea nationalized banks in August 1946 
and, on December 6, 1947, established the Central Bank of the Dem- 
ocratic People's Republic of Korea. The Foreign Trade Bank of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea was founded in 1959 to con- 
duct international business for the Central Bank. Since 1987, there 
have been a number of joint- venture banks and also four insurance 
companies. 

The Central Bank issues currency, regulates the money supply, 
sets official foreign-exchange rates, deals with the purchase and sale 
of gold and foreign exchange, and handles foreign loans. The For- 
eign Trade Bank, under the supervision of the Central Bank, handles 
transactions and letters of credit related to foreign trade and controls 
the foreign-exchange payments of foreign-trade organizations and 
other enterprises. The Kumgang Bank is a specialized bank that han- 
dles transactions of foreign-trade organizations dealing with exports 
and imports of machinery, metals, mineral products, and chemical 
products. The Daesong Bank handles transactions of the Daesong 
Trading Company and other trading organizations. 

Agriculture, the Famine of 1995-98, and Economic 
Changes 

Collapse in the 1990s 

The agricultural system in North Korea essentially collapsed in 
the 1990s, with severe economic and social repercussions through- 
out the country. Under the best weather conditions, the climate in 
North Korea allows only one growing season, from June to October, 
and some experts estimate that even in normal times, North Korea 
would have a 12 percent shortfall in the grain production required to 
feed its people. Before the division of the peninsula, the northern 
half imported food from the more-fertile South. With the division of 
the peninsula, North Korea attempted to be self-sufficient in food 



153 



North Korea: A Country Study 

production, a largely unattainable goal. That North Korea is unable 
to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture is not surprising — most cen- 
trally planned economies have inherent limitations because of the 
structure of land ownership and use, as well as the collectivized 
nature of the organization and management of agricultural produc- 
tion. In the case of North Korea, the Ch'ongsan-ni Method empha- 
sized mass mobilization and political conditioning, to the detriment 
of efficient agricultural practices. 

During the 1995-97 period, North Korea experienced a series of 
ecological shocks — drought and flooding — that devastated the 
already weakened agricultural sector and resulted in a nationwide 
famine. It is highly unusual for an industrialized country with a rela- 
tively advanced standard of living to experience famine. Famine and 
floods since the mid-1990s have devastated the agricultural sector, 
and reports of starvation and undernourishment are commonplace. 
Indeed, some scholars have estimated that from a peak around 1989, 
North Korea's agricultural production contracted by up to 50 percent. 

When North Korea collectivized agriculture and centralized deci- 
sion making in the 1950s, with the goal of food self-sufficiency, it 
achieved large quantitative increases in output. These increases were 
mainly the result of even-larger quantitative increases in inputs, such 
as fertilizers, and clearing land not normally suitable for agriculture. 
Between 1961 and 1988, grain production expanded by 2.8 percent 
per year. 

However, while these increases in fertilizer use, irrigation, and elec- 
trification explain the past success of North Korean agriculture, they 
also explain the subsequent decline in the 1990s. Pursuit of food self- 
sufficiency led to a heavy reliance on chemicals and fertilizer. Overuse 
of the arable land led to acidification and erosion of the soil. Margin- 
ally productive areas increasingly were converted to farmland, and 
this practice led to flooding as the topsoil eroded and deforestation 
occurred (see The Physical Environment, ch. 2). According to UN 
agronomists, the soil deposition into the river system raised river bot- 
toms to such a degree that the rivers are no longer capable of absorb- 
ing the water from heavy rains or spring thaw. The annual flooding 
that occurs thus has become increasingly severe. Furthermore, fertil- 
izer use dropped dramatically in the 1990s as the North lost the ability 
to import fertilizers at friendship prices from China and the former 
Soviet Union. For example, although North Korea had used 319 kilo- 
grams of nitrogenous fertilizers per hectare in 1990, that amount had 
dropped to 35 kilograms per hectare by 1996. 

As a result of these problems, by the early 1990s the agricultural 
system was even less able to produce enough grains and other food- 
stuffs to feed the population. For example, in 1992 grain demand 



154 




Red Cross food aid at Haeju Port, South Hwanghae Province, January 2005 

Courtesy Ministry of Unification, Seoul 

exceeded supply by more than 1 million tons. Initially, North Korea 
drew down stockpiles and attempted other short-term measures, such 
as exhorting the citizens to eat only two meals a day. However, even 
before the ecological disruptions of the mid-1990s, the system had 
begun to collapse. 

Causes of the Famine 

The famine in the mid-1990s was a result of both systemic and 
proximate causes. By the early 1990s, there was clear evidence of a 
severe decline across the entire North Korean economy. Having lost 
the Soviet Union and China as major subsidy providers, the econ- 
omy began to falter. In particular, the loss of agricultural subsidies 
and fertilizer and energy imports from the Soviet Union and China 
had an immediate impact on agricultural output. 

The failure of collective farming was also a factor in the collapse of 
agricultural production. The main systemic problem in collectivized 
farming — as in all centralized economies — is the disparity between 



155 



North Korea: A Country Study 

effort and reward. In North Korea, farmers were paid on the basis of 
points for workdays, as well as political loyalty to the state. However, 
monitoring effort is difficult in dispersed agricultural settings, and 
often workers physically would be in the fields but make no serious 
effort at work. As long as the system was able to receive large amounts 
of inputs in the form of cheap fertilizer and capital equipment from its 
socialist allies, output could generally increase, even though the pro- 
ductivity of the individual workers was not improving and, in fact, 
probably decreasing. When the inputs began to decline in the early 
1990s, the system was unable to adjust accordingly. 

The proximate cause of the famine itself began with massive sum- 
mer floods in 1995 that destroyed that year's harvest. Floods in July 
and August that year inundated 400,000 hectares of arable land, dis- 
placed 500,000 people, and reduced grain production by 1.9 million 
tons, which was about 30 percent of the annual grain supply. Severe 
flooding continued in 1996 and was followed abruptly in 1997 by a 
severe drought. In 1997 North Korea's Central News Agency 
reported that large reservoirs were 10 to 20 percent below normal, 
and almost 620 smaller reservoirs were close to empty. Prolonged 
drought and light snowfall in the winter of 1997-98 led to another 
grain shortfall of 1.9 million tons. A chronic shortage of energy 
resources further compounded the situation. 

Effects of the Famine 

North Korea underwent a severe economic, environmental, and 
demographic crisis in the mid-1990s. However, the extent of that cri- 
sis is still unknown, because outside observers have not had good 
access to the most-affected areas in North Korea. In particular, there 
is considerable scholarly dispute over the actual number of deaths 
that occurred as a result of the famine. A bipartisan team of U.S. 
congressional staff members visited North Korea in August 1998 
and concluded that famine-related deaths amounted to 300,000 to 
800,000 annually. The famine was so severe that North Korea was 
forced to ask for international aid, for the first time allowing officials 
of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the FAO 
World Food Programme into every province in North Korea. 

Post-Famine Situation 

North Korea had its best harvest in a decade in 2004. Even so, the 
harvest was not enough to feed its people. A report by the FAO 
World Food Programme projected domestic cereals availability in 
2004-5 at 4.24 million tons, a 2.4 percent increase from the previous 
year. The 2004 rice paddy harvest was estimated at 2.4 million tons, 



156 



The Economy 



while corn output was unchanged at 1.7 million tons. The forecast 
need for the year 2004-5 was estimated at 5.1 million tons, leaving a 
gap of 900,000 tons. 

After the devastating famine of the mid-1990s, the agricultural 
sector began to stabilize in the early twenty-first century. Realisti- 
cally, however, North Korea will never be able to attain food self- 
sufficiency. Indeed, even South Korea has never been in that posi- 
tion. Under the best of conditions, self-sufficiency in agriculture is 
impossible for North Korea, and the current conditions are far from 
ideal. Although the agricultural sector has been partially privatized, 
the overuse of fertilizer and subsequent deforestation of arable land 
have ruined much of the potentially arable land for a generation to 
come. Furthermore, lacking a fully free market and access to capital 
and technology, the system has not come anywhere near efficiency, 
and there is little potential for reform in the near future. 

Economic Reforms 

By the 1980s, the inherent limitations of North Korea's centrally 
planned economy had begun to be reached, as demonstrated by the 
failure of the Second Seven- Year Plan (1978-84). Compounding this 
situation, the end of the Cold War and the loss of support from China 
and the Soviet Union in close succession, as well as the famine of 
the mid-1990s, combined to devastate the North Korean economy. In 
response, North Korea cautiously began to move toward what it 
called economic adjustments (the term reform would have suggested 
there had been something wrong with the state's economic system, 
but the leadership allowed that adjustments could be made). 
Although North Korea initially made mostly empty pronouncements 
about economic reform, more dramatic changes occurred in 2002. 

On July 1, 2002, North Korea significantly adjusted the public dis- 
tribution system that had been a major element of the centrally 
planned economy. North Korea adopted monetized economic transac- 
tions and changed the incentives for labor and companies. The nation 
also adopted a number of policies and strategies designed to increase 
foreign investment and trade. However, although the reforms were 
centrally planned and administered, they were not comprehensive. As 
a result, a multilayered and partly decentralized economy emerged, 
where prices were allowed to float and private ownership and markets 
were permitted, but the state still owned most of the major enterprises 
and still controlled workers in many other ways. The government pro- 
mulgated new laws that covered central planning, agriculture, mineral 
resources, and industrial sectors. Concurrently, there were new laws 
on stock, joint- stock companies, joint ventures with foreign firms, and 



157 



North Korea: A Country Study 

a number of other decrees that opened the economy to more foreign 
participation. Administrative and managerial responsibilities were del- 
egated from KWP officials to industrial and commercial managers. 
Assets in oil refining, mining, manufacturing, textiles, and food pro- 
cessing became subject to corporate ownership. 

The changes of 2002 were categorically different from those 
announced earlier. In July 2003, the former U.S. ambassador to 
South Korea, James Laney, and Jason Shaplen, a former adviser to 
KEDO, noted that, "In the two months prior to the October 2002 
HEU [highly enriched uranium] revelation, North Korea had, with 
remarkable speed, undertaken an important series of positive initia- 
tives that seemed the polar opposite of its posturing on the nuclear 
issue . . . [representing] the most promising signs of change on the 
peninsula in decades." 

These reforms affected the entire society, whereas previous reform 
efforts were partial, segmented, and largely restricted to peripheral 
sectors of the economy. The earlier reform efforts extended only to 
areas easily controlled by the regime, such as foreign direct invest- 
ment or special economic zones that could be cordoned off from North 
Korean society at large. The implication of wider reforms was that the 
regime was taking a much larger step — and having a greater impact on 
society — than before. It also meant that the regime was making a big- 
ger gamble, because the effects of the changes would be difficult to 
control. Although the partial reform efforts of 2002 may be too limited 
to bring about economic recovery, the effect on society is increasingly 
irreversible. Yet with much control remaining within the government, 
economic reform is still partial. North Korea is no longer a centrally 
planned economy, but the new institutions for "market socialism" are 
either nascent or nonexistent. 

There is considerable skepticism among foreign analysts as to 
whether these changes are genuine or simply a minimalist attempt by 
the regime to "muddle through." There is also skepticism as to 
whether any reform measures can actually make a difference in 
North Korea's economy. Some experts have argued that only com- 
plete and thorough political and economic change can generate sus- 
tainable economy activity. Others see more potential for success in 
the set of "China-style" reforms that North Korea has begun. 
Although the ultimate assessment of the reforms will only occur in 
the future, it is possible to conclude that they are significant, and cat- 
egorically different from the adjustments of the past. At the same 
time, because these developments are continuing to occur in the mid- 
20008, a comprehensive description of the reforms is also difficult, 
because government institutions, laws, and policies are changing 
rapidly. 



158 




Farmers at work in the rice paddy; the sign exhorts them to work "All 

together to the rice-planting battle!" 
Courtesy Korea Today (Pyongyang), May 1996, 11 

Reform of the Public Distribution System 

The most significant of the July 2002 central government set of 
economic reforms was the introduction of a pricing system whereby 
the market sets most prices. Except for crops, rationing was abol- 
ished, and goods are now traded using currency. Although prices 
continue to be administered, "by fiat, state prices are brought in line 
with prices observed in the markets." In addition, workers were 
given a one-time salary raise, with salaries increasing 10 to 40 times, 
depending on occupation, and prices surged 40 to 80 times. Workers 
previously had been paid regardless of performance. Under the new 
system, however, they earn according to how much they work, and 
those who do not work are not eligible for some services provided by 
the government. 

Rationing under the old public distribution system had largely 
collapsed in the mid-1990s as the economy went through severe 
shocks. The main feature of the system was food rationing, which 
applied to almost two-thirds of the citizenry. Industrial workers 
received the major portion of public distributions; state-farm and 
collective-farm workers received smaller distributions from the sys- 
tem, making up the difference from their own agricultural produc- 
tion. Although originally designed to provide each citizen with 
sufficient food rations, as the economy and in particular agricultural 



159 



North Korea: A Country Study 

production contracted, the rations were reduced initially from 600 to 
800 grams per day, depending on the type of labor involved, to 400 
or 450 grams per day by late 1999. Many people could not afford to 
buy enough extra food. 

In response to the breakdown of the public distribution system, 
small-scale markets began sprouting up all over North Korea. Although 
in 2000 the private sector was estimated to constitute less than 4 per- 
cent of the entire economy, the expansion of private markets was rapid. 
Experts suggest that the private markets generated as much as 25 per- 
cent of the food supply in 2004. Farmers' markets, long grudgingly 
accepted, became much more important to the entire economy. Thus, 
many of the acts undertaken by the central government in 2002 were 
actually merely an official sanction of events and changes that were 
already underway. 

At the same time, the government decentralized much of the eco- 
nomic decision-making authority to local representatives. Measures 
included cutting government subsidies, allowing farmers' markets to 
operate, and transferring managerial decisions for industry and agri- 
culture from the party and the central government (through factory 
party committees) into the hands of local production units. In theory, 
enterprises were required to cover their own costs, managers were 
forced to meet hard budget constraints, and evaluation of workers 
was no longer based on the number of days they showed up, but 
rather on productivity and profit. To what extent this reform has been 
realized in practice is not clear, although there were reports in 2004 
and 2005 that the system was beginning to function as expected. 
State-owned enterprises were allowed to trade part of their produc- 
tion and materials in a new "socialist goods trading market," to 
export their products themselves, and to earn the capital necessary 
for their operation to function. State-owned enterprises also were 
allowed to restructure their operations as they saw fit. Farmers were 
given the right to make decisions on how to cultivate their land, with 
the government retaining ownership of the land. 

In order to participate in the private sector, households began to 
keep foreign currency. In 2000 the Bank of Korea in Seoul estimated 
that North Korean households held approximately US$964 million 
in total foreign currency, with the average household holding the 
equivalent of US$186. This practice not only put the North Korean 
households firmly in the marketplace but also took money away 
from private savings accounts denominated in won (for value of the 
won — see Glossary), thus affecting the central government's ability 
to direct lending and projects. Of the foreign currency, more than 60 
percent was in U.S. dollars, with the remainder in Chinese renminbi 
or Japanese yen. North Koreans' need for foreign currency initially 



160 



The Economy 



was largely a result of the breakdown of rationing that occurred after 
1995, which forced citizens to move into the black market in search 
of food and other goods. Black-market operators refused to take 
North Korean won and demanded hard currency. 

Information about the pace and extent of the market reforms is 
sketchy, because North Korea has not opened its economy to full 
international participation or scrutiny. However, anecdotal evidence 
abounds that notable change has taken place. A microbrewery 
opened in Pyongyang's Yanggakdo Hotel in 2002, 11 restaurants 
selling goat delicacies had opened in P'yongyang by 2004, and the 
capital has a "food street" lined with restaurants that cater to the 
well-off and to foreigners. Visitors to P'yongyang in 2004 reported 
that more than 35 distinct markets were in operation, the best known 
being the Tongil Market in the downtown area. These market opera- 
tions are not privately owned — usually they are run by a work 
unit — but they are profit generating, according to Nicholas Bonner 
of Koryo Tours, a company that specializes in travel tours to North 
Korea. Estimates suggest that there might be as many as 400 markets 
throughout in the country. 

It seems increasingly clear that the centrally planned economy had 
to be abandoned— that the decision was less one of choice than of 
necessity. Chosun Ilbo reported from Seoul on December 9, 2002, 
that the North Korean regime was forced to lift a ban on private busi- 
nesses because "popular disaffection was about to explode." Former 
World Bank economist Bradley Babson notes that "small family busi- 
nesses of 3-5 workers are expanding with official recognition, pro- 
ducing a variety of hand-made products for sale in local markets." 

Since July 2002, North Korea has continued to modify the wage 
and price structures. In March 2003, the government allowed mer- 
chants to sell not only farm products but also manufactured goods 
and other commodities and permitted manufacturers to sell directly 
to the market. On November 23, 2003, the regime charged industrial 
conglomerates with responsibility for investments in their own facil- 
ities. In the past, all facility investments had been made by the state. 
This change means that manufacturers are now responsible for 
replacing their own facilities. 

In 2004 the central government reduced the minimum wage paid to 
employees of foreign companies from US$80 or US$90 per month to 
US$38 per month. Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Kim Yong-sun said 
that "We have recently drastically reduced the minimum wage to 30 
Euros [US$38] ... in the past, we only allowed foreign companies 
entry into specialized economic zones, but now we will allow them to 
set up in other places around the North. If [a company] wishes to par- 
ticipate in the development of the mineral industry in the North, we 



161 



North Korea: A Country Study 

can grant rights, and the same goes for establishing a bank. We are tak- 
ing a series of steps to lessen investment restrictions in each industry." 

Although the enterprises remain under the control of the state, and 
although salaries in many sectors are still dictated by the govern- 
ment, it is clear that the introduction of limited supply and demand 
has generated an increase in market activity in North Korea. 

Banking and Finance 

The financial system of North Korea remained almost entirely 
state controlled in 2002; however, the government began to imple- 
ment change in this sector, as well. In the past, some foreign banks 
had been allowed to form businesses in North Korea. For example, 
in 1995 the Dutch bank ING signed a joint- venture agreement with 
the North Korean Foreign Insurance Company, establishing an 
investment bank in North Korea that was 70 percent owned by ING. 
This was the first Western bank in North Korea, although ING later 
pulled out. In the wake of the 2002 reforms, Daesong Bank of North 
Korea announced a relationship with Sberbank of Russia in Novem- 
ber 2004, designed to increase the ease with which customers of both 
banks could transfer foreign currency and make payments. Addition- 
ally, in July 2004 North Korea began, with an Australian firm, a joint 
venture called Korea Maranatha Enterprise Development Limited. 
The venture was owned equally by North Korea's Ministry of 
Finance and the Maranatha Trust of Australia, with the goal of lend- 
ing small amounts of money to North Korean enterprises in a bid to 
develop the country's small and medium-sized businesses. Officials 
of Korea Maranatha described the operation as a pilot program, said 
that the entity began operations with two clients, and hoped to 
increase its operations if the venture proved successful. 

Beginning in February 2002, North Korea also devalued the won 
relative to the dollar. During the 1 990s, North Korea had maintained 
an obviously overvalued rate of 2.15 won to the U.S. dollar. In Feb- 
ruary 2003, the black-market rate went from 200 won per dollar to 
400 won per dollar, and by November 2003 the won was exchanging 
at 1,000 won per dollar. In September 2004, the official exchange 
rate was 1 60 won to the euro (the currency adopted by North Korea 
in December 2002 for foreign-exchange transactions). However, the 
black-market exchange rate was 10 times that amount (see Assess- 
ment of the Economic Reforms, this ch.). 

Another aspect of the new financial changes was the issue of pub- 
lic bonds to North Korea's citizens. In 2003 the North Korean gov- 
ernment floated bonds for the first time since the start of the Korean 
War in 1950. On March 26, 2003, the minister of finance announced 



162 



The P 'yongyang Silk Mill, P 'ydngyang 
Courtesy Korea Today (P 'ydngyang), January 1997, 6 

that P' yongyang would borrow money from the public by issuing 
bonds. The bonds, floated on May 1, 2003, had a maturity date of 
April 30, 2013, in denominations of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 won. The 
bonds carried no interest rate and were redeemable in installments 
starting in December 2008, but if their holders drew lucky numbers 
in lotteries to be held once every six months, they would receive an 
unspecified "prize." 

Some observers believe that the bond program is a positive step as 
a fiscal policy improvement measure that brings North Korea further 
into the modern world. Others believe it will only add to the burdens 
of workers and laborers and was designed by the government to 
increase its budget by using surplus money that currently resides in 
the hands of citizens. 

Although there has been some reform in the financial sector in the 
first years of the century, on the whole the financial system remains 
tightly controlled. The government has made little effort to establish 
a viable financial capital market, and, as of 2007, there were no inde- 
pendent financial institutions and no appreciable bond market other 
than the unusual system P' yongyang had set up. 

Legal and Administrative Reforms 

In addition to changes to the centrally planned economy itself, the 
government changed a number of laws and amended the constitution 



163 



North Korea: A Country Study 

to provide a legal framework for domestic economic reform and to 
increase foreign trade and investment. A major element of those 
legal changes were the constitutional revisions of September 1998, 
which formally permitted private ownership of assets, provided a 
more clearly delineated basis for foreign investment and trade, and 
established the Cabinet of Ministers, composed mainly of the heads 
of economic ministries. Concurrently, the administrative reform of 
September 1998 aimed to reduce government expenditures and 
increase government efficiency through greater consolidation of 
functionally related bureaucracies at the center, and through delega- 
tion of responsibilities to local units. This reform had the result of 
decreasing central control over local administrative authorities. 

Although there has been foreign investment in North Korea since 
the 1970s, a relatively major effort to open the North to the interna- 
tional economy has occurred only since the mid-1990s. There were 
11 constitutional amendments relating to foreign investment in 1998 
alone. In 1999 the government amended joint-production and joint- 
venture laws to allow for projects outside the Najin-Sonbong Inter- 
national Trade Zone. Until that time, 100 percent foreign-owned 
investment enterprises were allowed to set up businesses only in the 
Najin-Sonbong zone. The government continues to establish the 
legal foundations that permit and regulate international investment. 
The Processing Trade Law, Lock Gate Law, and Copyright Law 
came into effect in April 2001 to expand the scope of foreign trade. 
These measures regulate which sectors are open to foreign invest- 
ment and in which sectors foreign firms may own 1 00 percent of the 
capital, with protection from nationalization and guarantees of the 
right to lease and use land for up to 50 years and of tax and tariff 
preferences. 

As part of the July 1, 2002, reforms, the KWP formally abandoned 
the Taean Work System and introduced a new economic-management 
system. The new system turned over to the manager responsibility for 
running a factory and reduced the political and economic role of the 
factory party secretary. It tasked the manager with running the factory 
on a self-accounting system and changed the wage system. In the new 
system, salaries for workers were raised, and merit pay was intro- 
duced to reward those who work harder or more efficiently. However, 
the factory party committee is still the formal leadership of the fac- 
tory, and the party secretary retains the chairmanship of the commit- 
tee, which continues to provide the secretary with the opportunity to 
wield power in the factory. Thus, although nominally the power of 
the KWP was reduced and the actual manager's power was increased, 
it is not clear how dramatic this shift is in practice. 



164 



The Economy 



North Korea set up the External Economic Legal Advice Office in 
June 1999 in order to settle legal issues with regard to international 
investment and trade relations. In August 2004, the North also allowed 
the establishment of the country's first private law firm, as part of its 
efforts to attract international investors. Hay, Kalb Associates, a Brit- 
ish-owned firm, opened a joint- venture company employing a dozen 
local lawyers with offices on Kim II Sung Square on August 15, 2004. 

In a revision of its criminal law on April 29, 2004, North Korea 
changed and strengthened legal measures to protect private property 
while stiffening penalties for antistate crimes. The revision, the fifth 
since 1950, reflects Pyongyang's ambition to achieve two goals at 
the same time: safeguarding its regime and boosting its impover- 
ished economy. The law introduced lengthy new provisions regard- 
ing the principle of legality and classified in detail previously 
obscure provisions regarding private ownership. The number of arti- 
cles dealing with economic crimes increased from 18 to 74. These 
articles cover such issues as provisions punishing foreign investors 
for tax evasion, infringement of trademark rights, illegal commercial 
transactions, and violation of import and export orders. 

In December 2004, North Korea announced a real estate law that 
gave individuals some rights to sell their houses at will in the first 
half of 2005. Because the number of illegal house trades among indi- 
viduals increased after the "economic adjustment policy" in July 
2002, regulating the trade gave the government some control over 
such activities. 

Many of the legal and administrative changes since 1998 were 
designed to clarify and further strengthen the rights and responsibili- 
ties of foreign firms in North Korea. Other changes covered the 
organization and control of domestic economic activity. Because so 
many of the laws have been enacted relatively recently, it is unclear 
how they will operate in practice and how vigorously the govern- 
ment will enforce and implement them. 

Special Economic Zones 

A major element of North Korea's reform was the development of 
special economic zones. These zones vary in their particulars, but all 
were established with special tax and tariff incentives for foreigners, 
with the aim of attracting investment and foreign exchange, spurring 
employment, and boosting the local development of improved tech- 
nologies and infrastructure through greater interaction with foreign 
firms. North Korea has established four such zones. The first of 
these areas was the Najin-Sonbong International Trade Zone, estab- 
lished in 1991 and located in territory carved out of the northeast 



165 



North Korea: A Country Study 





— International boundary 




mxn Demarcation line and 




demilitarized zone 


® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 





20 40 60 Kilometers 





20 40 60 Miles 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



CHINA 



A 



/ : .fius 

t 

Sonbong ^--A 
f Najinfif 

J- NAJIN-SONBONG 
INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE ZONE 




Sea of 
Japan 
fEast Sea) 



yzliov) Sea 
(West Sea) 



SOUTH 
KOREA 



Figure 9. Special Economic Zones, 2006 



province of North Hamgyong, near the border with Russia. By the 
early twenty-first century, three more regions had been added: the 
Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, in North P'yongan Province, 
along the border with China on the Yellow Sea (or, as Koreans pre- 
fer, the West Sea) was established in 2001; the Mount Kumgang 
Tourist Zone, in Kangwon Province, in the southeast coastal area 
along the DMZ, was established in 1998; and the Kaesong Special 
Industrial Zone, in the city of Kaesong (formerly Kaesong Prov- 
ince), within sight of the DMZ near P'anmunjom, was established in 
2002 (see fig. 9). 



166 



The Economy 



Like most other policies undertaken by the North Korean regime, 
the zones show slow and halting progress. The Najin-Sonbong zone 
has had a mixed history: by the end of 1999, total foreign investment 
was estimated at US$125 million, almost half of which came from 
the Emperor Group of Hong Kong for its construction of a hotel and 
casino. However, with help from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), in late 1998 North Korea opened its own busi- 
ness school in the zone, the Najin Business Institute, along with a 
business information center. 

In January 2001, the government announced the establishment of 
a large special economic zone in the city of Sinuiju, located on the 
Amnok River (known as the Yalu in China) border with China and 
intended to encompass 128 square kilometers. As planned, the 
Sinuiju region would allow foreign currencies to be used and was 
designed to take advantage of the restored railroad link between 
North Korea and South Korea. Sinuiju reportedly was given 50 years 
of independent authority in almost all political and economic 
aspects, including legislation, administration, and judicial power. 
P'yongyang claimed that it would not interfere except to handle 
diplomacy and national defense issues. Sinuiju was even to be given 
the right to issue visas independently. A Chinese businessman, Yang 
Bin, originally was put in charge of the zone, although Yang's legal 
complications with the Chinese government over unrelated business 
activities in China sidetracked his appointment. Sinuiju has made lit- 
tle progress, in large part as a result of difficulties over its adminis- 
tration and leadership. However, it is important to note that it was the 
Chinese who held up progress, not North Korean mismanagement. 

Since its opening in 1998, the Mount Kumgang Tourism Zone has 
shown more success. In accordance with an agreement signed 
between the Hyundai Group in South Korea and the North Korean 
government, the Mount Kumgang zone allows South Korean cruise- 
ship passengers to take tours of Mount Kumgang, one of Korea's 
most famous and beautiful mountains. Hyundai Asan started the 
three-day packages to Mount Kumgang in 1998 using a sea route, 
and an overland route has been available since September 2003. On 
July 3, 2004, a one-day trip to the mountain became possible as the 
two Koreas agreed to extend the hours during which visitors may 
pass through the DMZ. The total number of visitors to the Mount 
Kumgang zone reached 800,000 by the start of 2005. 

A fourth zone, in Kaesong, a historical capital of Korea, was 
established in 2002 and began operations in 2004; it has been more 
successful. The Kaesong Special Industrial Zone is mainly a North 
Korean-South Korean joint venture (see Kaesong Industrial Venture, 
this ch.). 



167 




168 




Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone, 2006 
Courtesy Munhwasarangbang Company, Seoul 



169 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Top-Down Reform Measures 

In assessing the reforms, an important point to be made about 
North Korea's economic policy is that the reform measures were 
centrally planned and top-down, and thus the measures enjoyed the 
support of the highest political levels in North Korea. For example, 
Kim Jong II himself was quoted as saying, "Things are not what they 
used to be in the 1960s. So no one should follow the way people 
used to do things in the past.... We should make constant efforts to 
renew the landscape and replace the one which was formed in the 
past, to meet the requirements of a new era." This reform initiative 
was a gamble for Kim because it also meant that he risked being per- 
sonally connected to its failure. 

An article in the semi-official English-language People s Korea in 
2002 reflected this attitude. It said, "these measures, effective July 1, 
are intended to comprehensively improve the people's living standard 
based on the new economic policy mapped out by General Secretary 
Kim Jong II to build an economically powerful nation." The article 
continued, "the recent series of economic measures came in line with 
General Secretary Kim Jong IPs new economic policy, whose essence 
is that the basic method of socialist economic management is to gain 
maximum profits while adhering to socialist principles." 

In addition, the regime emphasized that the reforms were a grad- 
ual and long-term process, writing that: "it was in the year 2000 that 
this new economic policy of Kim Jong II began to be put into prac- 
tice in earnest on a national scale. It contained the strengthening of 
the cabinet's role as the headquarters of the national economy, the 
transfer of authority of economic planning to each leading economic 
organ at all levels, the rational reorganization of factories and enter- 
prises and the improvement of their management; and the differenti- 
ation and specialization of production." Choe Hong-kyu, a bureau 
director in the State Planning Commission, was quoted in People s 
Korea as saying: "Kim Jong II stresses that all the outworn and dog- 
matic 'Soviet-type' patterns and customs should be renounced in the 
fields of economic planning, financing, and labor management ... he 
also points to the fact that foreign trade should be conducted in 
accordance with the mechanism and principles of capitalism." 

These official pronouncements by the leadership echoed the 
increasingly open admission that society was changing in response 
to the economic difficulties that North Korea was experiencing. On 
August 1, 2002, Supreme People's Assembly president Kim Yong- 
nam said: "We are directing our whole efforts to restructure our eco- 
nomic base to be in line with the information technology revolution 
... we are reforming the economic system on the principle of profit- 
ability." 



170 



The Economy 



There is further evidence of the explicit consent of the top leader- 
ship. The 2003 New Year's Day editorials in Nodong Shinmun 
(Workers' Daily) cited "new measures for economic management," 
and noted that "it is urgent to improve economic management and 
rapidly develop science and technology: we should manage and 
operate the economy in such a way as to ensure the largest profitabil- 
ity while firmly adhering to socialist principles." Minister of Finance 
Mun Il-bong gave a speech on March 26, 2003, saying that "in all 
institutions and enterprises a system of calculation based on money 
will have to be correctly installed, production and financial account- 
ing systems be strengthened, production and management activities 
be carried out thoroughly by calculating the actual profits." Thus, the 
government has attempted to retain control of the system, while at 
the same time recognizing the need to make changes in its economic 
practices. 

Assessment of the Economic Reforms 

Since the formal abrogation of the centrally planned economy in 
July 2002, most anecdotal reports indicate that the markets — after 
experiencing an initial and significant surge in prices — have contin- 
ued to function relatively normally. There was no widespread chaos, 
farmers' markets moved to fill the void in supplies caused by ration- 
ing, and the population appeared to have adjusted to the changing 
circumstances. The economic reforms tested the government's abil- 
ity to deal with inflation, troubled enterprises, and the urban poor 
created by the monetization of the economy. Low supply and low 
output have led to massive increases in prices and further devalua- 
tion of the won. 

The FAO's World Food Programme estimated that the price of rice 
and corn rationed through the public distribution system remained 
low and stable, 44 won and 24 won per kilogram, respectively. Yet 
prices at the private markets were much higher. The nominal price of 
rice increased 550 percent, and perhaps even more. In November 
2004, the price of rice was 600 won per kilogram, almost 30 percent 
of a typical monthly wage. Corn was 320 won per kilogram. In the 
months following the introduction of price reforms, there was rapid 
inflation. 

By comparison, in 1979 China's initial price reforms drove up the 
price of rice by 25 percent. In North Korea, prices have gone up by 
at least 600 percent, and the won has depreciated from the official 
exchange rate of 150 won to US$1 in 2002 to at least 1,000 won, 
with some estimating the black-market values at between 2,500 and 
3,000 won to the dollar in 2006. The reforms probably enabled Kim 
Jong II to gain some measure of control of the economy by hurting 



171 



North Korea: A Country Study 

those black marketeers who held large amounts of won before the 
currency devaluation, because the value of their won holdings plum- 
meted with the devaluation against the dollar. However, fixed- 
income workers also were badly affected by the rise in prices. In 
addition, many workers were laid off by companies forced to cut 
costs. Finally, fragmentary evidence suggests that even those sectors 
of the labor force favored with the largest wage hikes (6,000 won) 
were discontented. Defectors crossing into China complained that 
the promise of higher wages had not been kept, with workers receiv- 
ing only an additional 800 won and then nothing extra after October 
2003. This failure may have created a new class of urban poor that 
could be difficult to control in the future, although there is only lim- 
ited evidence of any unrest. 

The regime has made major changes in the way in which the 
economy functions. Undoubtedly these changes have been designed 
by Kim Jong II and the ruling regime to retain control while dealing 
with the undeniable economic problems in the country. However, the 
changes have created confusion and perhaps even chaos. While there 
is considerable disagreement among observers as to what the actual 
motivations of the regime are, and also skepticism as to whether the 
reforms can work, the point remains that the changes affect the entire 
society and are thus politically consequential. 

The evidence points to the conclusion that North Korea's eco- 
nomic reforms are cautious and tentative, not wholesale. They also 
are clumsy. Inflation is rampant, but production has not been freed to 
respond accordingly. A North Korean opening up will not foster the 
kind of immediate wholesale rhetorical and practical changes that 
the United States apparently expects. Examining the reforms, econo- 
mist Marcus Noland wrote in 2003: "It is not at all clear that the cur- 
rent leadership is willing to countenance the erosion of state control 
that would accompany the degree of marketization necessary to revi- 
talize the economy." 

Indeed, it is unclear whether any reform measures can actually 
make much of a difference in North Korea's economy. Nevertheless, 
these reforms are significant, and, more importantly, they will be 
extremely difficult to reverse. It is one thing to declare a special eco- 
nomic zone in the northeastern region of Najin-Sonbong and far 
more significant to affect the daily lives of every citizen by introduc- 
ing market reforms. Willingly or unwillingly, the Kim Jong II regime 
has started down a path that is difficult to reverse and also holds the 
potential to spark real change in North Korea. 



172 



The Economy 



Foreign Economic Relations 

In addition to domestic economic reforms that began in 2002, 
North Korea has become increasingly open to a foreign presence. 
The legal and constitutional changes that the regime has made since 
1998 provide a more clearly delineated framework for foreign trade 
and investment in North Korea. By 2005 overall levels of trade had 
surpassed those of 1991 (when trade was US$2.5 billion), as the 
upward trend continued from a nadir in 1998 (when trade decreased 
to US$1.4 billion). Total foreign trade for 2005 was around US$4 
billion, or around 10 percent of GDP. 

The regime also began to take small and tentative steps aimed at 
exposing North Korean bureaucrats to how market capitalism func- 
tions in practice. Because government bureaucrats have been trained 
entirely in a system of central planning, they lack the basic knowl- 
edge about how markets function and how to operate in such an 
environment. Beginning in 2001, former military officers were 
assigned as directors of factories and enterprises, in an apparent 
attempt to transform them from military elites into economic elites. 
There is skepticism on this point, with some observers seeing this 
action as an attempt by the military to increase its control over the 
economy. Even if this assumption were true, however, the result is 
that the military itself is becoming more involved in the daily func- 
tioning of economic matters. 

Political scientist Park Kyung-ae notes that nongovernmental 
contacts between North Korea and various foreign nations increased 
significantly in the late 1990s. For example, two North Korean med- 
ical and energy delegations visited the United States in 1999, and 
other visits to the United States in 1998 included economic delega- 
tions that focused on poultry, academic exchanges, and energy. In 
2001 more than 480 North Koreans visited Australia, China, Italy, 
and Sweden for training programs in finance, trade, and accounting. 
Other groups of officials have studied in Canada, Mexico, the Philip- 
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. By far, the most delegations have 
traveled to China, although industrial management training also has 
occurred in India and Malaysia. In Europe, North Koreans have 
studied medical techniques in Switzerland, and agricultural and cul- 
tural groups have visited Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 

In the wake of the agricultural and economic troubles of the 
1990s, North Korea also has depended heavily on foreign aid. From 
1995 to 2000, North Korea received more than US$2 billion in aid 
from other nations and international organizations. The bulk of this 
aid was from South Korea and covered projects such as the Mount 



173 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Kumgang zone, the 1994 Agreed Framework, and food and medical 
aid for famine victims. 

Despite political troubles with the North, the United States also 
has been a major donor to North Korea for humanitarian reasons. 
Between 1995 and 2003, the United States contributed US$615 mil- 
lion in food aid and US$5 million in medical assistance. The U.S. 
contribution to KEDO amounted to more than US$400 million 
before all work on the KEDO project was stopped in 2004. 

Although North Korea remains a very closed and isolated country, 
there has been considerable opening in foreign economic policy 
since the late 1990s. Mostly because of economic stagnation earlier 
in the decade, the North also has been far more open to international 
aid donors. As a result of this opening, foreign firms had achieved 
more penetration into North Korea in the early twenty-first century 
than at any time since the Korean War. 

North-South Relations 

Sunshine Policy and New Economic Development 

South Korea is clearly the country that has most vigorously pur- 
sued attempts to engage North Korea economically. In 1998 South 
Korean president Kim Dae Jung developed the Sunshine Policy, 
whereby South Korea abandoned its long-standing policy of hostility 
to the North and instead began to follow a path designed to engage 
the North through economic and cultural contacts. The change in 
strategy has proved popular in the South. Roh Moo Hyun won the 
2002 presidential election by a resounding 49 percent to 40 percent 
over competitor Lee Hoi Chang, based largely on Ron's campaign 
promise to continue the Sunshine Policy. 

Following the shift to the Sunshine Policy, South Korea rapidly 
increased its contacts with the North: North-South merchandise 
trade increased 50 percent from 2001 to 2002, to US$641.7 million. 
The following year, trade between North Korea and South Korea 
rose 13 percent, to US$724.2 million. 

South Korean conglomerates rapidly expanded their activities in 
the North with the official approval of both South Korean and North 
Korean governments. In 2002 permission was granted to 39 South 
Korean firms to establish cooperative partnership arrangements with 
North Korea. In 2005 Samsung successfully negotiated with the 
North Korean government to place its logo in P'yongyang and had 
begun exporting consumer electronics from its electronic industrial 
complex of more than 1.6 million square meters in factories in the 
North. LG Corporation has been manufacturing televisions in North 



174 



The port of Namp 'o, South P 'ydngan Province 
Courtesy Korea Today (Pyongyang), January 1997, 6 

Korea since 1996. By 2004, there were more than 1,000 South Kore- 
ans living and working in North Korea, and the port of Namp' o had 
180 South Korean companies. 

By the end of 2004, more than 400 South Korean companies had 
set up offices in Yanji, a city in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous 
Prefecture in China's Jilin Province, close to its border with North 
Korea. These firms have invested a total of US$161.8 million, the 
greatest amount of all the foreign investors. Indications are that the 
South Korean investments will keep growing. Of these companies, 
about 40 already have moved into North Korea's Sonbong and Najin 
development districts, establishing food, cigarette, and garment fac- 
tories. The garment factories alone were employing 20,000 North 
Koreans in 2005. In addition, many other companies are pursuing 
joint ventures in transportation, wood processing, cultivation of 
marine products, agricultural development, restaurants, trade, and 
tourism. 

Cooperation also increased rapidly between the two Korean gov- 
ernments in the early 2000s. In November 2004, the Korea 
Resources Corporation, a quasigovernmental organization in South 
Korea, announced that it would open a liaison office in North Korea. 
Park Yang-soo, president of the corporation, said that in order "to 
cooperate on economic development between South Korea and 
North Korea, our state-run corporation plans to set up a liaison office 



175 



North Korea: A Country Study 

or branch office for raw materials in P'yongyang next year." South 
Korea had never had a liaison office in the North, and at the time of 
Park's announcement, South Korea and North Korea technically 
were still at war The goal of the liaison office is to exploit mineral 
deposits in the North, beginning with an annual goal of exporting 
10,000 to 12,000 tons of graphite to the South. As of late 2007, the 
opening of the office was on hold. 

More than 200,000 South Koreans visited North Korea in 2003-4. 
The number of South Korean visitors to the North, excluding South 
Korean tourists to the Mount Kumgang resort, has experienced 
yearly increases of 20 percent since 2000. 

Another governmental project was the plan to reconnect the 
Kyongui Railroad — a connection between North Korea and South 
Korea through the DMZ, which had been severed since the Korean 
War. This railroad will connect the entire Korean Peninsula to Chinese 
and Russian railroad networks that, in turn, connect to cities in China 
and European Russia. The economic and political implications of the 
railroad reconnection are potentially fairly large, because it would 
allow shipment of goods from Japan and South Korea to Europe via 
North Korea. It also could be a conduit for further trade and invest- 
ment in the region. The Korea Transport Institute estimates that earn- 
ings could be significant within three years of completion of the 
railroad, perhaps up to US$149 million in fees annually. 

The Kyongui Railroad also is significant in political terms. Even 
during the 2002 United States-North Korea standoff, North Korea 
and South Korea continued to work toward reconnecting the 
Kyongui Railroad. The railroad has required clearing a section of the 
DMZ of land mines. In order to actually clear the DMZ, military 
meetings were required, and the fact that both militaries were able to 
agree is a significant step in the reduction of tension on the penin- 
sula. Work on the line continued throughout the crisis of 2002. The 
land mines were cleared by December 2002, and the laying of rail- 
road track was completed. Construction work was completed in 
2006. 

Kaesong Industrial Venture 

The major venture between North and South is the establishment 
of a special economic zone and industrial district just north of the 
DMZ in the ancient capital city of Kaesong. Planned to use South 
Korean capital and North Korean labor, the zone includes a railroad 
and a highway that connect North and South through the DMZ. 
Hyundai Asan of South Korea and the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee 
of the North struck a deal in August 2000 to develop an industrial 



176 



Workers sorting and weighing new prescription drugs at a 
Sariwon pharmaceutical factory, North Hwanghae Province 
Courtesy Choson (P yongyang), December 2005, 32 

park. The Land Corporation, a South Korean state-invested corpora- 
tion, contracted with the North for a 50-year lease of the area, and the 
North provided South Korean businesses favorable tax rates and cur- 
rency-exchange conditions in return. The two Koreas broke ground 
on the first phase of development on June 30, 2003, a ceremony to 
mark the inauguration of the Kaesong Special Industrial Zone Man- 
agement Committee and start the construction of enterprises to oper- 
ate in the zone was held in Kaesong in October 2004, and the entire 
park was expected to be completed by 2007. When finished, the park 
will cover 66 square kilometers and might eventually employ 
100,000 North Koreans and 150,000 South Koreans. The potential 
value of products produced in Kaesong could reach US$21 billion per 
year, according to the Federation of Korean Industries. 

On December 1 , 2004, the highway through the DMZ to Kaesong 
was officially opened. After completion of the 4.2 kilometer-long 
highway crossing the Demarcation Line (see Glossary) that divides 
the DMZ up to the Tongil Tower and connecting the two Koreas, the 
road officially opened as the Main East Sea Road. The railroad con- 
necting Kaesong to the South was also completed in June 2003, nine 
months after beginning work clearing land mines in the DMZ. In 
December 2004, the North and the South also reached an agreement 
on the supply of electric power to the Kaesong Special Industrial 
Zone, according to the Korea Electric Power Corporation. Under the 



177 



North Korea: A Country Study 

agreement, the South began transferring electric power to the North 
in January 2005, marking the first time electricity has been trans- 
ferred across the DMZ since the Korean War broke out in 1950. The 
South Korean government said it would seek provisions in future 
free-trade talks that will permit preferential duties for products from 
the Kaesong zone so that they will be treated as if they had been pro- 
duced in the South. 

North Korean-made iron kitchen pots began to appear in depart- 
ment stores in Seoul in December 2004, as the first products of an 
inter-Korean joint economic project to become available in the 
South. The South Korean manufacturing company, LivingArt, is one 
of 15 companies from South Korea that have begun to produce in 
Kaesong's pilot area of nearly 100,000 square meters. Such was the 
excitement in South Korea that the first set of 1 ,000 pots sold out in 
the first day. Wood Bank, South Korea's second-largest lender, 
opened a branch in Kaesong in December 2004. 

The Economy in Transition 

North Korea's economy is in transition. The old, centrally 
planned economy has essentially been abandoned, but a full embrace 
of market capitalism has not yet occurred. Some 15 years after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea continues to survive, stum- 
bling along with an economy that is barely functional. The North has 
endured far longer than most observers expected, and although it is 
tempting to predict that the regime — and the economy — will col- 
lapse in the near future, prudence cautions against any predictions 
about prospects. Market signals are beginning to pervade the econ- 
omy, and more information from the outside world is beginning to 
penetrate the country. Ultimately, this development will have a trans- 
formative effect in North Korea. How soon this transformation will 
occur is far less certain. 



* * * 

The economy of North Korea is in tremendous flux, and new 
sources of information are constantly appearing. The South Korean 
Ministry of Unification has an excellent English-language Web site 
(http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/), and both the Korean and English 
sites have detailed and comprehensive information that is consistently 
the most up-to-date available. The Nautilus Institute of Berkeley, Cali- 
fornia, has an informative Web site (http://www.nautilus.org/) that 
includes briefings, policy papers, and data on all aspects of North 



178 



The Economy 



Korea, including extensive discussion of the economic reforms. South 
Korea's Naewoe Press publishes a monthly review of North Korea 
called Vantage Point that incorporates the best English- and Korean- 
language information available. The Economist Intelligence Unit 
offers reliable economic data on North Korea through its quarterly 
Country Report: North Korea. 

The Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) of the DPRK has a 
Web site that contains its current and past news releases (http:// 
www.kcna.co.jp/). Among other North Korean sources that consis- 
tently contain economic topics are Choson chungang yon 'gam 
(Korean Central Yearbook), an annual with sections on the economy 
and other related topics; Kulloja (The Worker), a monthly journal of 
the KWP Central Committee; Nodong Shinmun (Workers' Daily), 
the KWP's daily newspaper; and Foreign Trade of the Democratic 
People s Republic of Korea and Korea Today, monthly English-lan- 
guage periodicals. 

Other South Korean research institutes that have extensive schol- 
arly publications on North Korea are the Korea Institute of National 
Unification (www.kinu.or.kr), the Sejong Institute (www.sejong.org), 
and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (www.ifans. 
go.kr). The most useful Japanese source is Kita Chosen no keizai to 
bdeki no tenbo (North Korean Economic and Trade Prospects), an 
annual published by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) 
that contains up-to-date surveys of the economy and statistical data on 
trade. Another informative Japanese source is the monthly periodical 
Kita Chosen kenkyu (Studies on North Korea). 

Other valuable sources in English are the January-February issue 
of Asian Survey, which carries the annual survey on North Korea; the 
United Nations' International Trade Statistics Yearbook; the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook; 
and the U.S. Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service) translations of North Korean broadcasts avail- 
able via the U.S. National Technical Information Service's World 
News Connection (http://wnc.fedworld.gov/). (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



179 



Three strong arms—from top: the farmer, the party intellectual, and the 
worker — grasping the pole of the Korean Workers ' Party flag with the 
three-part symbol of the hammer, writing brush, and sickle. The caption at 
the bottom reads: "Party s leadership means our life "; the inscription at 
top reads: "Victory if protected, death if abandoned. " 
Courtesy Choson Yaesul (Pyongyang), January 1996, 66 



THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK), 
or North Korea, was founded on September 9, 1948. Its claim to sov- 
ereignty was facilitated by the World War II Allied powers' defeat of 
imperial Japan in 1945, ending Japan's 35-year occupation of the 
Korean Peninsula, and was the direct result of failed attempts at trust- 
eeship models and later of failed United Nations (UN)-administered 
elections in 1948 to unify the two occupation zones. The North was 
under the sway of the Soviet Union while the South was under U.S. 
control. UN-administered elections — impeded by the Soviets in the 
North — were held only in the South on May 10, 1948, leading to the 
establishment in August of that year of the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea). 

North Korea is one of modern history's few truly Orwellian and 
nepotistic systems. The first leader of North Korea, Kim II Sung, 
was born in 1912. He served as an officer in the Soviet army and was 
an anti- Japanese guerrilla fighter in Manchuria in the 1930s, before 
returning to North Korea in September 1945, whereupon Soviet 
authorities anointed him as leader. Kim had taken a position of 
power in 1946, soon holding absolute, solipsistic control as general 
secretary of the North's communist Korean Workers' Party (KWP) 
and president of the state until July 8, 1994, when his sudden death 
led to the ascension of his son Kim Jong II as the next leader. Born 
on February 16, 1941 (although, since 1982 his official birth date has 
been February 16, 1942, to match it symbolically with Kim II Sung's 
birthday, which was April 15, 1912), and groomed since the early 
1970s as the heir apparent, Kim Jong II was given positions of 
increasing importance in the KWP hierarchy throughout the 1980s. 
At the KWP's Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, Kim Jong IPs 
succession was consolidated with his phased assumption of control 
over the civil administration, followed by his designation as supreme 
commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in December 1991. 
His assumption of rule was formalized in September 1998, presum- 
ably after the official period of mourning for Kim II Sung had ended. 
Kim Jong II rules the country as supreme commander of the military 
and as chairman of the National Defense Commission. The formal 
position of president remains held posthumously by his father. 

The cult of personality and the nepotism of the Kim family consti- 
tute unique features of North Korean politics. In the past, for exam- 
ple, Kim II Sung's wife, Kim Song-ae, was a member of the KWP 
Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the 



183 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Supreme People's Assembly, a deputy to the assembly, and chair- 
woman of the Korean Democratic Women's Union Central Commit- 
tee. Kim II Sung's daughter, Kim Kyong-hui, was a member of the 
KWP Central Committee and deputy to the Supreme People's 
Assembly, and his son-in-law, Chang Song-taek, was premier, alter- 
nate member of the KWP Central Committee, and deputy to the 
Supreme People's Assembly. Kang Song-san, Kim II Sung's cousin 
by marriage, was premier and a member of the KWP Central Com- 
mittee and its Political Bureau, deputy to the Supreme People's 
Assembly, and member of the state Central People's Committee. Ho 
Tarn, who died in 1991, was Kim II Sung's brother-in-law, a member 
of the KWP Central Committee and Political Bureau, chairman of 
the Supreme People's Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, deputy 
to the Supreme People's Assembly, and chairman of the Committee 
for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. In 2005 Kim Jong II 
appeared to be grooming one of his sons, Kim Jong Chul, to succeed 
him. His eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, was another possibility for suc- 
cession, but he appeared to have lost standing in the family hierarchy 
as a result of his arrest and detainment at Japan's Narita International 
Airport in 2001 while traveling on a forged passport. 

Although the Korean Communist Party dated from the 1920s, 
North Korea claims that the KWP was founded by Kim II Sung in 
1945. Since that time, despite the existence of other small political 
organizations, North Korea has been under the one-party rule of the 
KWP (see Mass Organizations, this ch.). Throughout Kim II Sung's 
reign, the party remained the most politically significant entity; its 
preeminence in all spheres of society placed it beyond the reach of 
dissent or disagreement. Party membership is composed of the 
"advanced fighters" among North Korea's working people: workers, 
peasants, and working intellectuals who are said to struggle devot- 
edly for the success of the socialist and communist cause. The KWP 
claims a membership of 3 million. The ruling elite considers KWP 
members the major mobilizing and developmental cadres, or kanbu 
(see Glossary). In principle, every worker, peasant, soldier, and revo- 
lutionary element can join the party. 

What distinguishes Kim Jong II 's rule from his father's has been 
the relative decline in influence of the KWP and the rise of the mili- 
tary as the predominant organ of government and society. "Military- 
first" (songun) politics is reflected not only in the leadership posi- 
tions held formally by Kim Jong II (chairman of the National 
Defense Commission) but also in the relative elimination of many 
major KWP functions (for example, plenary meetings). The most 
powerful government institution under Kim II Sung was the Political 
Bureau of the KWP Central Committee. The National Defense Com- 



184 



The national flag has three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple 
width), and blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side of the red 
band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star. The official seal shows a 
large hydraulic power plant under Mount Paektu and the light of a five- 
pointed red star with ears of rice forming an oval frame bound with a red 
ribbon inscribed: "Democratic People 's Republic of Korea. " 
Courtesy Korea Today (Pyongyang), August 1994, front cover 

185 



North Korea: A Country Study 

mission has effectively displaced the Political Bureau as the predom- 
inant decision-making authority. The privileging of the military 
undeniably is related to Kim Jong II 's moves to consolidate both 
power and legitimacy in the shadow of his father's military creden- 
tials and uncontested rule. 

The political system is guided by the concept of chuck' e (see 
Glossary) — "national self-reliance" in all activities. The essence of 
chuch 'e is to apply creatively the general principles of Marxism and 
Leninism in the North Korean way. As historian Dae-Sook Suh has 
noted, chuch 'e is "not the philosophical exposition of an abstract 
idea; rather, it is firmly rooted in the North Korean people and Kim 
II Sung." In April 1992, North Korea promulgated an amended state 
constitution that deleted Marxism and Leninism as principal national 
ideas and instead emphasized chuch 'e. Reinforcing this trend, con- 
stitutional amendments in 1998 recognized the concept of private 
ownership for the first time and granted some autonomy to techno- 
crats and local light industry from central party control. The regime, 
moreover, now admits flaws in the socialist-style economy as the 
source of the problems rather than blaming its economic woes on 
outside forces, as it traditionally has done. A Nodong Shinmun 
(Workers' Daily) editorial on November 21, 2001, thus declared: "... 
the socialist economic management method is still immature and not 
perfect .... If we stick to this hackneyed and outdated method, which 
is not applicable to the realities of today, then we will be unable to 
develop our economy." Wide-ranging economic reforms announced 
in July 2002 represented further steps away from the Marxist and 
socialist models (see Prospects: The Significance of Reform, this 
ch.). But in spite of these changes, the regime clings firmly to the 
chuch 'e ideology. 

This apparent contradiction, in large part, is because the ideology is 
inextricably intertwined with the glorification, bordering on deifica- 
tion, of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong IPs authority and cult of personal- 
ity. Kim and his father used the ideology, party, military, and 
government to consolidate power. The two Kims have been addressed 
by many honorary titles, including "great leader (father)," "dear leader 
(son)," and suryong (see Glossary), which can be taken to mean the 
son of the nation, national hero, liberator, and fatherly leader. Accord- 
ing to the party, there can be no greater honor or duty than being loyal 
to one or the other of the two Kims "absolutely and unconditionally." 
Executive power is not checked by any constitutional provision. The 
government structures' principal purpose is to ensure strict popular 
compliance with the policies of Kim Jong II; such compliance 
implants an appearance of institutional imprimatur on Kim's highly 



186 



Government and Politics 



personalized and absolute rule. Although the internal workings of 
North Korean politics are extremely opaque, politics as a function of 
competition for power by aspiring groups and promotion of the inter- 
ests of special groups appears to be less germane to the North Korean 
setting. 

The most significant twenty-first-century political event in North 
Korea relates to the July 2002 market-liberalization reforms (see 
Economic Reforms, ch. 3). These are generally associated with four 
measures: basic monetization of the economy and the legalization of 
makeshift markets; currency depreciation; transplanting managerial 
decisions for industry and agriculture from the central government 
(factory party committees) into the hands of local production units; 
and pressing forward with special administrative and industrial 
zones to induce foreign investment. These measures represent both 
the North's best attempt at serious reform and its most dangerous 
gamble in terms of regime resiliency. If major change is the objec- 
tive, the reforms are the clearest expression of Pyongyang's genuine 
intentions to move away from a command-style economy to one that 
might enable the regime to reach some modicum of economic stabil- 
ity, which, in turn, could mean that the North is serious about trading 
away its nuclear threat for the aid necessary to push forward with 
these reforms. If the liberalization is a gamble, the North may be 
pursuing the reforms despite its nuclear ambitions, with the hope that 
it can achieve both goals (that is, hard currency inflows and retention 
of some nuclear capabilities). The reality may lie between these two. 
But there is no denying that these reforms also make the regime 
more vulnerable to basic supply and demand and price pressures in a 
way never encountered before in North Korea. 

Relationships Among the Government, Party, 
and Military 

From the founding of the DPRK in 1948 through the early 1990s, 
the KWP held a commanding position vis-a-vis the government. A 
definitive shift toward "military-first," or songun, politics took place 
with the 1 994 death of Kim II Sung and the succession to power of 
Kim Jong II. The significance of this shift meant the promotion of 
the military as the central organ of government at the expense of the 
KWP. 

Also, from 1948 to the early 1990s, government organs were regarded 
as executors of the general line and policies of the KWP. Government 
was expected to implement the policies and directives of the party by 
mobilizing the masses. All government officials or functionaries were 



187 



North Korea: A Country Study 

exhorted to behave as servants of the people, rather than as overbearing 
"bureaucrats." The persistence in party literature of admonitions against 
formalism strongly suggests that authoritarian bureaucratic behavior 
remains a major source of concern to the party leadership. This concern 
may explain in part the party's intensified efforts, beginning in the early 
1970s, to wage an ideological struggle against the bureaucratic work 
style of officials. The general trend was toward tightened party control 
and supervision of all organs of administrative and economic policy 
implementation. 

In January 1990, Kim Jong II introduced the slogan "to serve the 
people" and directed party functionaries to mingle with the people 
and to work devotedly as their faithful servants. Kim stated that the 
collapse of socialism in some countries was a stern lesson to North 
Korea and was related to failures in party building and party activity. 
He stressed the importance of reinforcing the party's ideological 
unity and cohesion and elucidated tasks that would strengthen edu- 
cation in the principle of chuck 'e, revolutionary traditional educa- 
tion, and socialist and patriotic education. 

The KWP continues to be the formulator of national purpose, pri- 
orities, and administrative hierarchy. It is the central coordinator of 
administrative and economic activities at the national and local lev- 
els. Through its own organizational channels, which permeate all 
government and economic agencies, the party continues to oversee 
administrative operations and enforce state discipline. Without 
exception, key government positions are filled by party loyalists, 
most of whom are trained in the North Korean system, which 
emphasizes ideology and practical expertise. 

The shift to "military-first" politics is generally associated with 
Kim Jong Il's formal assumption of the National Defense Commis- 
sion chairmanship after the death of Kim II Sung in July 1994. In a 
1991 plenary session of the KWP Sixth Party Congress, Kim II Sung 
made his son the supreme commander of the KPA. A few months 
later, the elder Kim named the younger Kim marshal (wonsu) of the 
DPRK, effectively putting operational control of the military under 
his son. Kim II Sung held the National Defense Commission chair- 
manship until April 1993, when he turned this position over to his 
son, who assumed full duties only upon the death of his father. 

The National Defense Commission constitutionally is the highest 
institution within the military establishment only, but in practice, 
under Kim Jong II, the National Defense Commission has become 
the dominant decision-making body of the state (see fig. 10). Many 
believe this shift is the manifestation of the younger Kim's consoli- 
dation of power and legitimacy after the death of his father. Kim 



188 



Government and Politics 



Jong II possessed none of the credentials of his father, either in the 
party or in the military. The younger Kim thus sought to co-opt the 
military by elevating its position within North Korea relative to the 
party as the primary means of legitimizing his own rule. There is 
speculation that Minister of People's Armed Forces O Chin-u, a con- 
fidant of Kim II Sung, was a key figure in assuring the military's 
obedience and acceptance of Kim Jong II, despite the young Kim's 
lack of any military credentials such as his father had possessed. The 
only other possible leadership candidate, Premier Kim II (no rela- 
tion), had been removed from his post in 1976. 

Military- first politics was formalized in about 1995. It was at this 
time that the concept was introduced as "a revolutionary idea of 
attaching great importance to the army" and "politics emphasizing the 
perfect unity and the single-hearted unity of the Party, Army and peo- 
ple, and the role of the army as the vanguards." Phrases such as "the 
songun revolutionary idea," "songun revolutionary leadership," and 
"songun politics" also have been employed since 1998. The basic con- 
cept of songun is to rely on the military as the primary leg of the "rev- 
olution," economic reconstruction, and North Korean-style socialism. 
Implicit in this principle is the prioritization of the military's needs as a 
key component of the state's national objectives. 

One of the justifications for military-first politics is achievement 
of the national objective of kangsong taeguk (rich nation and strong 
army), a concept introduced in 1999 by Kim Jong II. As such, an 
inseparable link between North Korean patriotism and support for 
Kim's grip on the military has been established, explaining why the 
majority of Kim's public appearances have been with the KPA. 

The National Defense Commission's rise as the hegemonic institu- 
tion within the North Korean government began in April 1992, when a 
constitutional revision separated the National Defense Commission's 
chairmanship from the presidency, establishing the commission as an 
independent body. The 1992 state constitutional revisions also ended 
long-held practices in which the president was supreme commander of 
the armed forces and chairman of the National Defense Commission, 
shifting power instead to the Supreme People's Assembly and the 
National Defense Commission. The key significance of these revi- 
sions is that the president (a position that only two years later would be 
held posthumously by Kim II Sung) was made the nominal head of 
state, but with the power to appoint the National Defense Commission 
chairman. The first session of the 10-term Supreme People's Assem- 
bly on September 5, 1998, reinforced the National Defense Commis- 
sion's grip by empowering it with authority over all military affairs 
and defense projects. The National Defense Commission, although 



189 



North Korea: A Country Study 



KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY 



CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE 



POLITICAL 
BUREAU 
AND ITS 
STANDING 
COMMITTEE 



PROVINCIAL- 
LEVEL 
PARTY 

COMMITTEE 



COUNTY 
PARTY 
COMMITTEE 



CENTRAL 
AUDITING 
COMMITTEE 



SUPREME 
PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY 



SUPREME PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY PRESIDIUM 



NATIONAL 
DEFENSE 
COMMISSION 



CABINET 



CENTRAL 
PROCURATORS' 
OFFICE 



CENTRAL 
COURT 



SPECIAL 
PROCURATORS' 
OFFICE 



SPECIAL 
COURT 



PROVINCIAL- 
LEVEL 
PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY 



PROVINCIAL- 
LEVEL 
PROCURATORS' 
OFFICE 



COUNTY 
PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY 



MINISTRY OF 
PEOPLE'S 
ARMED 
FORCES 



MINISTRIES (30), 
COMMISSIONS (2), 
AND OTHER 
CABINET-LEVEL 
ORGANIZATIONS (3) 



PROVINCIAL- 
LEVEL 
PEOPLE'S 
COMMITTEE 



PROVINCIAL- 
LEVEL 
COURT 



COUNTY 
-1 PROCURATORS' 
OFFICE 



COUNTY 
PEOPLE'S 
COMMITTEE 



COUNTY 
PEOPLE'S 
COURT 



Political control 
General line of control 
Elected 



Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, Information 
Center on North Korea, "Power Structure of North Korea," 2006, http://unibook. 
unikorea.go.kr/dataroom/images/table_d_01.gif; and U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency, "North Korea," Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Govern- 
ments, June 28, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/chiefs94.html. 



Figure 10. Party, State, and Government Power, 2006 



190 



Government and Politics 



nominally under the Supreme People's Assembly, essentially consti- 
tutes the highest executive body, headed by its chairman, Kim Jong II. 
The primary military organ in the KWP is the Military Affairs Depart- 
ment, also run by Kim Jong II through his position as party general 
secretary (see National Defense Organizations, ch. 5). 

In 2007 the National Defense Commission consisted of a chair- 
man (Kim Jong II); first vice chairman (Cho Myong-nok); two vice 
chairmen (Kim Yong-chun and Yi Yong-mu); and three members 
(Kim Il-ch'61, Chon Pyong-ho, and Kim Yang-gon), each with five- 
year terms. The National Defense Commission has the power to 
direct all activities of the armed forces and national defense projects, 
establish and disband central defense institutions, appoint and dis- 
miss senior military officers, confer military titles and grant titles for 
top commanders, and declare a state of war and issue mobilization 
orders in an emergency. 

The Korean Workers' Party 

The Korean Workers' Party (KWP), according to the preamble of 
the party constitution, is the "vanguard organization of the working 
class," and the "highest type of revolutionary body among all organi- 
zations of the working masses." The National Party Congress is the 
supreme party organ and approves reports of other party organs, 
adopts basic party policies and tactics, and elects members to the 
KWP Central Committee and the Central Auditing Committee. The 
elections, however, are perfunctory because the members of these 
bodies are actually chosen by Kim Jong II and his few trusted col- 
leagues. When the National Party Congress is not in session, the 
Central Committee acts as the official agent of the party. The Central 
Committee is supposed to meet at least once every six months and 
has the responsibility of electing the party general secretary (Kim 
Jong II), members of the Political Bureau, and its Standing Commit- 
tee (or Presidium, the highest operational party organization). The 
Central Committee also elects members of the KWP Secretariat 
(which implements administrative decisions, personnel manage- 
ment, and other important party matters) and members of the Central 
Military Commission (which formulates the party's military policies, 
action plans, and defense industry development. The commission's 
last known chairman was Kim II Sung; it should not be confused 
with the similarly named Military Affairs Department. The Central 
Committee additionally elects the members of the Central Inspection 
Committee, which maintains party discipline, reviews petitions and 
appeals from provincial and directly governed city party organiza- 
tions, and investigates members violating party policies or at odds 



191 



North Korea: A Country Study 

with the top leadership. A party congress is supposed to be convened 
every five years, but as of 2007, one had not been held since the 
Sixth Party Congress in 1980. Party congresses are attended by dele- 
gates elected by the members of provincial-level party assemblies at 
the ratio of one delegate for every 1,000 party members. 

Until his death in July 1994, Kim II Sung held all key party posi- 
tions, including being KWP general secretary, member of the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau, and chairman of the Central Mili- 
tary Commission. Kim Jong II was not appointed general secretary 
until October 8, 1997. Although technically open to mass member- 
ship, access to the KWP is denied to those without a "reliable" class 
background. The KWP operates as the core of the North Korean pol- 
ity, with more than 3 million members. The party carries the identity 
of a class-based and individual-leadership organization. The KWP has 
two alliance parties, the Korean Social Democratic Party and the 
Chongu (Friends) Party, supportive of the Ch'ondogyo religion (see 
Reli gion, ch. 2). Kim Jong II has formally led the KWP since 1997, 
although informally the party has been under his control since 1994. 
Kim Jong IPs accession was followed by a round of purges in the 
KWP, in which some of his father's old followers were removed from 
office. 

The Sixth Party Congress, convened October 10-14, 1980, was 
attended by 3,220 party delegates (3,062 full members and 158 alter- 
nate members) and 177 foreign delegates from 118 countries. Atten- 
dance significantly increased from the approximately 1,800 delegates 
who attended the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. The 1980 
congress was convened by the KWP Central Committee to review, 
discuss, and endorse reports by the Central Committee, the Central 
Auditing Committee, and other central organs covering the activities 
of these bodies since the previous congress 10 years earlier. The Sixth 
Party Congress also elected a new Central Committee. 

In his report to the congress, Kim II Sung outlined a set of goals and 
policies for the 1980s. He proposed the establishment of a Democratic 
Confederal Republic of Koryo as a reasonable way to achieve the 
independent and peaceful reunification of the country. He also clari- 
fied a new 10-point policy for the unified state and stressed that North 
Korea and South Korea should recognize and tolerate each other's 
ideas and social systems, that the unified central government should 
be represented by P'yongyang and Seoul on an equal footing, and that 
both sides should exercise regional autonomy with equal rights and 
duties. Specifically, the unified government should respect the social 
systems and the wishes of administrative organizations and of every 
party, every group, and every sector of people in the North and the 
South, and the central government should prevent one side from 
imposing its will on the other. 



192 



Government and Politics 



Kim II Sung also emphasized the Three Revolutions (see Glos- 
sary), which are aimed at hastening the process of political and ideo- 
logical transformation based on chuch'e ideology, improving the 
material and technical standards of the economy, and developing 
socialist national culture. According to Kim, these revolutions were 
the responsibility of the Three Revolutions Team Movement (see 
Glossary) — "a new method of guiding the revolution," which com- 
bined political and ideological guidance with scientific and technical 
guidance. This approach enabled superior authorities to help the 
lower levels and rouse masses of the working people to accelerate 
the Three Revolutions. The teams performed their guidance work by 
sending their members to factories, enterprises, and cooperative 
farms. Their members are party cadres, including those from the 
KWP Central Committee, reliable officials of the government, per- 
sons from economic and mass organizations, scientists and techni- 
cians, and young intellectuals. Kim II Sung left no question that the 
Three Revolutions Team Movement had succeeded the Ch'ollima 
Movement (see Glossary) and would remain the principal vehicle 
through which the party pursued its political and economic objec- 
tives in the 1980s. 

The linkage between party and economic work also was addressed 
by Kim II Sung. In acknowledging the urgent task of economic con- 
struction, he stated that party work should be geared toward efficient 
economic construction and that success in party work should be mea- 
sured by success in economic construction. Accordingly, party organi- 
zations were told to "push forward economic work actively, give 
prominence to economic officials, and help them well." Party officials 
also were advised to watch out for signs of independence on the part 
of technocrats. The membership and organization of the KWP are 
specified in the party rules. 

There are two kinds of party members: regular and probationary. 
Membership is open to those 1 8 years of age and older but is granted 
only to those who have demonstrated their qualifications; applica- 
tions are submitted to a cell along with a proper endorsement from 
two party members with at least two years in good standing. An 
application is acted on by the plenary session of a cell; an affirmative 
decision is subject to ratification by a county-level party committee. 
After approving an application, a one-year probationary period is 
mandatory, but it may be waived under certain unspecified "special 
circumstances," allowing the candidate to become a full member. 
Recruitment is under the direction of the Organization and Guidance 
Department and its local branches. 



193 



North Korea: A Country Study 



The Constitutional Framework 

The state constitutions of North Korea have been patterned after 
those of other communist states. The constitutional framework delin- 
eates a highly centralized governmental system and the relationship 
between the people and the state. The constitution was adopted in 
1948, completely revised in December 1972, revised again in April 
1992, and then amended and supplemented in September 1998. 
Innovations of the 1972 constitution included the establishment of 
the positions of president and vice presidents and a supercabinet 
called the Central People's Committee. 

The revised 1998 state constitution has 166 articles (15 fewer than 
the 1992 constitution) in seven chapters. As with the 1992 revision, 
the 1998 constitution continues to uphold chuck 'e at the expense of 
Marxism-Leninism and includes articles encouraging joint ventures 
within special economic zones, guaranteeing the "legal rights and 
interests of foreigners," and establishing a framework for expanded 
ties with capitalist countries. The 1992 revision had provided a legal 
framework for the 1991 appointment of Kim Jong II as supreme 
commander of the armed forces by removing the military from the 
command of the president and by placing the military under the con- 
trol of the National Defense Commission, of which he is chairman. 
The 1998 constitution confirms this power. 

The 18 articles of chapter 1 of the 1998 constitution deal with poli- 
tics. Article 1 defines North Korea as an independent socialist state 
representing the interests of all the Korean people. Article 15 states 
that the DPRK defends the democratic, national rights of Koreans 
overseas and their rights as recognized under international law. Sover- 
eignty emanates from four expressly mentioned social groups: "work- 
ers, peasants, working intellectuals, and all other working people." 
State organs are organized and operate on the principle of democratic 
centralism. Article 9 declares that "the complete victory of socialism 
in the northern half of Korea" will be accomplished through the exe- 
cution of the three revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture, 
while struggling to realize unification of the fatherland by following 
the principles of independence, peaceful unification, and grand 
national unity. In the 1972 constitution, socialism was to have been 
accomplished by driving out foreign forces on a countrywide scale 
and by reunifying the nation peacefully on a democratic basis. Other 
articles in this chapter of the 1998 constitution refer to the main party 
line, the Ch'ongsan-ni Method (see Glossary) and spirit, and the Three 
Revolutions Team Movement. The constitution states that foreign pol- 
icy and foreign activities are based on the principles of independence, 
peace, and solidarity. Diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural 



194 



Government and Politics 



relations are to be established with all friendly countries based on the 
principles of complete equality, independence, mutual respect, nonin- 
terference in each other's internal affairs, and mutual benefit. 

Economic affairs were codified in chapter 2. The constitution 
declares that the means of production are owned by state and social 
cooperative organizations. Article 22 reiterates that natural resources, 
railroads, airports, transportation, communication organs, major facto- 
ries, enterprises, ports, and banks are state owned. Article 24 defines 
personal property as that "meeting the simple and individuals aims of 
the citizen." Benefits derived from supplementary pursuits, such as the 
small garden plots of collectivized farmers, are considered personal 
property; such benefits were protected by the state as private property 
and are guaranteed by law as a right of inheritance. According to arti- 
cle 33, the planned, national economy is directed and managed 
through the now largely abandoned Taean Work System (see Glos- 
sary; Organization, ch. 3). 

Culture, education, and public health are covered in chapter 3. 
Article 45 stipulates that the state develop a mandatory 11 -year edu- 
cation system, including two years of compulsory preschool educa- 
tion (see Education, ch. 2). Article 47 says that education is provided 
at no cost and that the state grants allowances to students enrolled in 
universities and colleges. Article 56 notes that medical service is 
universal and free (see Health Care, ch. 2). (Medical care and the 
right to education are also covered in articles 72 and 73 in chapter 5.) 
Article 57 places environmental protection measures before produc- 
tion; this emphasis is in line with recent attention given to preserving 
the natural environment and creating a hygienic living and working 
environment by preventing environmental pollution. 

Chapter 4, consisting of only four articles, covers national 
defense. Emphasis is given to the mission of the armed forces, a self- 
reliant defense, and unity between the military forces and the people. 

Chapter 5 extensively details the fundamental rights and duties of 
citizens. Citizens over the age of 17 may exercise the right to vote and 
be elected to office regardless of gender, race, occupation, length of 
residency, property status, education, party affiliation, political views, 
or religion. Citizens serving in the armed forces may vote and be 
elected; insane persons and those deprived by court decisions of the 
right to vote are disenfranchised. According to article 67, citizens have 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, and association. 
Citizens also have the right to work, and article 70 stipulates that they 
work according to their ability and be remunerated according to the 
quantity and quality of work performed. Article 71 provides for a sys- 
tem of working hours, holidays, paid leave, sanatoriums, and rest 
homes funded by the state, as well as for cultural facilities. Article 77 



195 



North Korea: A Country Study 

accords women equal social status and rights with men. Women are 
granted maternity leave and shortened working hours if they have 
large families. Marriage and the family are protected by the state, 
according to the next article. 

Chapter 6, on the structure of the state, has 75 articles in seven sec- 
tions. The chapter covers the Supreme People's Assembly, the National 
Defense Commission, the Central People's Committee, the State 
Administration Council, local people's assemblies, local people's com- 
mittees, the Central Procurators' Office, and the Central Court. 

Chapter 7 covers the national emblem, flag, and capital. It describes 
the first two items, designates P'yongyang as the national capital, and 
identifies the national anthem as the "Patriotic Song." In a change from 
the 1972 constitution, the 1992 and 1998 revisions mandated that "the 
sacred mountain of the revolution" — Mount Paektu — be added to the 
national emblem. It stands above the previously existing symbols: a 
hydroelectric power plant, the beaming light of a five-pointed red star, 
ovally framed ears of rice bound with a red band, and the inscription 
Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk (Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea). 

With the 1998 constitution, the post of state president, the Central 
People's Committee, and the Supreme People's Assembly Standing 
Committee were abolished, giving most of the power shared by these 
institutions to the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium. The consti- 
tution's preamble states that Kim II Sung is the "eternal president" of 
North Korea and stipulates that the constitution itself "shall be called 
Kim II Sung's Constitution." Under these revisions, the president of 
the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium became the de jure head of 
state, representing North Korea in external affairs, and head of the 
supreme sovereign institution. Article 100 notes that the National 
Defense Commission is the "highest military leading organ of state 
power and an organ for general control over national defense." 
Although article 105 states that the commission is "accountable to the 
Supreme People's Assembly," with Kim Jong II as chairman, the com- 
mission holds the de facto supreme power of state. 

The Structure of Government 

The Legislature 

According to article 87 of the 1998 constitution, the Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly is "the highest organ of state power." However, it is 
not influential and does not initiate legislation independently of other 
party and state organs. Invariably, the legislative process is set in 
motion by executive bodies according to the predetermined policies of 
the party leadership. The Supreme People's Assembly is not known 



196 



Supreme People s Assembly, P 'yongyang 
Courtesy Tracy Woodward 
Hall inside the Supreme People s Assembly 
Courtesy Tracy Woodward 



197 



North Korea: A Country Study 

ever to have criticized, modified, or rejected a bill or a measure placed 
before it, or to have proposed an alternative bill or measure. 

The constitution provides for the Supreme People's Assembly to 
be elected every five years by universal suffrage. Article 88 indicates 
that legislative power is exercised by the Supreme People's Assembly 
and its Presidium when the full Supreme People's Assembly is not in 
session. Earlier the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's 
Assembly exercised this power, but in 1998 it was abolished and 
replaced with the Presidium. Elections to the Eleventh Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly were held in August 2003, with 687 deputies elected. 
The KWP approves a single list of candidates who stand for election 
without opposition. Deputies usually meet once a year in regular ses- 
sions in March or April, but since 1985 they also have met occasion- 
ally in extraordinary sessions in November or December. 

The president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly 
represents North Korea in relations with foreign countries. Assembly 
sessions are convened by the Presidium, whose president since 1998 
has been Kim Yong-nam, a former vice premier and former minister 
of foreign affairs. There are also two vice presidents, two honorary 
vice presidents, a secretary general, and 12 members of the Presidium. 
Until April 1994, the Supreme People's Assembly convened nearly 
every year, but after Kim II Sung's death in July 1994, it did not con- 
vene until the tenth term was held in September 2000. Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly Presidium members are elected by the deputies, as are 
the Supreme People's Assembly president and vice presidents. The 
Supreme People's Assembly has three committees: bills, budget, and 
qualifications screening. Before the September 1998 constitutional 
amendments, the Supreme People's Assembly also had foreign affairs 
and reunification-policy deliberation committees. 

Article 91 states that the Supreme People's Assembly has the 
authority to adopt, amend, and supplement the constitution and depart- 
mental laws; establish the basic principles of domestic and foreign 
policies; and approve major departmental laws adopted by the 
Supreme People's Assembly Presidium in the intervals between the 
sessions of the Supreme People's Assembly. It also may elect or trans- 
fer the chairman and other members (on recommendation of the chair- 
man) of the National Defense Commission; elect or remove the 
president of the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium; elect or trans- 
fer the premier and vice premiers and members of the cabinet; appoint 
or remove the procurator general; elect or transfer the chief justice; 
and elect or transfer its own top officials. The Supreme People's 
Assembly is empowered to examine and approve the state plan for the 
development of the national economy and a report on its fulfillment; 



198 



Government and Politics 



examine and approve a report on the state budget and on its implemen- 
tation; receive a report on the work of the cabinet and national institu- 
tions and adopt measures, if necessary; and decide whether to ratify or 
abrogate treaties. Assembly decisions are made by a simple majority 
and signified by a show of hands. Deputies, each representing a con- 
stituency of approximately 30,000 persons, are guaranteed inviolabil- 
ity and immunity from arrest. Between assembly sessions, the 
Presidium acts for the Supreme People's Assembly. 

The Executive 

President and Vice Presidents 

Prior to Kim II Sung's death in July 1994, the president was the 
head of state and the head of government in his capacity as chairman 
of the Central People's Committee. The constitution stated that two 
vice presidents were to "assist" the president, but it did not elaborate 
on a mode of succession. Following Kim's death and the constitu- 
tional amendments of 1998, Kim Jong II as National Defense Com- 
mission chairman assumed presidential responsibilities but not the 
title. The preface to the constitution as amended in 1998 reads: "The 
DPRK and the entire Korean people will uphold the great leader 
Comrade Kim II Sung as the eternal President of the Republic." 
Thus, Kim II Sung posthumously occupies the presidency; the posi- 
tions of vice president remain unfilled. The titles of president and 
vice president in North Korea now refer only to the president and 
vice presidents of the Supreme People's Assembly. 

Presidential powers were stated only in generalities. The chief 
executive convened and guided the State Administration Council as 
occasion demanded. Under the 1972 constitution, he was also the 
supreme commander of the armed forces and chairman of the 
National Defense Commission, although Kim II Sung appointed his 
son to the former position in December 1991 and to the latter posi- 
tion in April 1993 (see National Command Authorities, ch. 5). The 
president's prior assent was required for all laws, decrees, decisions, 
and directives, and his edicts commanded the force of law more 
authoritatively than any other legislation. The president promulgated 
the laws and ordinances of the Supreme People's Assembly; the 
decisions of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's 
Assembly (abolished in 1998); and the laws, ordinances, and deci- 
sions of the Central People's Committee. The president also granted 
pardons, ratified or abrogated treaties, and received foreign envoys 
or requested their recall. No one served in top government posts 
without the president's recommendation. Even the judiciary and the 



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North Korea: A Country Study 

prosecutors were accountable to Kim II Sung. In accordance with 
article 91 of the 1998 constitution, these presidential functions now 
reside with the Supreme People's Assembly. 

It was not until 1997 that the younger Kim officially took over the 
leadership of the KWP. The following year, the presidency was 
reserved for the revered deceased leader. Kim Jong II consolidated 
his power in the positions left to him. The 1998 constitution declares 
that the chairman of the National Defense Commission "holds the 
highest post of the state." 

Cabinet 

Between 1972 and 1998, the highest administrative arm of the 
government was the State Administration Council. Before then, the 
cabinet had been the highest level of the executive branch, but the 
1972 constitution changed its name and function. The council was 
directed by the president and the Central People's Committee and 
was composed of the premier, vice premiers, ministers, commission 
chairmen, and other cabinet-level members of the central agencies. 

The 1998 constitution changed the State Administration Council 
into a cabinet and upgraded its status and power. The cabinet is the 
supreme administrative and executive organ and a general state man- 
agement organ. Previously the State Administration Council had 
been subject to the control of the president and the Central People's 
Committee. Since 1998 the cabinet has had the authority to formu- 
late measures for the implementation of national policies; enact, 
amend, or supplement regulations pertaining to national administra- 
tion; establish or abolish key administrative economic organs and 
industrial establishments and formulate plans to improve national 
management organizations; and implement inspection and control- 
ling activities to maintain order in national management. The cabinet 
has exclusive responsibility for all economic administrative projects. 

Under the 1998 constitution, the premier represents the govern- 
ment (article 120) and functions independently. In 2007 the cabinet 
was headed by Premier Kim Yong-il. Under him were three vice pre- 
miers, 30 ministers, two cabinet-level commission chairmen, the 
president of the Academy of Sciences, the president of the Central 
Bank, the director of the Central Statistics Bureau, and a chief secre- 
tary of the cabinet. Besides the 30 civilian ministries that are part of 
the cabinet, there is a thirty-first ministry — the Ministry of People's 
Armed Forces — that is not subordinate to the cabinet but reports 
instead to the National Defense Commission. 



200 



Government and Politics 



The Judiciary 

In the North Korean judicial process, both adjudicative and prose- 
cuting bodies function as powerful weapons for the proletarian dicta- 
torship. The constitution states that the Central Court, courts at the 
provincial or special-city level, the people's courts, and special 
courts administer justice. The Central Court, the highest court of 
appeal, stands at the apex of the court system. The president of the 
Central Court since September 1998 has been Kim P'yong-ryul. In 
the case of the one special city (Namp'o) directly under central 
authority, provincial or municipal courts serve as the courts of first 
instance for civil and criminal cases at the intermediate level. At the 
lowest level are the people's courts, established in ordinary cities, 
counties, and urban districts. Special courts exist for the armed 
forces and for railroad workers. The military special courts have 
jurisdiction over all crimes committed by members of the armed 
forces or the personnel of the Ministry of People's Security. The rail- 
road courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases involving rail and 
water transport workers. In addition, the Korean Maritime Arbitra- 
tion Committee adjudicates maritime legal affairs. 

In theory, the corresponding local people's assemblies elect 
judges and people's assessors, or lay judges. In practice, however, 
the KWP generally appoints judges, who do not require legal educa- 
tion or practical legal experience for their roles. In addition to 
administering justice based on criminal and civil codes, the courts 
are in charge of political indoctrination through "re-education." The 
issue of punishment is not expressly stated in the constitution or the 
criminal code. 

The collective interests of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and 
working intellectuals are protected by a parallel hierarchy of organs 
controlled at the top by the Central Procurators' Office (accountable 
to the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium when the full Supreme 
People's Assembly is in recess). This office acts as the state's procu- 
rator and checks on the activities of all public organs and citizens to 
ensure their compliance with the law and their "active struggle 
against all lawbreakers." Its authority extends to the courts, the deci- 
sions of which (including those of the Central Court) are subject to 
routine scrutiny. A judgment of the Central Court may be appealed 
to the plenary session of the Central Court, of which the state's chief 
procurator is a statutory member. 

The chief prosecutor, known as the procurator general, is 
appointed by and accountable in theory, although not in fact, to the 
Supreme People's Assembly. There are one procurator general and 
three deputy procurator generals. 



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North Korea: A Country Study 

Local Government 

There are three levels of local government: provinces (do) and 
provincial-level municipalities (chikalsi, or jikhalsi); a special city 
(t 'ukpyolsi), ordinary cities (si or shi), urban districts (kuydk), and 
rural counties (gun, or kuri)\ and traditional villages (rz, or m). Cities 
are subdivided into wards (gu), and some cities and wards are subdi- 
vided into neighborhoods (dong), the lowest level of urban govern- 
ment to have its own office and staff Towns and townships (myon) 
have not functioned as administrative units in North Korea since the 
Korean War (1950-53), but they still exist in South Korea. At the 
village level, administrative and economic matters are the responsi- 
bility of the chairman of the cooperative farm management commit- 
tee in each village. 

North Korea has nine provinces: Chagang, North Hamgyong, South 
Hamgyong, North Hwanghae, South Hwanghae, Kangwon, North 
P'yongan, South P'yongan, and Yanggang. There also are two provin- 
cial-level municipalities — P'yongyang and Najin-Sonbong — and one 
special city, Namp'o. Kaesong, which was once a chikalsi, had its terri- 
tory incorporated into South Hwanghae Province in 2003. Additionally, 
there are 17 ordinary cities under provincial authority; 36 urban dis- 
tricts; more than 200 counties; and some 4,000 villages. Among these 
divisions, the counties serve as the intermediate administrative link 
between provincial authorities and the grass-roots-level village organi- 
zations. Local organs at the county level provide other forms of guid- 
ance to such basic units as neighborhoods (dong) and workers' districts 
(nodongja-ku). 

Three types of local organs elect local officials to carry out cen- 
trally planned policies and programs. These organs are local KWP 
committees, local people's assemblies, and local administrative 
committees, with functions such as administrative and urban and 
rural economic guidance committees. These committees are local 
extensions of higher bodies at the national level, namely, the KWP, 
the Supreme People's Assembly, and the cabinet. 

The local people's assemblies, established at all administrative 
levels, perform the same symbolic functions as the Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly. They provide a facade of popular support and 
involvement and serve as a vehicle through which loyal and merito- 
rious local inhabitants are given visible recognition as deputies to the 
assemblies. The assemblies meet once or twice a year, for only a few 
days at each session. Their duties are to approve the plan for local 
economic development and the local budget; to elect the officers of 
other local bodies, including the judges and people's assessors of the 
courts within their jurisdictions; and to review the decisions and 



202 



Government and Politics 



directives issued by local organs at their corresponding and lower 
levels. The local people's assemblies have no standing committees. 
Between regular sessions, their duties are performed by the local 
people's committees, whose members are elected by assemblies at 
corresponding levels and are responsible both to the assemblies and 
to the local people's committees at higher levels. 

The officers and members of the people's committees are influen- 
tial locally as party functionaries and as senior administrative cadres. 
These committees can convene the people's assemblies; prepare for 
the election of deputies to the local assemblies; implement the deci- 
sions of the assemblies at the corresponding level and those of the 
people's committees at higher levels; and control and supervise the 
work of administrative bodies, enterprises, and social and coopera- 
tive organizations in their respective jurisdictions. 

The day-to-day affairs of local communities are handled by the 
local administrative committees. The chairman, vice chairmen, sec- 
retary, and members of these bodies are elected by the local people's 
committees at the corresponding levels. 

Political Ideology 

The Role of Chuch'e 

Chuck 'e ideology is the basic cornerstone of party construction, 
party works, and government operations. Chuch 'e is sanctified as the 
essence of what has been officially called Kim II Sung Chuui (Kim- 
ilsungism) since April 1974. Chuch 'e is also claimed as "the present- 
day Marxism-Leninism." North Korean leaders advocate chuch'e 
ideology as the only correct guiding ideology in their revolutionary 
movement. 

Chuch 'e also is referred to as "the unitary ideology" or as "the 
monolithic ideology of the Party." It is inseparable from and, for all 
intents and purposes, synonymous with Kim II Sung's leadership and 
was said to have been "created" or "fathered" by the great leader as 
an original "encyclopedic thought which provides a complete 
answer to any question that arises in the struggle for national libera- 
tion and class emancipation, in the building of socialism and com- 
munism." Chuch 'e is viewed as the embodiment of revealed truth 
attesting to the wisdom of Kim's leadership as exemplified in count- 
less speeches and "on-the-spot guidance." 

Chuch'e was proclaimed in December 1955, when Kim empha- 
sized the critical need for a Korea-centered revolution rather than 
one designed to benefit, in his words, "another country." Chuch 'e is 
designed to inspire national pride and identity and to mold national 



203 



North Korea: A Country Study 

consciousness into a potentially powerful focus for internal solidar- 
ity centered on Kim and the KWP. 

According to Kim, chuch'e means "the independent stance of 
rejecting dependence on others and of using one's own powers, 
believing in one's own strength and displaying the revolutionary 
spirit of self-reliance." Chuch'e is an ideology geared to North 
Korea's contemporary goals — an independent foreign policy, a self- 
sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture. Kim II Sung's 
enunciation of chuch'e in 1955 was aimed at developing a mono- 
lithic and effective system of authority under his exclusive leader- 
ship. The invocation of chuch 'e was a psychological tool with which 
to stigmatize the foreign-oriented dissenters and remove them from 
the center of power. Targeted for elimination were groups of pro- 
Soviet and pro-Chinese dissenters who opposed Kim. 

The Origins of Chuch'e 

There are three major schools of thought regarding the origins of 
the chuch 'e ideology: the instrumental, traditional political culture, 
and individual original perspectives. The instrumental viewpoint 
emphasizes both domestic and foreign political factors as the root of 
the chuch'e ideology. Some believe that Kim's unstable hold on 
power during and immediately following the Korean War caused 
him to deploy ideological purges in order to consolidate his political 
position, using the chuch'e principle of national solidarity as a 
domestic instrument to forge his personality cult. 

The second perspective on chuch Vs origin takes a longer view 
and focuses on the influence of traditional political culture in Korea, 
seeing chuch 'e as a reflection of a centuries-old tradition of indepen- 
dence from foreign powers. Geographically central to the strategic 
interests of powerful neighbors, Korea has long been a pawn in great 
power rivalries, with perhaps more recorded foreign invasions than 
any other territory in history. 

The third explanation for the origin of the chuch 'e ideology is the 
North Koreans' broadly accepted view that it is a prime example of 
their late supreme leader's brilliance and originality. This perspec- 
tive insists that chuch 'e was the intellectual result of Kim II Sung's 
highly exaggerated and romanticized personal experience as a guer- 
rilla fighting Japanese imperialism in the 1930s. 

Chuch 'e did not become a prominent ideology overnight. During the 
first 10 years of North Korea's existence, Marxism-Leninism was 
accepted unquestioningly as the only source of doctrinal authority. 
Nationalism was toned down in deference to the country's connections 
to the Soviet Union and China. In the mid-1950s, however, chuch'e 



204 



Monument in Pyongyang to the 
founder of the nation. The 
inscription reads "Comrade Kim 
II Sung is our eternal sun. " 

Courtesy Korea Today 
(Pyongyang), April 1995, 2 





was presented as a "creative" application of Marxism-Leninism. In his 
attempt to establish an interrelationship between Marxism-Leninism 
and chuck' e, Kim contended that although Marxism-Leninism was 
valid as the fundamental law of revolution, it needed an authoritative 
interpreter to define a new set of practical ideological guidelines appro- 
priate to the revolutionary environment in North Korea. 

Application of Chuch'e in the North Korean State 

Kim II Sung's practical ideology was given a test of relevance 
from the outset. In the late 1950s, he was able to mobilize internal 
support when he purged pro- Soviet and pro-Chinese dissenters from 
party ranks. During the first half of the 1960s, Kim faced an even 
more formidable challenge when he had to endure a series of tense 
situations that had potentially adverse implications for North 
Korea's economic development and national security. Among these 
were a sharp decrease in aid from the Soviet Union and China; dis- 
cord between the Soviet Union and China and its disquieting impli- 
cations for North Korea's confrontation with the United States and 
South Korea; Pyongyang's disagreements with Moscow and appre- 
hensions about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally; and the 
rise of an authoritarian regime in Seoul under General Park Chung- 
hee, in power 1961-79. 



205 



North Korea: A Country Study 

These developments emphasized self-reliance — the need to rely 
on domestic resources, heighten vigilance against possible external 
challenges, and strengthen domestic political solidarity. Sacrifice, 
austerity, unity, and patriotism became dominant themes in the 
party's efforts to instill in the people the importance of chuch 'e and 
collective discipline. By the mid-1960s, however, North Korea could 
afford to relax somewhat; its strained relations with the Soviet Union 
had eased, as reflected, in part, by Moscow's decision to rush eco- 
nomic and military assistance to P'yongyang. 

Beginning in 1965, chuch 'e was presented as the essence of Kim II 
Sung's leadership and of party lines and policies for every conceiv- 
able revolutionary situation. Kim's past leadership record was put 
forward as the "guide and compass" for the present and future and as 
a source of strength sufficient to propel the faithful through any 
adversity. Nonetheless, the linkage of chuch 'e to Marxism-Leninism 
remained a creed of the party. The April 1972 issue of Kulloja (The 
Worker) still referred to the KWP as "a Marxist-Leninist Party"; the 
journal pointed out that "the only valid policy for Korean communists 
is Marxism-Leninism" and called for "its creative application to our 
realities." 

Since 1974, however, it has become increasingly evident that the 
emphasis is on the glorification of chuch 'e as "the only scientific 
revolutionary thought representing our era of chuch 'e and commu- 
nist future and the most effective revolutionary theoretical structure 
that leads to the future of communist society along the surest short- 
cut." This new emphasis was based on the contention that a different 
historical era, with its unique sociopolitical circumstances, requires 
an appropriately unique revolutionary ideology. Accordingly, Marx- 
ism and Leninism were valid doctrines in their own times but had 
outlived their usefulness in the era of chuch 'e, which prophesies the 
downfall of imperialism and the worldwide victory of socialism and 
communism. 

As the years have passed, references to Marxism-Leninism in 
party literature have steadily decreased. By 1980 the terms "Marx- 
ism" and "Leninism" had all but disappeared from the pages of 
Kulloja. An unsigned article in the March 1980 Kulloja proclaimed, 
"within the Party none but the leader Kim II Sung's revolutionary 
thought, the chuch 'e ideology, prevails and there is no room for any 
hodgepodge thought contrary to it." The report Kim II Sung pre- 
sented to the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980 did not contain a 
single reference to Marxism-Leninism, in marked contrast to his 
report to the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. In the 1980 
report, Kim declared: "the whole party is rallied rock- firm around its 
Central Committee and knit together in ideology and purpose on the 



206 



Government and Politics 



basis of the chuck 'e idea. The Party has no room for any other idea 
than the chuch'e idea, and no force can ever break its unity and 
cohesion based on this idea." 

Chuch'e is instrumental in providing a consistent and unifying 
framework for commitment and action in the North Korean political 
arena. It offers an underpinning for the party's incessant demand for 
spartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, and dedication. Since the mid- 
1970s, however, it appears that chuch'e has become glorified as an 
end in itself. In his annual New Year's message on January 1, 1992, 
Kim II Sung emphasized the invincibility of chuch 'e ideology: "I 
take great pride in and highly appreciate the fact that our people have 
overcome the ordeals of history and displayed to the full the heroic 
mettle of the revolutionary people and the indomitable spirit of 
chuch'e Korea, firmly united behind the party.... No difficulty is 
insurmountable nor is any fortress impregnable for us when our 
party leads the people with the ever- victorious chuch ^-oriented 
strategy and tactics and when all the people turn out as one under the 
party's leadership." 

After Kim II Sung's death, Kim Jong II continued to use chuch 'e 
ideology to consolidate his tight control of his regime. It became 
legally embodied in the 1998 constitution, and throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s Kim Jong II espoused chuch 'e ideology in various 
publications, emphasizing "chuch 'e realism," as a uniquely creative 
method in North Korean socialist realism, quite different from the 
existing "socialistic realism." Such writings presumably were an 
attempt to explain the necessity of North Korea's pursuit of socialist 
ideals, despite the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
bloc states. 

More recently, a new interpretation of the "self-reliant revival" 
has seen greater emphasis since the declaration of the "New Think- 
ing Initiative" in 200 1 , which was an attempt at economic rehabilita- 
tion. In the past, "self-reliant revival" was widely understood as a 
phrase used to describe the spirit of the struggle necessary to pro- 
duce on one's own things that were lacking or in short supply, or to 
resolve problems, no matter what, even if that meant resorting to old 
and antiquated methods. However, Kim Jong II declared that "self- 
reliant revival is not possible apart from science and technology," 
while talking with party officials in December 2000. And a February 
28, 2001, Nodong Shinmun article claimed that "building a self-reli- 
ant national economy does not mean building an economy with the 
doors closed," reminding readers that the country had departed from 
a closed economy. The article signaled that North Korea is pursuing 
the construction of a strong and prosperous nation, and the concept 
of self-reliant revival is changing with the time and circumstances. 



207 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Such changes may be a reflection of Kim Jong II 's decision to pursue 
self-reliant revival as long as it is economically beneficial, although 
it is unclear whether a commensurate relaxation of economic and 
political control will necessarily result. 

Party Leadership and Elite Recruitment 

Composition 

The party congress, the highest KWP organ, meets infrequently. 
The most recently held congress was the Sixth Party Congress of 
October 1980. The official agent of the party congress is the Central 
Committee. In 2005 the Central Committee had 329 members: 180 
full members and 149 alternate members. Nearly 40 percent of these 
members — 131 individuals — are first-term members. The techno- 
crats — economists, managers, and technicians — predominate among 
the membership. The Central Committee is supposed to hold a ple- 
num, or plenary session, at least once every six months to discuss 
major issues. However, the Central Committee has not convened 
since Kim II Sung's death in 1994. The plenum also elects the gen- 
eral secretary, members of the Political Bureau (called the Political 
Committee until October 1980), and its Standing Committee, or Pre- 
sidium, established in October 1980. 

Influence and prestige within the party power structure are 
directly associated with the rank order in which the members of the 
Central Committee are listed. Key posts in party, government, and 
economic organs are assigned; higher-ranking Central Committee 
members also are found in the armed forces, educational and cultural 
institutions, and other social and mass organizations. Many leaders 
concurrently hold multiple positions within the party, the govern- 
ment, and the military. 

The Political Bureau has 14 members. Several central organiza- 
tions are subordinate to the Political Bureau Standing Committee (of 
which the only known member is Kim Jong II). One of the most 
important executive organs is the Secretariat of the Central Commit- 
tee, led by General Secretary Kim Jong II and eight other secretaries. 
Each secretary is in charge of one or more departmental party func- 
tions. Other key bodies include the Central Military Commission 
headed by Kim Jong II; the Central Auditing Committee, the fiscal 
watchdog of the party; and the Central Inspection Committee, which 
enforces party discipline and acts as a trial and appeals board for dis- 
ciplinary cases. 

The various departments of the Secretariat of the Central Com- 
mittee depend for implementation of party policies and directives on 



208 



Kim II Sung (left) with Kim Jong II during the Sixth Korean Workers ' Party 

Congress, Pyongyang, October 1980 
Courtesy Choson (P yongyang), September 2000, 6 

the party committees in the provincial- and county-level administra- 
tive divisions and in organizations where there are more than 100 
party members — for example, major enterprises, factories, govern- 
ment offices, military units, and schools. In the countryside, village 
party committees are formed with a minimum of 50 party members. 
The basic party units are cells to which all party members belong 
and through which they participate in party organizational activities. 
Attendance at cell meetings and party study sessions, held at least 
once a week, is mandatory. 

Party Members 

The KWP claimed a membership of more than 3 million persons as 
of 1988, a significant increase from the 2 million members announced 
in 1976. Later information on party membership strength has not been 
forthcoming from North Korea. This increase may have been a result 
of the active mobilization drive for the Three Revolutions Team 
Movement. The KWP has three constituencies: industrial workers, 
peasants, and intellectuals, that is, office workers. Since 1948 indus- 
trial workers have constituted the largest percentage of party members, 
followed by peasants and intellectuals. Beginning in the 1970s, when 
North Korea's population reached the 50 percent urban mark, the com- 
position of the groups belonging to the party changed. More people 



209 



North Korea: A Country Study 

working in state-owned enterprises became party members, and the 
number of members working in agricultural cooperatives decreased. 

Party Cadres 

The recruitment and training of party cadres (kanbu) has long 
been the primary concern of party leadership. Party cadres are those 
officials placed in key positions in party organizations, ranging from 
the Political Bureau to the village party committees; in government 
agencies; in economic enterprises; in military and internal security 
units; in educational institutions; and in mass organizations. The 
duties of cadres are to educate and lead party and nonparty members 
of society and to ensure that party policies and directives are carried 
out faithfully. The party penetrates all aspects of life. Associations 
and guidance committees exist at all levels of society, with a local 
party cadre serving as a key member of each committee. 

Some cadres are concerned principally with ideological matters, 
whereas others need to be both ideologically prepared and able to 
give guidance to the technical or managerial activities of the state. 
Regardless of specialization, all party cadres must devote two hours 
a day to the study of chuch 'e ideology and Kim II Sung's policies 
and instruction. The party has a number of schools for cadre training. 
At the national level, the most prestigious school is the Kim II Sung 
Higher Party School in P'yongyang, administered directly by the 
Central Committee and attended by high-level party officials. Below 
the national level, there are communist colleges in each province for 
the education of county-level cadres. Village-level cadres are sent to 
county training schools. 

The rules governing cadre selection have undergone subtle changes 
in emphasis. Through the early 1970s, "good class origin," individual 
ability, and ideological posture were given more or less equal consid- 
eration in the appointment of cadres. Since the mid-1970s, however, 
the doctrinally ordained "class principle" has been downgraded on the 
assumption that the actual social or class status of people should not be 
judged on the basis of their past family backgrounds but on their 
"present class preparation and mental attitudes." The party increas- 
ingly stresses individual merit and "absolute" loyalty as the criteria for 
acceptance into the elite status of cadre. Merit and competence have 
come to mean "a knowledge of the economy and technology." Such 
knowledge is considered crucial because, as Kim II Sung stressed in 
July 1974, "Party organizational work should be intimately linked to 
economic work and intra-party work should be conducted to ensure 
success in socialist construction and backup economic work." 



210 



Government and Politics 



An equally important, if not more important, criterion for cadre 
selection is political loyalty, inasmuch as not all cadres of correct 
class origin or all highly competent cadres are expected to pass the 
rigorous tests of party life. These tests entail absolute loyalty to Kim 
II Sung and Kim Jong II and the party, thorough familiarity with 
chuch 'e ideology, refusal to temporize in the face of adversity, and a 
readiness to respond to the party's call under any conditions and at 
all times. 

Although information on the composition of cadre membership is 
limited, the number of cadres of non-worker and non-peasant origin 
has increased steadily. These cadres generally are classified as 
"working intellectuals" engaged in occupations ranging from party 
and government activities to educational, technical, and artistic pur- 
suits. Another notable trend is the infusion of younger and better- 
educated cadres into the party ranks. An accent on youth and innova- 
tion was very much in evidence after 1973 when Kim Jong II 
assumed the leading role in the Three Revolutions Team Movement. 

The Ruling Elite 

Persons with at least one major position in leading party, govern- 
ment, and military organs are considered the ruling elite. This group 
includes all political leaders who are, at a given time, directly involved 
in the preparation of major policy decisions and who participate in the 
inner circle of policy making. The ruling elite includes Political 
Bureau members and secretaries of the KWP, Central People's Com- 
mittee members, members of the State Administration Council, and 
members of the Central Military Commission and the National 
Defense Commission. Because overlapping membership is common 
in public office, top-ranking officeholders number less than 100. In 
any event, those having the most influential voice in policy formula- 
tion are members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee. 

Top leaders share a number of common social characteristics. 
There is no clear evidence of regional underrepresentation. Nonethe- 
less, many Hamgyong natives are included in the inner circle. 

Leadership Succession 

Beginning in the fall of 1975, North Koreans used the term party 
center to refer to Kim Jong II. However, for a few years after its ini- 
tial introduction the term appeared only infrequently, because Kim II 
Sung's efforts to promote his son met some resistance. Kim II Sung 
purged many of his son's opponents, however, and neither Kim 
faced any active opposition thereafter. 



211 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Kim II Sung took the rank of grand marshal (taewonsu) on April 
13, 1992, and on April 20, 1992, Kim Jong II, as supreme commander 
of the armed forces, gained the rank of marshal (wonsu). Kim II Sung 
was the president and chairman of the National Defense Commission, 
with command and control of the armed forces, until Kim Jong II 
assumed the latter position in April 1993. 

There were many scenarios for leadership succession. Some of the 
prospects derived from a common postulation that arrangements after 
the death of Kim II Sung would take at least a few years to clarify 
because of the decades-long preparation of a succession plan. South 
Korean scholar Yang Sung-chul labeled this "positive skepticism" and 
called short-term failure, such as a coup d'etat or a revolution, "nega- 
tive skepticism." "Negative skepticism" was not to be dismissed, how- 
ever, because of Kim Jong Il's weaknesses — his lack of charisma, 
poor international recognition, and unknown governing skills — as 
well as the sagging domestic economy and external factors, such as 
inter-Korean, North Korea-Japan, and North Korea-United States 
relations (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). 

Kim Jong Il's appointment as commander of the Korean People's 
Army suggested that the succession issue had finally been solved 
because the military was once considered his weak point; he already 
had full control of the state and the economic administration. Kim 
Jong II also manages political affairs and KWP commercial opera- 
tions as a primary authority and handles symbolic roles, such as 
meeting with foreign leaders and appearing at national celebrations. 

In addition, Kim Jong II plays a prominent role in the KWP propa- 
ganda machine — mass media, literature, and art. Many literary works 
and performance works — including films, operas, and plays — have 
been produced under the "revolutionary tradition" of the KWP and 
Kim's guidance. Kim uses popular culture to broaden his public image 
and gain popular support (see Leisure Activities, ch. 2; Japan, this ch.). 

Kim Jong II tried to expedite economic growth and productivity 
using the Three Revolutions Team Movement, which was designed 
to inspire the broad masses into actively participating in the Three 
Revolutions. At the Fifth Party Congress, Kim II Sung emphasized 
the necessity of pressing ahead more vigorously with the Three Rev- 
olutions so as to consolidate the socialist system. In response, Kim 
Jong II developed the follow-up slogan, "Let us meet the require- 
ments of the chuck 'e in ideology, technology and culture." Most 
units forged ahead with "ideological education" to teach the party 
members and other workers to become revolutionaries of the 
chuch 'e idea. In many spheres of the national economy, productivity 
also is expected to increase as a result of the technology emphasis of 



212 



The Tower of Immortality in 
P 'ydngyang; the inscription reads 
"The Great Leader Comrade Kim II 
Sung Is with Us Forever. " 
Courtesy Korea Today (P 'ydngyang), 
December 1997, 31 



the campaigns. In addition, the "cultural revolution" addresses pro- 
moting literacy and cultural identity. 

Chuch 'e, instrumental in providing a consistent and unifying 
framework for commitment and action in the political arena, offers a 
foundation for the party's incessant demand for spartan austerity, sac- 
rifice, discipline, and dedication. It has not yet been determined, how- 
ever, whether chuch 'e is an asset or a liability for Kim. Nonetheless, 
Kim is likely to continue to emphasize chuch 'e as the only satisfactory 
answer to all challenging questions in North Korea, particularly 
because he attributes the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union 
and East European countries to their lack of chuch 'e ideology. 

Graduates of the first class of the Man'gyongdae Revolutionary 
Institute, established in 1947, support Kim Jong Il's power base. 
Many of these graduates occupy key positions in government and 
the military. For example, O Guk-nyol and General Paek Hak- 
nim — the latter, the former minister of people's security — are mem- 
bers of the Central Military Commission, the KWP Central Commit- 
tee, and the Supreme People's Assembly; Kim Hwan, a former 
minister of chemical industry and vice premier, is a member of both 
the KWP Central Committee and the Supreme People's Assembly; 
and Kim Yong-sun, an alternate member of the Political Bureau, is 
the director of the International Affairs Department, KWP Central 
Committee. 



213 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Kim Jong Nam, the eldest of Kim Jong Il's children, appeared 
likely to be the chosen successor until 2001, when he was arrested in 
Narita International Airport in Japan for traveling on a forged pass- 
port from the Dominican Republic. It is now believed that Kim Jong 
Chul, Kim's second son, will be the heir. Kim Jong Chul holds a 
position at the KWP Central Committee Leadership Division, just as 
Kim Jong II did when he was trained to succeed his father. 

In May 2005, reports of dissident activities against the regime 
began to trickle out of the country, including video images purported 
to be of defaced Kim Jong II portraits. Other rumors indicated that 
official Kim Jong II portraits were being removed from public build- 
ings. It is unclear whether these reports were authentic and whether 
the incidents were isolated or widespread, but shortly thereafter, 
public executions of traitors also were reported. 

Mass Organizations 

All mass organizations are guided and controlled by the KWP. A 
number of political and social organizations appear concerned with 
the promotion of special-interest groups but actually serve as auxil- 
iaries to the party. Many of these organizations were founded in the 
early years of the KWP to serve as vehicles for the party's efforts to 
penetrate a broader cross section of the population. 

Mass organizations have another important function: to create the 
impression that there are noncommunist social, political, cultural, 
and professional groups that can work with their South Korean coun- 
terparts toward national reunification. Most of these organizations 
were established to develop a unified strategy in dealing with the rul- 
ing establishment of South Korea and other foreign countries and 
organizations. As of 2006, these included the Korean Social Demo- 
cratic Party, Chongu Party, Socialist Working Youth League, Com- 
mittee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, Korean 
Democratic Women's Union, Korean National Peace Committee, 
Korean Students Committee, General Federation of Trade Unions, 
and many others. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of 
the Fatherland has been actively involved in the two Koreas' recon- 
ciliation talks since the early 1990s. 

Among auxiliary organizations, one frequently covered in the 
media is the Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League. Directly subordi- 
nate to the party Central Committee, it is the only mass organization 
expressly mentioned in the KWP constitution. The league is the 
party's most important ideological and organizational training 
ground, with branches and cells wherever there are regular party 
organizations. Youth league cells exist in the army, factories, cooper- 



214 



Government and Politics 



ative farms, schools, cultural institutions, and government agencies. 
The organization is hailed as a "militant reserve" of the party; its 
members are described as heirs to the revolution, reliable reserves, 
and active assistants of the party. Young people between the ages of 
14 and 26 are eligible to join the league regardless of other organiza- 
tional affiliations, provided they meet requirements similar to those 
for party membership. The junior version of the youth league is the 
Young Pioneer Corps, open to children between the ages of nine and 
about 15. The P'yongyang Children's Palace is maintained by league 
members for the extracurricular activities of Young Pioneer Corps 
members. 

The principal vehicle for Pyongyang's united front strategy in 
dealing with South Korea and foreign counterparts is the Democratic 
Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, popularly known as the 
Fatherland Front. The Fatherland Front actually is an umbrella for 
various other organizations and thus ostensibly is a nonpolitical, 
nongovernmental organization. Choch'ongryon (see Glossary), the 
General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, is one of the best 
known of the foreign auxiliary organizations. Its mission is to enlist 
the allegiance of the more than 600,000 Korean residents in Japan. 
At least one-third of these residents, who also are courted assidu- 
ously by Seoul, are considered supporters of P'yongyang. The 
remaining two-thirds of the members are either South Korean loyal- 
ists or neutral. Those who are friendly toward North Korea are 
regarded by P'yongyang as its citizens and are educated at Korean 
schools in Japan that are financially subsidized by North Korea. 
These Koreans are expected to work for the North Korean cause 
either in Japan or as returnees to North Korea. 

The activities of these mass organizations occasionally are 
reported in the news; however, it is usually difficult to ascertain what 
they actually do. Organizations such as the Korean Social Demo- 
cratic Party and the Chongu Party disclose only the officially pub- 
lished names of their leaders and do not report anything about their 
membership or activities. 

The Media 

Article 67 of the 1998 constitution states that North Korean citi- 
zens are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstra- 
tion, and association. Of course, such activities are permitted only in 
support of government and KWP objectives. Kim Jong II has even 
written a handbook for aspiring journalists, entitled The Great 
Teacher of Journalists. It provides guidelines on portraying the lead- 
ership in the most favorable way. Other articles of the constitution 



215 



North Korea: A Country Study 

require citizens to follow the socialist norms of life; for example, a 
collective spirit takes precedence over individual political or civil 
liberties. 

Domestic media censorship is strictly enforced, and deviation 
from the official government line is not tolerated. The regime pro- 
hibits listening to foreign media broadcasts, and violators reportedly 
are subject to severe punishment. Senior party cadres, however, have 
good access to the foreign media. No external media are allowed free 
access to North Korea, but an agreement to share in Japan's telecom- 
munications satellites was reached in September 1 990. 

Newspapers, broadcasting, and other mass media are major vehi- 
cles for information dissemination and political propaganda. 
Although most households have radios and some have television 
sets, neither radios nor televisions can be tuned to anything other 
than official programming. Only some 10 percent of the radios and 
30 percent of the televisions are in private households (see Telecom- 
munications and the Internet, ch. 3). Government control extends to 
artistic and academic circles, and visitors report that the primary 
function of movies, books, and the performing arts is to contribute to 
the cult of personality surrounding Kim II Sung. 

The media are government controlled. As of 2006, there were 
four main television stations, approximately 17 AM stations, 14 FM 
stations, 14 domestic shortwave stations, and a powerful interna- 
tional shortwave station. The latter broadcasts in English, French, 
German, Russian, Spanish, and several Asian languages. Korean 
Central Broadcasting Station and P'yongyang Broadcasting Station 
(Radio P'yongyang) are the central radio stations; there are also sev- 
eral local stations and stations for overseas broadcasts. "One margin- 
ally positive development in the past couple of years," according to a 
2003 International Press Institute report, "was the decision by the 
government to scrap radio broadcastings aimed at blaming South 
Korea for almost everything." 

A number of newspapers are published. Nodong Shinmun, the 
news organ of the party Central Committee, has a circulation of 
approximately 1.5 million. Kulloja, the theoretical organ of the party 
Central Committee, claims a circulation of about 300,000 readers. 
Minju Choson (Democratic Korea) is the government newspaper, 
and Nodong Chongnyon (Working Youth) is the newspaper of the 
Socialist Working Youth League. There also are specialized news- 
papers for teachers, the army, and railway workers. 

The Korean Central News Agency (Choson Chungyang Tongsinsa 
— KCNA) is the primary agency for gathering and disseminating news. 
KCNA publishes the daily paper Choson Chungyang T'ongsin (Korean 
Central News), Sajin T'ongsin (Photographic News), and Choson 



216 



The Unification of the Fatherland Three-Constitutions Memorial; the 
inscription at top, with the unified Korean Peninsula, reads "Three 

Constitutions. " 

Courtesy Choson (Pyongyang), March 2002, 15 

Chungyang Yonbo (Korean Central Yearbook). KCNA issues daily 
press releases in English, French, Spanish, and Russian; newscasts in 
these and other languages are beamed overseas. The Foreign Lan- 
guages Press Group issues the monthly magazines Korea Today and 
Korea Pictorial, the quarterly Foreign Trade of the Democratic Peo- 
ple s Republic of Korea, and the weekly newspaper the P 'yongyang 
Times published in English, French, and Spanish. All of these latter 
publications are available on the Internet from an official North Korean 
Web site. 

Despite all of these media, information from the outside world is 
not freely available, nor is information from North Korea available 
without censorship. Very few ordinary people in North Korea have 
access to the Internet. Although in the early twenty-first century 
more foreign journalists have been allowed into the country than in 
earlier years, movement within North Korea is restricted, and what is 
allowed is closely monitored. 

Foreign Policy 

North Korea's foreign relations are shaped by a mixture of histori- 
cal, nationalistic, ideological, and pragmatic considerations. The ter- 
ritorial division of the peninsula looms large in the political thinking 



217 



North Korea: A Country Study 



of North Korean leaders and is a driving force in their management 
of internal and external affairs. Over the centuries, unequal relations, 
foreign depredation, dependence on foreigners for assorted favors, 
and the emulation of foreign cultures and institutions are less the 
exception than the rule in Korea's perceptions of the outside world. 
These patterns give rise to the widely shared assumption among 
Koreans that their capacity to control their national destiny is limited 
by geopolitical constraints. 

Inter-Korean Affairs 

The reunification of the two Koreas is seen as a difficult goal by 
both the North and South. Although P'yongyang and Seoul agreed in 
principle in 1972 that unification should be achieved peacefully and 
without foreign interference, they continued to differ substantially 
on the practical methods of attaining reunification; this area of dis- 
agreement has not narrowed in subsequent years. Inter-Korean dia- 
logue in North Korea is the responsibility of the State Security 
Department (see State Security Department, ch. 5). 

North Korea's goal of unification remains constant, but tactics have 
changed depending on the perception of opportunities and limitations 
implicit in shifting domestic and external currents and events. From 
the beginning, North Korea has insisted that an inter-Korean political 
formula should be based on parity or equality, rather than population. 
Because South Korea has more than twice the population of North 
Korea, a supreme Korean council set up according to a one-person, 
one-vote formula would give South Korea a commanding position. 
Another constant is Pyongyang's insistence that the Korean question 
be settled as an internal Korean affair without foreign interference. 

Pyongyang's position that unification should be achieved by 
peaceful means was belied by circumstances surrounding the outbreak 
of the Korean War in 1950 and by subsequent infiltrations, the digging 
of invasion tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ — see Glos- 
sary), and other incidents. North Korea's contention that the conflict 
was started by South Korea and the United States failed to impress 
South Korea's population and has been proven false by Soviet 
archives. The war, in effect, reinforced the obvious ideological and 
systemic incompatibilities that were in place at the time of the division 
of the peninsula in 1945. At the 1954 Geneva Conference, North 
Korea proposed the formation of an all-Korean commission to achieve 
unification and a single, elected legislature; the withdrawal of all for- 
eign troops from the Korean Peninsula; and the formal declaration by 
outside powers of the need for peaceful development and unification 
in Korea. P'yongyang also proposed that the armies of both countries 



218 



Kim Dae Jung, president of South 
Korea, meets Kim Jong II, 
P yongyang, June 2000. 
Courtesy Choson (P yongyang), 
August 2000, 1 




be reduced to 100,000 persons each within a year, that neither side 
enter into any military alliance, and that measures be taken to facilitate 
economic and cultural exchanges. The sincerity of these proposals is 
at best debatable, but the positions taken by North Korea in the early 
Cold War years clearly reflected confidence and competitiveness with 
South Korea in military, economic, and political terms. 

Inter-Korean affairs became more complex in 1970 and 1971, in 
part because of the U.S. decision to withdraw some of its troops 
from South Korea and because of moves by the United States and 
China to improve their relations. In August 1971, amid signs of a 
thaw in the Cold War and an uncertain international environment, 
the Red Cross societies of Seoul and P 'yongyang agreed to open 
talks aimed at the eventual reunion of dispersed families. These 
high-level talks — between Kim II Sung's brother and the chief of the 
South Korean Central Intelligence Agency — were held alternately in 
the two capitals and paralleled behind-the-scenes contacts to initiate 
political negotiations, reportedly at South Korea's suggestion. The 
talks continued to make progress and resulted in a joint communique 
issued on July 4, 1972, in which the two countries agreed to abide by 
three principles of unification: to work toward reunifying the coun- 
try independently and without foreign interference; to transcend dif- 
ferences in ideology and political systems; and to unify the peninsula 
peacefully without the use of armed force. 



219 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Despite the various committees set up by the 1972 communique, 
it quickly became obvious to both sides that they had fundamentally 
divergent approaches. North Korea's position "front-loaded" all sig- 
nificant concessions from the South, including the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from South Korea, while the South sought to build 
transparency and trust first through confidence-building measures 
and "low politics" cooperation. 

At the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, Kim II Sung proposed 
the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, 
which would be based on a single unified state, leaving the two systems 
intact and federating the two governments. The Supreme National 
Assembly, with an equal number of representatives from North and 
South and an appropriate number of representatives of overseas Kore- 
ans, would be formed with a confederal standing committee to "guide 
the regional governments of the North and the South and to administer 
all the affairs of the confederal state." The regional governments of the 
North and South would have independent policies — within lim- 
its — consistent with the fundamental interests and demands of the 
whole nation and would strive to narrow their differences in all areas. 
But South Korea rejected the confederation as a propaganda ploy. 

No significant dialogue occurred between the two countries until 
the middle of 1984, when South Korea suffered a devastating flood. 
North Korea proposed to send relief goods to flood victims in South 
Korea, and the offer was accepted. This occasion provided the 
momentum for both sides to resume their suspended dialogue. In 
1985 the two countries exchanged performing arts groups, and 92 
members of separated families met. In January 1986, however, 
North Korea once again suddenly cut off all talks with South Korea, 
blaming "Team Spirit," the annual U.S.-South Korean joint military 
exercise. 

In 1988 the South Korean government of Roh Tae-woo pursued a 
new "northern diplomacy" or Nordpolitik (see Glossary) aimed at 
North Korea's allies. Ostensibly, it was an initiative to prevent ideol- 
ogy from trumping national interest as Seoul sought to broaden rela- 
tions in the region, but the strategy's true payoff was its ability to 
woo both China and the Soviet Union into diplomatic relations, 
thereby constituting the ultimate diplomatic coup over the North. 
South Korea's efforts in conjunction with the North's economic dif- 
ficulties compelled a basic change in Pyongyang's strategy toward 
Seoul. 

Five rounds of meetings were held alternately in Seoul and 
P'yongyang before the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggres- 
sion, Exchanges, and Cooperation between the South and the North 



220 



Government and Politics 



was signed on December 13, 1991. The accord reaffirmed the 1972 
principles of peaceful unification, issued a joint declaration of non- 
aggression, and instituted a variety of other confidence-building 
measures (for example, advance warning of troop movements and 
exercises and the installation of a telephone hot line between top 
military commanders). Several joint inter-Korean subcommittees 
were established to work out the specifics for implementing the gen- 
eral terms of the accord on economic cooperation, travel and com- 
munication, cultural exchanges, political affairs, and military affairs. 
Separate from the prime minister-level dialogue, yet closely associ- 
ated with it, were talks held between the two Red Cross organiza- 
tions about reunification of families. 

The two Koreas also stated in a parallel agreement that their pen- 
insula should be "free of nuclear weapons." The ensuing Joint Dec- 
laration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was 
signed on January 20, 1992, and took force on February 19, 1992, 
called for the establishment of a Joint Nuclear Control Commission 
to negotiate a credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspection 
regime. Although negotiations produced substantive progress on the 
drafting of detailed accords to achieve ratification of the 1991 
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and 
Cooperation, nothing was implemented. 

The next major watershed in inter-Korean relations revolved around 
the Sunshine Policy of the South Korean government under Kim Dae 
Jung. Various events led to the formation of this policy. Kim Dae Jung 
entered office in 1998 at the height of South Korea's financial crisis, 
and after a period of time in which the lessons of German unification 
had seeped into all of South Korean society. The focus of national 
attention on extricating South Korea from its economic crisis, in com- 
bination with the liberal ideologies long held by the new president, 
allowed Kim to put forward a new view of inter-Korean relations with 
relatively little opposition. Kim called for an open-ended engagement 
of North Korea in which unreciprocated cooperation was acceptable, 
and indeed expected. The Sunshine Policy encouraged all countries to 
engage with the North, in a departure from the position of his predeces- 
sor, South Korean president Kim Young-sam, who desired all engage- 
ment with the North to be routed through Seoul. This new approach 
facilitated the North's normalization of diplomatic relations with a 
number of European countries, including the United Kingdom and 
other European Union nations. By seeking to create a modicum of trust 
and transparency through Seoul's one-sided generosity, the Sunshine 
Policy constituted an entirely different stance from the decades of zero- 
sum diplomatic contention between North and South. The policy also 



221 



North Korea: A Country Study 

resulted in the establishment of a joint- venture scenic sport and tourism 
project, at Mount Kumgang, in the North near the DMZ, as well as the 
reconnection of railroad lines between the two Koreas. 

The Sunshine Policy's culmination was the historic June 2000 
summit in which Kim Dae Jung went to North Korea to meet with 
Kim Jong II. The joint communique from the meeting reaffirmed the 
principles of peaceful unification and proposed more family 
reunions. But the most long-lasting impact of the summit was the 
image of the two leaders embracing, broadcast throughout South 
Korea. A cathartic moment for many Koreans, this event had the 
effect of changing South Korean popular views of the North, virtu- 
ally overnight. Images of a demonized North Korean leader were 
replaced by an infatuation with him. Views of a North Korean 
"threat" were lost on much of the younger generation of South Kore- 
ans, despite the absence of any amelioration of the military situation 
on the ground (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, ch. 5). 

In spite of later revelations that the South Korean government 
made unofficial cash payments to facilitate the June 2000 summit, 
the Sunshine Policy continued to gain popularity among the younger 
generation in the South and in the government of Roh Moo Hyun 
(president of South Korea, 2003-8), although it was renamed the 
Peace and Prosperity Policy. A wave of demonstrations, which 
accompanied the electoral victory of Roh in 2002, have led some to 
believe that the younger generation (that is, under age 50) in South 
Korea has aligned itself more with the fate of North Korea than with 
the country's traditional ally, the United States. While not denying 
that South Koreans are in the midst of a new reconciliation mood 
with the North in the aftermath of the Sunshine Policy, this mood is 
subject to several constraints. 

First is the sober realization that the U.S. military presence is still 
critical to South Korean security. Demonstrations protesting that 
presence died down significantly after Washington initiated plans to 
reduce its troops on the peninsula as part of a larger realignment of 
forces in Asia. Second, changes in North Korea's nuclear posture 
could result in changes in the public perception. If part of the gener- 
osity toward the North stemmed from an inner confidence in Seoul 
that South Korea holds decisive superiority across all national indi- 
cators of power, the 2006 nuclear test by the North altered those 
visions. Third, it remains unclear whether any of the impact of the 
Sunshine Policy has reached deep into North Korea. Should these 
engagement efforts reveal no change in North Korean preferences 
over the long term, South Korean supporters of the policy might be 
discouraged. 



222 



Government and Politics 



China and the Soviet Union/Russia 

North Korea owes its survival as a separate political entity to 
China and the Soviet Union. Both countries provided critical mili- 
tary assistance — personnel and materiel — during the Korean War. 
From then until the early 1990s, China and the Soviet Union both 
were North Korea's most important markets and its major suppliers 
of oil and other basic necessities. Similarly, China and the Soviet 
Union were reliable pillars of diplomatic support. 

Moscow and Beijing's normalization of diplomatic relations with 
South Korea in 1990 and 1992, respectively, presaged a sea change 
in North Korea's foreign policy. Despite the professed chuck 'e ideol- 
ogy, Soviet and Chinese patronage to the North constituted main- 
stays of the economy. When both Cold War patrons terminated this 
support on normalization of relations with Seoul, the North's econ- 
omy began to register negative growth rates for much of the rest of 
the decade (see Collapse in the 1990s, ch. 3). Famine conditions in 
the mid-1990s were also partially a consequence of the North's loss 
of aid from its patrons. Pyongyang's relations with the Soviet Union 
and then Russia were permanently damaged. Moscow's abrupt shed- 
ding of the North as Russia sought to gain access to US$3 billion in 
loans from the wealthier South Korea (as part of its 1990 diplomatic 
normalization with Seoul) greatly offended Kim II Sung. China 
sought a less draconian break with the North, emphasizing the need 
for strong relations with both Koreas. 

Close North Korea-China ties continue, but Beijing strives to 
maintain a balance in its relationship with the two Koreas, a far cry 
from its previous four decades of dealing solely with P'yongyang. 
China welcomed the 1 992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula, making clear its preference for a non- 
nuclear Korea. Beijing also urged P'yongyang to cooperate with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA — see Glossary). Bei- 
jing clearly views its economic interest on the peninsula as being 
linked with the South; China has surpassed the United States as 
South Korea's largest trading partner. Yet, for strategic and historical 
reasons, China maintains its policy of keeping the North Korean 
regime afloat. 

Since 2003, talks among six nations (North Korea, South Korea, 
China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) — the so-called Six- 
Party Talks — have offered a forum that enabled China to play a 
larger diplomatic role on the Korean Peninsula. Hosting the talks in 
Beijing and taking on the self-proclaimed label of "honest broker," 
China sought to score diplomatic points in the region and enhance its 
influence. In the end, however, the equation for Beijing remains a 



223 



North Korea: A Country Study 

peculiar but compelling one. It seeks a nonnuclear North Korea as 
well as an economically reformed state, but China continues to pro- 
vide energy and food assistance to the North even in the absence of 
progress on denuclearization or reform because of the potential costs 
of regime collapse. 

The Soviet Union stunned North Korea in September 1990 when 
it established diplomatic relations with South Korea. Since then and 
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991, North 
Korea has worked to build a relationship with Russia's new political 
leaders. North Korea's efforts to recapture some of the previous 
closeness and economic benefits of its relationship with the former 
Soviet Union are seriously hampered, however, by Russia's preoccu- 
pation with its own political and economic woes. Trade between the 
two nations has dropped dramatically since 1990, as North Korea 
cannot compete with the quality of goods South Korea can offer. 
Whereas in the past the Soviet Union had readily extended credit to 
North Korea, Russia has demanded hard currency for North Korea's 
purchases. Russia also has signaled North Korea that it intends to 
revise a 1961 defense treaty between North Korea and the Soviet 
Union. The revision most likely will mean that Russia will not be 
obligated to assist North Korea militarily except in the event that 
North Korea is invaded. 

In large part as a result of changes in its historical relationships 
with China and the Soviet Union, North Korea faces a foreign policy 
paradox. Although it arguably has more diplomatic relations with 
Western countries than ever before, as a result of the Sunshine Pol- 
icy, P'yongyang is at the same time more diplomatically, politically, 
and economically isolated. The end of both China's and the Soviet 
Union's Cold War patronage has much to do with this new situation. 
The future direction of North Korea-China relations will be a critical 
indicator of the viability of the North Korean regime. If Beijing con- 
tinues to view the costs of "muddling through" — a phrase coined by 
Marcus Noland, a noted economist, and now widely used — North 
Korea's economic hardship as better than the costs of collapse, then 
the regime may be capable of subsisting in its current state. If, how- 
ever, the status quo results in a nuclear North Korea, then the costs to 
Beijing of "muddling through" may grow sufficiently high to war- 
rant change of the regime itself. 

Japan 

Until the late 1980s, North Korea's post-World War II policy 
toward Japan was mainly aimed at minimizing cooperation between 
Japan and South Korea and at deterring Japan's rearmament while 



224 




Kim Jong II shaking hands with China s President Hu Jintao, Beijing, 

April 2004 

Courtesy Choson (P 'yongyang), June 2004, 1 
Russia s President Vladimir V. Putin holds talks with Kim Jong II, 

Pyongyang, July 19-20, 2000. 
Courtesy Choson (P yongyang), September 2000, 4 

striving for closer diplomatic and commercial ties with Japan. Cru- 
cial to this position was the fostering within Japan of support for 
North Korea, especially among the Japanese who supported their 
nation's communist and socialist parties and the ethnic Korean resi- 
dents of Japan. Over the years, however, North Korea did much to 
discredit itself in the eyes of many potential supporters in Japan. The 
cases of missing Japanese citizens attributed to North Korean kid- 
nappings went unresolved. And Japanese citizens who had accompa- 
nied their spouses to North Korea had endured severe hardships and 
were prevented from communicating with relatives and friends in 
Japan. Japan watched with dismay as, in April 1970, North Korea 
gave safe haven to elements of the Japanese Red Army, a terrorist 
group. North Korea's inability and re nasal to pay its debts to Japa- 
nese traders also reinforced popular Japanese disdain for North 
Korea. 

Coincidental with the changing patterns in its relations with China 
and Russia, North Korea has moved to improve its strained relations 



225 



North Korea: A Country Study 

with Japan. Pyongyang's primary motives appear to be a quest for 
relief from diplomatic and economic isolation, which has also caused 
serious shortages of food, energy, and hard currency. Normalization of 
relations with Japan also raises the possibility of North Korea's gain- 
ing monetary compensation for the period of Japan's colonial occupa- 
tion (1910^5), a precedent set when Japan normalized relations with 
South Korea. 

The first round of diplomatic normalization talks was held in 
1991 but quickly broke down over the question of compensation. 
North Korea demanded compensation for damages incurred during 
colonial rule as well as for "sufferings and losses" in the period after 
World War II. Later rounds of normalization talks in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s were stymied by mutual rigidity: the North Koreans 
demanded colonial reparations and refused to discuss Tokyo's con- 
cerns over Pyongyang's deployment of short-range ballistic mis- 
siles threatening Japan. Tokyo set as preconditions for progress 
North Korea's provision of information regarding nationals abducted 
from Japan by North Korean agents in the 1970s and a satisfactory 
resolution to the nuclear weapons issue. 

With talks stalled, an apparent breakthrough materialized in Sep- 
tember 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro agreed to visit 
North Korea for a one-day summit with Kim Jong II. Building on the 
momentum created by the inter-Korean June 2000 summit, there 
were high hopes of a major improvement in relations. Kim Jong Il's 
admission at this summit that North Korea had indeed kidnapped 
Japanese nationals, however, resulted in a groundswell of popular 
anger in Japan. The public backlash at the news that some of these 
abductees had died without explanation was so severe that Tokyo 
pressed harder for additional information on the circumstance of 
their deaths as a precondition for talks. Bilateral relations were fur- 
ther complicated over this issue when Tokyo refused to return the 
abductees and relatives after they had been granted permission to 
visit Japan. A second summit between Kim Jong II and Koizumi in 
May 2004 did not fully resolve this major impediment to normaliz- 
ing relations. 

Security tensions between P'yongyang and Tokyo augmented the 
political problems over abductees during the same period. In August 
1998, the North staged a ballistic missile test over Japan that height- 
ened concerns immeasurably. This event marked the start of a signifi- 
cant augmentation of Japanese security capabilities. In response to the 
ballistic missile test, Japan launched its first intelligence-gathering sat- 
ellites. During the period 2000^1, moreover, several incidents at sea 
involving North Korean ships and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense 



226 



Government and Politics 



Force vessels occurred, with the Japanese shooting at and sinking a 
North Korean vessel. Also, in response to the North Korean threat, in 
2003^ Japan undertook a set of legislative reforms that enhanced 
Tokyo's capacity to participate in a multilateral proliferation-security 
initiative as well as to impose bilateral sanctions against North Korea, 
even without a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution. As 
of 2006, Japan had not exercised these capabilities. A militarily proac- 
tive Japan will be perhaps the most long-lasting legacy of North 
Korea's threat. 

The United States 

North Korea's relationship with the United States since 1945 has 
been marked by almost continuous confrontation and mistrust. North 
Korea views the United States as the strongest imperialist force in the 
world, the successor to Japanese imperialism, and a malevolent hege- 
mon in a unipolar world in the post-Cold War period. U.S. concerns 
about North Korea as an international outlaw derive from 
Pyongyang's activities in nuclear proliferation and weapons devel- 
opment, sales of weapons technology, illicit narcotics and counterfeit 
currency trafficking, human rights violations, and the conventional 
military threat to Washington's allies in the region. 

The uneasy armistice that halted the intense fighting of the 
Korean War on July 27, 1953, occasionally has been broken. Perpet- 
uating the mutual distrust was North Korea's 1968 seizure of the 
intelligence-gathering ship USS Pueblo, the downing of a U.S. 
reconnaissance plane in 1969, and the 1976 killing of two U.S. army 
officers at the P'anmunjom Joint Security Area in the middle of the 
DMZ. North Korea's assassination in 1983 of several South Korean 
cabinet officials educated in the United States and the terrorist 
bombing of a Baghdad-Seoul South Korean airliner in midair off the 
coast of Burma in 1987 likewise have reinforced U.S. perceptions of 
North Korea as unworthy of having diplomatic or economic ties with 
the United States. 

In 1988 the United States launched its own modest diplomatic initia- 
tive to reduce Pyongyang's isolation and to encourage its opening to 
the outside world. Consequently, the U.S. government began facilitat- 
ing cultural, scholarly, journalistic, athletic, and other exchanges with 
North Korea. After a hesitant start, by the early 1990s almost monthly 
exchanges were occurring in these areas between the two nations, a 
halting but significant movement away from total estrangement. 

The United States supported the simultaneous admission of both 
Koreas into the UN in September 1991. That same month, President 
George H.W. Bush announced the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical 



227 



North Korea: A Country Study 

nuclear weapons worldwide. In January 1992, after North Korea had 
publicly committed itself to the signing of a nuclear safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA and to permitting IAEA inspections of its 
primary nuclear facility at Yongbyon, about 50 kilometers north of 
P'yongyang, President Bush and South Korean president Roh Tae- 
woo cancelled the 1992 joint annual "Team Spirit" military exercise. 

In February 1992, the U.S. Department of State's undersecretary 
for political affairs, Arnold Kantor, met with his North Korean coun- 
terpart, the director of the KWP Central Committee's International 
Affairs Department, Kim Yong-sun, in New York City. At this meet- 
ing, the United States set forth the steps it wanted North Korea to 
take prior to normalization of relations. North Korea had to facilitate 
progress in the North-South dialogue; end its export of missile and 
related technology; renounce terrorism; cooperate in determining the 
fate of all U.S. Korean War unaccounted-for military personnel; 
demonstrate increasing respect for human rights; and conclude a 
credible and effective North-South nuclear inspection regime 
designed to complement inspections conducted by the IAEA. Once a 
credible and effective bilateral North-South inspection regime had 
been implemented, the U.S. Government would initiate a policy- 
level dialogue with North Korea to formulate specifics for resolving 
other outstanding U.S. concerns. The culmination of this diplomacy 
was the June 1993 North Korea-United States joint statement in 
which the two sides expressed their hope for relations to be based on 
the principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and noninter- 
ference in each other's internal affairs. 

The 1993-94 nuclear crisis with North Korea brought to an end this 
short-lived thaw in relations. North Korea's refusal to cease and dis- 
close nuclear activities at its facilities in Yongbyon, in defiance of 
IAEA directives and agreements, became the center of a crisis very 
close to war in June 1994. Last-minute diplomacy by former President 
Jimmy Carter, just as the United States was considering plans to rein- 
force its military presence in the region, enabled North Korea-United 
States bilateral negotiations that led to the October 1994 Agreed 
Framework for the denuclearization of North Korea. Negotiated by 
North Korea's Kang Sok-ju and U.S. ambassador Robert Gallucci, this 
agreement required P'yongyang to freeze, put under international 
monitoring, and ultimately dismantle its nuclear activities at 
Yongbyon. In exchange for these actions, the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea were to form the Korean Peninsula Energy Develop- 
ment Organization consortium to provide two light- water reactors. 
The United States also agreed to provide interim energy supplies in the 
form of heavy fuel oil to the North for the duration of the project. 



228 



On October 11, 2000, the first vice chairman of the National Defense Com- 
mission, Vice Marshal Cho Myong-nok, met with President William J. 

Clinton at the White House, Washington, DC. 
Courtesy Audio-Visual Division, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, 

Little Rock, Arkansas 

Given the degree of mutual mistrust, this agreement was iterated in 
stages such that each side could demonstrate cooperation at each step 
of the implementation process. Over the longer term, the Agreed 
Framework held out the hope of further improvements in relations 
between North Korea and its neighbors across a range of issues 
including missiles, conventional military threats, political normaliza- 
tion, economic aid, and other key issues. 

Concerns about whether the 1994 agreement was being imple- 
mented in good faith began almost immediately after its consumma- 
tion. Because of pressure from the U.S. Congress, Washington fell 
behind in the delivery of interim fuel-oil shipments, although, until 
the termination of these shipments in December 2002, the United 
States fulfilled every shipment. For its part, North Korea went against 
the spirit of the agreement by engaging in provocative acts against 
South Korea and Japan, testing ballistic missiles, and pursuing other 
weapons activities suspected to be in violation of the agreement. 

The Agreed Framework appeared on the brink of collapse over 
suspected nuclear weapons activities at Kumchangri, about 90 kilo- 
meters north of P'yongyang, in North P'yongan Province, in 1998. 
After a protracted negotiation process, inspections of Kumchangri 
turned up nothing, but mistrust was very high, and skepticism about 



229 



North Korea: A Country Study 

North Korean intentions to comply with the 1994 agreement were 
palpable in Washington. A policy review conducted by former Secre- 
tary of Defense William J. Perry in 1999 laid out two paths along 
which U.S. -North Korean relations could proceed. The first was con- 
tinued implementation of the Agreed Framework as a springboard for 
cooperation on other issues of concern such as ballistic missiles. The 
other path would involve alternative, more coercive actions. A flurry 
of diplomatic activity subsequent to the Perry policy review led to the 
visit of North Korean envoy Cho Myong-nok to the United States in 
October 2000 and a joint statement of no hostile intent. U.S. Secre- 
tary of State Madeleine Albright reciprocated with an unprecedented 
October 2000 visit to P'yongyang and meetings with Kim Jong II. 
Discussions about a visit by President Clinton and a potential agree- 
ment on missiles took place but were never concluded. 

In October 2002, the George W. Bush administration stated that 
North Korea was in violation of the 1994 agreement with a clandes- 
tine second nuclear weapons program, using highly enriched ura- 
nium technology. North Korea asserted that it was entitled to such 
weapons if the United States maintained its hostile policy and then 
proceeded in the winter of 2002 to break out of the 1994 agreement, 
unsealing buildings, disabling monitoring cameras, and expelling 
IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon facility. A new forum for dis- 
cussion was established — the Six-Party Talks — hosted by China, 
which sought to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weap- 
ons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. At these talks, 
the United States laid out proposals for nuclear disarmament by 
offering energy assistance from some of the six parties in return for a 
North Korean commitment to verifiable nuclear dismantlement. 

Prospects: The Significance of Reform 

The most significant twenty-first-century political development in 
North Korea relates to the July 2002 market-liberalization reforms, 
generally associated with four measures. The first was a basic mone- 
tization of the economy. The government abolished the coupon- 
based public distribution system for food rations and relaxed price 
controls, thereby allowing supply and demand to determine prices. 
In order to meet the rise in prices, the government also hiked wage 
levels, which had been almost uniform across sectors. For some sec- 
tors, the rise was as much as fortyfold and for other "special" wage 
sectors (government officials, soldiers, miners, and farmers) as much 
as sixtyfold. Small-scale markets have sprouted up all over North 
Korea, and the public ration system has broken down (see Reform of 
the Public Distribution System, ch. 3). 



230 



Government and Politics 



The second reform measure was adopted in August 2002, when 
the government abandoned the artificially high value of the North 
Korean won (for value of the won, see Glossary), adjusting the cur- 
rency exchange rate from 2.15 won per US$1 to 150 won per US$1. 
This measure was aimed at inducing foreign investment and provid- 
ing export incentives for domestic firms. The "unofficial" value of 
the currency has depreciated much further since the reforms. 

A third reform measure was the government's decentralization of 
economic decisions. Measures entailed cutting government subsidies, 
allowing farmers' markets to operate, and devolving managerial deci- 
sions for industry and agriculture from the central government (via 
factory party committees) into the hands of local production units. 
Enterprises now have to cover their own costs. Managers have to 
meet hard budget constraints. Workers are not evaluated based on the 
number of days they show up to work, but on productivity and profit. 
Farmers are now allowed to plant small private plots of land in addi- 
tion to those plots designated for state production. 

The fourth reform measure was the government's pursuit of spe- 
cial administrative districts and industrial zones in order to induce 
foreign investment. The Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, in 
North P'yongan Province on the Yellow Sea (or West Sea, as it is 
called in North Korea) is an open economic zone for foreign busi- 
nesses designed to exist completely outside North Korea's regular 
legal strictures. The Kaesong Special Industrial Zone is another proj- 
ect designed in particular to attract small and medium-sized South 
Korean businesses, and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone operated 
by Hyundai provides hard currency to the North from tourism. All 
three projects sought to avoid the mistakes and failures of the 
Najin-Sonbong International Trade Zone, in the northeast near Rus- 
sia, created by the North in 1991, although these later projects are 
still hampered by the lack of adequate infrastructure, among other 
problems (see Special Economic Zones, ch. 3). 

The July 2002 reforms were unarguably a significant develop- 
ment. They represented the first attempt in the regime's history at 
large-scale economic change. In addition, while Pyongyang's pro- 
paganda continued to maintain anticapitalist rhetoric and spurned 
market economic principles, unlike the cases of China and Vietnam, 
the regime admitted flaws in the socialist-style economy. The signif- 
icance of these reforms, however, does not make them successful. 
The obstacles to successful reform are numerous. 

First, it is unclear whether the July 2002 measures represent the 
equivalent of North Korea's religious "conversion" to capitalism. 
Neither the language nor the nature of these initial reforms appears 
to have the same conviction as those seen in China or Vietnam. 



231 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Moreover, many of the reforms arguably may constitute coping 
mechanisms to deal with immediate problems rather than a whole- 
sale, prescient shift in economic ideology. For example, North Korea 
authorized monetization of the economy and permitted farmers' 
markets to buy and sell goods largely because the public distribution 
system had broken down. Similarly, local managers were given more 
leeway, not because the central government trusted their entrepre- 
neurial capabilities, but because plunging outputs and high absentee 
rates for workers who went searching for food rather than reporting 
to work required some drastic measures. 

When the reform package initially was announced in 2002, the 
government was reluctant to call these measures "reforms, " instead 
referring to an "economic adjustment policy" that would "solidify 
the nation's socialist principles and planned economic system." Such 
statements contradict earlier pronouncements by P'yongyang about 
the difficulties of socialism, raising questions about whether an ideo- 
logical and systemic conversion has yet occurred. Economist Hong 
Ink-pyo has observed that "market freedom is not the goal" and that 
the North Korean authorities intend to normalize the planned econ- 
omy by enhancing efficiency and productivity in industry, and to 
restore the official economic sector so as to absorb or contract the 
private economic sector. 

The economic reforms will test the government's ability to deal 
with the triple problems of inflation, economic losers, and the urban 
poor created by the monetization of the economy. Low supply and 
low output have led to massive increases in prices and further deval- 
uation of the won. By comparison, in 1979 China's initial price 
reforms drove up the price of rice by 25 percent; in North Korea, the 
price has gone up by at least 600 percent, and the won depreciated 
from 150 won (to US$1) in 2002 to 900 won to the dollar in 2003, 
with some estimating the black-market values at 3,000 won to the 
dollar in 2005. The North Korean currency has fallen dramatically 
against China's renminbi as well, depreciating from 30 won to the 
renminbi in August 2002 to 120 won in 2003, to more than 130 won 
in 2004. Despite wage hikes averaging 15 to 20 times the 2002 level, 
these increased wages, if they are truly paid, still cannot keep pace 
with the skyrocketing retail prices, estimated at more than 27 times 
the growth in wage rates. 

Although companies in 2006 were allowed greater flexibility in pro- 
duction, the basic absence of any capital inputs allows flexibility in 
name only. The designated "winners" as a result of these reforms 
would probably include fanners. They are now allowed to produce 
food for sale on the open market, after meeting state production quotas. 



232 



Government and Politics 



They benefit from the inflated prices as a result of increased demand. 
The state also attempted to introduce new seeds and fertilizers to 
increase crop yields. 

Even in a best-case scenario of increased agricultural output stim- 
ulated by the reforms, however, the agricultural sector represents a 
fraction of the economy. The North Korean economy, since the days 
of the Japanese occupation, has been largely an industrial economy 
with some 70 percent of the population residing in cities. And there 
is no internal capacity to increase agricultural output because of the 
decrepit infrastructure, lack of capital inputs and limited arable land, 
creating many losers across society. The reforms enabled Kim Jong 
II to gain some control of the economy by hurting those black mar- 
keters who held large amounts of won before the currency devalua- 
tion. Fixed-income workers were badly hit by the combination of 
price hikes and weakening of the North Korean currency. In addi- 
tion, many workers were laid off by companies forced to cut costs. 
Finally, there is fragmentary evidence that even those sectors of the 
labor force favored by the wage hikes were discontented. Urban fac- 
tory workers fell into a wage-productivity trap where they initially 
were given two months' salary of 3,000 won — which was not 
enough to support a family of four for one month — but nothing 
beyond that. In order to gain wages, the workers needed to produce, 
but in 2004 factories in North Korea operated at less than 30 percent 
capacity. Even among those sectors given the highest wage increases 
(6,000 won) there was widespread discontent. Refugees crossing the 
border into China complained that the promise of higher wages had 
not been kept, with workers receiving only 800 won and then noth- 
ing after October 2003. There is the possibility that "money illusion" 
is wearing off in North Korea, giving way to a new class of urban 
poor, potentially numbering in the millions, that could be difficult to 
control. 

The ultimate success of the reforms rests on the North's capacity to 
secure international food supplies until the changes start to increase 
agricultural output domestically; secure loans to finance shortages in 
cash-flow for managerial enterprises; and obtain technical training in 
accounting, fiscal policy, finance and other requisite skills. A report on 
a U.S. Senate trip to North Korea in 2004 described the basic dilemma: 
in order for the reforms to succeed, the North must overcome chronic 
shortages of electricity, food, timber, coal, capital, technology, and 
trained personnel. Or as a Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corpora- 
tion (HSBC) report published in February 2003 explained, the absence 
of such inputs impedes any chance of sustained economic growth, and 
without such growth there is no way to produce the needed inputs. The 



233 



North Korea: A Country Study 



North's ability to secure this magnitude of assistance depends on a sat- 
isfactory resolution of the nuclear crisis. But P'yongyang continues to 
demand these economic inputs from the United States and others as a 
condition of addressing the world's political concerns about its nuclear 
programs. 



* * * 



Sources on North Korea vary considerably in reliability and bal- 
ance, so they should be used with care, particularly in the case of 
information emanating from North Korea. Information from South 
Korea also has a political bias. Major articles in Nodong Shinmun 
(Workers' Daily), Kulloja (The Worker), and other Korean-language 
publications are available in U.S. Open Source Center (formerly the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service) translations of North 
Korean broadcasts via the U.S. National Technical Information Ser- 
vice's World News Connection (http://wnc.fedworld.gov/). 

For in-depth coverage of North Korea, one of the most compre- 
hensive sources is Pukhan Choson (North Korean Handbook), in 
Korean, prepared by South Korea's Kuktong Munje Yon'guso (Insti- 
tute for East Asian Studies). Pukhan (North Korea), the monthly 
organ of Pukhan Yon'guso, the Research Institute on North Korea in 
Seoul; and Kita Chosen Kenkyo (Studies on North Korea), a Japa- 
nese-language monthly of the Kokusai Kankei Kyodo Kenkyo-jo 
(Joint Research Institute on International Relations) in Tokyo are 
also useful. Vantage Point, an English-language monthly periodical 
issued by Naewoe Press in Seoul, and East Asian Review, an Eng- 
lish-language quarterly published by the Institute for East Asian 
Studies in Seoul, provide in-depth studies of North Korean social, 
economic, and political developments. 

Other sources include the annual survey articles on North Korea 
in Asian Survey and the Europa World Year Book. Various portal 
sites at the Library of Congress offer access to selected official and 
nongovernmental Web sites. These include North Korean resources 
listed in Portals to the World (http://www.loc.gov/rr/international/ 
asian/northkorea/northkorea.html) and on the Law Library's Nations 
of the World (http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/northkorea.html). North 
Korean official Web sites include the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (http://www.korea.dpr.com/) and Naenara Korea Computer 
Center in the DPRKorea (http://www.kcckp.net/en/). (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



234 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Bas-relief on P 'ydngyang s Arch of Triumph showing members of the 
various branches of the Korean People s Army celebrating the liberation 
of their country 

Courtesy Pulmyol ui t'ap (Tower of Immortality) , P 'ydngyang: Munye 
Ch 'ulpansa, 1985, 283 



AS THE WORLD'S MOST MILITARIZED STATE in proportion to 
population, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or 
North Korea, fields a massive combat force that ranks fourth in the 
world in size behind the armed forces of China, the United States, 
and India. North Korea's major forward deployment of armed forces 
near the demilitarized zone (DMZ — see Glossary) that divides the 
Korean Peninsula puts it in a confrontational relationship with the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the United States, as one of the 
final legacies of the Cold War. 

The division of Korea originated as a consequence of a territorial 
partition that was imposed by the United States and the former Soviet 
Union to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces at the end of World 
War II (1939^5; see National Division in the 1940s, ch. 1). Agreeing 
to divide the Korean Peninsula into dual occupation zones at the thirty- 
eighth parallel, the former Soviet Union occupied the North and the 
United States the South in what was intended as a temporary division. 
Instead, antithetical political systems and opposing armed forces were 
established in the two areas; all subsequent efforts to reunify the two 
states have failed. 

Military Heritage 

The origins of North Korea's modern armed forces, which were 
founded on February 8, 1948, as the Korean People's Army (KPA or 
Choson Inmin'gun), can be traced through three forging factors: its 
Kapsan (see Glossary) partisan lineage (1932^45), Soviet occupa- 
tion (1945^8), and Chinese communist associations (1932-50). 
These three factors, perhaps more than any others, have contributed 
uniquely to the formation of the KPA leadership, force structure, 
doctrine, and tactics. 

During the 1930s and 1940s, many Koreans and Chinese joined 
guerrilla units to oppose Japan's annexation of Korea (1910) and Man- 
churia (1931). According to North Korean historiography, Kim II Sung 
(1912-94) organized his Anti- Japanese Guerrilla Army (or Han il 
Yugyotae) on April 25, 1932; it was later renamed the Korean People's 
Revolutionary Army (KPRA or Choson Inmin Hyongmyonggun). In 
1936 the KPRA joined with the Chinese Communist Party's newly 
formed Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, which fought as a 
coherent unit until its defeat in battle by the Japanese Imperial Army in 
1941. Remnants of the defeated northeast army, including Kim II Sung 



237 



North Korea: A Country Study 

and many fellow Koreans, escaped to the Soviet Far East, where they 
joined the Soviet Eighty-eighth Special Brigade. Many of these Korean 
exiles (the Kapsan faction) were given leadership positions within the 
brigade, including Kim II Sung, who commanded the First Battalion. 

At the end of World War II, Koreans repatriated from the Soviet 
Union were either Kapsan faction members (Kim II Sung loyalists) 
or long-term Soviet-Korean residents; the former group would even- 
tually be elevated to positions of government and military authority. 
There were factional power struggles among the various Korean 
troops. The pro-Chinese Yan'an faction had its origins in the Korean 
nationalist movement in China. Kim Mu-chong (1904-51), a veteran 
of the Chinese Communist Party's Long March (1934-35), estab- 
lished the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA or Choson Uiyonggun) in 
Yan'an with Chinese communist backing. Under Chinese commu- 
nist protection, the Yan'an faction trained several thousand soldiers 
and political cadres and was a political and military force to be reck- 
oned with when it attempted to return to Korea in 1945. 

From August 1945 until December 1948, the Soviet Red Army 
(later the Soviet Civil Administration) occupied Korea north of the 
thirty-eighth parallel, where it exercised broad control over adminis- 
tration, including national security. During the Soviet occupation, the 
North Korean government was fully organized and included the Min- 
istry of Defense and the KPA. In 1948 the KPA had 60,000 personnel 
assigned to four infantry divisions and a tank battalion that was 
equipped with Soviet weapons systems and trained and organized 
according to Soviet doctrine and tactics, which were adapted to 
accommodate North Korea's infantry-centric force structure. Another 
40,000 personnel were organized into a border constabulary that was 
subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

In the 1 8 months between the Soviet withdrawal and the Korean 
War (1950-53), the KPA rapidly grew to 160,000 personnel orga- 
nized into 10 infantry divisions, a tank division, an air division, and 
a motorcycle regiment; the extra 40,000 personnel formed the border 
constabulary. This rapid expansion was not only facilitated by the 
steady influx of Soviet materiel and the domestic conscription of an 
additional 40,000 personnel but also greatly augmented by the trans- 
fer of perhaps as many as 60,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from Chi- 
nese communist forces to the KPA in 1949 and 1950. 

National Command Authorities 

National command authority in North Korea is consolidated in one 
person — Kim Jong II (officially born in 1942). This solidification of 
absolute authority was a carefully arranged process that was initiated 



238 



National Security 



by Kim's father, the late President Kim II Sung, and occurred through 
several successive appointments (or elections) to various positions, 
including vice chairman of the National Defense Commission in May 
1990, supreme commander of the KPA in December 1991, marshal in 
April 1992, and chairman of the National Defense Commission in 
April 1993. More than three years after Kim II Sung's death, in Octo- 
ber 1997, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) elected Kim Jong II as its 
general secretary, and both the KWP Central Committee and the Cen- 
tral Military Commission elected him chairman of the parly's Central 
Military Commission. 

In accordance with the 1998 revised state constitution, the National 
Defense Commission is the highest military leadership body of state 
power and the organ of overall administration of national defense. 
Constitutionally, the National Defense Commission is accountable to 
the Supreme People's Assembly (see The Legislature, ch. 4). How- 
ever, in fact, if not in law, the National Defense Commission chair- 
man, Kim Jong II, holds the highest position responsible for North 
Korea's political, economic, and military resources (see The Constitu- 
tional Framework; Relationships Among the Government, Party, and 
Military, ch. 4). 

National Defense Organizations 

The KWP Central Military Commission and the state National 
Defense Commission, both bodies chaired by Kim Jong II, hold 
coordinating authority over the armed forces (see fig. 11). The Cen- 
tral Military Commission of the KWP Central Committee (also 
headed by General Secretary Kim Jong II) provides broad political 
and policy guidance, while the National Defense Commission exer- 
cises command and administrative control over the armed forces. 

Central Military Commission 

The party Central Military Commission is subordinate to the party 
Central Committee and, as enumerated in article 27 of the KWP con- 
stitution, serves as the party's leading body on all military matters, 
including establishing policies, plans, and defense acquisition priori- 
ties (see The Korean Workers' Party, ch. 4). The Central Military 
Commission, and by extension the party Central Committee, coordi- 
nates its work through the party Secretariat's military, munitions 
industry, operations, civil defense, and organization and guidance 
departments and the party Political Bureau's chain of command, 
which extends through the General Political Bureau of level of all 
military units. 



239 



North Korea: A Country Study 





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240 



National Security 



The members of the party Central Military Commission concur- 
rently hold key defense and military positions. In 2007 these mem- 
bers and positions included Kim Il-ch'61, minister of people's armed 
forces; Cho Myong-nok, director of the General Political Bureau of 
the Ministry of People's Armed Forces; Kim Yong-chun, chief of the 
General Staff Department; Yi Ha-il, director of the KWP Military 
Affairs Department; Kim Ik-hyon, director of the party Civil 
Defense Department; Pak Ki-so, commander of the P'yongyang 
Defense Command; Kim Ch'61-man, former chairman of the Second 
Economic Committee; Yi Yong-ch'61, first vice director of the KWP 
Organization and Guidance Department; and others. 

National Defense Commission 

In the 1998 constitution, clauses related to national defense are 
arranged in two chapters. Those specifying the roles and missions of 
the armed forces are in chapter 4, National Defense, articles 58 
through 61. Clauses stipulating the powers of the National Defense 
Commission are located in chapter 6, State Organs, section 2: The 
National Defense Commission, articles 100 through 105. Section 2 
empowers the National Defense Commission chairman to direct and 
command the armed forces and to guide overall national defense 
affairs. This section also establishes the National Defense Commis- 
sion as the highest military leadership body of state power and the 
organ of overall administration of national defense. It also defines its 
organization and specifies its duties and authorities. 

Article 101 specifies that the National Defense Commission shall 
consist of a chairman, a first vice chairman, one or more other vice 
chairmen, and other members. This body is elected by the Supreme 
People's Assembly and serves a five-year term, which can be 
extended if an election is not held because of "unavoidable circum- 
stances." The National Defense Commission includes Marshal Kim 
Jong II, chairman; Vice Marshal Cho Myong-nok, first vice chair- 
man and director of the General Political Bureau; Vice Marshal Yi 
Yong-mu, vice chairman; Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun, vice chair- 
man and former chief of the General Staff Department; and three 
members: Vice Marshal Kim Il-ch'61, minister of people's armed 
forces; Chon Pyong-ho, secretary of the KWP; General Hyon Ch'61- 
hae, former vice director of the General Political Bureau; and Kim 
Yang-gon, councilor and director of the KWP's International Affairs 
Department. 

Article 103 gives the National Defense Commission the constitu- 
tional power to direct the armed forces; establish and abolish state insti- 
tutions in the defense sector; appoint and dismiss senior military 



241 



North Korea: A Country Study 

officers; enact and confer military titles on senior officers; and mobilize 
for emergencies and declare war. Constitutionally, the Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly is charged with oversight of the National Defense 
Commission per articles 105 and 110; however, in practice the National 
Defense Commission is not accountable to any regulatory body. Subor- 
dinate to the National Defense Commission are the Ministry of Peo- 
ple's Security, State Security Department, Guard Command, and 
Ministry of People's Armed Forces (see Internal Security, this ch.). 

Ministry of People's Armed Forces 

The Ministry of People's Armed Forces coordinates administra- 
tive defense activities and represents the military externally. Since 
September 1998, the ministry has been led by Vice Marshal Kim II- 
ch'61. Although a ministry, it is not subordinate to the cabinet but 
answers directly to Kim Jong II in his role as chairman of the 
National Defense Commission. Within the ministry, the General 
Staff Department, General Political Bureau, and Security Command 
form a ruling triumvirate that operates in a construct of checks and 
balances. 

The General Staff Department is led by Chief of the General Staff 
General Kim Kyuk-sik, who exercises unitary command author- 
ity — operational responsibility over the KPA ground, air, naval, spe- 
cial operations, and reserve forces. Subordinate to the General Staff 
Department are more than 20 bureaus and an elaborate organization 
of military schools, academies, and universities. Akin to other 
nations' Joint Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff Department is 
directly responsible for all military strategy, planning, operations, 
and training. These duties specifically fall under the purview of the 
General Staff Department Operations Bureau and are carried out by 
its 10 military departments. The First Department is in charge of 
administrative affairs, while the Second Department develops opera- 
tions plans. The Third Department supervises the forward infantry 
corps (I, II, IV, and V Corps), and the Fourth Department supervises 
all other infantry corps. The Fifth Department oversees the Light 
Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, the Sixth Department supervises 
the Air Force Command, and the Seventh Department supervises the 
Navy Command. The Eighth Department plans operations for subor- 
dinate units of other General Staff Department bureaus, the Ninth 
Department conducts corps-level training exercises, and the Tenth 
Department (or Information Department) supervises the North 
Korean members of the Military Armistice Commission. 

The General Political Bureau is the regime's political apparatus 
for controlling the KPA, and it is led by the eminently powerful 



242 



A bemedaled Korean People s Army on parade in P 'yongyang during the 
celebration of the ninetieth birthday of Kim II Sung, also the seventieth 
anniversary of the establishment of the Korean Workers ' Party, April 25, 2005 
Courtesy Choson (P yongyang), June 2002, front cover 



243 



North Korea: A Country Study 

director general Vice Marshal Cho Myong-nok (second in the 
national hierarchy behind Kim Jong II). As the KPA's political guid- 
ance system, it permeates every organization of the KPA down 
through company levels. Operating under the supervision of the 
party Central Committee, the General Political Bureau is responsible 
for propaganda, educational, and cultural activities. Moreover, based 
on delegation of authority from the National Defense Commission, 
the bureau also authorizes the movement of military units. Inserting 
political officers into unit movements is a precautionary measure 
against unauthorized, possibly regime-threatening movement of 
units by commanders. 

The Security Command is an intramilitary surveillance agency that 
is responsible for internal affairs and for exposing corrupt and disloyal 
elements within the KPA. Commanded by a military officer, Colonel 
General Kim Won-hong, and organized under the Ministry of People's 
Armed Forces, the command is directly accountable to the State Secu- 
rity Department. Similar to the General Political Bureau, the Security 
Command also operates a separate but parallel chain of command that 
extends down to the battalion level. Battalion-level security command 
officers clandestinely employ six or seven informants per company to 
report politically disloyal elements. Those who are accused often are 
apprehended, interrogated (routinely tortured for a confession), tried 
by military court, and sentenced, as deemed appropriate. The Security 
Command not only conducts surveillance of the military chain of 
command but also observes and reports on the actions of the political 
officers. 

Other bureaus of the General Staff Department include the Gen- 
eral Rear Services Bureau, which controls KPA logistical support 
activities, and the Cadre Bureau, which oversees officer personnel 
matters, including promotions, awards, and records. The Military 
Justice Bureau establishes military judicial policy and supervises the 
lower military courts, and the Military Prosecutions Bureau prose- 
cutes cases that appear before the Military Justice Bureau and over- 
sees the activities of subordinate prosecution elements. 

National Security Policy Formulation 

The KWP Central Military Commission and the state National 
Defense Commission hold coordinating authority over the armed 
forces. Together (and both under the chairmanship of Kim Jong II), 
they represent North Korea's core national security policy-making 
component. 

North Korea's national security structure has a four-tiered military 
operational component. In this structure, orders originate from the 



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National Security 



national coordinated authorities and are passed through the minister of 
People's Armed Forces to the chief of the General Political Bureau 
and then to the chief of the General Staff Department. However, as 
head of state, party, and defense and in his role as KPA supreme com- 
mander, Kim Jong II can abbreviate this process by issuing operational 
orders directly to the chief of the General Staff Department, a two- 
tiered process. During wartime operation, a supreme command head- 
quarters would be activated to prosecute the war, thereby normalizing 
this two-tiered process. 

Kim Jong IPs control of the military is further strengthened by his 
appointments of loyalists to state, party, and military positions. 
Among his closest military advisers are Vice Marshal Cho Myong- 
nok, director of the General Political Bureau; Vice Marshal Kim 
Yong-chun, former chief of the General Staff Department; Vice 
Marshal Kim Il-ch'61, minster of people's armed forces; General 
Hyon Ch'61-hae, former vice director of the General Political 
Bureau; General Pak Chae-kyong, vice director of Propaganda 
Department of the General Political Bureau; General Kim Myong- 
kuk, director of the Operations Bureau of the General Staff Depart- 
ment; and Colonel General Kim Won-hong, chief of the Security 
Command. 

Elements of the administrative-logistical component of the 
national security structure include the Second Economic Committee, 
which is directly subordinate to the National Defense Commission 
and controls the defense industry under the guidance of the party 
Munitions Industry Department; in 2007 the chief of the latter was 
Chon Pyong-ho (see Defense Industry, this ch.). The General Staff 
Department and the General Rear Services Bureau of the Ministry of 
People's Armed Forces prepare military budgets under the guidance 
of the Political Bureau and Central Military Commission. Proposed 
budgets are approved by the Central Military Commission and 
passed into law by the essentially rubber-stamp legislature, the 
Supreme People's Assembly. 

Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces 

General Staff Department 

North Korea has enormous armed forces, numbering more than 
1.2 million personnel on active duty and an additional 7.7 million 
personnel in paramilitary and reserve forces (see Reserve Forces, 
this ch.). The KPA is a unitary or joint force that is led operationally 
by the General Staff Department. 



245 



North Korea: A Country Study 




Figure 12. Deployment of Ground and Naval Forces and Air Wings, 2006 



In early 2007, General Kim Kyuk-sik became chief of the General 
Staff Department, replacing Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun, who 
became vice chairman of the National Defense Commission. The 
department is staffed with members from all of its components and 
is responsible for manning, training, equipping, administering, and 
supporting the KPA and planning, organizing, and employing the 
KPA to accomplish its missions. Subordinate to the General Staff 
Department are military commands, bureaus, and institutions that 
perform command and administrative functions, provide warfighting 



246 



National Security 



capabilities, and coordinate deployment of the armed forces. 
Broadly defined, the military commands — ground, air, naval, and 
special operations forces — are collectively termed the KPA. 

Army 

North Korea has amassed the world's third largest ground 
forces — with 1 million personnel — and the world's largest artillery 
force — with 13,500 pieces. Seventy percent of the ground forces are 
permanently deployed south of P'yongyang and Wonsan and within 
about 80 kilometers of the DMZ. The ground forces' size, organiza- 
tion, disposition, and combat readiness provide North Korea with 
options for either offensive operations to attempt to reunify the pen- 
insula forcibly or defensive operations against perceived threats. 

The ground forces are organized into 19 major commands that are 
deployed in echelon by mission and include nine infantry corps, four 
mechanized corps, a tank corps, an artillery corps, P'yongyang 
Defense Command, Border Security Command, the Missile Guidance 
Bureau, and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. Major com- 
bat formations include some 80 infantry divisions (including training 
divisions), 30 artillery brigades, 25 special warfare brigades, 20 mech- 
anized brigades, 10 tank brigades, and seven tank regiments. 

The forward echelon is organized with four infantry corps 
deployed abreast (from west to east: IV Corps, II Corps, V Corps, 
and I Corps) along the DMZ (see fig. 12). The 620th Artillery Corps 
also is deployed forward and operates from hardened artillery sites. 
Some 250 long-range artillery systems (240-millimeter multiple 
rocket launchers and 170-millimeter self-propelled howitzers) are 
within striking range of Seoul from their current positions. Also 
located south of the P'yongyang-Wonsan line are, from west to east, 
the 815th Mechanized Corps within the IV Corps boundary (in the 
vicinity of Kobul-tong); the 820th Tank Corps also within the IV 
Corps boundary (near Songwol-li); and the 806th Mechanized Corps 
within the V Corps boundary (in the vicinity of Kosan-dong). 

Two geographically postured infantry corps are organized in the 
central echelon. They are III Corps in the west and VII Corps in the 
east; in addition, there is an unidentified infantry corps located 
within the VII Corps boundary, and the P'yongyang Defense Com- 
mand is based at the national capital. Organized in the rear echelon 
are two strategically postured infantry corps: VIII Corps in the west 
and IX (formerly VI) Corps in the east; the 425th Mechanized Corps 
is located in the VIII Corps boundary (in the vicinity of Chongju), 
and the 108th Mechanized Corps is within the VII Corps boundary 
(near Oro). 



247 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Since 2000 the Missile Guidance Bureau (possibly renamed the 
Artillery Guidance Bureau) was organized or reorganized to unify 
command and control of North Korean theater missile units, which 
are deployed operationally to several locations. The Light Infantry 
Training Guidance Bureau is a special operations forces (SOF) com- 
mand that directly controls assigned forces and might control other 
strategic SOF, specifically, the air and naval sniper brigades. 

The major army weapons systems and equipment include tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and bridg- 
ing assets. The army has some 3,700 tanks that are categorized as 
either light or medium armaments. Light tanks include the PT-76, 
T-62, and T-63 light amphibious tank; medium tanks include T-54, 
T-55, T-59, and T-62 models. The tanks are organized into medium 
and light tank companies (10 tanks each), battalions (three tank com- 
panies), brigades (four medium and one light tank battalions), and 
the tank corps (five tank brigades). 

The armored vehicle inventory has about 2,100 armored person- 
nel carriers, including the wheeled BTR series, Type M-1973, and a 
lesser quantity of the track-mounted BMP. Ground forces use 
armored personnel carriers for multiple roles that include maneuver, 
reconnaissance, and command and control. Typically, mechanized 
infantry units organize this equipment into mortar and mechanized 
infantry companies (often 10 vehicles each), mechanized battalions 
(three mechanized infantry companies and one mortar company), 
mechanized brigades (one mechanized infantry battalion and four 
motorized infantry battalions), and mechanized corps (five mecha- 
nized infantry brigades). 

With more than 13,500 artillery pieces, the world's largest artil- 
lery force includes free-rocket-over-ground (FROG) artillery sys- 
tems, 107-millimeter to 240-millimeter multiple rocket launchers, 
and 100-millimeter to 170-millimeter howitzers. Artillery forma- 
tions are organized by type and assigned to regiments, divisions, and 
corps: regiment assignments include an 18-gun 122-millimeter how- 
itzer battalion and a nine-launcher 107-millimeter or 140-millimeter 
multiple rocket launcher battery; division assignments include two 
12-gun 152-millimeter howitzer battalions, one 18-gun 122-millime- 
ter howitzer battalion, and one 12-launcher 122-millimeter multiple 
rocket launcher battalion; and corps assignments include six 18-gun 
170-millimeter howitzer battalions and six 18-launcher 240-millime- 
ter multiple rocket launcher battalions. To support maneuver opera- 
tions, artillery is task-organized into regimental, division, and corps 
artillery groups, which are routinely augmented with additional artil- 
lery units that are attached from higher echelons. 



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National Security 



The army has amassed more than 15,600 antiaircraft artillery pieces 
for theater missile-defense and counterair operations. Strategically 
employed and integrated to defend critical geopolitical assets, surface- 
to-air (SA) missile systems include several fixed and semifixed SA-2, 
SA-3, and SA-5 medium and medium-to-high-altitude missile sys- 
tems. Short-range air-defense systems are deployed at the corps, divi- 
sion, and regimental levels and include an organized selection of 14.5- 
millimeter, 37-millimeter, and 57-millimeter antiaircraft artillery 
pieces. Short-range, man-portable SA-7B launchers also contribute to 
localized air defense and are employed down to battalion level. 

Although the army conducts training exercises at all levels of com- 
mand, most training occurs at the regimental level or below, and mainly 
at company and platoon levels. Exercises involving units that consume 
scarce resources, such as fuel, oil, and lubricants, occur infrequently, 
inhibiting the readiness of exploitation forces, which may cause inte- 
gration difficulties during division and corps operations. 

On March 7, 2006, the commander of the United Nations Com- 
mand, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Com- 
mand, and U.S. Forces Korea, General Burwell B. Bell, testified 
before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee concerning North 
Korea's military posture. General Bell assessed that despite aging 
equipment and simplistic methods, North Korean conventional mili- 
tary forces pose a continuing threat because of their sheer size and 
forward positions. 

Special Operations Forces 

The KPA has a mixture of conventional and unconventional war- 
fare units. North Korea's special operations forces (SOF) are the 
world's largest and have the highest military funding priority. Esti- 
mates of strength range from 87,000 to 92,000 and 100,000 to 
120,000 personnel, depending on whether or not both strategic (the 
lower numbers) and tactical forces (the higher numbers) are counted. 
The uncertainty over the number of forces is derived mainly from 
the varying definitions of what actually constitutes KPA special 
operations forces, which include light infantry, airborne, sniper, and 
reconnaissance forces. Organized into 25 brigades and nine separate 
battalions, the special operations forces are believed to be the best 
trained and to have the highest morale of all North Korean ground 
forces. SOF operations are categorized by the supported echelon: 
strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic SOF are employed in 
reconnaissance, sniper, and agent operations and support national or 
Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives. Operational SOF 



249 



North Korea: A Country Study 

support corps operations, and tactical SOF support forward-division 
operations. 

The Ministry of People's Armed Forces controls strategic SOF 
through four commands, the Reconnaissance Bureau, Light Infantry 
Training Guidance Bureau, Air Force Command, and Navy Com- 
mand. The Reconnaissance Bureau is subordinate to the Ministry of 
People's Armed Forces, is responsible for the collection of strategic 
and tactical intelligence, and directly controls one sniper brigade and 
five reconnaissance battalions. The bureau also exercises operational 
control over agents engaged in collecting military intelligence and in 
the training and dispatch of unconventional warfare teams. The 
Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is a subordinate command 
of the General Staff Department and directly controls four light 
infantry brigades, three airborne brigades, and a sniper brigade. 

The Air Force Command has two sniper brigades of 3,500 person- 
nel each and up to 300 An-2 biplanes that are used mainly for infil- 
trating SOF assets into South Korea's rear areas. Because of the 
ability of the An-2 to fly at low speeds and at very low altitudes, this 
otherwise antiquated aircraft provides the KPA with a fairly reliable 
means of infiltration. The Navy Command has two seaborne sniper 
brigades with a combined force of about 7,000 personnel that are 
capable of being infiltrated rapidly along South Korea's coast. Of the 
navy's 260 landing craft, more than 50 percent are of the landing 
craft air-cushion variety, well suited to traversing large mud flats, 
seasonal frozen coastal waters, and areas of great tidal variance. 

Operational and tactical SOF units are organized at corps and divi- 
sion levels, respectively. At the operational level, each of the four for- 
ward infantry corps has a reconnaissance battalion, light infantry 
brigade, and sniper brigade; each of the four mechanized corps has a 
light infantry brigade. (Rear area infantry corps are organized as light 
infantry brigades, but because of their geographical separation from 
the front line, these units are not considered as SOF.) At the tactical 
level, each of the 20 or so forward infantry divisions has an assigned 
light infantry battalion. 

Reconnaissance battalions are employed in rear areas — strategic 
and operational — to collect intelligence and information on high- 
value targets. Battalions are organized with a headquarters, signal 
platoon, recruit-training company, training company, and four recon- 
naissance companies of fewer than 100 troops each. Reconnaissance 
companies are organized with four platoons each, including four 
five-man teams (basic operating units) that are lightly armed with 
rifles and sidearms. 



250 



The KPA in a river-crossing exercise at an undisclosed location 
Courtesy Choson (P yongyang), July 2003, 1 7 

Light infantry units are employed at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels; they operate in battalions or companies to conduct 
raids on command and control centers and artillery positions and to 
secure choke points along axes of advance. Light infantry brigades 
are robust organizations with a headquarters, signal company, equip- 
ment company, transportation company, and six light infantry battal- 
ions. Light infantry battalions have a recruit-training company, 
signal company, air defense platoon, and six light infantry compa- 
nies. Light infantry companies have two light infantry platoons, each 
with a three-tube, 60-millimeter mortar platoon and four light infan- 
try squads. 

Sniper brigades generally operate in teams to conduct raids, demo- 
lition, and reconnaissance and to collect intelligence. Sniper brigades 
are organized less robustly than light-infantry sniper brigades and 
have a headquarters, signal company, and six sniper battalions; each 
battalion has a signal platoon and five sniper companies, and each 
company has a three-tube mortar squad and three sniper platoons. 

KPA special operations forces were developed to meet three basic 
requirements: to breach the flankless fixed defense of South Korea; to 
create a second front in the enemy rear area, disrupting in-depth rein- 
forcements and logistical support during a conflict; and to conduct bat- 
tlefield and strategic reconnaissance. Missions to counter opposing 
forces and to conduct internal security were added over time. 



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North Korea: A Country Study 

Strategic missions require deep insertions either in advance of 
hostilities or in the initial stages by naval or air platforms. Based on 
available insertion platforms, North Korea has a strategic lift capa- 
bility of about 21,000 SOF personnel, which includes about 15,000 
personnel by sea and another 6,000 personnel by air. The majority of 
SOF elements infiltrate over land to execute operational and tactical 
missions. 

Air Force 

In 2007 Colonel General O Kum-ch'61 headed the Korean Peo- 
ple's Air Force Command, which has roots dating back to 1946. The 
Air Force Command has adapted Soviet and Chinese doctrines and 
tactics to accommodate internal requirements and resources. Its pri- 
mary mission is air defense; secondary missions include tactical air 
support to the ground and naval forces, transportation and logistical 
support, and SOF insertion. 

The air force is organized around four air divisions, three air com- 
bat divisions, and one air training division, with a total of 110,000 
personnel, including 7,000 special operations troops. The First Air 
Combat Division is headquartered at Kaech'on, South P'yongan 
Province, and operates in the northwest. The Second Air Combat 
Division is headquartered at Toksan-dong, near Hamhung, South 
Hamgyong Province, and operates in the east. The Third Air Combat 
Division is headquartered at Hwangju, North Hwanghae Province, 
and operates in the south. The Eighth Air Training Division (a unit 
designation that is speculative) is headquartered at Orang, North 
Hamgyong Province, and operates in the northeast. Additional 
forces include a helicopter brigade, and support units include the 
Fifth and Sixth transport brigades. About 40 percent of air force 
fighters are forward deployed. The Air Force Command itself is 
headquartered in P'yongyang and controls, operates, and maintains 
all military and civilian aircraft, airfields, and airports throughout 
North Korea. 

Significantly smaller than the ground forces, the air force has 
about 110,000 airmen and is equipped with an aging fleet of more 
than 1,600 aircraft that includes about 780 fighters, 80 bombers, 300 
helicopters, 300 An-2 biplanes, and more than 100 support craft. 
About 70 percent of the fixed-wing aircraft are first- and second- 
generation Soviet-made fighters and bombers, including MiG-15, 
-17, -19, and -21 fighters and 11-28 fighter-bombers. The air force 
also has many third- and fourth-generation Soviet-made aircraft such 
as MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 ground attack aircraft. 



252 



National Security 



Among its rotor-wing fleet are a significant number of Mi-2s, 
Mi^s, Mi-8s, Mi-17s, and Hughes-500 multirole helicopters. 

The air force operates 20 strategic air bases and about another 70 
operational bases and reserve and emergency runways nationwide. The 
majority of tactical aircraft are concentrated at air bases around 
P'yongyang and in the southern provinces. P'yongyang can place 
almost all its military aircraft in hardened — mostly underground — shel- 
ters. In the early 1990s, North Korea activated four forward air bases 
near the DMZ, which increased its initial southward reach and con- 
versely decreased warning and reaction times for Seoul. 

The air force operates two main flight schools, Kim Ch'aek Air 
Force Academy in Ch'ongjin and Kyongsong Flight Officer School 
in Kyongsong, both of which are located in North Hamgyong Prov- 
ince. Both institutions are four-year commissioning programs that 
provide students with about 70 hours of flight training on propeller- 
driven Yak-18 or CJ-6 aircraft. Graduating second lieutenants attend 
22 months of advanced flight training, where they receive about 1 00 
hours of flight instruction on either MiG-15 or MiG-17 fighters. 
After flight school, new pilots are assigned to an operational unit, 
where they receive another two years of training before they are rated 
as combat pilots. As with other types of military training, fuel short- 
ages have required the air force to increase flight-simulator training 
time while sharply curtailing actual flying time to little more than 1 
hours a year per pilot, a factor contributing to decreasing operational 
readiness. 

Navy 

In 2007 Admiral Kim Yun-sim commanded the Korean People's 
Navy Command. Headquartered since 1946 in P'yongyang, the navy 
is subordinate to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. With fewer 
personnel than a single forward-infantry corps, the 60,000-person 
"brown-water" navy is primarily a coastal defense force. The North 
Korean navy does not have naval air or marine components. 

The navy has 12 squadrons of around 1,000 vessels organized into 
two fleets, the West (or Yellow) Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet, and 
19 naval bases. The fleets do not exchange vessels, and their areas of 
operations and missions determine their organizational structure; 
mutual support is difficult at best. The West Sea Fleet is headquar- 
tered at Namp'o and has major bases at Pip'a-got and Sagot and 
smaller bases at Tasa-ri and Ch'o-do. The East Sea Fleet has its 
headquarters at T'oejo-dong, with major bases at Najin and Wonsan 
and lesser bases at Puam-ni, Ch'aho, Mayang Island, and Ch'angjon 



253 



North Korea: A Country Study 

near the DMZ. Additionally, there are many smaller bases along 
both coasts. 

The smallest of the three services, the navy is equipped with a 
mismatched fleet of more than 430 surface combatants, nearly 90 
submarines, 230 support vessels, and 260 landing craft. About 150 
of these vessels are not under navy control but instead are assigned 
to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces Coastal Security Bureau. 
Equipped with corvettes, guided-missile patrol boats, torpedo boats, 
and fire-support boats, the navy maintains about 60 percent of the 
surface combatants forward of the P'yongyang-Wonsan line. Of 
these relatively small ships, the guided-missile patrol boats, which 
are equipped with either two or four tubes of Styx antiship missiles 
each, pose a credible threat against ships of much larger size. 

North Korea's submarine force is the world's largest, including 
about 60 submarines of the 1,800-ton Romeo and 300-ton Sango 
classes and as many as 10 Yugo-class submersibles. The Romeo- and 
Sango-class submarines are capable of blocking sea-lanes, attacking 
surface vessels, emplacing mines, and infiltrating SOF. The Yugo- 
class submersibles are intended for clandestine SOF insertion. Sub- 
marines are stationed at Ch'aho, Mayang Island, Namp'o, and Pip'a- 
got naval bases. 

North Korea also has a formidable coastal defense system that 
includes more than 250 soft and hardened coastal-defense artillery 
positions and one coastal-defense missile regiment per naval fleet. 
Coastal-defense artillery systems are equipped mainly with 122-mil- 
limeter or 152-millimeter guns; coastal-defense missile regiments 
are equipped with Silkworm and Seersucker antiship cruise missiles 
that are either truck- or transporter-erector-launcher-mounted. These 
coastal-defense positions are located on both coasts and on several 
islands. 

The navy is capable of conducting inshore defensive operations, 
submarine operations against merchant shipping and unsophisticated 
naval combatants, offensive and defensive mining operations, and 
conventional raids. Because of the general imbalance of ship types, 
the navy has a limited capability to carry out such missions as sea 
control-or-denial and antisubmarine operations. The primary offen- 
sive mission of the navy is to support SOF unit insertions. It also has 
a limited capability to engage ships and to attack coastal targets. 

Reserve Forces 

As part of its military policy, North Korea has succeeded in arming 
much of its population (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, this ch.). 
Some 9 million people, or more than one-third of the population, 



254 



Women of the Korean People s Navy on parade in Kim II Sung Square, P 'yongyang 

Courtesy Choson (P 'yongyang), October 2003, 11 



KPA solider in training 
Courtesy Choson (P 'yongyang), 
April 2004, 11 




255 



North Korea: A Country Study 

serve with either the active or reserve forces. As many as 7.7 million 
people between the ages of 14 and 60 are required to serve as reserve 
forces organized into four broad categories: Red Youth Guard, 
Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU), Workers and Peasants Red 
Guard, and paramilitary units. 

For many North Koreans, military service begins by joining the 
Red Youth Guard, a militia organization that generally resembles a 
Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps program, during their last 
years of senior middle school (see A Thought-Controlled Society, 
ch. 2; Mass Organizations, ch. 4). Membership is available to male 
and female students who are between 14 and 17 years of age. The 
Red Youth Guard, with some 940,000 members, is supervised by 
local military affairs departments, which report up through their 
respective provincial military affairs departments to the party Cen- 
tral Military Commission. During the school year, the Red Youth 
Guard receives 450 hours of classroom training and seven days each 
semester of unit training. The training focus is on pre-induction mili- 
tary familiarization and includes physical training, drill and cere- 
mony, first aid, and weapons familiarization. 

The RMTU is North Korea's ready reserve and accounts for 
approximately 620,000 soldiers assigned to some 37 RMTU infantry 
divisions. Typically, 17-year-old students who are graduating from 
senior middle school but not joining the active-duty forces are 
assigned to a local RMTU. Additionally, service members who com- 
plete their active-duty obligation are assigned to an RMTU. Accord- 
ingly, males between the ages of 17 and 45 and single females 
between the ages of 17 and 30 are eligible for RMTU service. Unlike 
the other reserve forces, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces con- 
trols the RMTU, from the General Staff Department through the 
corps headquarters to their assigned RMTU divisions. Mobilization 
of RMTUs is controlled by the Logistics Mobilization Bureau of the 
General Staff Department. These RMTU divisions annually conduct 
30 days of mobilization training and 10 days of self-defense training, 
which prepares them to round out the order of battle of their assigned 
corps when they serve alongside regular army divisions. Lengthy 
reserve service obligations mitigate reduced training opportunities 
while enhancing unit cohesion, producing an adequately capable 
force that in general is as well equipped as active-duty forces, but 
with earlier-model equipment. 

The Workers and Peasants Red Guard resembles a civil-defense 
force, and, with as many as 5.7 million personnel, it is North Korea's 
largest reserve component. Typically, at age 46 men are transferred 
from their RMTU divisions to a Workers and Peasants Red Guard unit 



256 



National Security 



where they continue to serve until discharged at age 60, ending a life- 
time of military service that began at age 14 and continued uninter- 
rupted for 46 years. The Workers and Peasants Red Guard is controlled 
directly by local military affairs departments, which report to their pro- 
vincial military affairs departments and on up the chain of command to 
the party Central Military Commission. Operationally organized at the 
company level by factories, farms, mines, and villages, the Workers 
and Peasants Red Guard has as its principal mission to provide civil 
defense in the form of local homeland defense, air defense, and logistic 
support. As a secondary mission, the Workers and Peasants Red Guard 
could be mobilized by the party Civil Defense Department to provide 
troop replacements for RMTU and active-duty forces. The Workers 
and Peasants Red Guard annually conducts 15 days of mobilization 
training and 15 days of self-defense training. This force is armed with 
individual (AK-47 rifles) and crew-served weapons, such as machine 
guns, mortars, and antiaircraft artillery pieces. 

Paramilitary units, which number about 420,000 personnel, main- 
tain a quasimilitary status and wear a military-type uniform. Such 
organizations include the Ministry of People's Security, Guard Com- 
mand, College Training Units, and Speed Battle Youth Shock Bri- 
gades. The Ministry of People's Security functions as a national 
police force (see Ministry of People's Security, this ch.). The Guard 
Command is an independent, corps-sized organization that is respon- 
sible for the protection of Kim Jong II and other senior-level officials 
(see Guard Command, this ch.). College students are organized into 
College Training Units and trained for individual replacements, a 
system by which during combat officers and noncommissioned offi- 
cers (NCOs) are replaced at the unit level on a one-for-one basis. 
Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigades, organized in 1975 to "more vig- 
orously prepare the youth to become the reliable successors of the 
revolution," are youth-level militaristic work- group organizations. 

Strategic Weapons 

Since the 1970s, North Korea has invested significant resources to 
increase its indigenous acquisition of ballistic missiles and weapons 
of mass destruction, which include chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons. These weapons, the development of which has caused con- 
siderable international reaction, include ballistic missiles, chemical 
and biological weapons, and, possibly, nuclear warheads. 

Ballistic Missiles 

In 1976 North Korea, which had been unable to procure surface-to- 
surface missiles (SSMs) from China or the Soviet Union, contracted 



257 



North Korea: A Countiy Study 

with Egypt for the transfer of several SCUD-B short-range ballistic mis- 
siles (SRBMs). These SRBMs were reverse-engineered and facilitated 
the inauguration of North Korea's indigenous missile-production pro- 
gram. Successfully test-launched in 1984, the reverse-engineered 
SCUD-B missile was named the Hwasong-5 and shortly thereafter 
placed into full production. Seeking an extended-range capability 
beyond the Hwasong-5's 300-kilometer limit, North Korea further 
modified this missile to produce the Hwasong-6 (or SCUD-C) — a 500- 
kilometer extended-range SRBM — that in 1990 was test- fired success- 
fully from Musudan-ni launch facility in North Hamgyong Province. 

Having achieved the ability to strike targets anywhere in South 
Korea with Hwasong missiles, North Korea continued pursuing the 
ability to target Japan, which culminated on May 23, 1993, in a suc- 
cessful launch of what commonly has been referred to as the Nodong 
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Whereas the 1993 Nodong 
missile test flight yielded a range of only 500 kilometers, in April 1998 
Pakistan successfully tested a Nodong missile (known in Pakistan as 
the Ghauri) to a reported distance of 1,500 kilometers; then, in July 
1998, Iran conducted a test launch of a Nodong missile (known as Sha- 
hab-3) to a distance of 1,000 kilometers. By May 23, 2006, Iran had 
conducted its tenth test launch of the Shahab-3, an MRBM that has 
been designed (or modified) to reach ranges up to 2,000 kilometers. 

Concurrent with its Nodong missile development, since the 1990s 
North Korea has been developing an intermediate-range ballistic mis- 
sile (IRBM), the Taepodong-1, and a long-range, intercontinental bal- 
listic missile (ICBM), the Taepodong-2. The Taepodong-1 has two 
variants: the shorter range, two-stage system that is purported to be 
able to deliver a 700- to 1,000-kilogram warhead up to 2,000 kilome- 
ters; and the longer range, three-stage, space-launch vehicle (SLV) 
model which, if configured as a missile, presumably could deliver a 
light payload up to 5,000 kilometers. In August 1998, North Korea 
conducted a test launch of a Taepodong-1 SLV, reportedly in an 
attempt to place its first satellite into orbit. The first two stages appar- 
ently separated properly along the flight trajectory, but the third stage 
malfunctioned, failing to project the satellite into orbit. 

In September 1999, only 13 months after the Taepodong-1 test 
launch, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced a self- 
imposed ballistic missile moratorium that was reaffirmed in 2001 with a 
commitment to extend the moratorium until 2003. With the exception of 
short-range missile launches, including the March 2006 KN-02 (an 
upgraded Soviet SS-1 (SCUD) SSM with a firing range of 120 kilome- 
ters) test launch, the missile launch moratorium remained in force until 
July 5, 2006, when North Korea shocked much of the world with its first 



258 



This Chinese-manufactured MiG-19 fighter was flown by a defector from 
the Korean People s Air Force to South Korea in 1983. It is now an exhibit 

at the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul. 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

test launch of a Taepodong-2 missile, which is thought to be based on 
the Soviet SS submarine-launched ballistic missile. The missile appar- 
ently malfunctioned along its trajectory. However, when commander of 
U.S. Forces Korea General B.B. Bell testified before the U.S. Senate in 
March 2006, he said that North Korea's continued development of a 
three-stage variant of the Taepodong missile could be operational within 
the next decade, providing P'yongyang with the capability to target the 
continental United States directly. Experts have surmised that a two- 
stage Taepodong-2 could deliver a 700- to 1,000-kilogram warhead to a 
distance of 10,000 kilometers, and that a three-stage Taepodong-2 could 
deliver a similar warhead about 15,000 kilometers. 

North Korea's ballistic missile inventory includes more than 600 
short-range Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 (SCUD) ballistic missiles 
that can deliver conventional or chemical munitions (and possibly a 
nuclear warhead) across the Korean Peninsula. North Korea possesses 
as many as 200 Nodong MRBMs that are capable of targeting Japan 
with these same payloads. And once made operational, North Korea's 
two-stage Taepodong- 1 MRBM could easily reach Japan, including 
the island of Okinawa; the two-stage Taepodong-2 IRBM could reach 
U.S. military forces stationed in Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska; and the 
three-stage Taepodong-2 ICBM would be unrestrained in its ability to 



259 



North Korea: A Country Study 

reach targets anywhere in the continental United States. Subordinate 
to the Missile Guidance Bureau, the KPA ballistic missile forces 
(either division- or corps-sized) are assumed to be organized as a 
FROG-7 brigade, a Hwasong-5/6 brigade (or regiment), a Nodong 
brigade (or regiment), and possibly a Taepodong-1/2 battalion. 

Chemical and Biological Weapons 

The U.S. military assesses that North Korea has a significant 
inventory of chemicals that could be weaponized on conventional 
weapons systems (mortars, artillery, rockets, and bombs), missiles, 
and unconventional delivery platforms. In 2004 South Korea esti- 
mated that this chemical stockpile was as large as 2,500 to 5,000 
tons of toxicants and included nerve, blister, blood, and vomiting 
agents. According to the South Korean assessment, North Korea also 
had the independent ability to cultivate and produce biological 
weapons, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera. American mili- 
tary analyst Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. posits that North Korea has 12 
chemical agent factories and two chemical weapons factories, at 
Sakchu and Kanggye, which are responsible for filling, packaging, 
and shipping chemical munitions to operational units. 

Nuclear Weapons 

North Korean nuclear-related activities began in 1955, when repre- 
sentatives of the Academy of Sciences participated in an East Euro- 
pean conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1956 North 
Korea signed two agreements with the Soviet Union covering joint 
nuclear research. Then, in 1959 North Korea signed an intergovern- 
mental atomic energy cooperation agreement — Series 9559 con- 
tract — with the Soviet Union, which included Soviet technical 
assistance and funding to conduct a geological site survey to deter- 
mine a suitable location for a nuclear reactor; construct a nuclear 
research facility near Yongbyon; and train North Korean scientists and 
specialists and establish a nuclear-related curriculum at Kim II Sung 
University (see Education, ch. 2). Chinese and Soviet assistance with 
training of nuclear scientists and technicians historically has been 
North Korea's principal source of nuclear expertise, although in 2004 
it was revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, 
the "father of the Islamic bomb," had sold nuclear secrets to North 
Korea for more than 15 years. 

The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, established in 
1962, has more than 100 buildings. From 1965 to 1967, Soviet special- 
ists built a two-megawatt thermal research reactor IRT-2000 (IRT is 
the Russian acronym for issledovatel skiy reaktor teplovyy, or thermal 



260 



National Security 



research reactor) for nuclear research — known as Y6ngby6n-1 — that 
was later upgraded by North Korean scientists, first to a capacity of five 
megawatts and then to its current capacity of eight megawatts. 
Y6ngby6n-1 was brought under International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA — see Glossary) controls in 1974. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea began expanding its 
nuclear infrastructure. In 1980 the country began construction on an 
indigenously designed, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled five-mega- 
watt electric reactor, known as Y6ngby6n-2, which became opera- 
tional in 1986. Four years into this project, North Korea attempted a 
more ambitious endeavor by initiating construction of a 50-mega- 
watt nuclear reactor, called Y6ngby6n-3, followed shortly thereafter 
by construction of a 200-megawatt reactor at T'aech'on; neither of 
these projects has been completed. In 2006 there reportedly were as 
many as 22 nuclear-related facilities in North Korea, including 
nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, nuclear fuel plants, research 
facilities, and uranium mines. 

In December 1985, North Korea signed the 1968 Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) but delayed signing 
the IAEA Full-scope Safeguards Agreement until January 30, 1992. 
Ten days earlier, North Korea and South Korea had signed the Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which 
pledged that neither country would "test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" or "possess 
nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." Moreover, 
they agreed to reciprocal verification inspections by a Joint Nuclear 
Control Commission. 

During the 1992 inspections at Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific 
Research Center, the IAEA discovered that North Korea had diverted 
reprocessed weapons-grade plutonium from its five-megawatt nuclear 
reactor. Surprised by this exposure, North Korea expelled the IAEA 
inspectors and submitted a 90-day resignation from the NPT, which 
eventually was held in abeyance one day before the resignation took 
effect. In the months that followed, a potential war between the United 
States and North Korea was averted when the DPRK signed the Octo- 
ber 1994 Agreed Framework, wherein North Korea agreed to freeze 
and eventually dismantle its plutonium-based nuclear weapons pro- 
gram in exchange for a series of quid pro quo concessions that 
included normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between 
the two parties, the transfer to North Korea of two one-gigawatt elec- 
tric light-water nuclear reactors, and the interim provision to North 
Korea of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually. 



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North Korea: A Country Study 

In October 2002, the United States informed North Korea that it 
was suspected of operating a clandestine highly enriched uranium 
(HEU)-based nuclear weapons program. What followed was a series 
of P'yongyang-implemented Agreed Framework reversals that 
included evicting IAEA inspectors, removing IAEA monitoring 
equipment, abrogating the NPT, restarting its five-megawatt nuclear 
reactor, and reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. In an effort to denu- 
clearize North Korea, six regional players — the United States, North 
Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia — agreed to meet in a 
series of negotiations termed Six-Party Talks. As of mid-2007, there 
had been six sessions of Six-Party Talks. 

On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it was one of 
the world's nuclear- armed states by issuing a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs statement declaring possession of nuclear weapons. Then, 
within a week of another Foreign Ministry announcement that the 
state would prove its nuclear capabilities, North Korea conducted 
what appears to have been a nuclear test, on October 3, 2006. By all 
indications, this test was a low-yield detonation. Although the verac- 
ity of its purported nuclear capacity remains unproven, some experts 
have surmised that North Korea could have as many as eight to 10 
plutonium bombs. These could include one or two weapons from 
plutonium produced before 1992; four or five weapons from pluto- 
nium produced from the 8,000 reprocessed nuclear fuel rods; and 
three weapons from plutonium that could be produced annually by 
operating the five-megawatt nuclear reactor that was restarted in 
January 2003. Additionally, in November 2002 the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency postulated that by mid-decade North Korea 
could produce at least two HEU bombs annually. 

Officer Corps Professional Education and Training 

The commissioned officers' military education and training system 
in North Korea is elaborate and includes numerous schools, acade- 
mies, colleges, and universities. Among these institutions are officer- 
candidate schools for each armed service; basic and advanced branch 
schools for armor, artillery, aviation, rear services, and other branches; 
mid-career staff colleges; senior war colleges; and specialty schools, 
such as medical and veterinary service schools. 

The majority of officer candidates are selected from noncommis- 
sioned officers (NCOs) who display exemplary military qualities and 
political reliability. Once selected, candidates receive initial branch 
training and commissioning from service academies and schools. 
Ground force officer candidates train at branch-specific schools, 
such as the Combined Artillery Officer School, Armor Officer 



262 




An officers ' military theory class at the Man 'gyongdae Revolutionary 

Institute, Pyongyang, 1997 
Courtesy Korea Today (Pyongyang), October 1997, SO 

School, and Kang Kon General Military Academy (which was estab- 
lished in July 1946 as the Central Security Cadre School, renamed in 
December 1948 as the First Officer Candidate School, and acquired 
its current name in October 1950). Air force officer candidates train 
at either the Kim Ch'aek Air Force Academy or the Kyongsong 
Flight Officer School; navy officer candidates train at the Kim 
Ch'ong-suk Naval Academy. Mid-career command and staff training 
is offered at all the service academies, various branch schools, and 
the Kim II Sung Military University. Courses taught at the service 
academies last six to 12 months, whereas courses that are taught at 
branch schools tend to be limited to six months. 

Two schools are of particular importance: Kim II Sung Military 
University and Man' gyongdae Revolutionary Institute. Kim II Sung 
Military University is the most prestigious military school and offers 
advanced training to officers of all services. Various degree pro- 
grams are offered: company and junior field-grade officers can 
attend a three- to four-year program; senior field-grade and political 
officers are eligible to attend a one-year program. Founded in Octo- 
ber 1948, Man'gyongdae Revolutionary Institute is an 11 -year mili- 
tary boarding school for children of the party elite. Many graduates 
of this prestigious institution go on to serve as party members. 



263 



North Korea: A Country Study 

Generally, political officer candidates are selected according to 
merit, party loyalty, and political reliability among KPA General 
Political Bureau service members. Candidates receive two years of 
training at the Political Officers School before commissioning and 
service in the General Political Bureau or as unit-level political offi- 
cers. Training focuses on politics, economics, party history, chuck 'e 
(see Glossary) philosophy, and party loyalty. Advanced training is 
offered at other institutions, such as Kumsong Political College and 
Kim II Sung Political University (which was established in Novem- 
ber 1945 as the P'yongyang Institute, renamed in January 1949 as 
the Second Officer Candidate School, and assumed its current name 
in February 1972). 

Political officers for field-grade positions are routinely selected 
by the political department at the corps level from party members in 
the corps headquarters. Supplemental training may include a six- 
month course at a political college. Candidates for positions at the 
division or higher level are identified by the Organization Depart- 
ment of the KPA General Political Bureau. They then are screened 
by the party committee and approved by the party Central Commit- 
tee's Secretariat before appointment as head of a political depart- 
ment at division or higher level. 

Colleges and universities provide most of the training for reserve 
officers; information available about the training does not differenti- 
ate between the officer-selection process and other reserve military 
training. There may be two separate tracks or a selection process at 
the end of training. 

Enlisted Conscription and Training 

North Korea enforces universal conscription for males and selec- 
tive conscription for females with significant pre-induction and post- 
service requirements. In April 1993, North Korea enacted the Ten- 
year Service System, which lengthened universal conscription from 
an eight- to a 10-year obligation. In October 1996, the Army Service 
Decree was amended, lengthening (by as much as three years) con- 
script service obligations to age 30. 

Initial draft registration is conducted at age 14, pre-induction 
physicals are administered at age 16, and graduating senior middle 
school students typically are drafted at age 17. Eligibility for the 
draft is based on economic and political factors as well as physical 
condition. Some young people are able to postpone military service 
through temporary deferments that are offered for continuing educa- 
tion at high school or college. Technicians, skilled workers, mem- 
bers of special government organizations, and children of the 



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National Security 



politically influential often are excluded from the draft. Most service 
personnel are single, as marriage is prohibited in the military until 
age 30, even for commissioned officers. Women are conscripted 
selectively at a ratio of about one female to nine males and serve in 
all three services and branches. 

The coordinating national command authorities of the Central 
Military Commission and National Defense Commission establish 
annual conscription quotas that are enforced by the provincial, 
municipal, and county military-mobilization departments. The 
county departments, in turn, levy conscription requirements on local 
schools for implementation, and the schools select the most qualified 
students. After receiving official notification, inductees are assigned 
to the army, air force, or navy; given a military occupational spe- 
cialty, such as infantry, communications, or medical; and assigned to 
a duty unit. The young men or women then go to a service- and 
branch-specific military training center or training company at regi- 
mental or divisional level for basic and occupational specialty train- 
ing. Initial training varies by type and lasts approximately two 
months for ground forces and between two and three months for 
naval and air forces. Additional training is provided on the job at 
squad, platoon, and company levels. 

Training, conducted under constant supervision, essentially empha- 
sizes memorization and repetition but also includes a heavy emphasis 
on technical skills and vocational training. Lack of a technical base is 
another reason for the emphasis on repetitive training drills. Nighttime 
training is extensive, and physical and mental conditioning is stressed. 
Remedial training for initially substandard performances is not 
uncommon. Such training methods produce soldiers well versed in the 
basics even under adverse conditions. The degree to which they are 
prepared to respond rapidly to changing circumstances is less certain. 
NCO candidates are selected by merit for advanced military training at 
NCO schools, which are located at both the corps and the Military 
Training Bureau of the General Staff Department. 

The quality of life of the enlisted soldier is difficult to evaluate. 
Conditions are harsh; rations are no more than 700 to 850 grams per 
day, depending on branch and service. Leave and passes are limited 
and strictly controlled. A two-week leave is allowed, although rarely 
granted, only once or twice during an entire enlistment. Passes for 
enlisted personnel are even more rare; neither day nor overnight 
passes are granted. During tours of duty, day passes are granted for 
public affairs duties or KWP-related activities. There is conflicting 
information about the frequency of corporal punishment and the 
harshness of military justice. 



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North Korea: A Country Study 




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National Security 



A typical daily routine can last from 5:00 AM to 10:00 PM, with at 
least 10 hours devoted to training and only three hours of unsched- 
uled or rest time, excluding meals. In addition, soldiers perform 
many duties not related to their basic mission; for example, units are 
expected to grow crops and to raise livestock or fish to supplement 
their rations. 

Military Ranks 

The KPA officer rank structure has 15 grades divided into three 
categories: commissioned officer (junior and senior), general officer, 
and marshal. Across services— army, air force, and navy — the KPA 
title for each rank is the same; however, it translates differently when 
broadly associated with the U.S. military rank structure (see fig. 13). 
The North Korean rank names used in this chapter are direct transla- 
tions from the Korean titles and in some cases differ from the U.S. 
military rank equivalents in figures 13 and 14. Junior commissioned 
officer ranks are four-tiered: sowi (army and air force junior lieuten- 
ant and navy ensign), chungwi (army and air force lieutenant and 
navy junior lieutenant), sangwi (army and air force senior lieutenant 
and navy lieutenant), and taewi (army and air force captain and navy 
senior lieutenant). Senior commissioned officer ranks also are four- 
tiered: sojwa (major/lieutenant commander), chungjwa (lieutenant 
colonel/commander), sangjwa (colonel/captain), and taejwa (senior 
colonel/senior captain). General officer ranks are four-tiered: sojang 
(major general/rear admiral), chungjang (lieutenant general/vice 
admiral), sangjang (colonel general/admiral), and taejang (general/ 
senior admiral). Marshal ranks are three-tiered: ch'asu (vice mar- 
shal), wonsu (marshal), and taewdnsu (grand marshal). 

Until December 1991, Kim II Sung alone held the rank of marshal 
in his position as supreme commander of the KPA. In December 
1991, Kim Jong II was named supreme commander of the KPA; on 
April 20, 1992, Kim II Sung was given the title grand marshal and 
Kim Jong II and Minister of People's Armed Forces O Chin-u 
(1917-95) were named marshal. In an effort to solidify his hold on 
the military, Kim Jong II has in turn bestowed the title of marshal 
and vice marshal on a select group of loyalists. North Korea has two 
marshals: Kim Jong II and Yi Ul-sol, the former commander of the 
Guard Command who retired in September 2003. Beyond these 
advancements to marshal and vice marshal, since 1 992 Kim Jong II 
also has promoted more than 1,200 general officers. 

Enlisted promotion historically has been a slow process. In 1998 the 
junior enlisted rank structure expanded from two categories — chonsa 
(private) and sangdungbyong (corporal) — to four (see fig. 14). The 



267 



North Korea: A Country Study 




268 



National Security 



rank structure in 2007 was chonsa (private), hagup pyongsa (junior ser- 
viceman), chunggup pyongsa (middle serviceman), and sanggup 
pyongsa (senior serviceman). Eligible senior servicemen compete for 
admission to the corps-level NCO training school; upon graduation 
they are promoted to the grade of staff sergeant, the first of four senior 
enlisted or NCO ranks. The NCO ranks are hasa (staff sergeant), chun- 
gsa (sergeant first class), sangsa (master sergeant), and tukmusangsa 
(sergeant major). 

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics 

Notwithstanding the inter-Korean engagement policies of the cur- 
rent and former South Korean administrations, North Korea contin- 
ues to embrace its national objective of communizing the Korean 
Peninsula, as articulated in the state constitution and the party char- 
ter. Specifically, the constitution declares "national reunification as 
the nation's supreme task," and the KWP constitution states that the 
"ultimate goal of the party is to spread chuck 'e ideology and con- 
struct a Communist society throughout the world." 

To develop the capabilities to realize its national objective, in 
December 1962 the Fifth Plenum of the Fourth KWP Central Com- 
mittee adopted the Four-Point Military Guidelines: to arm the peo- 
ple; fortify the nation; create a cadre-based military; and modernize 
the force. These four military guidelines or defense policy principles 
are codified in article 60 of the 1998 state constitution. 

The KPA has a three-part military strategy: surprise attack; quick, 
decisive war; and mixed tactics to carry out the national defense pol- 
icy. Employing these three strategies, the KPA envisions reunifying 
the Korean Peninsula by initiating hostilities with large-scale asym- 
metric operations including massive conventional and chemical artil- 
lery, missile attacks, and simultaneous insertion of SOF throughout 
the depths of the battlespace (surprise-attack strategy). Thereafter, 
first-echelon operational forces (forward corps) would attack 
through the DMZ, or under it using invasion tunnels, to annihilate 
opposing forward forces, establish gaps and maneuver corridors to 
facilitate the rapid passage of second- and third-echelon operational 
forces (mechanized and armored forces), and complete the annihila- 
tion of opposing forces and secure the Korean Peninsula within 30 
days (quick, decisive war strategy). To facilitate these aims of sur- 
prise attack and quick, decisive war, North Korea plans to fight a 
closely coordinated two-front war (mixed-tactics strategy). The first 
front would be fought by conventional forces and the second front by 
SOF to maximize disruption and destruction of command, control, 



269 



North Korea: A Country Study 

communications, and intelligence facilities; air and sea ports; logisti- 
cal bases; and lines of communications. 

North Korean military strategy defines KPA doctrine, force struc- 
ture (manpower and equipment) requirements, and tactics. KPA mil- 
itary doctrine is based on a synthesis of Soviet operational practice 
and Chinese People's Liberation Army military doctrine adapted to 
conform to the Korean Peninsula's mountainous terrain and the 
KPA's emphasis on light infantry as the key force structure. The 
result of this amalgamation is the KPA's five fundamental principles 
of war: mass and dispersion, surprise attack, increased maneuver- 
ability, cunning and personified tactics (such as initiative, leadership, 
and deception), and secure secrets (including reconnaissance, coun- 
terintelligence, and terrain utilization). 

Defense Industry 

The defense industry is controlled by the interrelated efforts of the 
National Defense Commission, the KWP, and the cabinet through a 
hierarchical association. Annually, the Ministry of People's Armed 
Forces determines defense requirements and submits them for 
approval to the National Defense Commission. Thereafter, the 
National Defense Commission, working with the party Central Mili- 
tary Commission, establishes defense priorities and issues directives, 
which are disseminated by the cabinet and the Central Military Com- 
mission. The cabinet forwards these defense requirements to appro- 
priate agencies for action: as an example, the State Planning 
Commission uses defense requirements to help inform budget appro- 
priations, which are approved by the Supreme People's Assembly 
and administered by the Ministry of Finance; other agencies are 
directed to supply energy and material resources. The Central Mili- 
tary Commission, working through the KWP's Munitions Industry 
Department, establishes defense industry policies, which are tasked 
to the Second Economic Committee for implementation. 

A subordinate organ of the National Defense Commission, the 
Second Economic Committee, directs the defense industry with 
oversight and guidance provided by the party Munitions Industry 
Department. In 1989 Kim Ch'61-man succeeded Chon Pyong-ho as 
chairman of the Second Economic Committee; and then in Septem- 
ber 2003, the 85-year-old Kim Ch'61-man was replaced by Paek Se- 
bong (suspected alias for Kim Jong Chul, second son and possible 
heir to Kim Jong II). In his dual capacity as party secretary for muni- 
tions and party director for the Munitions Industry Department, 
Chon Pyong-ho oversees and guides the work of the Second Eco- 
nomic Committee and thereby the defense industry. Organized into 



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National Security 



nine bureaus, the Second Economic Committee exercises responsi- 
bility for defense industry plans, finances, production, distribution, 
and foreign military sales. 

At the head of the Second Economic Committee is the General 
Bureau, which is responsible for defense industry plans, budget com- 
pilation, and resource procurement and distribution. Defense industry 
procurement, development, and production are directed by seven 
machine industry bureaus. The First Machine Industry Bureau over- 
sees small arms, munitions, and general-purpose equipment. The Sec- 
ond Machine Industry Bureau commissions tanks, armored personnel 
carriers, and trucks. The Third Machine Industry Bureau is responsible 
for artillery and antiaircraft artillery systems. Missile systems are pro- 
duced by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau while the Fifth 
Machine Industry Bureau is responsible for nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons. The Sixth Machine Industry Bureau manufactures 
naval vessels, and the Seventh Machine Industry Bureau produces 
communications equipment and aircraft. The machine industry 
bureaus supervise defense factories and coordinate internally with the 
Second Natural Science Institute (formerly the Academy of Defense 
Sciences) and with corresponding Ministry of People's Armed Forces 
bureaus and commands. Organized into divisions by specialty, the 
Second Natural Science Institute directs all defense-industry research 
and development. 

The External Economic Affairs Bureau (also known as Yongak- 
san Company) is the ninth bureau of the Second Economic Commit- 
tee and has primary responsibility for foreign military sales and 
shared responsibility with the machine industry bureaus for defense 
article procurement. It is suspected that foreign military sales either 
fund the defense industry or supplement its spending. North Korea's 
announced defense spending for 2003 was nearly US$1.8 billion or 
15.7 percent of the state budget, an increase of US$320 million, from 
2002. However, when coupled with profit estimates from the Second 
Economic Committee's foreign military sales, it is possible that 
actual 2003 military spending could have reached as much as US$5 
billion, or 44.4 percent of the total budget. 

North Korea's extensive defense production capability reflects its 
commitment to self-reliance and its military-first, or songun, policy 
(see Relationships Among the Government, Party, and Military, ch. 4). 
As it relates to the defense industry, emphasis on the military-first pol- 
icy has two foci: preferential development of defense articles and 
accomplishment of announced economic priorities executed in the 
revolutionary military spirit. 



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North Korea: A Country Study 

North Korea has an impressive, although technologically dated, 
military production capacity. From an aggregate of some 180 arms 
factories, North Korea operates approximately 40 gun factories of 
varying calibers, 10 armored vehicle factories, 10 naval shipyards, 
and 50 munitions factories. Many of these factories are constructed 
underground in strategic rear areas. Additionally, more than 115 
nonmilitary factories have a dedicated wartime materiel production 
mission. 

Most of the equipment is of Soviet or Chinese design, but North 
Korea has modified the original designs to produce both derivatives 
and indigenously designed versions of armored personnel carriers, 
self-propelled artillery, tanks, and high-speed landing craft. Ground 
systems production includes a complete line of crew- and individual- 
served weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers, rocket launch- 
ers, and missiles. Naval construction includes surface combatants, 
submarines, landing craft air-cushion vehicles, and a wide range of 
specialized infiltration craft. Aircraft production includes Mi-2 heli- 
copters, Yak-18 trainers, spare parts, and perhaps coproduction of 
jet fighters. 

Internal Security 

Control System 

Since its founding in 1948, North Korea has meticulously erected a 
pervasive system of totalitarian control unique even when compared 
to the communist systems in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. The North Korean population is rigidly controlled, as individ- 
ual rights are systematically subordinated to state and party designs. 
The regime uses education, mass mobilization, persuasion, isolation, 
coercion, fear, intimidation, and oppression to guarantee political and 
social conformity. Invasive propaganda and political indoctrination are 
reinforced by an elaborate internal security apparatus. 

The regime's control mechanisms are quite extensive. Security 
ratings or loyalty groups are established for individuals and influ- 
ence access to employment, schools, medical facilities, stores, 
admission to the KWP, and other walks of life. The system in its 
most elaborate form consists of three loyalty groups: core class 
(haeksim kyech 'ung), wavering class (tongyo kyech 'ung), and hostile 
class (choktae kyech'ung), which historically were further divided 
into 51 categories. Over time, however, the use of subcategories has 
diminished. 

The core class accounts for about 10 to 15 percent of the popula- 
tion and includes KWP members and those with a revolutionary 



272 



A North Korean guard post over- 
looking the Joint Security Area at 
P'anmunjdm in the Demilitarized 

Zone 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 




(anti- Japanese) lineage. The wavering class or the basic masses of 
workers and peasants make up about 40 to 50 percent of the popula- 
tion. The remaining 40 percent of the population includes members 
of the hostile class — descendants of pro-Japanese collaborators, 
landowners, relatives of defectors, and prisoners. 

There are five main means of social control: residence, travel, 
employment, clothing and food, and family life. Change of residence 
is possible only with party approval. Those who move without a per- 
mit are not eligible for food rations or housing allotments and are 
subject to criminal prosecution. Travel is controlled by the Ministry 
of People's Security, and a travel pass is necessary. Travel on other 
than official business is limited strictly to attending family functions, 
and obtaining approval normally is a long and complicated process. 
The ration system does not apply to individuals while they are trav- 
eling, which further curtails movement. Employment is governed by 
the party; assignments are made on the basis of political reliability 
and family background. A change in employment is made at the 
party's convenience. 

Punishment and the Penal System 

The 1998 state constitution stipulates judicial independence; 
requires court proceedings to be carried out in accordance with the 
law; directs court trials to be open to the public (unless otherwise 



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North Korea: A Country Study 

stipulated by law); and guarantees the accused the right of defense 
(articles 158-60). North Korea's penal code was enacted in 1950 and 
has since been revised or amended six times, including the Supreme 
People's Assembly Presidium's most recent revision on April 29, 
2004. Despite significant revisions that include replacing strong 
political and ideological sections with those presenting a more neu- 
tral tone, the penal code remains a political tool for safeguarding 
national sovereignty and the socialist system. The amended 2004 
penal code contains an additional 14 areas that elaborate and clarify 
constituted crimes, which are divisible into two groups of crime: 
ordinary and political. Of significant note, with this amendment the 
state adopted the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime 
without a law), which in principle removed power from authorities 
to criminalize acts not covered by the penal code. The penal code 
also addresses a wide range of issues from labor laws and workplace 
safety to torture and capital punishment. 

The penal code classifies punishment into four main categories: 
capital punishment; lifetime confinement to hard labor; termed con- 
finement to hard labor (one to 15 years); correctional labor or "labor- 
training" (six to 24 months); and a number of less severe punish- 
ments, including suspension of electoral rights and confiscation of 
property. The 2004 penal code reduced the number of antistate 
crimes punishable by death from five to four: plots to overthrow the 
state; acts of terrorism; treason, including defection and espionage; 
and suppression of the people's movement for national liberation. 
Although the penal code prohibits torture and inhumane treatment, 
according to reports by South Korea's National Intelligence Service 
in 2005, and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 
in 2006, torture is both routine and severe. 

On May 6, 2004, the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium also 
amended the state's criminal procedure law, which was adopted orig- 
inally in 1950 and amended eight times thereafter. Punishment for 
criminal behavior is determined by both the type of crime — criminal 
or political — and the status of the individual. Party influence is per- 
vasive in both criminal and political cases. In criminal cases, the 
government assigns lawyers for the defense. In political cases, trials 
often are dispensed with, and the Ministry of People's Security refers 
such cases directly to the State Security Department for the imposi- 
tion of punishment. 

As specified in the penal code, criminal proceedings are accom- 
plished in six stages: investigation, preliminary examination, indict- 
ment, trial, decision, and enforcement. The proceedings begin with 
an investigation, during which the accused is identified and detained 



274 



National Security 



(as necessary), and basic evidence is preserved. Preliminary exami- 
nation lasts for two months and is the stage where the case against 
the accused is built. If the prosecutor assesses that there is sufficient 
evidence to try the accused, then an indictment is submitted before 
the court holding jurisdiction: people's courts for ordinary crimes 
not belonging to provincial courts; provincial-level courts for ordi- 
nary cases that could result in a death sentence or lifetime imprison- 
ment; military courts for crimes by military members; railroad courts 
for crimes by railroad employees or rail-related crimes; and the Cen- 
tral Court for appeals (articles 126 and 133 of the criminal procedure 
law). Lower court trials are divided into two phases: preparation and 
deliberation phases. Court decisions are determined by a majority 
ruling of the judge and two people's assessors; enforcement of sen- 
tencing immediately follows guilty verdicts. 

Whereas the aforementioned criminal proceedings are the pre- 
scribed process, practice is another matter, according to the U.S. 
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 2006. Although North Korea refuses outside observation of its 
legal system, it is clear that the limited guarantees legally in place 
often are not well followed. North Korean law limits incarceration 
during investigation and interrogation to a period of up to two 
months. The period of incarceration, however, can be extended 
indefinitely with the approval of the Central Procurators' Office. The 
approval apparently is given quite freely. It is not uncommon for 
individuals to be detained for six months or much longer without 
trial. There has been strong evidence that prisoners are routinely tor- 
tured or ill treated during interrogation. Habeas corpus or its equiva- 
lent is not recognized in theory or practice. In addition, information 
about detainees is restricted, and it is often very difficult, if not 
impossible, for concerned family members to obtain any information 
about someone being detained. 

Criminal procedures are entrusted to four state agencies. The 
courts, procurators' offices, and the Ministry of People's Security 
are responsible for public order, and the State Security Department 
imposes political order (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). 

Judicial and Prosecutorial Systems 

In accordance with the 1998 constitution, North Korea's judicial 
and prosecutorial systems are composed of tiered courts and procura- 
tors' offices (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). Judicial bodies include the 
Central Court, military courts, railroad courts, provincial and special- 
city courts, and county-level people's courts. Appointed prosecutorial 
officials investigate and prosecute those accused of breaking the law, 



275 



North Korea: A Country Study 

and such officials serve in the Central Procurators' Office, the Special 
Procurators' Offices, and lower-level procurators' offices (article 
147). 

The highest judicial organ, the Central Court, supervises all lower 
courts and is accountable to the Supreme People's Assembly or to 
the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium when the former is in 
recess (articles 161 and 162). The Supreme People's Assembly has 
the power to appoint or remove the procurator general of the Central 
Procurators' Office (article 91). The Central Court appoints and 
recalls judges of the special courts; people's jury assessors are 
elected by a general meeting of concerned soldiers or employees 
(article 155). Below the Central Court are the lower courts, whose 
judges and civilian assessors are elected and recalled by their local 
people's assemblies (article 134). The constitution does not require 
legal education as a qualification for being elected as a judge or peo- 
ple's assessor. Over time, however, legal training has received more 
emphasis, although political reliability remains the prime criterion 
for holding office. 

The Central Procurators' Office parallels the court system and per- 
forms three principal duties. The first is to ensure observance of laws 
by institutions, enterprises, organizations, and citizens. The second is 
to ensure that decisions and directives of state organs conform to the 
state constitution, Supreme People's Assembly laws and decisions, 
National Defense Commission decisions and orders, Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly Presidium decrees, decisions, and directives, and cabi- 
net decisions. The third is to protect state sovereignty, the social 
system, and state and social cooperative organizations' property, and 
to safeguard life, property, and personal rights by instituting and pros- 
ecuting legal proceedings against offenders (article 150). 

In September 2003, the Supreme People's Assembly reelected 
Kim Pyong-ryul as president of the Central Court. At the same time, 
Yi Kil-song was appointed as procurator general. 

Ministry of People's Security 

The Ministry of People's Security (formerly the Ministry of Pub- 
lic Security) is headquartered in P'yongyang and since July 2004 
General Chu Sang-song, former IV Corps commander, has been the 
minister. One of the most powerful organizations in North Korea, the 
ministry has about 130,000 employees and is responsible for over- 
seeing a national police force responsible for maintaining law and 
order; investigating common criminal cases; conducting preliminary 
examinations; and managing correctional facilities (excluding politi- 
cal prison camps). The police force also conducts background inves- 



276 



National Security 



tigations, the census, and civil registrations; manages government 
classified documents; protects government and party officials; and 
patrols government buildings and some government and party con- 
struction activities. 

Vice ministers direct the affairs of the ministry's 12 bureaus. These 
are the Security Bureau for law enforcement; the Investigation Bureau 
for criminal investigation; and the Public Safety Bureau for fire pro- 
tection, traffic control, public health, and customs. The Registration 
Bureau issues and maintains citizen identification cards and public 
records on births, deaths, marriages, residence registration, and pass- 
ports. The Penal Affairs Bureau is in charge of prisons. The Civil 
Defense Bureau oversees preparedness for air raids and nuclear, bio- 
logical, or chemical attacks. The Railroad Security Bureau is responsi- 
ble for railroad security. There are several engineer bureaus, which are 
responsible for design and construction: the Sixth Engineer Bureau for 
subway systems and underground facilities, the Twenty-sixth Engi- 
neer Bureau for large-scale public projects, and the Twenty-seventh 
Engineer Bureau for nuclear-related facilities. The Twenty-eighth 
Engineer Bureau has responsibility for coal mining, and the Twenty- 
ninth Engineer Bureau for roads, railroads, and bridges. 

Below the ministry level, there are public security offices for each 
province, special city, municipality, and county. Although dependent 
on population density, a typical municipality or county with a popu- 
lation of about 120,000 people has a public security office that is 
staffed with about 350 functionaries, organized into directorates and 
sections. A public security office of this level generally includes 
directorates for politics, security, and resident registration. Represen- 
tative sections are responsible for accounting, communications, fire- 
fighting, inspections, investigations, law enforcement, ordnance, and 
preliminary examinations. 

Interior regions of the country have public security suboffices dis- 
persed among a grouping of between two and three villages; however, 
border and coastal regions maintain suboffices in each village. Typical 
suboffices have a head of station and a number of security and resident 
registration officers. Border and coastal suboffices also have security 
officers from the armed forces' Border Security Command. 

State Security Department 

In 1973 political security responsibilities were transferred from the 
Ministry of People's Security to the State Security Department, a sub- 
ordinate agency of the National Defense Commission that employs 
more than 30,000 elite agents who ultimately are responsible to Kim 
Jong II in his role as director of the State Security Department. Head- 



277 



North Korea: A Country Study 

quartered in P'yongyang, the State Security Department carries out a 
wide range of counterintelligence and internal security functions that 
normally are associated with secret police, such as the former Soviet 
KGB. The department has several charges. One is searching for anti- 
state criminals, a general category that includes those accused of anti- 
government and dissident activities, economic crimes, and slander of 
the political leadership. Another charge is conducting foreign and 
domestic intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Further- 
more, the department operates political prison camps and maintains 
surveillance of overseas North Korean embassy personnel and trade 
and joint- venture employees. 

The State Security Department is organized into 17 bureaus, with 
functions including communications interception, data analysis, and 
intelligence. There are bureaus for research, surveillance, preliminary 
examinations, investigations, interrogations, and political prison 
camps. The State Security Department's responsibility also includes 
inter-Korean dialogue and entry and exit management. Moreover, the 
department covers military industrial security, operational security, 
and protection. There are bureaus for equipment, finance, supply, and 
logistics. 

Among North Korea's many societal control systems are the politi- 
cal prison camps (euphemistically referred to by the state as kwalliso- 
dul or management centers) that are controlled and operated by the 
Political Prison Camps Bureau. According to South Korea's National 
Intelligence Service and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in 
North Korea, the bureau operates six widely dispersed political prison 
camps that confine a total of between 150,000 and 200,000 inmates, 
which may include an individual's family members up to three genera- 
tions as well as the accused. Some of the political prisons are subdi- 
vided into two sections: a maximum control zone for lifetime 
detentions and a reeducation zone for limited- term detentions. Often 
operating extrajudicially, the State Security Department apprehends, 
interrogates, and imprisons the accused (and family members) without 
the advantage of legal counsel or due process. 

The Surveillance Bureau operates a pervasive network of agents 
and informants from national to village levels. Using a pyramid 
organizational structure, the State Security Department surveillance 
agents permeate organizations and communities as each agent sur- 
reptitiously employs some 50 quasi-agents who, in turn, each retain 
about 20 base-level informants. This surveillance process has 
spawned a national culture of deceit and distrust that intentionally 
pits one against another for the purpose of subduing the politically 
ambitious and the general population alike. 



278 



KPA troops celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the Korean War. 

Courtesy Choson (Pyongyang), July 2003, 16 

Guard Command 

Subordinate to the National Defense Commission, the Guard 
Command is an independent corps-size organization equipped with 
artillery, aircraft, tanks, and engineers. Loosely analogous to the 
U.S. Secret Service, it has primary responsibility for the protection 
of Kim Jong II and other senior-level officials. In September 2003, 
Marshal Yi Ul-sol, owing to declining health, retired as commander 
of this elite organization of between 100,000 and 120,000 special 
agents; the name of his replacement had not been made public in 
2007. 

Border Security Command and Coastal Security Bureau 

Collectively responsible for restricting unauthorized cross-border 
(land and sea) entries and exits, in the early 1990s the bureaus 
responsible for border security and coastal security were transferred 
from the State Security Department to the Ministry of People's 
Armed Forces. Sometime thereafter, the Border Security Bureau was 
enlarged to corps level and renamed the Border Security Command. 
Previously headquartered in Chagang Province, the Border Security 
Command was relocated to P'yongyang in 2002. 

Deployed along the northern borders with China and Russia, the 
Border Security Command is organized as four infantry-type units. 



279 



North Korea: A Country Study 

The Tenth Border Security Division (which may be a brigade) is 
based in North P'yongan Province. The Thirty-seventh Border Secu- 
rity Brigade is in Chagang Province, the Forty-fourth Border Secu- 
rity Brigade in Yanggang Province, and the Thirty-second Border 
Security Brigade in North Hamgyong Province. These brigades are 
deployed west to east from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan (or, as 
Koreans prefer, the West Sea and East Sea, respectively). Responsi- 
ble for staffing checkpoints, guarding border crossing points, and 
conducting patrols, these border security units are estimated to have 
as many as 40,000 assigned personnel. The command also employs 
an operational-level reserve force that is organized around an 
enlarged mechanized brigade and tank brigade, which has a com- 
bined force structure of about 20,000 personnel. 

The Coastal Security Bureau apparently was disaggregated and its 
coastal security brigades reassigned to various infantry corps. Col- 
lectively, the coastal security forces are equipped with about 150 
patrol craft and organized into six coastal border brigades, which are 
deployed with three brigades on each coast. Deployed on the west 
coast from north to south are the Eleventh Coastal Security Brigade 
(North P'yongan Province), the Thirteenth Coastal Security Brigade 
(South P'yongan Province), and the Fifteenth Coastal Security Bri- 
gade (South Hwanghae Province). On the east coast from south to 
north are the Twenty-second Coastal Security Brigade (Kangwon 
Province), Seventeenth Coastal Security Brigade (South Hamgyong 
Province), and Nineteenth Coastal Security Brigade (North Ham- 
gyong Province). The Coastal Security Bureau is responsible for 
patrolling the coastlines to prevent illegal entries and exits, maintain- 
ing harbor and port security, and policing and protecting the nation's 
coastal waterways and fishing areas. 

National Security Prospects 

North Korea's national security is threatened predominantly by 
issues of internal instability resulting from environmental disasters, 
famine, poor governance, failed economic policies, and social 
oppression. The failure or inability of the regime to initiate adequate 
environmental, political, economic, and social reforms exacerbates 
an already precarious milieu that perpetuates the continued suffering 
of North Korea's populace and burdens the international community. 

Despite such national security challenges, the regime seems to 
possess the ability to control internal order and maintains adequate 
means of self-defense. The massive network of citizen surveillance 
suppresses overt deviation from acceptable behavior, although there 
are growing signs that ordinary North Koreans are not putting much 



280 



National Security 



effort or commitment into their work. Additionally, beyond retaining 
an adequate self-defense capability, North Korea's massive armed 
forces present a credible conventional threat, and its growing strate- 
gic weapons arsenal frequently has been used as a tool to influence 
international politics. 



* * * 



For a survey of North Korea, see Yonhap News Agency's North 
Korea Handbook. The origins of North Korea's armed forces and 
current military tactics are presented in James M. Minnich's The 
North Korean People's Army: Origins and Current Tactics. The 
organization of North Korea's armed forces is covered in Joseph S. 
Bermudez Jr.'s Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of 
North Korea. North Korea's modern-day origins are reviewed in 
Dae-Sook Suh's Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader and in 
Charles K. Armstrong's The North Korean Revolution: 1945-1950. 
For information on North Korea's judicial system, Kim Soo-Am's 
The North Korean Penal Code, Criminal Procedures, and their 
Actual Application is useful. For information on North Korea's 
nuclear-weapons program, the best sources are James Clay Moltz 
and Alexandre Y. Mansourov's The North Korea Nuclear Program: 
Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia and James M. 
Minnich's The Denuclearization of North Korea: The Agreed 
Framework and Alternative Options Analyzed. 

The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense's annual 
Defense White Paper (published in both Korean and English) is par- 
ticularly noteworthy. Asian Survey, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Korea and World Affairs, and Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 
are generally useful and relatively free of bias. South Korean investi- 
gative journalism, particularly monthlies such as Wolgan Choson 
(Monthly Chosun), produces valuable insights of defectors and trav- 
elers to North Korea. 

The North Korean media monitoring service of the U.S. Open 
Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service) 
is an excellent source of English-language translations and other 
materials on many North Korean issues. The service is available 
from the U.S. National Technical Information Service and accessed 
through Dialog's World News Connection (http://wnc.dialog.com/). 
(For complete citations and further information, see Bibliography.) 



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Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 1992; Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
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Chapter 5 

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son] (Seoul), 1990-91, 2005.) 



305 



Glossary 



Agreed Framework — Signed in Geneva, Switzerland, between the 
United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, following 
talks held between September 23 and October 21, 1994, during 
which the two sides negotiated an overall resolution of the nuclear 
issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides agreed to four points: to 
cooperate to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors 
and related facilities with light-water nuclear-reactor power 
plants; to move toward full normalization of political and 
economic relations; to work together for peace and security on a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and to work together to strengthen 
the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

cadre(s), or kanbu — Term for responsible party, government, and 
economic functionaries; also used for key officials in the 
educational, cultural, and scientific fields. 

Choch'ongryon — Abbreviation for Chae Ilbon Chosonin Ch'ongyon- 
haphoe, literally General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. 
Members of this Japan-based association tend to be supportive of 
North Korea's foreign policy and have kinship and financial ties to 
North Korea. Known as Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai, or Chosen 
Soren, in Japanese. 

Ch'ollima, or Ch'ollima Work Team Movement — Intensive mass 
campaign to increase economic production inaugurated in 1958; 
began as Ch'ollima Movement (Ch'ollima Undong), named after 
a legendary flying horse said to have galloped 1 ,000 li in a single 
day; a symbolic term for great speed. Farm and factory workers 
were exhorted to excel in the manner of Ch'ollima riders, and 
exemplary individuals and work teams were awarded special 
Ch'ollima titles. The labor force was organized into work teams 
and brigades and competed at increasing production. Superseded 
in the early 1960s by the Ch'6ngsan-ni Method (q.v.) and the 
Taean Work System (q.v.), and then in 1973 by the Three 
Revolutions Team Movement (q.v.). 

Ch'ondogyo — Teachings of the Heavenly Way. This indigenous 
monotheistic religion was founded in the nineteenth century as a 
counter to Western influence and Christianity. Its Christian- 



307 



North Korea: A Country Study 

influenced dogma stresses the equality and unity of man with the 
universe. Formerly Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement (q.v.). 
Ch'ongsan-ni Method — A personalized, "on-the -spot" management 
method or spirit reputedly developed by Kim II Sung in February 
1960 during a visit to the Ch'6ngsan-ni Cooperative Farm in South 
P'yongan Province. In addition to important material incentives, the 
method had three main components: party and government 
functionaries must eschew their bureaucratic tendency of only issuing 
orders and directives; they must mingle with farmers and uncover and 
solve their problems through comradely guidance; and they should 
give solid technological guidance to spur efficient and productive 
achievement. The method was largely abandoned in the early twenty- 
first century. 

chuck 'e, or juch 'e — Political ideology promulgated by Kim II Sung. The 
application of Marxism-Leninism to the North Korean experience 
based on autonomy and self-reliance popularized since 1955 as an 
official guideline for independence in politics, economics, national 
defense, and foreign policy. 

Comintern — Short form for Communist International or the Third 
International, which was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate 
the world communist movement. Officially disbanded in 1943, the 
Comintern was revived as the Cominform (Communist Information 
Bureau) from 1947 to 1956. 

Demarcation Line — Established at the thirty-eighth parallel under 
the Korean War armistice agreement of 1953; marks the actual 
cease-fire line between North Korea and South Korea. 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) — The 4,000-meter-wide buffer zone that 
runs east and west across^ the waist of the Korean Peninsula for 
238 kilometers over land and three kilometers over the sea, 
dividing it into North Korea and South Korea. The DMZ was 
created by the armistice in 1953. 

exclusionism — Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) foreign policy of 
isolation adopted after the Japanese invasions in the 1590s. 

fiscal year — January 1 through December 3 1 . 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for 
final consumption and intermediate production are assumed to be 
included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and 
shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies 



308 



Glossary 



are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies have been 
eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross 
indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have 
not been made. Income arising from investments and possessions 
owned abroad is not included, only domestic production — hence 
the use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP from gross 
national product (q.v.). 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product (q.v.) 
plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign 
countries, including income received from abroad by residents 
and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is 
the broadest measurement of the output of goods and services by 
an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include 
indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies 
are only transfer payments, GNP often is calculated at factor cost 
by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

hangul — The Korean phonetic alphabet developed in fifteenth- 
century Choson Korea by scholars in the court of King Sejong (r. 
1418-50). This alphabet is used in both North Korea and South 
Korea; in North Korea, it is called choson 'gul and is used 
exclusively, whereas in South Korea a mixture of the alphabet and 
Chinese characters is used. 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — Specialized agency 
of the United Nations established in 1956, which became 
effective in 1957, to assist member nations with the development 
and application of atomic energy for peaceful uses and to foster 
and monitor a universal standard of nuclear safeguards. Through 
on-site inspections and monitoring, the IAEA ensures that fissile 
and related nuclear material, equipment, information, and services 
are not used to produce nuclear weapons as provided for in 
bilateral nuclear safeguard agreements between the IAEA and 
individual member nations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), formally the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. In 2007 there were 144 members of the IAEA, not 
including North Korea. 

Kapsan — Name of a political faction that takes its name from a town 
in Yanggang Province in the Changbai mountain range on the 
border of Korea and Northeast China (then called Manchuria), 
where Kim II Sung's guerrilla army conducted some of its 
militant activities against the Japanese in the 1930s. Having 



309 



North Korea: A Country Study 



joined up with the Manchurian-based Northeast Anti- Japanese 
United Army, surviving partisans from this group fled to the 
Soviet maritime provinces in 1941. In 1945 this group of Soviet 
exiles, Kim II Sung loyalists — the Kapsan faction or 
Kapsanists— returned to North Korea, where many eventually 
were elevated to prominence in the national political-military 
hierarchy. 

Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League — A branch of the Korean 
Workers' Party. It was originally known as Korea Democratic 
Youth from 1946 to 1953. At the end of the Korean War 
(1950-53), it was renamed the Socialist Working Youth League, 
sometimes given as the Socialist Labor Youth League. In 1994, 
after the death of Kim II Sung, the group was given its current 
name. 

national solipsism — Term indicating North Korea's isolationism and 
its sense that it is the center of the world's attentions. 

Nordpolitik, or pukbang chdngch'aek — The name given to the 
foreign policy pursued in various forms by South Korea since 
1988 aimed at improving its diplomatic and economic ties with 
the former communist nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. 

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD)— Established in 1960, the OECD took effect in 1961 to 
promote economic cooperation and development among member 
countries (in 2008, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States; one member with special 
status is the European Union — EU) by assisting member 
governments in the formulation and coordination of policy; and to 
encourage member-nation support of developing nations. 

songbun — Term for a person's socioeconomic or class background, 
which determines his or her standing with the state. 

suryong — Ancient Koguryo term for "leader," which Kim II Sung 
took in 1949 as his highest, and usual, title. 

Taean Work System — An industrial management system that grew 
out of the Ch'6ngsan-ni Method (q.v.). Introduced in December 
1961 by Kim II Sung while on a visit to the Taean Electrical 



310 



Glossary 



Appliance Plant, the Taean Work System applied and refined 
agricultural management techniques to industry. Higher-level 
functionaries assisted lower-level functionaries and workers in a 
spirit of close consultation and comradery. Party committees 
controlled the general management of factories and enterprises 
and stressed political or ideological work as well as technological 
expertise. The system allowed for material incentives to 
production. The system was abandoned in 2002. 

Three Revolutions Team Movement — Inaugurated in February 1973 
as "a powerful revolutionary method of guidance" for the Three 
Revolutions — ideological, technical, and cultural — stressed since 
the early 1960s. Under this method, the Three Revolutions teams 
were sent to factories, enterprises, and rural and fishing villages 
for on-the-spot guidance and problem solving in close 
consultation with local personnel through the 1970s and 1980s. 

Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement — Refers to an indigenous 
religious movement founded by Ch'oe Che-u in the early 1860s 
that brought together elements of traditional Korean and Christian 
religious beliefs and was the antecedent of Ch'ondogyo (q.v.). 

won — North Korean unit of currency. The North Korean won is 
divided into 1 00 chon and has several exchange rates — some for 
official transactions and others for commercial rates in foreign 
trade. As of late October 2008, officially US$1=140 won but 
2,500-3,000 won or more to US$1 on black market. 

yangban- — The traditional Korean term for the scholar-official 
gentry (literally, the two orders or classes) who virtually 
monopolized all official civil and military positions in the 
bureaucracy of the late Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) and the 
Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) by competing in a system of civil 
and military service examinations. 



311 



Index 



Academy of Defense Sciences, 271 
Academy of Sciences, 200, 260 
Acheson, Dean, 43, 44 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 
126-27 

Agreed Framework (1994), 57, 58, 147, 174, 
228-30, 261,262 

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, 
Exchanges, and Cooperation ( 1 99 1 ), 220-2 1 

agriculture (see also famine; rice; volunteer 
labor), xxxi, 46-47, 67, 153-57; arable land 
for, 64, 67, 145, 233; collective farming, 
46-47, 143, 154, 155-56; early practice of, 
6, 9; inputs for, 100, 145, 154; irrigation for, 
154; output of, 64, 145, 153-54, 233; work- 
force in, 104 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome 

air combat divisions, 252 

air defense, 249 

air force aircraft and equipment, 252-53, 272 
Air Force Academy. See Kim Ch'aek Air 

Force Academy 
Air Force Command, 240, 242, 250, 252-53 
AirKoryo, 150 
air pollution, 65-66 
airports, 150, 195 
air training divisions, 252 
air transport brigades, 252 
Alaska, 259 

Albright, Madeleine, 57-58, 93, 230 
Amnok (Yalu) River, 4, 1 1, 14-15, 62, 64, 167 
An Chung-gun, 28 
An Si Fortress, 10 
Andong, 12 

Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army (Han il Yugyotae), 
237 

armed forces (see also individual services): 
attitudes to, 103; deployment of, 246-57; 
development of, 237-38; doctrine, strategy, 
and tactics of, 269-70; mission of, 195, 
237-38, 241^2, 244-45, 269-70; national 
command structure of, 238-45; strength of, 
xxxiv, 245, 247, 249, 252, 253, 254, 256, 
280 

armistice agreement (see also Military Armi- 
stice Commission), xxx, 44-45, 57, 63, 227 



armored equipment, 248, 272 

Armor Officer School, 262-63 

arms exports, 47, 228, 271 

arms imports, 238, 252, 258, 260 

arms production, 270-72 

arms trafficking, 47 

Armstrong, Charles K., 79 

army. See Korean People's Army 

Army Day (April 25), 85 

Army Service Decree, 264 

arrests, political, 276, 278 

artillery: corps, 247; equipment, xxxiv, 247, 

248, 249, 254, 272 
Artillery Guidance Bureau, 248 
artistic expression, freedom of, 216 
Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, 176-77 
Australia, 3, 173 
Austria, 173 



Babson, Bradley, 161 

ballistic missiles, 226, 229, 230, 257-60; mor- 
atorium on testing, 258-59 
Banco Delta Asia, xxxv 
banking sector, 153, 162-63, 195 
Bank of Korea (Seoul), 31, 160 
base classes, 19-20, 79-80 
Bell, Burwell B. (B.B.), 249, 259 
Berlin Wall, 3 

Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., 260 
biological weapons. See chemical and biologi- 
cal weapons 
birth control, 69 
birthrate, 67,99, 105, 130 
black market, 160-61, 232, 233 
bonds, 162-63 
bone-rank system, 9 
Bonner, Nicholas, 161 
borders, 61-63 
border security brigades, 280 
Border Security Bureau, 279 
Border Security Command, 240, 277, 279-80 
Border Security Division (Tenth), 280 
Boxer Uprising, 28 

Britain (see also United Kingdom), 25, 125 
British Broadcasting Corporation, 115 



313 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Buddhism, xxx, 7, 12, 14, 16, 1 17, 120; adop- 
tion of, 9; and politics, 1 1 

budget: defense, 245; local, 152; national, 
152-53, 198-99 

Burma, 53 

Bush, George H.W., 227-28 
Bush, George W.: administration of, xxxvi, 
57-58, 230 



Cabinet of Ministers, 143-45, 164, 200 
Cadre Bureau, 240, 244 
cadres, 79, 184, 203, 210-1 1, 244 
Cairo Conference (1943), 37-38 
Cambodia, 56 
Canada, 3, 173 
capitalism, 173, 178, 231-32 
Carter, Jimmy, 55-56, 228 
cease-fire line (1953), 63 
Ceausescu, Nikolae, 54 
celadon porcelain, 13-14 
censorship (see also self-censorship), xxxiii, 151, 
216,217 

Central Auditing Committee. See Korean 

Workers' Party 
Central Bank of the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea, 153,200 
Central Committee. See Korean Workers' 

Party 

Central Court, 201,275 

Central Inspection Committee. See Korean 

Workers' Party 
Central Intelligence Agency (South Korea), 

55,219 

centrally planned economy, 135, 140-41, 
142-45, 154, 155-56, 157-58, 159-62, 
163-65, 170-72, 178, 187, 230-34 

Central Military Commission. See Korean 
Workers' Party 

Central People's Committee, 194, 199-200 

Central Procurators' Office, 201, 275-76 

Central Security Cadre School, 263 

Central Statistics Bureau, 200 

Chaeryong Plain, 63 

Chagang Province, 202, 279, 280 

Ch'aho, 253, 254 

chain of command, military, 238-44 

Changchung Cathedral, 117 

Ch'angjon, 253 

Chang Song-taek, 184 

chemical and biological weapons, 260 

chibaejuui ("dominationism"), 56 



child care, 110-12 

children (see also family), 110-13 

China (see also individual dynasties; China, Peo- 
ple's Republic of; Confucianism; Sino-Japa- 
nese War): border with, xxix-xxx, 4; influence 
of, ii, 5, 6, 11, 13-14, 20; relations with, 11, 
20-21,42-43 

China, People's Republic of: aid and assis- 
tance from, xxix, xxxii, 44-45, 47, 140-41, 
173, 205; air service to, 150; border with, 
xxx, 4, 233, 279; emigration to, 233; imports 
from, xxix, xxxii, 100; influence of, 43; mil- 
itary aid from, 223; military relations with, 
223-24, 257-58; reforms in, compared to, 
xxix, xxxii, 231-32; relations with, 
42-43, 56-57, 173, 223-24, 233-34; rela- 
tions with South Korea, 56-57, 141; rela- 
tions with the United States, 55-56; role of, 
in Six-Party Talks, xxix, xxv, 223, 230, 262 

Chinese characters and language, 10-11, 18, 
120 

Chinese civil war (1946-49), 42^3 
Chinese Communist Party, 41, 237, 238 
Chinese People's Liberation Army, 270 
Chinhan, 6 

Choch'ongryon (General Association of 

Korean Residents in Japan), 2 1 5 
Ch'o-do, 253 
Choe Hong-kyu, 170 
Ch'oe Ung-sam, 128 
Ch'oe Yong-gon, 42 
Cholla provinces, 9 
Ch'ollima Movement, 49, 193 
Ch'ollima Work Team Movement, 137 
Cho Man-sik, 40 

Cho Myong-nok, 191, 229, 230, 241, 244, 245 
Ch'ondogyo, 49, 120, 192 
Ch'ongch'on River, 5 
Ch'ongjin, 65, 127, 150, 253 
Ch'ongj in Medical College, 128 
Chongju, 247 

Ch'6ngsan-ni Method, 143, 154, 194 
Chongu (Friends) Party, 49, 120, 192, 214, 
215 

Chong Yag-yong, 23 
Chonju, 12 

Chon Pyong-ho, 191,245,270 

Choson Chungyang Yonbo (Korean Central 
Yearbook), 216-17 

Choson Dynasty, xxx-xxxi, 16-29, 61; Bud- 
dhism under, 16; bureaucracy under, 16-17, 
29; class and society under, 18-20; culture 



314 



Index 



and education under, 17-19, 23-24; foreign 
relations under, 20-21, 25-26, 29; land 
ownership under, 16, 22; neo-Confucianism 
under, 16-17,21 

chosdn 'gid (Korean script in North Korea), 
xxxi, 18, 120 

Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 161 

Christianity, 115-19 

chuch'e (self-reliance), xxxii, xxxiii, 41, 
49-54, 71, 74, 112, 135, 186, 203-8, 
212-13,223,264, 269 

Chun Doo Hwan, 53, 54, 56 

Ch 'unhyang chon (The Tale of Ch'unhyang), 
24 

Chu Sang-song, 276 
cities (si), 202 
Civil Defense Bureau, 277 
Civil Defense Department. See Korean Work- 
ers' Party 

civil liberties (see also human rights), 195-96 
civil war, 54 

class structure, xxxi, 18, 19, 20, 78-82, 210, 
272-73; in Choson Dynasty, 18-22, 78-82; 
in colonial period, 30-32, 35 

climate, xxx, 4, 64, 153 

Clinton, William J., 57, 229, 230 

coal, 65-66, 147, 233 

coastal defense system, 254 

coastal plains, 63-64 

coastal security brigades, 280 

Coastal Security Bureau, 279-80 

coastline, 63 

Cold War (1945-89), xxix, xxxiv, 4, 39, 55, 

56, 139, 140,219, 223,237 
College Training Units, 257 
Combined Artillery Officer School, 262-63 
command economy. See centrally planned 

economy 

Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of 

the Fatherland, 184,214 
communism: rise of, 18, 238 
Communist International (Comintern), 37 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 37 
computers, 151-52 

Confucianism (see also Neo-Confucianism), 
xxx, xxxi, 10, 75, 120; in Choson Dynasty, 
16, 20, 61; in Koryo, 13; study of, 10, 1 1, 16 

conscription, 238, 264-65 

constitution, 198, 201; (1948), 194; (1972), 
42, 194, 199; (1992), 186, 189, 194; (1998), 
xxxiii, 142, 164, 186, 194, 198, 199, 200, 
207,215,241,275 



construction industry, 48, 87-88 
consumer goods and services, 98-99 
containment policy, 39-40, 44-45 
control systems, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 78-82, 

272- 73, 278 
Copyright Law (2001), 164 

core class (haeksim kyech ung), 50, 272-73 
councils of nobles (hwabaek), 5 
counterfeit currency trafficking, 54, 227 
counties, 202 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
275 

courts (see also criminal justice system; judi- 
ciary), 201,273-75 
crime, 274 

criminal justice system (see also penal code), 

273- 75 

criminal law, 165, 274-75 
Cuba, 57 

cultural development, xxix, xxx, 61 



DaesongBank, 153, 162 
Daesong Trading Company, 153 
Dalian (Port Arthur), 28 
Daoism, 120 

"Dear Leader." See Kim Jong II 

death rate, 67, 130 

debt, foreign. See foreign debt 

defectors, 72, 79, 116, 119, 172 

defense industry, xxxiv, 270-72 

defense spending, 102-4, 153, 271 

deforestation, 66, 157 

Delta Asia Financial Group, xxxv 

Demarcation Line, 63, 177 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), xxxiv, xxxvi, 55, 

57, 63, 150, 166, 176-77, 227, 237, 247, 

253-54, 269 
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, 

192, 220 

Democratic Front for the Unification of the 

Fatherland (Fatherland Front), 215 
Deng Xiaoping, 123 
Denmark, 173 

development plans. See economic planning 
Dharani Sutra, 12 

diet and nutrition (see also food; famine), 

99-100, 126, 130, 154 
disaster response, 74 
dissidents, 214 

division of Korea, xxix, xxxi, 38, 40, 55, 61, 
136,217-18, 237 



315 



North Korea: A Country Study 



divorce, 106, 109 

DMZ. See Demilitarized Zone 

domestic faction, 4142 

Dongdaemun (East Gate), 24 

drainage, 64, 154 

drought, 64, 67, 154, 156 

drug trafficking, 227 



earthquakes, 64 

Eastern Europe, 54, 57, 137, 272 

Eastern Zhou. See Yan 

East Germany, 54 

East Sea. See Sea of Japan 

East Sea Fleet, 253-54 

East Sea Fleet Command, 240 

economic adjustments. See economic reforms 

economic development {see also economic 
planning), xxxii, 35, 135-41 

economic growth, xxxi, xxxii, 32, 45-46, 138, 
145, 233; negative, 47, 223 

economic planning {see also individual eco- 
nomic plans), xxxii, 4546, 137—42, 171 

economic reforms, xxxii, 48-49, 135, 157-61, 
170-72, 187, 230-34 

education, 112, 120-25; abroad, 123, 124, 173; 
college and university, 104, 121, 123-25; 
Confucian, 17; high school, 121, 122; kinder- 
garten, 121; literacy, 120; middle school, 121, 
122-23; nursery school, 111-12, 121-22; 
political, 103-4, 110, 123, 124, 188; primary, 
121-22; technological, 123; vocational, 123; 
women and, 104, 109-10 

Egypt, 258 

electric power, 145-47, 177-78; generation 
of, 145, 146-47; hydroelectric, 145, 147; 
shortages of, 146-47, 233 

elite class {see also class structure; Korean 
Workers Party), xxxii, 78-79, 91-95, 104, 
211; and access to media, 216; and armed 
forces, 189, 211, 264; education of, 122; in 
Choson Dynasty, 18-19, 78; in Koryo 
Dynasty, 13-14 

emigration, 35-37, 102, 233 

energy sector, 47-48, 146-47 

engineer bureaus, 277 

English language, 124, 216-17 

environment, 65-67; disasters, 280; protection 
of the, 65, 195 

Ethiopia, 130 

European Union (EU), 3, 221 

exports, 48; arms, 47, 228, 271; minerals, 176 



External Economic Affairs Bureau (Yongak- 

san Company), 271 
External Economic Legal Advice Office, 165 



family (see also children), 51, 52, 83-84, 100, 
101, 103, 104-10, 196; and Confucianism, 
17, 75 

famine, xxix, xxxii, xxxvii, 3, 67, 69, 101-2, 

129, 130, 155-56, 173-74, 223 
farming. See agriculture 
Fatherland Front. See Democratic Front for 

the Reunification of the Fatherland 
Fatherland Liberation War, 43 
Federal Reserve Bank (New York), xxxv 
Federation of Korean Industries, 177 
fertility rate, 130 

fertilizers, 67, 145, 154, 155, 156, 157 
Finnish language, 18 

First Anglo-Chinese, or Opium, War ( 1 839-42), 
24 

First Officer Candidate School, 263 
fiscal year, 152-53 
fishing industry, 151 

Five-Year Plan (1957-61), 4546, 137-38 
floods, xxix, xxxii, xxxvi, 64, 67, 154 
food {see also agriculture; famine; diet and 
nutrition): aid, xxix, 104, 130, 233-34; dis- 
tribution of, 69, 101, 159-62, 171; imports 
of, 69, 153; production of, 153-55, 156-57; 
rationing of, 99-100, 159-60, 171, 230; 
shortages of, 33, 69, 100, 101, 130, 154, 226 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of 

the United Nations, 130, 150-51, 156, 171 
foreign debt, 46, 153 
foreign direct investment, 164, 173 
foreign exchange, 48, 153, 160, 162 
Foreign Insurance Company, 162 
Foreign Languages Press Group, 217 
foreign relations, xxxvii, 20-21, 47, 54-57, 
217-30; with China, 223-24; with Japan, 
224-27; with South Korea, 21,21 8-22; with 
the Soviet Union and Russia, 223-24; with 
the United States, xxix, xxxv-xxxvii, 
227-30 

Foreign Trade of the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea, 2 1 7 
forests, 66, 150-51 

Foundation Day (October 3), xxix, 5; sixtieth 

anniversary of founding, xxxvi 
Four-Point Military Guidelines, 269 
Four-Power Talks, 57 



316 



Index 



Framework Agreement. See Agreed Frame- 
work 
France, 28, 34-35 

freedom of assembly {see also civil liberties; 
human rights), 195,215 

freedom of association (see also civil liberties; 
human rights), 195,215 

freedom of religion (see also civil liberties; 
human rights), 115, 118-19 

freedom of speech (see also civil liberties; 
human rights), 195,215 

freedom of the press (see also civil liberties; 
human rights), 195, 215-16 

freedom, personal and political. See civil liber- 
ties; human rights; self-censorship 

French language, 216-17 

FROG-7, 260 

Full-scope Safeguards Agreement. See Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 



Gallucci, Robert, 228 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Federation of Trade Unions, 214 
General League of Writers, Central Commit- 
tee, 116 

General Political Bureau, 239, 240, 241, 
2A2-A4, 245; Organization Department, 
264; Propaganda Department, 245 

General Rear Services Bureau, 240, 244, 245 

General Sherman, 25 

General Staff Department, 240, 241, 242, 244, 
245^17, 250, 256; divisions of, 242; Logis- 
tics Mobilization Bureau, 256; Military 
Training Bureau, 265; Operations Bureau, 
242, 245 

Geneva Conference, 218 

German language, 216 

Germany (see also East Germany), 28, 125, 
150 

Ghauri missile, 258 

GNP. See gross national product 

Good Friends, 129 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 54 

Government General Headquarters (Seoul), 31 

Government Hospital (Ponghwa Clinic), 128 

Graham, Billy, 116, 118-19 

Greece, 39 

gross domestic product (GDP), 127, 135, 141, 

142, 153, 173 
gross national product (GNP), 46, 141, 142 
ground forces. See Korean People's Army 



Guam, 259 

Guard Command, 240, 242, 257, 267, 279 
guerrilla resistance: Chinese support for, 38; 
development of myths about, 34; led by Kim 
II Sung, 237-38; Soviet support for, 38; to 
Japanese, xxxi, 33-34, 38, 40, 183; to U.S. 
occupation, 39 
Guyana, 124 



Haein Temple, 14 
Haeju, 150 
Haeju Hospital, 128 
Haiti, 130 

Hamhung, 65, 127, 150, 252 
Han Chinese, 5 
Han Dynasty, 5 
hangukxxxi, 18,26, 120 
Han River, 6 
Hawaii, 259 

Hay, Kalb Associates, 165 

head of state, xxxiii, 196, 198, 199 

Health and Recreation Center, 92 

health care (see also diet and nutrition; hospi- 
tals), 71, 126-30; and diseases, 126, 128; 
and medicines, 129; preventive, 126 

heavy industry, 35, 45^6, 136, 137-38 

"hegemonism," 56 

helicopters. See air force aircraft and equip- 
ment 

HEU (highly enriched uranium), 230, 262 

Hideyoshi. See Toyotomi Hideyoshi 

Hill, Christopher R., xxxv 

HIV. See human immunodeficiency virus 

Ho Ka-i, 38, 42 

Hong Ink-pyo, 232 

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 

(HSBC), 233 
Honnecker, Erich, 54 
hospitals and clinics, 127, 128 
hostile class (choktae kyech 'ting), 272-73 
Ho Tarn, 184 
Huich'on, 150 
Hu Jintao, 225 

human immunodeficiency virus (HTV), 
126-27 

human rights (see also civil liberties), xxxi, 70, 

92, 195-96,215,227, 228, 275 
humanitarian aid, xxxv, 69, 174 
Hungarian language, 1 8 
Hungary, 57, 173 
Hungnam, 150 



317 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Hwang Jang-yop, 75, 119 
Hwangju, 252 

Hwasdng short-range ballistic missile 

(SRBM), 258, 259-60 
hydroelectric power, 65, 147 
Hyon Ch'61-hae, 241,245 
Hyundai Asan, 167, 176 
Hyundai Group, 57, 167, 231 



IAEA. See International Atomic Energy 
Agency 

ideology (see also chuch 'e; Marxism-Lenin- 
ism), 41, 50, 203-8 

idu (Korean adaptation of Chinese characters), 
11 

imports, 46, 48; of food, 66, 69; of oil, 48, 146 
Inch' on, 14 

income (see also wages), 46 
independence, xxix, xxxi, 37-38 
Independence Club, 26 
India, 173 

industrialization, xxxii, 35, 46 

industrial sector (see also construction indus- 
try; heavy industry; manufacturing), 32, 35, 
40, 136, 145, 161, 233; development of, 32, 
35, 46, 137-41; growth of, 46, 145 

infant mortality rate, 130 

infantry corps, 242, 247 

inflation, 159, 171-72, 232 

informal sector, 161, 162, 171, 233 

ING, 162 

Inner Asia, 12 

intellectuals, 49-50, 79, 120, 184, 194, 
209-10 

Interim People's Committee, 40 
Inter-Korean affairs, xxix, xxxii, xxxvi, xxxvii, 

55, 57-58, 174-78, 218-22, 278 
internal security (see also security forces), 

272-80 

International Affairs Department. See Korean 

Workers' Party (KWP) 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

xxxv, xxxvi, 223, 228, 230, 262; Full-scope 

Safeguards Agreement (1992), 261 
International Friendship Exhibition Hall, 76 
International Press Institute, 216 
International Telecommunication Union, 151 
Internet, 151-52, 217; access, 151-52; cafes, 

151-52 
Interrogation Bureau, 277 



invasions, foreign, xxx, xxxi, 10, 1 1, 14, 21, 22, 

23 

Investigation Bureau, 277 
Iran, 47, 258 
Iran-Iraq War, 47 
Iraq, 124 

irrigation (see also agriculture), 47, 1 54 
IRT-2000 thermal research reactor, 260-61 
Italy, 25, 173 
ltd Hirobumi, 28 



Jaisohn, Phillip (So Chae-p'il), 26 

Japan: attitudes to, in Korea, 30, 33; coloniza- 
tion of Korea by, xxix, xxxi, 25, 26, 28, 29, 
30-37, 61, 136, 183, 237; defeat of, in 
World War II, 38, 125; early links with, 9; 
invasions by, xxxi, 21, 22; language training 
in, 124; North Koreans in, 215, 225, rela- 
tions with, xxix, 25, 125, 224-27; role of, in 
Six-Party Talks , xxix, xxxv, 262; as target, 
258 

Japanese colonial occupation (1910-45), xxix, 

25, 29-37, 237 
Japanese Imperial Army, 34, 237 
Japanese language, 18 
Japanese Red Army, 225 
Jehol Diary, 24 
Jilin Province (China), 61, 175 
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula (1992), 221, 223, 261 
Joint Nuclear Control Commission, 221, 261 
juch 'e. See chuch 'e 
judiciary, 201,275-76 
Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps, 256 



Kaech'on, 252 

Kaesong, xxxvi, 12, 24, 57, 150, 166-67, 

176-78, 202 
Kaesong Special Industrial Zone, 166-67, 

231; Management Committee, 177 
Kamakura shogunate, 14 
Kanggye, 260 
Kanghwa Island, 14 

Kang Kon General Military Academy, 263 

Kang Sok-ju, 228 

Kang Song-san, 140, 184 

kangsong taeguk (rich nation and strong 

army), 189 
Kangwon Province, 166, 202, 280 
Kantor, Arnold, 228 



318 



Index 



Kapsan faction, 237, 238 
Kaya League, 9 

KCNA. See Korean Central News Agency 
KEDO. See Korean Peninsula Energy Devel- 
opment Organization 
Khabarovsk, 38 
Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 260 
Khubilai Khan, 14 

kidnapping of foreigners, 124-25, 225-26 

Kim Ch'aek Air Force Academy, 253, 263 

KimCh'61-man, 241,270 

Kim Chong-ch'61. See Kim Jong Chul 

Kim Chong-il. See Kim Jong II 

Kim Ch'ong-suk Naval Academy, 263 

Kim Dae Jung, 57, 135, 174, 221; and 2000 

P'yongyang summit, 3, 219, 222 
Kim Hong-jip, 25 
KimHwan, 213 
Kimlk-hydn, 241 
Kim II, 189 

Kim Il-ch'61, 191, 241, 242, 245 

Kim II Sung: attitudes to, 72, 1 12; birth of, 34, 
183; Chinese support for, 38; cult of person- 
ality surrounding, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 18, 51, 

71- 78, 115, 117, 183, 186, 204, 216; death 
of, xxix, xxxii, 3, 73-74, 183, 208, 239; 
early years of, 3, 34, 70-71, 183; emergence 
of, as leader, 40-41 ; influences on, 70-71; in 
guerrilla movement, 33-34, 38, 40, 95, 183, 
204, 237-38; leadership style of, 51-52, 

72- 73, 203; lifestyle of, 95; on-the-spot 
guidance of, 41, 49, 72, 143, 203; presence 
of, in society, 72, 1 12; purges by, 205, 211; 
roles of, 183, 192, 267; Soviet support for, 
183; speeches and writings of, 71, 77, 111, 
123, 143, 207; succession to, xxxii, 51, 
74-75, 183, 199; tomb of, 76 

Kim II Sung's birthday (April 15), 85 
Kim II Sung's Constitution, 196 
Kim II Sung Chuui. See Kimilsungism 
Kim II Sung Higher Party School, 210 
Kimilsungism, 52, 75, 80, 203 
Kim II Sung Military University, 263 
Kim II Sung Political University, 264 
Kim II Sung sanga (Kim II Sung's Thoughts), 
78 

Kim II Sung Socialist Youth League, 85-91, 
214 

Kim II Sung Square, 165 

Kim II Sung University, 79, 94, 120, 123-24 

Kim Jong Chul (Paek Se-bong), 184, 214, 270 



Kim Jong II, 3, 52; assumption of power by, 
xxix, xxxii, xxxv, xxxvi, 74-75, 183, 188; 
birth of, 7, 63, 183, 238; exposure to religion, 
71; health of, xxxvi, xxxvii; influences on, 
53; leadership of, 212; lifestyle of, 95; pro- 
tection of, 257, 279; purges by, 192; relations 
with the military, 184, 186, 188-89, 238-39, 
242, 244, 245, 267; role in National Defense 
Commission, 188-91, 199, 239, 241; roles 
of, xxxiii, 183, 192, 199, 208, 211, 212, 239, 
241, 277-78; succession to, xxxii-xxxiii, 
184, 214, 270; writings and speeches of, 207, 
215 

Kim Jong Nam, 184,214 

Kim Key-hiuk, 2 1 

KimKu,33 

Kim Kyong-hui, 1 84 

KimKyuk-sik, 242, 246 

Kim Mu-chong, 238 

Kim Myong-kuk, 245 

Kim Ok-kyun, 25 

Kim Pyong-ho, 270 

Kim Pyong-ryul, 201, 276 

Kim Song-ae, 1 83 

Kim S6ng-ju. See Kim II Sung 

Kim Won-hong, 245 

KimYang-gon, 191,241 

Kim Yong-chun, 191, 241, 245, 246 

Kim Yong-il, xxxvi, 200 

KimYong-nam, 170, 198 

KimYong-sun, 161,213,228 

Kim Young-sam, 221 

Kim Yun-sim, 253 

kindergarten, 121 

Kissinger, Henry, 55 

Kitan. See Qidan 

KN-02 missile, 258 

Kobul-tong, 247 

Koguryo, ii, 7-12 

Koizumi Junichiro, 226 

Kojong (king), 26, 28 

kokutai (national polity), 5 1 

Korea, Republic of. See South Korea 

Korea Electric Power Corporation, 1 77 

Korea Maranatha Enterprise Development 

Limited, 162 
Korea Pictorial, 2 1 7 
Korea Resources Corporation, 175 
Korea Strait, 9 
Korea Today, 217 
Korea Transport Institute, 176 



319 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Korean Central Intelligence Agency. See Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency (South Korea) 

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA; 
Choson Chungyang Tongsinsa), xxxv, 216 

Korean Communist Party, 33, 184 

Korean Democratic Women's Union, Central 
Committee, 184,214 

Korean language {see also choson 'gul; han- 
gul), 18,20, 120, 125 

Korean Maritime Arbitration Committee, 201 

Korean National Peace Committee, 214 

Korean Peninsula, xxix, xxx, xxxii, xxxvi, 61; 
balance of forces on, 57-58; division of, 
xxix, 54-55, 136, 237; early settlement of, 5, 
10; geography of, 7, 63-64, 270; missile 
launches from, 259; unification of, 12, 269; 
war on, 269-70 

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Orga- 
nization (KEDO), 146, 174, 228 

Korean People's Air Force Command. See Air 
Force Command 

Korean People's Army (KPA; Choson 
Inmin'gun) (see also armed forces; army), 
xxxiii, xxxiv, 42, 183, 212, 238, 244, 247; 
founded, 42, 237; fundamental principles of 
war of, xxxiv, 270 

Korean People's Navy Command. See Navy 
Command 

Korean People's Revolutionary Army 
(KPRA; Choson Inmin Hyongmyonggun), 
237-38 

Korean Provisional Government (in Shang- 
hai), 33 

Korean Social Democratic Party, 192, 215 

Korean Students' Committee, 214 

Korean Volunteer Army (KVA; Choson 
Uiyonggun), 238 

Korean War (1950-53), xxix, xxxi, xxxii, 3, 
34, 43-45, 202, 223, 238; aftermath of, 
41^12, 45, 136-37, 204; start of, 43-44, 218 

Korean Workers' Party (KWP), xxxi, xxxiii, 
40, 52, 142, 191-93, 239, 245, 272; cadres, 
193, 210-11; Central Auditing Committee, 
191, 208; Central Committee, xxxiii, 183, 
191-93, 208-9, 239, 244, 269; Central 
Inspection Committee, 191, 208; Central 
Military Commission, xxxiii, 191-92, 208, 
239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 256, 257, 265, 270; 
Civil Defense Department, 241, 257; consti- 
tution, 191, 269; discipline, 188; economic 
work by, 193; International Affairs Depart- 
ment, 228, 241; leadership of, 208-14; 



membership, 104, 184, 193, 209-10; Mili- 
tary Affairs Department, 191, 241; Muni- 
tions Industry Department, 245, 270; 
National Party Congress, 191; Organization 
and Guidance Department, 193, 241; Politi- 
cal Bureau, 184, 191, 208, 239, 245; Presid- 
ium, 191; purges, 192; Secretariat, 191, 
208-9, 234, 264; Standing Committee, 191, 
208; symbol of, 49 
Korean Workers' Party Congress: Fifth, 192, 
206, 208; Sixth, 51, 183, 188, 192, 206, 208, 
220 

Koryo Dynasty, xxx, 12-16; culture of, xxx, 

13-14 
Koryo Tours, 161 
Kosan-dong, 247 
Kosong, 150 

KPRA. See Korean People's Revolutionary 
Army 

Kulloja (The Worker), 206, 216 
Kumchangri, 229 
KumgangBank, 153 
Kumho, 146 

Kumsong Political College, 264 
Kumsusan Assembly Hall, 76 
Kun Ch'ogo (king), 7 
Kungye, 12 

kwalliso-dul (management centers), 278 

Kwanggaet'o (king), 10 

Kwangmyong-net, 152 

KWP. See Korean Workers' Party 

Kyongju, 9, 12 

Kyongsong, 253 

Kyongsong Flight Officer School, 253, 263 
Kyongui Railroad, 176 
Kyonhwon, 12 



Land Corporation, 177 
land erosion, 67 

land reform, 16, 17, 32-33, 39, 40, 137 

Laney, James, 158 

Lankov, Andrei, 37 

Later Koguryo, 12 

Later Paekche, 12 

Law on the Forest (1999), 66 

Law on Water Resources (1997), 67 

Lee Hoi Chang, 174 

Lee Sang-tae, 116 

legal system. See human rights; judiciary; 

penal code 
leisure activities, 113-15 



320 



Index 



LG Corporation, 1 74 

Liaodong Peninsula, 14, 28 

Liaoning Province (China), 61 

Liao River, 10 

life expectancy, 69, 129 

Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, 

240, 242, 248, 250 
literacy rate, 120 
literati. See scholar-officials 
LivingArt, 178 
living standards, 47, 94-97 
local government, xxxiii-xxxiv, 202-3 
Lock Gate Law (2001), 164 
Logistics Mobilization Bureau. See General 

Staff Department 
Lolang (Nangnang), 6 
Long March, 238 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, 38, 44-^5 
machine industry bureaus, 27 1 
Mahan, 6 

Main East Sea Road, 177 
Malaysia, 173 
Malgal, 12 

malnutrition. See diet and nutrition 

Manchu: invasions, 21, 22-23 

Manchuria (see also Northeast China), 4, 7, 

10, 28,33,40, 183,237 
Man'gyongdae, 76 

Man'gyongdae Revolutionary Institute, 213, 
263 

Mansurov, Alexandre, 151 
manufacturing, xxxi, 145 
Mao Zedong, 49, 50, 70, 72 
Maranatha Trust of Australia, 162 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japanese), 
226-27 

market forces (see also economic reforms), 

159, 161, 171, 172, 173 
markets, 97, 101-2, 160, 162, 171, 230, 232 
marriage, 69, 83, 105-9 
Martin, Bradley K., 117 
Marxism-Leninism, xxxiii, 3, 50, 52, 70, 186, 

194, 204-6 
mass organizations, 214-15 
Mayang Island, 253, 254 
McCloy, John J., 38 
mechanized corps, 247 
media, xxxiii, 151-52, 215-17 
medical colleges, 127 
medical personnel, 126-29 



Meiji Restoration, 25 
Mexico, 173 

middle classes, 20, 78, 79 
MiG fighters. See air force aircraft and equip- 
ment 

Military Armistice Commission (UN), 242 
military budget (see also defense spending), 

153,245,271 
military conscription, 264-65 
military doctrine and policy, 254, 269-70 
"military first" (songun) politics, xxxiii, 184, 

187, 189, 271 
Military Justice Bureau, 240, 244 
Military Prosecutions Bureau, 240, 244 
military ranks, 266-69 
military role in society, 102-4, 184-85 
military service, 103, 264-65 
military special courts, 201, 275 
military strategy and tactics, xxxiv, 269-70 
military training, 262-65, 266 
minerals, 145 
Ming Dynasty, 14, 22-23 
mining, 145 
Ministry of Culture, 75 
Ministry of Defense, 238 
Ministry of Finance, 152, 153, 162, 270 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, xxxv, 95, 258, 

262 

Ministry of Internal Affairs, 238 

Ministry of People's Armed Forces, xxxiv, 

200, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 249, 250, 253, 

254, 256, 270, 271,279 
Ministry of People's Security, 201, 240, 242, 

257, 273, 274, 275, 276-77 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, 

151 

Ministry of Public Security, 276 
Ministry of Unification (South Korea), 146 
Minju Choson (Democratic Korea), 216 
Missile Guidance Bureau, 240, 248, 260 
missiles, xxxiv, xxxvii, 57, 248, 249, 254, 

257-60; moratorium on testing, 258-59 
Mitsubishi, 31-32 
Mitsui, 32 
Mokp'o, 22 

money: role of, in the economy, 94, 96-97, 

159, 171,230, 232 
Mongols, xxx, 14 
morale, 81 
mortality rate, 130 
mountains, 63-64 



321 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Mount Kumgang (Mount Diamond), 57, 117, 
167 

Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone, 167-69, 

173-74, 176,231 
Mount Mohyang, 1 1 7 

Mount Paektu (Paektu-san or White Head 

Mountain), 7, 62-63, 115, 196 
Mu Chong, 42, 43 
mudang (shamans), 1 6 
Mun Il-bong, 1 7 1 

Munitions Industry Department. See Korean 

Workers' Party (KWP) 
Munson, xxxvi 

Musudan-ni launch facility, 258 



Naemul (king), 9 
Najin. 150, 152, 175,253 
Najin Business Institute, 167 
Najin-Sonbong, 152, 172, 202; International 

Trade Zone, 164, 165-67, 231 
Naktong River, 9 
Namdaemun (South Gate), 24 
Nam 11.38 

Namp'o, 65, 110, 150, 175,201,202,253,254 

narcotics trafficking, 54, 227 

Narita International Airport (Tokyo), 184, 214 

"nation-first-ism," 52-53 

National Day (September 9), 85 

National Defense Commission {see also 
Guard Command. Second Economic Com- 
mittee, State Security Department), xxxiii, 
xxxiv, 183, 188-91. 194, 196, 198-200, 
239, 240, 241^12, 244, 246, 265, 270, 276, 
277 

National Intelligence Service (South Korea), 
274, 278 

nationalism, 41, 204 

nationalization, 40. 137 

National Party Congress. See Korean Work- 
ers' Party (KWP) 

national solipsism, 52 

natural resources, 144-45, 195 

Naval Academy. See Kim Ch'ong-suk Naval 
Academy 

Navy Command, 240, 242, 250, 253-54 
navy equipment and ships, 254, 272 
neighborhoods (dong), 202 
Neo-Confucianism, xxx-xxxi, 16, 21, 41 
nepotism, xxxii, 183-84 
Netherlands, 173 

newspapers. See censorship; media 



"New Thinking Initiative," 207 

NGOs. See nongovernmental organizations 

Nixon, Richard M., 55 

Nodong Chongnyon (Working Youth), 216 

Nodong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), 

258,259-60 
Nodong Shinmun (Workers' Daily), 43, 171, 

186, 207,216 
Noland, Marcus, 172, 224 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 173-74 
Nordpolitik, 220 

North Hamgyong Province, 166, 202, 211, 

252, 253, 258, 280 
North Hwanghae Province, 202 
North Kyongsang Province, 9 
North P'yongan Province, 166, 202, 229, 230, 

280 

Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, 237-38 
Northeast Asia (see also Manchuria), xxx, 4, 

8,35-36,61, 135 
Northeast China (see also Manchuria), 4, 79 
nuclear bomb test, xxxiv-xxxv, 262 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). See 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons 
nuclear proliferation, 227 
nuclear weapons (see also missiles), xxxiv, 

xxxv, 260-62 
nuclear weapons issue, xxix, xxxv, xxxvi, 

xxxvii, 57-58, 187, 222, 223-24, 226-27, 

227-30, 261-62 
nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a 

law), 274 



Oberdorfer, Donald. 70 
OChin-u. 189.267 
O Guk-nyol, 213 

oil (see also energy sector): imports, 47, 146, 
261; shortage of, 65 

Okinawa, 259 

O Kum-ch'61, 252 

Old Choson, 6 

Olympic Games, 54, 57 

Operations Bureau. See General Staff Depart- 
ment 

Opium War (1839-42), 24 
Orang, 252 

ordinary cities (si or shi), 202 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development (OECD), 139 
Oriental Development Company, 30-31 



322 



Index 



Oro, 247 

Orwellian society, 71, 90, 183 



Paekche, ii, 6-8, 10 

paekchong (caste-like groups), 20 

PaekHak-nim,213 

Paek Se-bong. See Kim Jong Chul 

Paektu-san. See Mount Paektu 

Pak Chae-kyong, 245 

Pak Chi-won, 24 

Pak H6n-y6ng,33,41,42 

Pakistan, 47, 258 

PakKi-so, 241 

Pak Pong-ju, xxxvi 

Palais, James B., 17 

Pang Ho-san, 43 

P'anmunjom, 166; Joint Security Area, 227 
paramilitary units, 257 
Parhae, 11, 12 

ParkChung-hee, 54, 142, 205 

Park Kyung-ae, 173 

Park Yang-soo, 175 

"Patriotic Song," 196 

Peace and Prosperity Policy, 222 

peasants, 19-20, 24, 32, 35-36, 39, 45, 194, 

209; as party members, 184, 209 
Penal Affairs Bureau, 277 
penal code, 274 
penal system, 273-75 
people's courts, 201, 275 
People's Korea (P'yongyang), 170 
Perry, Matthew C, 24-25 
Perry, William J., 230 
Philippines, 28, 173 
Pip'a-got, 253, 254 

plutonium reprocessing, xxxv, 58, 145, 261, 

262 
Poland, 57 

police (see also Ministry of People's Secu- 
rity), 31, 39, 276-78 
political elite. See elite class 
Political Officers School, 264 
Political Prison Camps Bureau, 278 
political study sessions, 89, 209, 210 
pollution, 65-67, 195 

Ponghwa Clinic (Government Hospital), 128 
Pongsu Church, 118 
popular protests, 33 

population, 35-36, 67-69, 209; density, 67; 

growth, 68-69; size, 61, 67 
ports, 150, 195 



poverty, 101, 171,232-33 
presidency, xxxiii, 183 
Primorskiy Territory (Russia), 62 
prices, 97, 157, 159, 161, 171, 230, 232 
printing, xxxi, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19 
prisoners, 278 

prison system, 102, 276-77, 278 
private property, xxxiii, 165, 186, 195 
private sector, 160-61 
Processing Trade Law (2001), 164 
Procurators' Office. See Central Procurators' 
Office 

Propaganda Department. See General Political 
Bureau 

Protestants, 117-18; missionaries, 26, 115 
provinces (do), 202 

provincial-level municipalities (chikalsi), 202 
Puam-ni, 253 

public distribution system, xxxii, 1 59-62 

Public Safety Bureau, 277 

public security, 276-77 

Pueblo, USS, 55, 64, 227 

Pulguksa Temple, 12, 13 

"Pure Land" Buddhism, 12 

purges: of literati, 21-22; of opponents of Kim 

II Sung, 42, 205; of opponents of Kim Jong 

II, 192, 211; by Stalin, 37 
Pusan, 9, 22 
Putin, Vladimir V., 225 
Puyo, 7 

P'yongyang, xxix, 64, 71, 83, 91-94, 104, 
147-50, 202, 247, 252, 253, 276, 277-78, 
279 

P'yongyang Children's Palace, 92, 215 
P'yongyang Defense Command, 240, 241, 
247 

P'yongyang Hospital, 128 

P'yongyang Informatics Center, 151 

P'yongyang Institute, 264 

P'yongyang Maternity Hospital, 48, 92, 128 

P'yongyang Medical College Hospital, 128 

P'yongyang Plain, 63 

P'yongyang Revival, 118 

P yongyang Times, 2 1 7 

P'yongyang-Wonsan line, 247, 254 

Pyonhan, 6 

Qidan (or Kitan), 12 
Qin Dynasty, 5 
Qing Dynasty, 23 



323 



North Korea: A Country Study 



radio broadcasting, 114, 1 19, 216 

railroad courts, 201, 275 

railroads, xxxvi, 35, 57, 147^19, 176, 195 

Railroad Security Bureau, 277 

rainfall, xxxvi, 64 

Rajin. See Najin 

Rangoon, 53 

Reagan administration, 56 

Reconnaissance Bureau, 250 

Record of Concern for the Underprivileged, 23 

Red Cross, 2 19, 221 

Red Cross Hospital, 127-28 

Red Youth Guard, 256 

refugees, 233 

Registration Bureau, 277 

religion {see also under individual religions), 

115-20 
renminbi, 232 

Republic of Korea. See South Korea 

Republic of Korea-United States Combined 
Forces Command, 249 

reserve forces, 254, 256-57; training, 264 

Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU), 
256-57 

restaurants, 113, 161 

reunification, 214, 218, 269 

Rhee, Syngman (Yi Sungman), 26, 33, 43 

rice, 100, 171; harvest, 88; production of, 6, 
24, 47, 64; tax payments in, 32; transplant- 
ing, 88 

rivers, 64, 66-67 

roads, 149-50, 195 

Roh Moo Hyun, xxxvi, 174 

Roh Tae-woo, 220, 222, 228 

Roman Catholicism, 24, 117 

Romania, 54 

Romanian Marxists, 50 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 37-38 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 26 

rural counties (gun or kun), 202 

Rusk, Dean, 38 

Russia (see also Soviet Union), 25, 150; bor- 
der with, xxx, 279; military aid from, 223; 
relations with, 223-24; role of, in Six-Party 
Talks, xxix, xxxv, 262; trade with, 223 

Russian language, 124,216-17 

Russian Orthodox Church, 119 

Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), xxxi, 28, 37 



sadae (policy), 20 

sadaebu (scholar-officials or literati), 14, 16 



Sagot, 253 

Sajin T'ongsin (Photographic News), 216 

Sakchu, 260 

Sakyamuni Buddha, 12 

Samsung, 174 

sanctions, xxxv, 146, 227 

Sariwon, 127 

Saro,9 

Sberbank (Russia), 162 

scholar-officials or literati (sadaebu), 14, 16, 

17,21-22, 32,78 
School of Foreign Languages, 124 
SCUD-B short-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBMs), 258-59 
SCUD-C. See Hwasong short-range ballistic 

missile (SRBM) 
Sea of Japan (East Sea), xxx, 7, 62, 63, 64, 280 
Second Economic Committee (National Defense 

Commission), 240, 241, 245, 270-71 
Second Indochina War (1954-75), 55 
Second Natural Science Institute, 271 
Second Officer Candidate School, 264 
Security Bureau, 277 
Security Command, 240, 242, 244, 245 
security forces (see also internal security), 

279-80 

Seersucker antiship cruise missiles, 254 
Sejong (king), 18, 19 
self-censorship, 72, 216 
self-criticism meetings, 49, 77, 89-91 
self-defense, 280-81 

self-reliance, 206; economic, xxxii, 47-49, 

139, 154, 204; military, 204 
Seoul, xxix, 16, 24, 205,247 
Seven-Year Plan: First (1961-67), 45-46, 

138-39; Second (1978-84), 139-40; Third 

(1987-93), 140 
Shahab missile, 258 
Shanghai, 33 
Shaplen, Jason, 158 
shipping, 150 

shops. See consumer goods and services 
Siberia, 4 
Sierre Leone, 130 
sijo (poetry), 24 

Silkworm antiship cruise missiles, 254 
Silla, xxx, 5, 7, 9-12 
Singapore, 173 
Sino-Japanese War, 26 
Sino-Korean script, 18 
Sino-Soviet dispute, 46, 138 



324 



Index 



Sinuiju, 167; Special Administrative Region, 

166, 231 
Sirhak (Practical Learning), 23 
Six-Party Talks, xxix, xxxv, xxxv-xxxvi, 223-24, 

230,262 
"6-25 War," 43 

Six-Year Plan (1971-76), 138-39 

slavery, 20 

Sobaek Mountains, 7 

So Chae-p'il (Philip Jaisohn), 26 

socialist corporatism, 50-53 

Socialist Working Youth League, 214 

social structure (see also class structure), xxxi, 

78-85 
Sokkuram Grotto, 12 
Sonbong, 152, 175 
Song Dynasty, 13-14 
Song of Paradise, 1 1 6 

songbun (socioeconomic or class background), 
78-79,81 

songun ("military first"), xxxiii, xxxiv, 184, 

187, 189, 271 
Songwol-li, 247 

South Hamgyong Province, 146, 202, 211, 
252, 280 

South Hwanghae Province, 202, 280 

South Korea (see also inter-Korean affairs; 
Sunshine Policy): attitudes to, 216; Central 
Intelligence Agency of, 55, 219; defense of, 
251; economy of, xxxii, 18, 142; establish- 
ment of, xxix, 40; infiltrations of, 218, 250; 
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula, 261; Joint Nuclear 
Control Commission, 261; Ministry of Uni- 
fication, 141; participation in Six-Party 
Talks, xxix, xxxv, 223, 262; relations with, 
xxxii, 18, 135, 174-78, 192, 218-22, 237; 
trade with Russia and China, 48 

South Pyongan Province, 202, 252, 280 

Soviet Civil Administration, 238 

Soviet Eighty-eighth Special Brigade, 238 

Soviet faction, 41, 42 

Soviet Far East, 238 

Soviet-Koreans, 38 

Soviet Red Army, 238 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): agreements 
with, 260; aid and advice from, xxix, xxxii, 
43^6, 47, 54, 137, 140-41, 205, 238, 
257-58, 270; collapse of, xxix, xxxii, 100, 
207, 213, 224; defeat of Japan, 237; imports 
from, xxix, xxxii, 100; influence of, 42; mil- 
itary relations with, 54; occupation of North 



Korea, 38, 39^10, 237, 238; relations with, 

21, 37, 38, 223-24; relations with South 

Korea, 141,205 
SPA. See Supreme People's Assembly 
space-launch vehicle (SLV), 258 
Spanish language, 216-17 
special city (t'ukpyolsi), 201, 202 
special courts, 201, 275 
special economic zones, 165-67, 231 
special operations forces (SOF), 249-52, 254, 

269 

Special Procurators' Offices, 276 
Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigades, 257 
sports, 95, 113-14, 126, 221-22 
Stalin, Joseph V., 37, 44, 70, 72 
Stalinism, 4 

State Administration Council (SAC), 199-200 

State Planning Commission, 170, 270 

State Security Department, 218, 240, 242, 

244, 274, 275, 277-78, 279 
Stevens, Durham, 28 

study sessions. See political study sessions 
submarines. See navy equipment and ships 
subway: in P'yongyang, 77, 149 
succession issue, xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvi, 1 84, 21 1-14 
Suh, Dae-Sook, 186 
Sui Dynasty, 10 

Sunan International Airport, 150 

Sungari River, 7 

Sunjong (king), 28-29 

Sunshine Policy, 57-58, 174-76, 221-22 

Sun Yatsen, 28 

supreme command headquarters, 245 

Supreme National Assembly, 220 

Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), 183-84, 
189, 196-200, 245, 270; Eleventh, 198; For- 
eign Affairs Committee, 184; oversight of 
the National Defense Commission, 198, 
239, 241^2; Presidium, 196, 198-99, 201, 
274; Standing Committee, 183-84, 196, 
198, 199; Tenth, 198 

surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), 257-60 

Surveillance Bureau, 278 

suryong (leader), 43, 186 

Sweden, 173 

Switzerland, 173 

Syria, 47 

Taean Work System, 143, 164, 195 
T'aebaek Mountains, 7 
T'aech'on, 261 



325 



North Korea: A Country Study 



Tae Cho-yong, 1 1 

Taedong River, 7, 10, 11,64 

Taepodong intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM), 258, 259-60 

Taepodong intermediate -range ballistic mis- 
sile (IRBM), 258, 259-60 

Taewon'gun (grand prince), 25 

Tai Zong, 10 

Tang Dynasty, ii, 10, 1 1 

Tan' gun, 5 

tank corps, 247 

Tasa-ri, 253 

taxes, 48-49, 152 

"Team Spirit" exercises, 56, 220, 228 
technicians. 120 
technocrats, 50 

technology, 139, 146, 233; imports of, 46, 48, 
49 

telecommunications, 151-52,216 

telephone service, 151-52 

television broadcasting, 216 

Ten-year Service System, 264 

terrorism, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, 53-54, 228 

Thailand, 150, 173 

The Great Teacher of Journalists, 215 

thirty-eighth parallel, 38, 43, 44, 63, 237, 238 

Three Kingdoms period, 6-12 

Three Revolutions, 193, 194, 209, 212 

Three-Year Plan (1949-50), 45, 137 

Three- Year Postwar Reconstruction Plan 

(1954-56), 45-46, 137 
ti-yong (essence and practical use), 51 
T'oejo-dong, 253 
Toksan-dong, 252 

Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement, 24, 

26, 120 
Tongil Market, 161 
Tongil Tower, 1 77 
Tongnae, 24 

Tongnip Sinmun (The Independent), 26 

topography, xxx, 63-64 

towns and townships (myori), 202 

tourist industry, 176, 221-22, 231 

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 22 

trade (see also exports; imports), xxxii, 48, 

139, 173-74, 224 
traditional villages (ri or ni), 202 
transportation system, 92, 138, 147-50, 195 
travel restrictions, 83, 92, 109, 217 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT), 261,262 
Tree-Planting Day (March 2), 66 



Tripitaka Koreana, 14, 15 
Truman, Harry S., 39-40, 44-45 
Truman Doctrine, 39-40 
tuberculosis, 126 
Tumangang. See Tuman River 
Tuman River, 4, 11,62, 64 
Tumen River. See Tuman River 
Turkey, 39 
Turkish language, 1 8 
"turtle ships," 22 
Two-Year Plan (1949-50), 137 

Uiju, 24 

Ulchi Mundok, 10 

Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly 
Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, 
117 

United Kingdom {see also Britain), 173, 221 
United Nations (UN), xxix, 40, 44, 183, 227 
United Nations Children's Fund, 156 
United Nations Command (see also Military 

Armistice Commission), 249 
United Nations Development Programme 

(UNDP), 151, 167 
United Nations Environment Programme 

(UNEP), 65 
United Nations Security Council, 227 
United States: Agreed Framework with North 
Korea, 57, 58, 146-47, 261-62; humanitarian 
aid from, xxxv, 174; in Korean War, 43-45; 
nuclear inspection issue, xxxv, xxxvi-xxxvii, 
261-62; occupation of southern Korea, 38, 
39-40; policy toward South Korea, 56; rela- 
tions with, xxix, 55-58, 146-47, 172, 
227-30; relations with China, 55-57, 219; 
role of, in Six-Party Talks, xxix, xxxv, 262; 
World War E, 125; talks with, 56, 57; threat 
from, xxxiv; threat to, 259-60 
universities (see also colleges), 121, 123-25; 

military, 263-64 
Ural-Altaic group of languages, 18 
uranium: enrichment of, xxxvi, 57-58, 230, 262 
urban districts (kiiydk), 202 
urbanization, 67, 233 
urban population, 67-68, 209, 232 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 46, 
262 

U.S. Combined Forces Command, 249 

U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 

Korea, 274, 278 
U.S. Congress, 40, 229 



326 



Index 



U.S. Department of State, 39-40, 275 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, xxxv 
U.S. Forces Korea, xxxiv, 56, 249, 259 
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 249, 
259 



vacations, 83, 84, 96-97, 108, 195 
Vichy France, 34-35 
Vietnam, 56, 231 
vocational colleges, 123 
Voice of America, 1 1 5 
volunteer labor, 84, 86-89 



Wa,9 

Wada Haruki, 38 

wages, 96-97, 159, 161, 164, 230, 232, 233 
walled-town states, xxx, 5, 6 
Wang Kon, 12 

War Department (U.S.), 38, 40 
wards (gu), 202 
Warren, Reverend Rick, 1 1 8 
water pollution, 65, 67 
water supply, 66-67 

wavering class (tongyd kyech ung), 272-73 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 260-62 

Web sites, government, 152, 217 

Western Europe, 48 

Westernization, 26 

West Sea. See Yellow Sea 

West Sea Fleet, 253 

West Sea Fleet Command, 240 

White Head Mountain. See Mount Paektu 

Wilson, Woodrow, 33 

Wiman Choson, 5-6 

With the Century, 7 1 

WMD. See weapons of mass destruction 
women, 16, 104-10; education of, 104, 109-10; 

in the armed forces, 265; status and rights 

under the constitution, 195-96 
won, 94, 160-61, 162, 172, 230-32 
Wonsan, 64, 95, 147^18, 149, 150, 247, 253 
WooriBank, 178 

Workers and Peasants Red Guard, 256-57 
Workers' Daily. See Nodong Shinmun 
workers: and the state, 184, 194, 209-10 
workers' districts (nodonja-ku), 202 
workforce, 104, 109-10, 233 
work unit, 82-85 



World Festival of Youth and Students, 117 
World Food Programme, 156, 171 
World Health Organization, 47 
World War II, xxix, xxxi, 34, 63, 79, 125, 183, 
237, 238 



Yalu River. See Amnok River 

Yan (Eastern Zhou), 5 

Yan'an faction, 42, 238 

Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture 

(China), 175 
yangban (the two orders), 13, 18-19, 24, 28, 

32-33 
Yang Bin, 167 
YangDi, 10 

Yanggang Province, 202 
Yang Sung-chul, 212 
Yanji, 175 

Yellow Sea (West Sea), xxx, xxxvii, 22, 56, 
62, 63,64, 166, 231,280 

Yi Ha-il, 241 

Yi Ha-ung, 25 

Yilk,23 

Yi Kil-song, 276 

Yi Song-gye, 14, 16 

Yi Su-kwang, 23 

Yi Sungman. See Syngman Rhee 

Yi Sun-sin, 22 

Yi T'oegye, 21 

Yi Ul-sol, 267, 279 

YiYong-ch'61, 241 

Yi Yong-mu, 191,241 

Yongaksan Company, 271 

Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Cen- 
ter, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvi-xxxvii, 228, 230, 
260-61 

Yosu, 39 

Young Pioneer Corps, 85-86, 215 
youthful warrior (hwarang), 1 1 
Yuan Shikai, 26 
Yugoslavia, 51, 124 
Yu Hyong-won, 23 
YuKil-chun, 25 
Yun Ch'i-ho, 25 



zaibatsu (business empires), 31-32 
Zhongguo (the Middle Kingdom), 20 



327 



Contributors 



Victor D. Cha, is Associate Professor of Government and D.S. 
Song-Korea Foundation Chair in the Edmund Walsh School of 
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 

Bruce Cumings is the Norman and Edna Freehling Professor of 
History at the University of Chicago. 

Helen-Louise Hunter is a former National Intelligence Officer for the 
Far East and the author of Kim Il-song 's North Korea. 

Balbina Y. Hwang is Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of 
Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 

David C. Kang is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth 
College, Hanover, New Hampshire. 

James M. Minnich is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army 
and Director of Policy, Liaison, Operations, and Training, Joint 
United States Military Affairs Group — Korea, Seoul, South Korea. 

Robert L. Worden is the former Chief of the Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 



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